O.C.G.A. § 15-11-511 (2019)
Arraignment; admissions at arraignment; right to attorney
(a) At arraignment, the court shall inform a child of:
(1) The contents of the petition alleging delinquency;
(2) The nature of the proceedings;
(3) The possible consequences or dispositions that may apply to such child’s case following adjudication; and
(4) His or her due process rights, including the right to an attorney and to an appointed attorney; the privilege against self-incrimination; that he or she may remain silent and that anything said may be used against him or her; the right to confront anyone who testifies against him or her and to cross-examine any persons who appear to testify against him or her; the right to testify and to compel other witnesses to attend and testify in his or her own behalf; the right to a speedy adjudication hearing; and the right to appeal and be provided with a transcript for such purpose.
(b) The court may accept an admission at arraignment and may proceed immediately to disposition if a child is represented by counsel at arraignment. If a child’s liberty is not in jeopardy, he or she may waive the right to counsel at arraignment, provided that such waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and on the record. A child represented by counsel or whose liberty is not in jeopardy may make a preliminary statement indicating whether he or she plans to admit or deny the allegations of the complaint at the adjudication hearing. The court shall not accept an admission from a child whose liberty is in jeopardy and who is unrepresented by counsel.
(c) The court shall appoint an attorney to represent an alleged delinquent child whose liberty is in jeopardy and who is an indigent person.
History
Code 1981, § 15-11-511, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2014, p. 780, § 1-39/SB 364; Ga. L. 2018, p. 935, § 4/SB 131.
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, added the proviso at the end of the second sentence of subsection (b).
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - Many of the following annotations should be examined in light of the amendment to Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI) which took effect November 1, 1981. In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 24A-1101, 24A-1201, pre-2000 Code Sections 15-11-15 and 15-11-16 and pre-2014 Code Sections 15-11-29 and 15-11-30, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor’s notes at the beginning of the chapter. Arraignment during adjudicatory hearing. - In the absence of a transcript, a juvenile failed to establish that former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-181, 15-11-400, 15-11-421, 15-11-441, and 15-11-582) was violated since a hearing was timely scheduled and held, an arraignment was conducted at the beginning, the juvenile requested legal counsel and was found eligible to receive counsel, and a continuance was granted so counsel could be secured; conducting an arraignment was not inconsistent with an adjudicatory hearing. In re R.D.F., 266 Ga. 294, 466 S.E.2d 572 (1996). Arraignment hearing scheduled within the 60-day time period is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement that an adjudicatory hearing must be set within that period. In re R.O.B., 216 Ga. App. 181, 453 S.E.2d 776 (1995). Delinquency adjudication hearing serves same purpose as arraignment. - Delinquency adjudication hearing merely serves the same purpose in the
civil juvenile court proceeding as an arraignment under the criminal code. M.E.B. v. State, 230 Ga. 154, 195 S.E.2d 891 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101); D.C.E. v. State, 130 Ga. App. 724, 204 S.E.2d 481 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1101). Rule as to confessions of juveniles should be same as that for confessions of adults because law enforcement officers cannot be certain when officers question a juvenile what kind of case may develop, and the statutory safeguards are applicable to both criminal and juvenile cases. Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 240 S.E.2d 824 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402); Jackson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 375, 246 S.E.2d 407 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402). Confession inadmissible if failure to comply with safeguards. - Failure to comply with the statutory safeguards renders a confession of a juvenile inadmissible in evidence. Bussey v. State, 144 Ga. App. 875, 243 S.E.2d 99 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402). Failure to comply with the statutory safeguards renders confession of a juvenile inadmissible even in a criminal case where a juvenile is tried as an adult. Manning v. State, 162 Ga. App. 494, 292 S.E.2d 95 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19). Confession obtained illegally inadmissible in delinquency hearing. - Confession obtained from a juvenile in violation of the statute was inadmissible in a hearing to determine the delinquency of a juvenile. J.J. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 660, 218 S.E.2d 668 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-1402).
Confession admissible after juvenile opted not to have parent present. - Because the undisputed evidence established that a juvenile defendant was informed of the right to have a parent present during an interview with police in which a custodial statement was obtained, but did not invoke that right, there was no error in allowing the juvenile defendant’s statement into evidence. Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 653 S.E.2d 23 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-47). Confession admissible if parent present and rights protected. - Juvenile defendant’s confession was admissible despite the fact that the defendant was not taken before an impartial juvenile intake officer but a member of the county police department since the defendant’s mother was present during the juvenile’s interrogation and it was not alleged that the officer failed to perform any duty imposed upon the officer. Worthy v. State, 253 Ga. 661, 324 S.E.2d 431 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19). Issue of whether officer to whom juvenile was taken and to whom the juvenile made a confession was a ‘‘juvenile court intake officer’’ did not affect the admissibility of the statement since Miranda warnings were given and the juvenile’s mother was present. Houser v. State, 173 Ga. App. 378, 326 S.E.2d 513 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
Language of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-133, 15-11-501, and 15-11-502) requiring the bringing of a child before juvenile authorities was directory and did not serve to render inadmissible a juvenile’s confession if the juvenile’s rights were otherwise protected, such as if the juvenile’s father was present and was continually apprised of the questioning. W.G.C. v. State, 173 Ga. App. 528, 327 S.E.2d 522 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19). Confession admissible despite technical violation. - Police officer’s failure to bring juvenile initially to juvenile court did not render the 14-year old’s confession inadmissible since the confession was obtained only after the juvenile waived the juvenile’s rights knowingly and voluntarily, and with the knowledge and consent of both the juvenile’s mother and legal guardian. In re J.D.G., 207 Ga. App. 698, 429 S.E.2d 118 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19). Since the defendant’s statement was knowingly and intelligently given before officers had an opportunity to take the juvenile anywhere, former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-133, 15-11-501, and 15-11-502) was neither implicated nor violated. McKoon v. State, 266 Ga. 149, 465 S.E.2d 272 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19).
PART 5 INFORMAL ADJUSTMENT