Unconstitutional to convict defendant of unindicted charge.

- When a reasonable probability existed that the jury convicted the defendant of a firearms charge in a manner not charged in the indictment (through burglary, rather than during an aggravated assault), the error violated the defendant's due process rights and was sufficiently egregious to preclude a finding that the error was waived. Levin v. State, 222 Ga. App. 123, 473 S.E.2d 582 (1996).

Section applies to possession of firearm even with a valid license.

- These provisions do not make it a crime to be illegally in possession of a firearm during commission of another crime, but makes it a crime to be in possession of a firearm even with a valid license during commission of a crime. Spence v. State, 233 Ga. 527, 212 S.E.2d 357 (1975).

"Possession" specifically proscribed by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b) is the act of having on or within arm's reach of one's person a knife having a blade of three or more inches in length. White v. State, 203 Ga. App. 889, 418 S.E.2d 149 (1992).

When cocaine and a gun were found in a residence controlled by defendant, the jury could consider evidence of the small size and crowded conditions within the residence and infer that it was inevitable that defendant passed even momentarily within arm's reach of the gun. Gibson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 103, 476 S.E.2d 863 (1996).

Subsection (e) does not demonstrate intent to impose multiple convictions.

- In light of this legislative history, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(e) does not demonstrate a legislative intent to impose multiple convictions for possession of a weapon based on multiple predicate felonies. Instead, it evidences only the legislative intent to provide punishment for both the possession offense and the predicate felony. Thus, subsection (e) would require that the possession offense stand even when the predicate felony merges as a matter of fact into another offense. State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383, 589 S.E.2d 69 (2003).

Meaning of "on his person."

- Evidence that firearms were in the rear of and on the floor of a van near where defendants were seated does not come within the meaning of "on his person," referred to in subsection (a) (now O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)). Beal v. State, 175 Ga. App. 234, 333 S.E.2d 103 (1985) (decided prior to 1987 amendment which inserted "within arm's reach of" in subsection (b)).

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 requires that the weapon be either on or within arm's reach of the person charged with possessing a firearm during the commission of the felony; the legislature did not intend to criminalize the mere possession of a weapon by a person who after putting the weapon away subsequently commits a felony. Carswell v. State, 251 Ga. App. 733, 555 S.E.2d 124 (2001).

Meaning of "within arm's reach."

- The 1987 amendment, adding the phrase "or within arm's reach" in O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), was clearly a substantive change as it altered the evidence required to be found guilty of the offense, and its misapplication to a defendant would be subject to the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. McIntosh v. State, 185 Ga. App. 612, 365 S.E.2d 454 (1988).

Meaning of "theft of a vehicle."

- Statutory phrase, "theft of a vehicle," is very general language and, most reasonably construed, includes the various methods of theft rather than limiting it to theft by taking. Allen v. State, 192 Ga. App. 306, 384 S.E.2d 467 (1989).

Length of blade determination.

- While there was no evidence as to the length of the knife, the trial court was authorized to determine if the blade met the requirements for the defendant's conviction for possession of a knife during the commission of a crime. Petro v. State, 327 Ga. App. 254, 758 S.E.2d 152 (2014).

Active employment of gun.

- Defendant's prior O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(4) conviction for possessing a firearm during a crime was a firearms offense within U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(iii), as it would have been an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and it was wrong to suggest § 924(c) required "active employment" of a gun whereas § 16-11-106(b)(4) did not. United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1092, 130 S. Ct. 1012, 175 L. Ed. 2d 620 (2009).

Sufficiency of indictment.

- Offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime can be committed by possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime against or involving the person of another or by possessing a firearm during the commission of a theft from a building; an indictment was not void merely because the indictment alleged an armed robbery not of a person, but of a building. Dowdell v. State, 278 Ga. App. 142, 628 S.E.2d 226 (2006).

Indictment sufficiently alleged possession of a weapon during commission of certain crimes, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, by alleging that the defendant had a handgun during the commission of the crime of aggravated assault; if the defendant sought to know to which of the two aggravated assault counts was referred to, the defendant's motion was a special demurrer and was untimely under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110. Allen v. State, 300 Ga. 500, 796 S.E.2d 708 (2017).

No speedy trial violation.

- Convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with the intent to rob, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were proper because the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the 20-month delay between the date the indictment was issued to the date of the defendant's actual trial as the delay was due to a higher priority of statutory speedy trial demands, so it was not a deliberate delay on the part of the state, and as the defendant failed to show any prejudice from the delay. Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006).

Severance of trials.

- After the defendants were convicted of possession of a firearm during a crime, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendants' motions to sever the defendants' trials as the defendants failed to make a clear showing of prejudice and a denial of due process protection. Attaway v. State, 259 Ga. App. 822, 578 S.E.2d 529 (2003).

In a prosecution on two counts of attempting to hijack a motor vehicle, four counts of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and criminal trespass, because the offenses committed by a defendant and a codefendant amounted to a series of continuous acts connected together both in time and the area in which committed, and there was no likelihood of confusion, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever the trial from that of the codefendant; furthermore, the mere fact that the codefendants' defenses were antagonistic was insufficient in itself to warrant separate trials. Diaz v. State, 280 Ga. App. 413, 634 S.E.2d 160 (2006).

Defendant's motion to sever the failure to register as a sex offender counts under former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 from the remaining aggravated sodomy and child molestation counts was properly denied as: (1) the defendant was not entitled to severance as a matter of right since the charges involved a series of acts which were connected together; (2) the case was not so complex as to impair the jury's ability to distinguish the evidence and to apply the law intelligently to the counts as joined; and (3) the failure to sever the failure to register as a sex offender counts was proper, even applying an analogy to cases involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, as the failure to report charges were legally material to the crimes against two children because the failure constituted evasive conduct that was circumstantial evidence of guilt and evidence of the conduct underlying the defendant's conviction of a sex offense in North Carolina was admissible as a similar transaction. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

No merger if different victims and different incidents despite same weapon.

- Defendant's two convictions of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 were based on felonies charged in separate indictments that arose out of unrelated incidents and involved different victims. The fact that the same weapon may have been used was irrelevant; consequently, the offenses did not merge. Little v. State, 263 Ga. App. 893, 589 S.E.2d 656 (2003).

Convictions merged since single victim.

- Two convictions for possession of a firearm, one involving an aggravated assault and the other an armed robbery, should have been merged as there was a single victim. Wells v. State, 294 Ga. App. 277, 668 S.E.2d 881 (2008).

Although the defendant was engaged in a continuous crime spree consisting of murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and, as a party to the crime, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, because only one victim was involved in the crime spree, the defendant could only be convicted once under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1) for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Stovall v. State, 287 Ga. 415, 696 S.E.2d 633 (2010).

Multiple convictions.

- When multiple crimes are committed together during the course of one continuous crime spree, a defendant may be convicted once for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as to every individual victim of the crime spree as provided under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), and additionally once for firearm possession for every crime enumerated in paragraphs (b)(2) through (5). State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383, 589 S.E.2d 69 (2003).

Trial court erred by sentencing defendant on both the possession of a knife during the commission of murder and on the possession of a knife during the commission of kidnapping with bodily injury in a case alleging that defendant killed defendant's estranged spouse by stabbing the spouse. Bell v. State, 278 Ga. 69, 597 S.E.2d 350 (2004).

Two of the five convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime must be vacated, because there were two individual victims and the defendant was convicted of burglary, a crime enumerated in O.C.G.A. § 16-11106(b)(2). Accordingly, the statute authorized imposition of sentence on the defendant for three of the guilty verdicts returned on the five counts charging the defendant with being in possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime: the count in which burglary was the underlying felony, one of the counts in which one person was the victim, and one of the counts in which another person was the victim. Grell v. State, 291 Ga. 615, 732 S.E.2d 741 (2012).

Pre- and post-Miranda statements properly admitted.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, despite testimony from the arresting officer that the defendant was complaining of physical problems and under the influence of alcohol, both the pre- and post-Miranda statements made, as well as the numerous voluntary and unsolicited remarks which were not made in response to any form of interrogation, were properly admitted. Dorsey v. State, 285 Ga. App. 510, 646 S.E.2d 713 (2007).

Conviction for possession had to be vacated because conviction for criminal damage was reversed.

- After a juvenile was convicted of first degree criminal damage to property and possession of a firearm during the commission of this crime, and the conviction for first degree criminal damage to property was reversed, the conviction for possession of a weapon during this crime had to be vacated. In the Interest of M.D.L., 271 Ga. App. 738, 610 S.E.2d 687 (2005).

Sentence not excessive.

- Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant because the sentence the court imposed on defendant was ten years in prison and ten years probation for aggravated assault, ten years in prison to run concurrently for aggravated battery, and five years confinement to run consecutively for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as each part of defendant's sentence was well within the statutory limits for the respective crime involved; accordingly, defendant's sentence would not be modified on appeal. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004).

Although the victim was unable to identify defendant in court as the person who robbed the victim at gunpoint, due to defendant's changed appearance, the victim positively identified defendant from a photo lineup both immediately after the robbery and at trial; therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Garcia v. State, 271 Ga. App. 794, 611 S.E.2d 92 (2005).

Evidence of possession sufficient.

- There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the possession of a firearm while committing the felony of cocaine trafficking; an undercover officer testified that the weapon seized by police was the same gun the defendant had brandished after the defendant sold cocaine to the officer at a residence, and the gun and a briefcase of cocaine were found hidden in the same room where the defendant had gone before admitting other officers to the residence no more than an hour later. Daugherty v. State, 283 Ga. App. 664, 642 S.E.2d 345 (2007).

When the defendants, a married couple who were in a car with a third person, were charged with trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of amphetamine, and possession of a firearm during certain crimes, there was sufficient evidence that the defendants had joint constructive possession of a duffel bag in which drugs and a weapon were found. The evidence showed that one spouse exercised control over the car that transported the contraband and that the other spouse tried to retrieve a paper sack inside the duffel bag at the sheriff's office with suspicious and inconsistent explanations. Howard v. State, 291 Ga. App. 289, 661 S.E.2d 644 (2008).

Because testimony about the circumstances of the victim's visit to a home when defendant was shot was relevant and admissible to explain defendant's motive in shooting the victim, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of malice murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Taylor v. State, 287 Ga. 440, 696 S.E.2d 652 (2010).

Sufficient evidence showed the defendant committed possession of a firearm, under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), in the process of hijacking a victim's vehicle and committing an aggravated assault of the victim, because the defendant undisputedly possessed a handgun during the commission of these crimes and fled the scene. Campbell v. State, 314 Ga. App. 299, 724 S.E.2d 24 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, motor-vehicle hijacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-5-44.1(b), and16-11-106(b)(1), because the defendant waited in a getaway vehicle while an accomplice hijacked the victim's vehicle, and possessed the gun that the accomplice used in the crime. Gordon v. State, 316 Ga. App. 42, 728 S.E.2d 720 (2012).

As the first defendant aided and abetted in effecting a plan to steal the victim's car, and as the second defendant took the victim's money, the evidence was sufficient to convict both of the defendants of armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-44.1,16-8-41(a), and16-11-106. Copeny v. State, 316 Ga. App. 347, 729 S.E.2d 487 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and two counts of possession of a firearm because the evidence showed that the defendant was identified by the victim, the defendant was arrested about an hour and a half after the crimes occurred in the Lincoln Town car used during the commission of the crimes, which the defendant admitted belonged to the defendant, and the cell phone that the victim had reported stolen was found in the car in addition to guns matching the victim's description of the weapons used. Hinton v. State, 321 Ga. App. 445, 740 S.E.2d 394 (2013).

Evidence sufficient to support convictions.

- Evidence including DNA evidence, the victim's testimony regarding the nature of the attack and description of the attacker, and the store surveillance video of an individual who wore clothing similar to that worn by the attacker and who appeared to be the same race as the attacker, supported the defendant's convictions for rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, theft by taking, and three counts of possession of a gun during the commission of a crime. Glaze v. State, 317 Ga. App. 679, 732 S.E.2d 771 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony obstruction, possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, and disorderly conduct because the defendant slammed the refrigerator door twice, breaking items stored in the door; the victim called9-1-1 seeking assistance for a domestic dispute in progress; when one of the responding officers told the defendant that the defendant would have to leave the house as the victim did not want the defendant living there, the defendant told the officer that the officer could not make the defendant leave; and, when the officer unsnapped a taser from the taser's holster and approached the defendant, the defendant grabbed a knife with an eight-inch blade and threatened the officers with the knife. Owens v. State, 329 Ga. App. 455, 765 S.E.2d 653 (2014).

Evidence that the defendant entered the victim's bedroom with a knife and that the victim suffered lacerations to the arm and head that required the victim's hospitalization was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. Williams v. State, 345 Ga. App. 692, 814 S.E.2d 818 (2018).

Prior convictions properly admitted for both impeachment and sentencing purposes.

- Trial court properly admitted certified copies of the defendant's two prior convictions of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the court carefully balanced the competing interests; (2) the prior offenses had a substantial probative value which outweighed the offense's prejudicial effect; and (3) nothing prevented the use of a defendant's convictions for both impeachment and sentencing purposes. Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's claim that by adding the word "substantially" to the balancing test, the Georgia legislature meant to incorporate the standard for admissibility embodied in Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Newsome v. State, 289 Ga. App. 590, 657 S.E.2d 540 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1042, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 494 (Ga. 2008).

Cited in Roberts v. State, 228 Ga. 298, 185 S.E.2d 385 (1971); Chumley v. State, 235 Ga. 540, 221 S.E.2d 13 (1975); Brock v. State, 239 Ga. 326, 236 S.E.2d 835 (1977); Dunbar v. State, 163 Ga. App. 243, 292 S.E.2d 897 (1982); Teague v. State, 165 Ga. App. 470, 301 S.E.2d 667 (1983); Miller v. State, 165 Ga. App. 638, 302 S.E.2d 394 (1983); Pittman v. State, 172 Ga. App. 22, 322 S.E.2d 71 (1984); Weaver v. State, 178 Ga. App. 91, 341 S.E.2d 921 (1986); King v. State, 178 Ga. App. 343, 343 S.E.2d 401 (1986); Allen v. State, 180 Ga. App. 701, 350 S.E.2d 478 (1986); Donaldson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 879, 350 S.E.2d 849 (1986); Johnson v. State, 181 Ga. App. 822, 357 S.E.2d 161 (1987); Russell v. State, 183 Ga. App. 209, 358 S.E.2d 631 (1987); McMachren v. State, 187 Ga. App. 793, 371 S.E.2d 445 (1988); Curtis v. State, 190 Ga. App. 173, 378 S.E.2d 516 (1989); In re M.J.H, 193 Ga. App. 621, 388 S.E.2d 738 (1989); Tatum v. State, 195 Ga. App. 349, 393 S.E.2d 494 (1990); Hollingsworth v. State, 195 Ga. App. 502, 394 S.E.2d 131 (1990); Whatley v. State, 196 Ga. App. 73, 395 S.E.2d 582 (1990); Busch v. State, 234 Ga. App. 766, 507 S.E.2d 868 (1998); Daniels v. State, 238 Ga. App. 511, 519 S.E.2d 269 (1999); Green v. State, 249 Ga. App. 546, 547 S.E.2d 569 (2001); Guild v. State, 255 Ga. App. 285, 564 S.E.2d 862 (2002); Darnell v. State, 257 Ga. App. 555, 571 S.E.2d 547 (2002); Clark v. State, 258 Ga. App. 347, 574 S.E.2d 344 (2002); Jackson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003); Fernandez v. State, 263 Ga. App. 750, 589 S.E.2d 309 (2003); Blake v. State, 272 Ga. App. 181, 612 S.E.2d 33 (2005); Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 642 S.E.2d 64 (2007); Fagan v. State, 283 Ga. App. 784, 643 S.E.2d 268 (2007); Jaheni v. State, 285 Ga. App. 266, 645 S.E.2d 735 (2007); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007); Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007); Withers v. State, 282 Ga. 656, 653 S.E.2d 40 (2007); Smith v. State, 289 Ga. App. 742, 658 S.E.2d 156 (2008); Lemming v. State, 292 Ga. App. 138, 663 S.E.2d 375 (2008); Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 32, 666 S.E.2d 452 (2008); Williams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 193, 666 S.E.2d 703 (2008); Abdullah v. State, 284 Ga. 399, 667 S.E.2d 584 (2008); Burton v. State, 293 Ga. App. 822, 668 S.E.2d 306 (2008); Gordon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 908, 670 S.E.2d 533 (2008); Fisher v. State, 295 Ga. App. 501, 672 S.E.2d 476 (2009); Mathis v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (May 20, 2009); Bonker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 867, 681 S.E.2d 256 (2009); Verdree v. State, 299 Ga. App. 673, 683 S.E.2d 632 (2009); Crawford v. State, 301 Ga. App. 633, 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009); Souder v. State, 301 Ga. App. 348, 687 S.E.2d 594 (2009); Gutierrez v. State, 285 Ga. 878, 684 S.E.2d 652 (2009); Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 166, 692 S.E.2d 766 (2010); Anthony v. State, 315 Ga. App. 701, 727 S.E.2d 528 (2012); Russell v. State, 319 Ga. App. 472, 735 S.E.2d 797 (2012); Hyman v. State, 320 Ga. App. 106, 739 S.E.2d 395 (2013); Vann v. State, 322 Ga. App. 148, 742 S.E.2d 767 (2013); Martin v. State, 324 Ga. App. 252, 749 S.E.2d 815 (2013); Banks v. State, 329 Ga. App. 174, 764 S.E.2d 187 (2014); Young v. State, 328 Ga. App. 857, 763 S.E.2d 137 (2014); Young v. State, 329 Ga. App. 70, 763 S.E.2d 735 (2014); Williams v. State, 330 Ga. App. 606, 768 S.E.2d 788 (2015); Howard v. State, 334 Ga. App. 7, 778 S.E.2d 19 (2015); Wiggins v. State, 334 Ga. App. 54, 778 S.E.2d 60 (2015); McGil v. State, 339 Ga. App. 130, 793 S.E.2d 442 (2016); Patterson v. State, Ga. App. , 817 S.E.2d 557 (2018).

Probable cause for arrest.

- Police search of a defendant's bag and person, which produced handguns, cocaine, cash, and other drugs was lawful because the search was made pursuant to the police officers' lawful warrantless arrest of the defendant when the defendant arrived at a motel room exactly answering a detailed description provided by a confidential informant, who stated that the defendant would be carrying a shoulder bag containing drugs and a loaded handgun. Green v. State, 302 Ga. App. 388, 691 S.E.2d 283 (2010).

Marijuana is not a controlled substance under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 for the purpose of a prosecution for possession of a firearm during the commission of a "crime involving the possession, manufacture, delivery, distribution, dispensing, administering, selling, or possession with intent to distribute any controlled substance." Asberry v. State, 220 Ga. App. 40, 467 S.E.2d 225 (1996).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the credibility of the victim's identification of the defendant was a matter to be determined by the jury; and, even though the defendant was covered from head to toe in clothing with only the defendant's eyes visible, the victim was able to identify the defendant, who spoke during the robbery, as the defendant was a regular customer and the victim watched the defendant grow up. Wiggins v. State, 334 Ga. App. 54, 778 S.E.2d 60 (2015).

Predicate felony offense involving marijuana.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's jury instruction on possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime that referenced possession of marijuana as a potential predicate felony offense because there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's felony conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which could serve as the predicate felony offense for the defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; and there was not a reasonable probability that, if the trial court had omitted the reference to simple possession of marijuana from the instruction, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to the defendant. McNorrill v. State, 338 Ga. App. 466, 789 S.E.2d 823 (2016).

Evidence of knife blade length sufficient.

- Victim's testimony that the blade of a knife used by the defendant to stab the victim was longer and wider than the blade of a facsimile knife blade, which itself exceeded three inches in length, along with presentation of the facsimile to the jury, although it was not admitted into evidence, was sufficient to support conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Fuller v. State, 235 Ga. App. 436, 509 S.E.2d 79 (1998).

While no witness testified to the length of the blade, proof of the length of the knife blade was sufficient because the knife was admitted into evidence and the jury was charged in two separate instances, that defendant could not be convicted unless the jury found that the knife had a "blade three inches or more in length." Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 157, 543 S.E.2d 439 (2000).

There was sufficient evidence about a knife blade's length to support a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b): (1) there was witness testimony that the defendant carried a five-inch knife with a long blade; (2) it could be inferred from another witness's testimony about the witness's own knife that the defendant's knife was longer than three inches; and (3) there was expert and eyewitness testimony that the victim's wound was at least two and a half inches deep and was gaping in nature. Stanley v. State, 283 Ga. 36, 656 S.E.2d 806 (2008).

Despite the defendant's claim that no trial witness testified that the knife used had a blade of any certain length, because the knife itself was introduced into evidence, the jury was authorized to use the jury's senses to determine if the knife blade was of the requisite length. Mitchell v. State, 283 Ga. 341, 659 S.E.2d 356 (2008).

Stabbing of victim with knife.

- Conviction of possession of a knife during the commission of a felony was supported by sufficient evidence that, after the victim confronted the defendant about a comment made to the victim's wife, the defendant stabbed the victim to death; witnesses saw the defendant fighting with the victim, saw the defendant fold up a knife after the victim fell, and the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim. Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 297, 627 S.E.2d 32 (2006).

Firearm capable of being fired not required.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 does not require that the state prove that the firearm "within arm's reach" must be capable of being fired. Smith v. State, 214 Ga. App. 631, 448 S.E.2d 906 (1994); Herndon v. State, 229 Ga. App. 457, 494 S.E.2d 262 (1997), overruled on other grounds, Howard v. State, 233 Ga. App. 724, 505 S.E.2d 768 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 512 S.E.2d 640 (1999), overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. State, 277 Ga. 195, 586 S.E.2d 669 (2003).

Evidence of bullets properly admitted.

- With regard to a defendant's convictions on two counts of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, failure to obey a traffic control device, fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer, reckless driving, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions as the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence certain bullets found in the defendant's possession at the time of the defendant's arrest based on the state allegedly not providing a proper chain of custody; the bullets, unlike fungible articles, were distinct and recognizable physical objects that were identifiable by observation, eliminating the necessity of a chain-of-custody showing. Green v. State, 287 Ga. App. 248, 651 S.E.2d 174 (2007).

Possession of pellet gun not prohibited.

- Legislature did not intend to have O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 prohibit the possession of a "Marksman repeater pellet pistol" (otherwise described as a ".177 caliber Marksman Repeater B-B pistol ...") as this weapon is not mentioned in the statute and there is no proof that the weapon is capable of discharging a projectile via force of gunpowder. Fields v. State, 216 Ga. App. 184, 453 S.E.2d 794 (1995).

Possession of black powder guns sufficient.

- Evidence that the defendant was found in possession of two black powder guns was sufficient to support the convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and by a convicted felon. Hall v. State, 322 Ga. App. 313, 744 S.E.2d 833 (2013).

Use of firearm is aggravating circumstance.

- The use of a firearm to commit a murder for pecuniary gain is an aggravating circumstance which warrants separate consideration. Simpkins v. State, 268 Ga. 219, 486 S.E.2d 833 (1997).

Felony requirement.

- Conviction of possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony must stand or fall in conjunction with the underlying felony upon which the charge is predicated. Strong v. State, 223 Ga. App. 434, 477 S.E.2d 866 (1996) (overruling Cleveland v. State, 212 Ga. App. 361, 441 S.E.2d 820 (1994)).

Evidence showed that defendant's commission of crimes against the victim while holding a gun on the victim were felonies; the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime against the person of another, such as the rape and armed robbery of the victim, or during an unlawful entry into a building, such as defendant's act in kicking in the door of the victim's residence to unlawfully gain entry, were felonies because the rape, armed robbery, and burglary were each felonies punishable by imprisonment for more than 12 months. Moore v. State, 261 Ga. App. 752, 583 S.E.2d 588 (2003).

Offense of criminal damage to property in the first degree, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-7-22(a)(1), involves a person, and thus may serve as a predicate for a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). Craft v. State, 309 Ga. App. 698, 710 S.E.2d 891 (2011).

No merger of related offenses.

- As separate facts were used to prove each crime, the trial court did not err by refusing to merge the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

No merger into conviction for felony murder.

- A conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106) does not merge with a conviction for felony murder. Hawkins v. State, 262 Ga. 193, 415 S.E.2d 636 (1992).

Possession of firearm conviction did not merge with attempted armed robbery.

- Possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony did not merge with an attempted armed robbery conviction because the crime of possession of a firearm is considered to be a separate offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b) and (e). McKinney v. State, 274 Ga. App. 32, 619 S.E.2d 299 (2005).

Merger for continuous crime spree.

- When a defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and two counts of kidnapping, but each crime occurred within the course of one continuous crime spree against two victims, two of the defendant's four firearm possession offenses were to be merged. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).

Robbers in a home robbery and murder had one gun, and there were two victims of the crimes, the decedent and the decedent's grandmother; therefore, under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), the defendant should have been convicted of only two counts of possession of a firearm while committing a crime, one for each of the victims, and the third count should have been merged. Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 682, 755 S.E.2d 703 (2014).

Double punishment included.

- Counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and armed robbery did not merge. Baker v. State, 214 Ga. App. 640, 448 S.E.2d 745 (1994).

When the defendant's codefendant was within arm's length of two pistols during the commission of the crime, the defendant is guilty of the offense as a party to the crime. Victrum v. State, 203 Ga. App. 377, 416 S.E.2d 740, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 740 (1992).

Armed robbery by use of a firearm. standing alone and without further proof also demonstrates a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Coleman v. State, 163 Ga. App. 173, 293 S.E.2d 395 (1982).

Defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld based on the defendant's accomplice's testimony that the defendant pointed a shotgun at a resident during a robbery and evidence that a shotgun and items taken during the robbery were found in the defendant's bedroom. This evidence also supported the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Mays v. State, 306 Ga. App. 507, 703 S.E.2d 21 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41,16-5-21,16-5-41, and16-11-106, based on testimony from witnesses inside the bank, defendant's clothing, a text message between the defendant and defendant's accomplice, and the defendant's accomplice's testimony, which was corroborated as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8. Odle v. State, 331 Ga. App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256 (2015).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony based on the witnesses' positive identification of the defendant's distinctive speech; the ski mask and salad bag found in the defendant's vehicle from the restaurant robbed; and the sudden, labored, and sweaty appearance of the defendant immediately after the robbery and high speed chase. Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 765 S.E.2d 599 (2014).

Use of shotgun.

- Because the defendant kicked open the door of a home while shouting that the defendant was a "federal agent," fired a shotgun through a door, shooting off a victim's thumb, inserted the barrel of the shotgun in the same man's mouth, and demanded money, which the victims turned over, two codefendants identified the defendant as the user of the shotgun, and the defendant's DNA was found on a ski mask recovered from the getaway car and the defendant's fingerprints were found on the car, evidence supported convictions for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated battery, and impersonating an officer. Garrison v. State, 276 Ga. App. 243, 622 S.E.2d 910 (2005).

Armed while in possession of controlled substance.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 includes those persons who are armed while in possession of controlled substances. Singleton v. State, 194 Ga. App. 5, 389 S.E.2d 496 (1990).

Possession of firearm.

- Various counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime are not lesser included offenses of, and do not merge with, the offenses of burglary, kidnapping, armed robbery, or aggravated assault. Golden v. State, 233 Ga. App. 703, 505 S.E.2d 242 (1998); Pace v. State, 239 Ga. App. 506, 521 S.E.2d 444 (1999); Banks v. State, 244 Ga. App. 191, 535 S.E.2d 22 (2000).

Evidence that the defendant or an accomplice either carried or was within arm's length of a weapon during the commission of a crime authorized a finding of guilty for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b). Hill v. State, 276 Ga. 220, 576 S.E.2d 886 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1) because after defendant hurled a glass bowl at a motel manager, causing injuries, the defendant pointed a gun at the manager, a desk clerk, and a guest, and threatened to kill all of them. Watson v. State, 301 Ga. App. 824, 689 S.E.2d 104 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence to find that a defendant was within arms' reach of three firearms during the commission of felonies such that the defendant was in possession of the firearms within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b). Davenport v. State, 308 Ga. App. 140, 706 S.E.2d 757 (2011).

Armed while trafficking in drugs.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 includes those persons who are armed while trafficking in cocaine even though their involvement with others is limited to the commission of the felony of trafficking. Belcher v. State, 161 Ga. App. 442, 288 S.E.2d 299 (1982).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that defendant was in joint constructive possession of the cocaine, marijuana, and pistol found inside the driver's car because the drugs were in plain view inside a car that smelled of raw marijuana, defendant was nervous about the impending search and gave evasive answers to the officers, defendant was in possession of an unusually large amount of cash and was in a position to see the pistol when the driver took the driver's proof of insurance from the glove box and, given the trafficking amount of cocaine found, the jury was authorized to infer that the driver and defendant possessed a loaded handgun to protect their illegal drug trade; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Lopez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 720, 578 S.E.2d 304 (2003).

Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of trafficking in cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), trafficking in methamphetamine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(a)(5), because the state failed to prove any connection between the defendant and the contraband other than spatial proximity; no drugs were found on the defendant's person, and the defendant was not seen in proximity to the well-hidden drugs. Cobarrubias-Garcia v. State, 316 Ga. App. 787, 730 S.E.2d 455 (2012).

Misdemeanor offense of theft by taking did not support conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Harrison v. State, 213 Ga. App. 366, 444 S.E.2d 613 (1994).

Real issue was who were parties and not possession issue.

- Assuming that it was obviously erroneous for the trial court to fail to remind the jury about the "within arm's reach" element when the court described the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, that failure did not constitute plain error as it had no effect on the outcome of the defendant's trial as that element was properly included in the indictment; the jury was instructed that the state had to prove every material allegation in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt; whoever used a gun to shoot the victim actually had a firearm within arm's reach at the time of the shooting; and the only issue at trial was whether one of the defendants was the shooter and the others were parties to the crime. Anderson v. State, 299 Ga. 193, 787 S.E.2d 202 (2016).

Lack of proper jury instruction resulted in improper conviction.

- When an original indictment charged defendant with murder and with possessing a firearm during the commission of that murder, but the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, defendant was improperly convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as there was no instruction identifying voluntary manslaughter as a felony. Prather v. State, 259 Ga. App. 441, 576 S.E.2d 904 (2003).

Jury was authorized to find defendant guilty as a principal since the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant was concerned, either as an aider or an abettor, in the commission of the crime of the codefendant's actual possession of a firearm during the commission of an armed robbery. Wilcox v. State, 177 Ga. App. 596, 340 S.E.2d 243 (1986).

Defendant may properly be convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime on the ground that defendant was a party or aider or abettor to the offense. Perkins v. State, 194 Ga. App. 189, 390 S.E.2d 273 (1990); Victrum v. State, 203 Ga. App. 377, 416 S.E.2d 740, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 740 (1992).

When a party has committed armed robbery and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, an accomplice who is concerned in the commission of those crimes is likewise guilty of both offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the accomplice did not have actual possession of the firearm. Howze v. State, 201 Ga. App. 96, 410 S.E.2d 323 (1991).

Although the defendant was found not guilty of murder, where the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant was concerned in the commission of the crime of the codefendant's actual possession of the firearm during commission of the murder, the jury was authorized to find appellant guilty as a principal under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Brooks v. State, 208 Ga. App. 869, 432 S.E.2d 612 (1993).

In a case involving a defendant's cohort shooting a man at a gas station, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony since the evidence showed that the defendant willingly drove the cohort to the gas station, waited in a stolen truck while armed with an assault rifle as the cohort pulled the victim out of the victim's car and then shot the victim, and then rescued the injured cohort and fled the police; the defendant's criminal intent was properly inferred from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. McClendon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 238, 651 S.E.2d 165 (2007).

Two intruders entered a house through a window, threatened the occupants with handguns, and stole items from the house. As circumstantial evidence established that the defendant drove the get-away vehicle, the defendant was properly convicted as a party to the possession of a firearm during the commission of a burglary. Olds v. State, 293 Ga. App. 884, 668 S.E.2d 485 (2008).

Jury's verdict of acquittal on an aggravated assault charge and guilty on the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime was not necessarily inconsistent because the jury was free to reject the defendant's testimony that the defendant did not know the defendant's passenger had a gun and accept the defendant's testimony that the defendant was unaware of the intended robbery. Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. App. 443, 721 S.E.2d 643 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0800, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 484 (Ga. 2012).

Evidence of previous incident admissible.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), evidence that defendant stabbed another in an incident eight years previously was admissible to show whether defendant intended to threaten or harm the victim when defendant brandished a knife, and the evidence was not more prejudicial than probative, given the prior incident's relevance to a necessary element of the current crimes. Ledford v. State, 275 Ga. App. 107, 620 S.E.2d 187 (2005).

Evidence of subsequent arrest admitted.

- Evidence of the defendant's subsequent arrest on other charges while driving the same vehicle defendant had been driving on the night of the robbery and of the seizure from that vehicle of a pistol which was similar in appearance to the one alleged to have been used by defendant during the robbery was clearly relevant in that it connected defendant both to the vehicle and to the weapon. When evidence is otherwise relevant and material to the issues being tried, the evidence is not rendered inadmissible merely because the evidence may incidentally place the defendant's character in issue. Worthy v. State, 180 Ga. App. 506, 349 S.E.2d 529 (1986).

Acquittal of possession of a knife during the commission of a crime did not compel acquittal on the armed robbery charge because the jury was free to compromise on the verdict. Oliver v. State, 232 Ga. App. 816, 503 S.E.2d 28 (1998).

Conviction for possession of a firearm reversed where predicate felony conviction reversed.

- Because the possession of a firearm count of the indictment named only hijacking as the predicate felony, the state's failure to prove hijacking under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b) resulted in reversal of the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b). Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 24, 709 S.E.2d 44 (2011).

Convictions as aider and abettor proper despite lack of personal involvement.

- Defendant's contention that the crimes against a stabbing victim were solely committed by a codefendant was rejected, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as ample evidence existed to conclude that defendant either committed the crimes or was a party to the crimes, including that both defendant and the codefendant drove to the stabbing victim's home, that victim was stabbed to death, and a wallet and checkbook were stolen so that both defendants could have money to buy more drugs. Odom v. State, 279 Ga. 599, 619 S.E.2d 636 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery, aggravated assault against the manager and cashier, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery because the law allowed the defendant to be charged with and convicted of the same offenses as the codefendant since the evidence showed that the defendant drove the codefendant to the fast food restaurant that was robbed and waited as the getaway driver. Broyard v. State, 325 Ga. App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014).

Possession due to dangerous nature of business argument rejected.

- Defendant objected to defendant's sentences for the firearm violations because defendant had not used a handgun "in furtherance" of the drug sales, but only had it available because of the dangerous nature of defendant's pawn shop business. However, there is no exception under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 for someone who may otherwise be in lawful possession of a firearm. Shirley v. State, 260 Ga. App. 309, 581 S.E.2d 320 (2003).

Identification of defendant sufficient.

- Victim's testimony at trial sufficiently identified the defendant as the assailant who fired shots at the victim, and the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, since the victim knew the defendant from a previous encounter and although it was dark, the victim was able to see the defendant's face during the incident because the area was illuminated by a streetlight. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 153, 630 S.E.2d 661 (2006).

There existed sufficient evidence to uphold the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the evidence established that the victim, an airline pilot, was robbed at gunpoint at approximately 4 A.M., with the perpetrator taking the victim's luggage and fleeing in a Ford Ranger pickup truck and that, within two to three minutes after calling9-1-1, an officer stopped the speeding Ford Ranger and apprehended the defendant, who was wearing clothing as described by the victim and the luggage was found in the back of the pickup truck. Feaster v. State, 283 Ga. App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (2007).

As a cashier was only two feet from two robbers during the crime, which lasted about a minute, and the cashier looked at their faces, the fact that the cashier identified the defendant twice from photo arrays, and once at trial as the robber who had held the gun was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Shabazz v. State, 293 Ga. App. 560, 667 S.E.2d 414 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime as the testimony of the defendant's accomplice that the defendant raped the victim at gunpoint was corroborated by the victim's out-of-court and in-court identification of the defendant as the rapist and the fact that the defendant's DNA was found on the victim's clothing. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of armed robbery of a restaurant, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because sufficient evidence corroborated an accomplice's testimony that the defendant participated in the robbery; the driver corroborated that the driver picked the defendant up and dropped the defendant and the accomplice off at the defendant's residence near the restaurant about two-and-one-half hours before the robbery, the driver overheard the defendant speaking to the accomplice about committing a robbery, and two more witnesses confirmed that the two were together that evening. Jones v. State, 302 Ga. App. 147, 690 S.E.2d 460 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by sufficient evidence. While the defendant contended that the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial, an eyewitness's identification of the defendant as the second gunman during the photographic lineup constituted direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).

Defendant's new trial motion based on insufficient evidence lacked merit as the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and a weapons possession charge under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-11-106(b)(1); issues of credibility regarding the witnesses' identification of the defendant as the shooter were within the jury's province pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620). Williams v. State, 317 Ga. App. 248, 730 S.E.2d 726 (2012).

Variance in indictment and proof at trial was not fatal.

- Defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal because a variance in the indictment and the proof at trial was not fatal since: (1) the names subject to the alleged variance in fact referred to the same person; and (2) the testimony of a codefendant, when combined with the defendant's post-arrest admissions, sufficiently proved the defendant's commission of an armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party to the crimes. Brown v. State, 289 Ga. App. 421, 657 S.E.2d 322 (2008).

Parents had authority to consent to searches resulting in conviction for possession of weapon.

- With regard to defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a gun during a crime, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motions to suppress the evidence found in the defendant's bedroom and in the vehicle that the defendant operated as the defendant's parents had authority to give consent to the police to search the defendant's unlocked bedroom since the defendant did not pay rent and was only home for the summer from college. As to the vehicle, the parents asked the police to locate their vehicle and the police properly seized the vehicle, impounded the vehicle, and obtained a search warrant; thus, the rifle used during the robberies that was found in the trunk of the vehicle was not the product of an illegal search. Warner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 56, 681 S.E.2d 624 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1952, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 35 (Ga. 2010).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction.

- See Worthy v. State, 180 Ga. App. 506, 349 S.E.2d 529 (1986); McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988); Olsen v. State, 191 Ga. App. 763, 382 S.E.2d 715 (1989); Glover v. State, 192 Ga. App. 798, 386 S.E.2d 699 (1989); Nelson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 898, 399 S.E.2d 748 (1990); Stoudemire v. State, 261 Ga. 49, 401 S.E.2d 482 (1991); Merritt v. State, 201 Ga. App. 150, 410 S.E.2d 349 (1991); Byrd v. State, 261 Ga. 808, 411 S.E.2d 709 (1992); Adside v. State, 216 Ga. App. 129, 453 S.E.2d 139 (1995); Tanksley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 505, 487 S.E.2d 98 (1997); Combs v. State, 268 Ga. 398, 500 S.E.2d 328 (1997); Copeland v. State, 228 Ga. App. 734, 492 S.E.2d 723 (1997); Abrams v. State, 229 Ga. App. 152, 493 S.E.2d 561 (1997); Collins v. State, 229 Ga. App. 210, 493 S.E.2d 592 (1997); Young v. State, 229 Ga. App. 497, 494 S.E.2d 226 (1997); Louis v. State, 230 Ga. App. 897, 497 S.E.2d 824 (1998); Cheney v. State, 233 Ga. App. 66, 503 S.E.2d 327 (1998); Bartlett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 49, 537 S.E.2d 362 (2000); Solomon v. State, 244 Ga. App. 289, 534 S.E.2d 915 (2000); Green v. State, 244 Ga. App. 697, 536 S.E.2d 565 (2000); Respres v. State, 244 Ga. App. 689, 536 S.E.2d 586 (2000); Hemidi v. State, 245 Ga. App. 417, 537 S.E.2d 804 (2000); Williams v. State, 247 Ga. App. 99, 543 S.E.2d 408 (2000); LaCount v. State, 265 Ga. App. 352, 593 S.E.2d 885 (2004); Crawford v. State, 265 Ga. App. 393, 593 S.E.2d 915 (2004); Davis v. State, 267 Ga. App. 668, 600 S.E.2d 742 (2004); McGordon v. State, 298 Ga. App. 161, 679 S.E.2d 743 (2009).

Gun under floor mat.

- Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant possessed a firearm since a revolver was found under the floor mat in the car where the defendant was sitting. Carter v. State, 248 Ga. App. 821, 547 S.E.2d 613 (2001).

Evidence that the defendant, a convicted felon, accompanied the victim to a store with the codefendant; shot the victim in the head with a handgun that the defendant had in defendant's possession; thereby, causing a wound in which the victim lost one eye; and along with the codefendant took all the victim's money was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Drummer v. State, 264 Ga. App. 617, 591 S.E.2d 481 (2003).

Victim's testimony that the defendant kicked in the door of the victim's residence, entered without permission, pointed a shotgun at the victim, and threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not give the defendant money was sufficient in itself to support the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant, who was brandishing a handgun, and the defendant's sibling entered a victim's home demanding money, and that the victim, after being shot, gave cash to the sibling, was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008).

Sufficient evidence was presented to convict a defendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony based on evidence that the defendant and a codefendant approached the victims' rental car and brandished guns; while pistol whipping the victims and robbing them of their property, the defendant's gun went off and fatally wounded the first victim; and a gun matching the caliber of bullet recovered from the first victim during the autopsy was found during the execution of a search warrant at a hotel where the defendant had visited a guest on three occasions. Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 674 S.E.2d 275 (2009).

Gun found in vehicle.

- Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(5); a handgun was found on the driver's side floorboard of the vehicle the defendant had just been driving. Flores v. State, 308 Ga. App. 368, 707 S.E.2d 578 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1072, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 527 (Ga. 2011).

Possession of knife.

- When the defendant's girlfriend arranged to meet with the victim at the victim's home, then the victim was running late and left a message for the girlfriend on the voicemail account the girlfriend shared with the defendant, then when the victim arrived at the girlfriend's mobile home, the defendant emerged from a closet armed with a knife, the girlfriend fled, leaving the defendant alone with the victim, who was subsequently found dead in the mobile home, and when the defendant's shirt was covered with the victim's blood, the defendant still had the knife in the defendant's possession when the police arrived, and the defendant admitted to the police that the defendant killed the victim, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. Watson v. State, 289 Ga. 39, 709 S.E.2d 2 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for kidnapping, hijacking a motor vehicle, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a weapon on school property were authorized because, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the victim's testimony alone established the essential elements of the offenses. Lester v. State, 309 Ga. App. 1, 710 S.E.2d 161 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the defendant and a codefendant began shooting across a street at someone, who returned fire, and the victim was an innocent 16-year-old bystander who was killed during the shootout. Norris v. State, 289 Ga. 154, 709 S.E.2d 792 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1) since, while possessing a firearm, the defendant knowingly and without authority interfered with property in a manner endangering human life by shooting at an inhabited apartment building. Craft v. State, 309 Ga. App. 698, 710 S.E.2d 891 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for malice murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because evidence was presented that the defendant and a codefendant entered a restaurant to rob the restaurant and shot two employees of the restaurant. In a statement to the police, the defendant admitted that the defendant entered the restaurant with a handgun to rob the restaurant, but the defendant claimed that the defendant heard gunshots and left the restaurant, while the codefendant gave a similar statement to the police. Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 711 S.E.2d 655 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a bus hijacking, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), and possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault, § 16-11-106(b)(1), because the defendant committed the substantive offenses of bus hijacking and aggravated assault with a handgun; therefore, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a firearm during the commission of the defendant's felony convictions. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645 (2011).

Evidence of the circumstances was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator and the defendant's guilt of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant matched the description of the perpetrator given by both a convenience store clerk and another store employee; when the defendant was apprehended, an officer recovered next to the defendant's person the contraband and instrumentalities used in the commission of the robbery. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

Issue of which defendant held weapon immaterial.

- Because the victim's testimony was legally sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to establish that the defendants assaulted the victim with intent to rob, the issue of which defendant actually held the weapon was immaterial; therefore, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), the evidence was sufficient to find both the defendants guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rob and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1) and16-11-106. Clark v. State, 311 Ga. App. 58, 714 S.E.2d 736 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of distribution of marijuana, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(4); the testimony of a party to the transaction was corroborated by the observations of the detectives, the marijuana taken into evidence, the written statements of the parties regarding the defendant's involvement, and the defendant's own statement to a detective. Arnett v. State, 311 Ga. App. 811, 717 S.E.2d 312 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), because: (1) the perpetrator of a crime entered just before closing time a fast-food restaurant with a gun and directed the employees into a room, a cooler, and a freezer; (2) the perpetrator took money from the restaurant, shot one of the employees, and left the scene in the employee's car; (3) one of the employees telephoned relatives with a cell phone and told them what was happening; (4) the relatives called the police, came to the restaurant, and saw the perpetrator drive away; (5) money, a gun, and discarded clothing was recovered from the car or the area where the perpetrator fled on foot; (6) a police officer, who was pursuing the perpetrator, was wounded in an altercation with the perpetrator when the officer's gun discharged; (7) when the defendant later surrendered to the police, DNA from the officer's blood was found on the defendant's chest; and (8) the employees, the relatives, and the officer identified the defendant, a former employee of the restaurant who was fired days before the crime, as the perpetrator. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011).

Because the defendant pointed a gun at the victim while defendant's accomplices robbed the victim, and thereafter shot at the victim's trailer, hitting a child and killing the victim's sister-in-law, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, cruelty to children, possession of a gun during the commission of a crime, and possession of a revolver by a person under the age of 18. Lytle v. State, 290 Ga. 177, 718 S.E.2d 296 (2011).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), carrying a concealed weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(b), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b), because during an argument with the victims, the defendant shot the victims and threatened to kill the victims. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Because the driver of a delivery truck was forced at gunpoint by the defendant's accomplice to drive a substantial distance to a secluded dirt road, and because the defendant followed the truck in another vehicle, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-5-40(a), the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of kidnapping and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Sipplen v. State, 312 Ga. App. 342, 718 S.E.2d 571 (2011).

Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, hijacking a motor vehicle, and armed robbery because there was ample evidence, based upon the defendant's actions and presence, companionship, conduct, and demeanor before, during, and after the commission of the crime, to conclude that the defendant was more than "merely present" during the commission of the crimes and was a party to the crimes pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; while in a car with the victim and companions, the front-seat passenger pulled out a gun and shot the victim, and during the incident, the defendant did not say or do anything to intervene. Cook v. State, 314 Ga. App. 289, 723 S.E.2d 709 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and participation in criminal street gang activity. The defendant and fellow gang members walked toward a group of teenagers in a front yard while yelling and making gang signals; the defendant fired once into the crowd, killing the victim, who was unarmed; and the defendant, who fled the scene, was the only person who fired a weapon and was identified to police as the shooter by witnesses who knew the defendant by name. Jackson v. State, 291 Ga. 25, 727 S.E.2d 120 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime against another person, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because a witness and a friend testified that they saw the defendant shoot the victim. Redinburg v. State, 315 Ga. App. 413, 727 S.E.2d 201 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony since the evidence showed that the defendant either directly committed or was a party to the armed robberies of both victims at the rest area. A custodian present at the scene identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators who had participated in the crimes, and the defendant's flight from the rest area, flight from the officers, act of driving the getaway car, and possession of one victim's driver's license and clothing items linked the defendant to the crimes. Bryson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 512, 729 S.E.2d 631 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, despite the defendant's claim that the defendant took nothing from the victim and did not point a weapon at the victim, because: (1) it was undisputed that the crime occurred; and, (2) whether the defendant or the defendant's accomplice pointed the gun and took the property, the defendant could be convicted through the defendant's role as a party, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21. Bush v. State, 317 Ga. App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b), armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), based on the defendant's involvement as a party to the crimes, or as a coconspirator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b). The evidence presented was that: (1) when two people walked past the victim's parked vehicle, one of the people held a knife to the victim's stomach and ordered the victim to give the person the victim's wallet and keys; (2) the victim complied; (3) the person with the knife got into the driver's seat and the other person, who had stood nearby during the incident, got into the passenger seat; (3) the victim identified the defendant as the person who got into the passenger seat; (4) the people drove away, but were apprehended; (5) the victim's wallet was recovered, on the ground to the rear of the vehicle, on the passenger side; and (6) the victim, who was without money, wanted to leave the area because there was a warrant for the defendant's arrest. Harrelson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 710, 719 S.E.2d 569 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because a house-sitter returned to a residence to discover an intruder inside; the intruder flashed a gun and told the house-sitter that the intruder would shoot the house-sitter; the house-sitter identified the defendant, whom the house-sitter had known for over 20 years, as the intruder; and a back window of the home had been shattered. Davis v. State, 325 Ga. App. 572, 754 S.E.2d 151 (2014).

Evidence from a victim that the defendant robbed the victim of cash, cell phones, and a GPS unit at knifepoint was sufficient pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8 to establish that the defendant committed armed robbery with a knife in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-11-106(b)(1), although the defendant testified that the victim gave the defendant these items for drugs. Sanders v. State, 324 Ga. App. 4, 749 S.E.2d 14 (2013).

Victim's testimony that the victim and the defendant were fighting, the defendant left the room and later returned with a gun that the defendant held to the victim's side, and the victim heard a gunshot and turned to face the defendant, who told the victim that the defendant had been meaning to do that and ran, supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Jones v. State, 326 Ga. App. 151, 756 S.E.2d 267 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because, although the two passengers of the car committed the actual armed robbery, there was evidence that the defendant, the driver of the car, knew that the two passengers were armed and that the defendant "kind of sort of" knew what they were going to do, which supported a finding that the defendant participated in the robbery as the getaway driver. Smith v. State, 325 Ga. App. 745, 754 S.E.2d 788 (2014).

Evidence that the defendant invited the victim to physically fight the defendant after a verbal dispute arose over a dice bet, and that the victim was unarmed while the defendant had concealed a firearm in a pocket, was sufficient to defeat the defendant's justification defense and support the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Robinson v. State, 326 Ga. App. 59, 755 S.E.2d 865 (2014).

Evidence, including the defendant's statement to police that the defendant had shot the victim, had meant to shoot the victim, and would have shot the victim again, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Taylor v. State, 327 Ga. App. 288, 758 S.E.2d 629 (2014).

Victim's testimony that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim, gave the gun to an accomplice, and took the victim's possessions, and that the victim was 100% sure the defendant was one of the robbers was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Hogan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 596, 768 S.E.2d 779 (2015).

Testimony of the victim identifying the defendant as the person who robbed the victim and identifying the handgun, and the testimony of the security guard and the bystander which aligned with the victim's account of the robbery was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Murphy v. State, 333 Ga. App. 722, 776 S.E.2d 657 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime because, although the defendant testified that the victim attacked the defendant without provocation and that the defendant stabbed the victim merely to end a physical assault, the evidence of the disparity between the ages and physical sizes of the defendant and the victim, the defendant's lack of injuries from the encounter, the fact that the victim was unarmed and was seated or lying down when attacked, and the obvious savagery of the stabbing as shown by the victim's multiple and severe wounds, permitted not only findings of implied malice, but belied the claim that the killing was as an act of self-defense. Mosley v. State, 300 Ga. 521, 796 S.E.2d 684 (2017).

Evidence that the defendant shot at a man who laughed when the defendant yelled anyone selling drugs in the neighborhood would have to give the defendant a commission, and then began shooting and hit two others was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated battery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 883, 802 S.E.2d 713 (2017).

Testimony that the defendant was in possession of a firearm when the defendant entered the victim's apartment and that the defendant remained in possession of that firearm throughout the incident was sufficient to establish that the defendant was in possession of the handgun while each of the predicate offenses were committed. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 122, 809 S.E.2d 76 (2017).

Weapon within reach.

- Defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana and a firearm were affirmed because, although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to show that the weapon was within arm's reach of the defendant during the commission of a crime. Under the circumstances, the trial court could find that, given the close proximity, the defendant passed within reach of the handgun while handling the marijuana. Carter v. State, 319 Ga. App. 609, 737 S.E.2d 714 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant kicked in a door and entered an occupied apartment with others, the defendant provided the guns used, the defendant placed a gun to one victim's head, a victim's wallet and key were taken, and marijuana, digital scales, and a device used to grind marijuana were found at the defendant's house was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for four counts of aggravated assault, three counts of false imprisonment, and one count each of armed robbery, burglary, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 150, 739 S.E.2d 434 (2013).

Defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the state was unable to present evidence to disprove the earlier incident between the defendant and the victim or disprove that the defendant acted in self-defense when the defendant shot the victim failed because testimony from eyewitnesses to the shooting and forensic evidence belied the claim that the defendant acted in self-defense. Among other things, the defendant testified the defendant shot the victim because the victim pulled out a knife, claiming the defendant saw the blade; however, two closed pocket knives were found. Hoffler v. State, 292 Ga. 537, 739 S.E.2d 362 (2013).

Testimony from two witnesses that the witnesses recognized the defendant from the defendant's distinctive walk and that one also recognized the defendant from the defendant's posture, shoulders, complexion, and nose; the fact that a dark fiber like one that could have been from the shooter's wig was found in the defendant's truck; and the defendant's admission to an inmate that the defendant shot the victim supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 739 S.E.2d 313 (2013).

Victim's testimony that the defendant approached the victim, thrust a gun about six inches from the victim's face, took the victim's cell phone and keys, and told the victim to "get out of here", while waving a gun, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, and theft by taking. Wright v. State, 319 Ga. App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (2013).

Testimony of an accomplice that the defendant was with the others during the robbery of the first victim and ran off and ate pizza with everyone afterward and the testimony of the second victim identifying the defendant at trial as the man the second victim spoke to about selling a Blackberry while an accomplice put a gun to the second victim's neck, searched the second victim's pockets, and took the second victim's Blackberry and wallet, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Fuller v. State, 320 Ga. App. 620, 740 S.E.2d 346 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as the state presented the requisite corroboration to the codefendant's testimony; the getaway driver's testimony about the height of the defendant and the codefendant was consistent with the gas station clerk's comparison of their heights, and there was evidence that the defendant, who had no job, was spending significant amounts of money on cars and expensive clothing. Harrell v. State, 322 Ga. App. 115, 744 S.E.2d 105 (2013).

Testimony of an inmate, who had been housed with the defendant when the defendant was in prison on an unrelated charge, that the defendant admitted to the inmate that the defendant killed the victim because the victim had beaten the defendant up and taken the defendant's wallet, and that the defendant and another individual participated in the shooting, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime based on the theory of party to a crime. Jackson v. State, 322 Ga. App. 196, 744 S.E.2d 380 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant was found in the laundry room of the home that was the subject of the home burglary; police found masks, gloves, money, a gun, and some of the victim's jewelry in or near the laundry room; and the defendant's DNA was found on one of the masks recovered supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Rudison v. State, 322 Ga. App. 248, 744 S.E.2d 444 (2013).

Evidence including testimony as to the gang's criminal activities, corroborating the defendant's participation in the armed robberies; the defendant's admission to participating in two murders; and a gun the defendant used in the attempted armed robbery of the first victim was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for criminal street gang activity, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Morris v. State, 322 Ga. App. 682, 746 S.E.2d 162 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of terroristic threats, six counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because a witness testified that a vehicle fitting the description of the defendant's car was driven by the shooter who shot at the house of the complainant's mother where the complainant was staying; multiple gunshot holes were found in the side of the home; the complainant testified that, earlier that morning, the defendant had threatened to come to the house and kill the complainant; and the complainant received text messages from the defendant later that morning apologizing for what had happened. Brown v. State, 325 Ga. App. 237, 750 S.E.2d 453 (2013).

As there was evidence that the officers identified themselves as police, the defendant admitted to shooting a rifle in the direction of the officers, and there was undisputed evidence that one officer was hit, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict as to four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Stover v. State, 324 Ga. App. 467, 751 S.E.2d 115 (2013).

Evidence only sufficient to support one count since there was only one victim.

- Defendant could not be convicted of two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony since there was only one victim. Barnes v. State, 319 Ga. App. 509, 736 S.E.2d 471 (2013).

Evidence only sufficient to support two of three counts.

- Defendant could only be convicted of two of the three possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime counts because there were only two victims; thus, the defendant's third conviction involving one of the same victims had to be vacated. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. 607, 740 S.E.2d 100 (2013).

Murder, other offenses, and possession shown.

- Evidence sufficient to support convictions of murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Baty v. State, 257 Ga. 371, 359 S.E.2d 655 (1987).

Rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Walden v. State, 264 Ga. 92, 441 S.E.2d 247 (1994).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the shooting deaths of two victims. Burtts v. State, 269 Ga. 402, 499 S.E.2d 326 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime against a person because: (1) the codefendant jumped out of the car defendant was driving and told the victim and two other men to empty their pockets as the codefendant was robbing them and then codefendant began shooting; and (2) the victim was shot in the head and later died. Thomas v. State, 275 Ga. 882, 572 S.E.2d 537 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime since the record revealed that defendant was riding in a car, made a gang sign to some people on the street, and in response to their obscene gesture, defendant took out a gun and fired at the people, killing two people and wounding one; defendant's contention that defendant was acting to protect oneself and others in the car, that defendant fired into the air, and that defendant did not mean to hurt anyone was found to lack merit. Ingram v. State, 276 Ga. 223, 576 S.E.2d 855 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in relation to the shooting death of a man whom defendant allegedly suspected of killing defendant's father after: (1) three witnesses identified defendant as the shooter; (2) another witness, who had heard defendant say that defendant was going to kill the victim to avenge the death of defendant's father, placed defendant at the crime scene with a gun; (3) two other witnesses averred that defendant told the witnesses that defendant had killed the victim; and (4) defendant was arrested two weeks after the murder while carrying the same kind of weapon which was used to kill the victim. Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 263, 577 S.E.2d 548 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of malice murder, felony murder, burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony since the defendant: (1) planned the defendant's crimes, and armed himself with a gun and handcuffs; (2) broke into his in-laws' house after severing their phone line; (3) shot and killed his father-in-law and wounded his mother-in-law while they lay in bed; (4) handcuffed his bleeding mother-in-law to her nine-year-old son and left them tethered to a bed rail in a room with her dead husband and defendant's two-year-old son; and (5) abducted his estranged wife and her 17-year-old sister to a mobile home where he made them take showers while he watched, and then raped them both. Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 902, 124 S. Ct. 251, 157 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2003).

Defendant was found guilty of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession by a first offender probationer when defendant fired a gun at a woman, the bullet grazed the woman, went through a wall, and killed another person. George v. State, 276 Ga. 564, 580 S.E.2d 238 (2003).

Evidence that defendant and another person hijacked the victim, put the victim in the trunk of the car, the other person later shot the victim, both subsequently dumped the body and returned the car, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of malice murder and possession of a weapon during a felony. Washington v. State, 276 Ga. 655, 581 S.E.2d 518 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as the evidence showed that defendant held a pistol on the victim and shot the victim, as part of a sequence of events that involved defendant and two other individuals robbing the victim, shooting the victim and transporting the victim while alive to another location, and then murdering the victim at the second location by shooting the victim to death. Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003).

When defendant shot a victim in the head after an argument and also shot at another victim but failed to hit the second victim, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Hightower v. State, 278 Ga. 39, 597 S.E.2d 362 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions on two counts of felony murder, predicated on the underlying felony of aggravated assault, one count of armed robbery, and two counts of possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime as the evidence showed that defendant brandished a handgun and forced the two victims to give defendant money, and that defendant then fatally shot the victims after one victim argued with other people defendant was with regarding the purity of a drug purchase the one victim had just made. Harden v. State, 278 Ga. 40, 597 S.E.2d 380 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find defendant guilty of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault because: (1) one eye-witness testified to seeing the victim speaking to an occupant of a car, then hearing a shot, seeing the victim try to peddle the bicycle away, and then falling to the ground; (2) another witness testified that on the night of the shooting, defendant told the witness that defendant shot a person on a bicycle and that the witness helped defendant dispose of a gun in a lake; (3) a third witness testified that defendant told the third witness that defendant had shot and killed a man on a bicycle; and (4) defendant made a videotaped statement during which defendant admitted to shooting the victim. Roberts v. State, 278 Ga. 541, 604 S.E.2d 500 (2004).

In addition to the second codefendant's testimony, the state showed that, shortly after the murder, defendant was in possession of the victim's cab, that the victim's blood was found in the vehicle and on defendant, and that defendant made incriminating admissions to others; thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt of malice murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Wicks v. State, 278 Ga. 550, 604 S.E.2d 768 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because, inter alia: (1) the shooting victim was the boyfriend of defendant's former girlfriend; (2) the victim had beaten defendant earlier; (3) witnesses saw defendant at the scene of the killing, in daylight from about two feet away, saw defendant draw a gun, and then heard shots; (4) a witness saw one perpetrator run from the scene; (5) the witnesses gave the police a description of the shooter, and within hours, independently identified defendant as the perpetrator from a photo lineup; and (6) a few days later, defendant admitted to a former girlfriend that defendant was the shooter. Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 608 S.E.2d 634 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because defendant admitted that defendant took money from the victim, that defendant arranged for a meeting with the victim, and that defendant did not return the money before defendant shot the victim. Flanders v. State, 279 Ga. 35, 609 S.E.2d 346 (2005).

Evidence that defendant's vehicle was seen at the victim's residence around the time the victim was murdered, the defendant's subsequent arrest in a hotel room paid for with the victim's credit card, and the presence of the victim's blood on defendant's boots when defendant was arrested was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Moore v. State, 279 Ga. 45, 609 S.E.2d 340 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for malice murder, cruelty to a child, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because defendant pointed a loaded revolver at the victim and pulled the gun's trigger twice, while driving, fatally wounding the victim, the victim's two-year-old child was also in the car, and defendant did not call9-1-1 from defendant's cell phone and drove past a hospital. Reed v. State, 279 Ga. 81, 610 S.E.2d 35 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony because an eyewitness identified defendant as one of two armed men seen getting out of a van and two other eyewitnesses testified that the witnesses saw defendant fire shots at the victim; the medical evidence showed that the victim died from gunshot wounds to the head and neck. Cox v. State, 279 Ga. 223, 610 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's guilt of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because, although the codefendant fired the shot that killed the victim, eyewitness testimony showed that defendant was a party to the crimes. Cox v. State, 279 Ga. 223, 610 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and concealing the death of another; the victim was shot in the back of the head with defendant's gun in the woods behind defendant's family's property, the victim's body was found in a landfill two days later, defendant's friend confided to a friend that defendant shot the victim and then called the friend to help dispose of the body, the friend confessed to a role in the concealment and secretly videotaped a conversation with defendant about the shooting and, on the tape, defendant bragged about killing the victim and demonstrated how defendant did the killing. Bragg v. State, 279 Ga. 156, 611 S.E.2d 17 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as the circumstantial evidence showed defendant shot the victim three times, that defendant did so in retaliation for the victim allegedly arranging to rob the codefendants of certain property the defendants planned to sell to buy drugs, that defendant did not report the shooting but, instead, fled the scene, and stated that "he just shot that damn boy," but did not claim to have shot the victim accidentally. Glenn v. State, 279 Ga. 277, 612 S.E.2d 478 (2005).

Evidence that defendant took money from the one victim, beat the victim while doing so, that defendant was armed at the time, that defendant had the victim removed from defendant's house by the codefendants so that the one victim could be murdered elsewhere, and that the second victim was removed from the defendant's house by another codefendant, all after the one victim and the second victim were suspected of plotting to rob defendant, who was selling illegal drugs from defendant's home, was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for malice murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and being in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Mason v. State, 279 Ga. 636, 619 S.E.2d 621 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in a case because defendant, who had engaged in previous altercations with the victim, got out of defendant's car after seeing the victim on the street, ran up to the victim, shot the victim, returned to defendant's car, ran back to the victim and shot the victim again, and then got in defendant's car and drove off, as all of the elements of those offenses were established. Hayes v. State, 279 Ga. 642, 619 S.E.2d 628 (2005).

Expert testimony that a shell casing at the crime scene came from a pistol found in defendant's apartment, along with two witnesses' identifications of defendant, and expert testimony that a bullet extracted from a victim's head possibly came from defendant's pistol, although it was too damaged to say with complete certainty, sufficiently supported defendant's convictions for murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Escobar v. State, 279 Ga. 727, 620 S.E.2d 812 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of malice murder, burglary, and possession of a gun during the commission of a crime because a witness testified that the witness, defendant, and defendant's brother drove around looking for a home to burglarize and that while in a house, the two victims came home unexpectedly and were killed; also, DNA found at the crime scene matched the defendant. Denny v. State, 280 Ga. 81, 623 S.E.2d 483 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and a statutory violation, all in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1,16-8-41,16-5-21,16-7-1, and16-11-106, respectively, since the defendant and the codefendant went to a club with the intention of robbing someone, met the victim and drove the victim back to the victim's home, beat and fatally stabbed the victim, and upon leaving the victim's apartment, took some of the victim's belongings. Willoughby v. State, 280 Ga. 176, 626 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony since, upon pulling into an apartment complex to turn around and ask for directions, the victims were approached by defendant and another man, then defendant pulled out a gun and told the victims to "give it up," following which, when one of the victims hesitated, defendant shot the victim, defendant then stole that victim's money and jewelry, and then, later, the gunshot victim died, and the second victim described defendant, who was wearing a specific jersey at the time of the crimes, and then two witnesses who knew defendant testified that defendant robbed and shot the victim while wearing that jersey. Davis v. State, 280 Ga. 442, 629 S.E.2d 238 (2006).

Defendant's convictions of murder, felony murder, armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of an armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a burglary were supported by sufficient evidence that, the day before the three murder victims were found shot in the head, the defendant borrowed the defendant's sister's car to visit one of the victims, who owed the defendant money, the defendant admitted going to the victims' home twice on the day of the murders, but stated that the victims were not home during either visit, neighbors heard gunshots around the home at approximately 7:30 P.M., near the last time that the two younger victims were heard from, and again at 10:00 P.M. that evening, when the older victim returned home for the day, a number of items stolen from the victims' home at the time of the murders were subsequently found in a dumpster next to a storage locker the defendant shared with a friend, the items were contained in plastic bags which had the defendant's fingerprints on them, and the plastic bags came from a roll of trash bags found in the trunk of the car which the defendant borrowed on the day of the murders. Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683, 631 S.E.2d 671 (2006).

Convictions of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by sufficient evidence, including the proper introduction of the pretrial statement of a witness who identified the defendant as the shooter in the murder, and the pretrial statement of a second witness who claimed that the defendant had admitted that the defendant had killed a man five hours after the fatal shooting and that the witness had frequently seen the defendant carrying the sort of pistol that fired the fatal shots. Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 632 S.E.2d 152 (2006).

Convictions of felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were supported by sufficient evidence showing that, during an argument involving the defendant and the two victims, the defendant told one of the victims to go get the victim's guns, adding that the defendant had guns, the victim went to the victim's vehicle and retrieved two handguns, approached with arms crossed and a gun in each hand, and the defendant took a gun out of the waistband of the defendant's pants and started shooting, wounding one victim and killing the other victim. McKee v. State, 280 Ga. 755, 632 S.E.2d 636 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, as the defendant was angered by the victim's presence in the residence, the defendant assaulted the victim with a baseball bat and threatened to kill the victim if the victim did not leave the residence, and when the victim returned to the residence, the defendant fatally shot the victim in the stomach. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was supported by the evidence as: (1) the defendant told the defendant's girlfriend that the defendant knew who had taken the defendant's drugs from a motel room and that the defendant was going to get them; (2) the defendant and an accomplice forced a woman with something "glossy" on the woman's forehead; (3) the defendant told the driver to stop at a secluded area so that the defendant could put the woman "somewhere safe"; (4) the defendant threw a gun from a bridge on the return; (5) the defendant instructed the driver to clean blood from the car's backseat; and (6) the defendant told the defendant's girlfriend that the defendant had killed the person who had the defendant's drugs and told a cell mate that the defendant had shot a person. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 2d 50 (2007).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of two counts of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; two witnesses testified that the defendant had told the witnesses that the defendant shot the victim, and one of the witnesses testified that the defendant stated that the shooting occurred during a robbery, the defendant discarded a gun that was later found to be the murder weapon while fleeing police on another crime, and the defendant admitted to police that the murder weapon was the defendant's, that the defendant stole $100 from the victims, and that the defendant shot the murder victim. Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for malice murder, felony murder while in commission of an aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant came to a tenant's apartment and told the victim that the defendant just shot someone in the backyard; (2) the tenant heard the victim calling the tenant's name; (3) another witness heard a series of gunshots and then someone being beaten, was familiar with the victim and recognized the victim's voice as the victim hollered, "You stomping me. I've been shot. You already done shot me," and saw the defendant emerge from behind the residence with a gun in the defendant's hand; (4) the defendant held the gun to the head of the witness, but then instructed the witness to leave the area; and (5) the victim's death was caused by two fatal gunshot wounds to the neck and chest and there was blunt force trauma to the head. Compton v. State, 281 Ga. 45, 635 S.E.2d 766 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of malice murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106; the defendant was arrested in the white van seen at the scene of the crime, a person resembling the defendant was seen at the scene, the defendant's brother was tied by DNA evidence to the offense, and the defendant and the defendant's brother were known to commit burglaries together. Denny v. State, 281 Ga. 114, 636 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant told the victim that the defendant was going to shoot the victim and then the defendant shot the victim in the stomach, argued with the victim some more, and shot the victim again; (2) the victim never admitted cheating on the defendant; (3) after the second shot, the defendant and a friend took the victim to a hospital in a car; (4) while en route, the defendant persisted in the defendant's efforts to get the victim to admit to cheating on the defendant; and (5) the defendant wiped down the revolver and threw the revolver out of the car. Durham v. State, 281 Ga. 208, 636 S.E.2d 513 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant repeatedly followed the victim in and out of a restaurant, and eventually chased the victim from the restaurant, firing at the victim at least nine times; (2) after the shooting, the defendant jumped into a silver truck and sped away; (3) the victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds; and (4) two witnesses identified the defendant from photographic lineups. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006).

Eyewitness's identification of the defendant and the statement made to police by the mother of the defendant's children in which the mother stated that the defendant admitted to shooting someone provided sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of malice murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106; the weight accorded to the identification and the statement to police was a matter for the jury. Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and of possession of a knife in the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106; the defendant called9-1-1 to report the defendant's killing of the victim, who had earlier broken up with the defendant, and the victim was found with fatal stab wounds and a five-inch knife blade embedded in the victim's neck. Perez v. State, 281 Ga. 175, 637 S.E.2d 30 (2006).

Defendant's convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by the evidence, which included use of the murder weapon during a later robbery by the defendant's accomplices, a video that provided a corroborating account of the shooting, and the defendant's spontaneous inculpatory statements while being transported from Maryland to Georgia. Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 825, 642 S.E.2d 82 (2007).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) believing that the victim was involved in the murder of the defendant's brother five months before the incident, the defendant told a first witness that the defendant intended to kill the victim and offered to pay the first witness for information as to the victim's whereabouts; (2) a second witness saw the defendant and two other men approach the victim, call out the victim's name, and open fire on the victim as the victim ran away; (3) the victim died from gunshot wounds; (4) the second witness had met the defendant and, after the shooting, the second victim noticed the defendant's gold teeth, and identified the defendant by the defendant's street name from a photographic lineup and in court; and (5) the defendant threatened to kill the second witness if the second witness testified against the defendant. Woodruff v. State, 281 Ga. 235, 637 S.E.2d 391 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony as: (1) during a van ride, the defendant fought with an assault victim, striking the assault victim in the head with a gun, and was told to stop hitting the assault victim; (2) a gunshot was heard and the passengers saw a murder victim lying dead and the defendant holding the gun; (3) the gun was inside the murder victim's mouth when the gun was fired; (4) the assault victim and another passenger fled; and (5) the defendant and an accomplice dumped the body in an industrial area. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. 229, 637 S.E.2d 393 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for malice murder, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant had threatened to kill the victim, who was seeking a divorce from the defendant; (2) the defendant shot the victim eight times with an AK-47 assault rifle, killing the victim; (3) in woods located approximately 10 miles from the crime scene, investigators found the defendant's car, a bag of the defendant's personal items, some of which had the defendant's name written on the items, and the defendant's AK-47 rifle and ammunition; and (4) the defendant admitted to firing defendant's AK-47 many times at the victim's home at what the defendant described as an unknown assailant who shot at the defendant first. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006).

Evidence sufficient to support convictions of malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony based on the defendant's telephone call to a friend admitting to the murder; and expert medical testimony which explained how the killing was committed and how the defendant "worked up the courage" to inflict the deep cut that stretched across the victim's throat, severing the victim's left carotid artery and right internal jugular vein, causing the victim to bleed to death; further, the defendant had sufficient notice of the specific deadly weapon allegedly used for purposes of the felony murder charge by the language in count three. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 47, 644 S.E.2d 853 (2007).

Because sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant was provoked by an attack on a sibling, and that the defendant had a history of abusive relationships with several others, the voluntary manslaughter of the victim was supported by the evidence; moreover, evidence of the victim's stabbing and death also supported the jury's verdict with respect to the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, felony murder, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony charges. Breland v. State, 285 Ga. App. 251, 648 S.E.2d 389 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support the three defendants' convictions of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony since: the victims were shot from a gold SUV and the first defendant owned a gold SUV; the first defendant, who had been robbed the day before, stated that the first defendant "wanted to straighten about the money"; the third defendant met the first two defendants at a hotel and transferred weapons into the gold SUV; the first defendant pointed to a person outside the hotel and said "Let him have it"; and the third defendant later wondered if one of the victims was dead. Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 875, 644 S.E.2d 116 (2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony since the defendant had gone to the victim's laundromat and waited until the victim opened a change machine, pointed a gun at the victim's head and ordered the victim to put the money in a bag, told the victim, "Hell, yeah, I'll kill you," and shot the victim multiple times; eyewitnesses, including two who knew the defendant, had identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. 760, 642 S.E.2d 817 (2007).

Because no reversible error resulted from excepting a prosecution witness from sequestration, the admission of certain recorded out-of-court statements by three witnesses and one of the codefendants, and the jury charge on impeachment, the defendant's felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony convictions were upheld on appeal; hence, the trial court properly denied the defendant a new trial. Warner v. State, 281 Ga. 763, 642 S.E.2d 821 (2007).

Based on the evidence explaining the circumstances and events leading up to the victim's death, including testimony from the medical examiner as to the cause of death, the weapon found, and the defendant's own statements, the appeals court concluded that overwhelming evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Sturgis v. State, 282 Ga. 88, 646 S.E.2d 233 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the jury was entitled to disbelieve family members who testified that the defendant was out of state when the crimes occurred; the defendant pointed a handgun at the two victims and told the victims to give the defendant the keys to the van in which the victims were loading scooters, shot one victim in the chest, and ran away, after which the defendant's companions drove the van after the defendant. Edwards v. State, 282 Ga. 259, 646 S.E.2d 663 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; a witness who sold drugs for the defendant had gotten into a dispute with a third person over drugs before the shooting, the defendant upon seeing the victim asked the witness if the victim was the third person in question and then shot the victim, and witnesses placed the defendant at the scene of the crime and testified that the witnesses saw the defendant carrying a gun. Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 235, 647 S.E.2d 48 (2007).

Even if the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; the evidence showed that the defendant had drove three times into a crowd of people playing basketball, left after an altercation, retrieved a handgun, then returned, hid in some bushes, and fired into the crowd, striking the victim. Spiller v. State, 282 Ga. 351, 647 S.E.2d 64 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079, 128 S. Ct. 812, 169 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant and the victim lived in the same rooming house where the defendant often intimidated the victim and demanded money from the victim, on the night of the crime the defendant sent the victim to buy crack cocaine and became angry when the victim returned empty-handed, the defendant argued with the victim and shot the victim in the eye, and at the hospital the victim repeatedly declined to say who shot the victim, except to say that a person with a first name other than the defendant's shot the victim accidentally. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 306, 647 S.E.2d 576 (2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime in relation to incidents in 2001, after an assailant approached the victims with a gun and pistol-whipped one of the victims, and in 2002, after an assailant shot one of the victims after the other victim reached for the assailant's gun; two of the three victims of the 2001 incident identified the defendant as the assailant, the third victim who was also a victim in 2002 could not identify the defendant at trial but had picked the defendant's photograph out of a lineup after the 2002 incident and had testified that the same person was involved in both incidents, and there was evidence of a similar incident in 2003. Hall v. State, 282 Ga. 294, 647 S.E.2d 585 (2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the two surviving victims testified that the defendant began shooting at the victims after arriving at an apartment, and the testimony of the victims, the location of shell casings, and the evidence showing that the deceased victim was shot from a distance of over three feet, significantly refuted the defendant's claim of self-defense. Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494, 651 S.E.2d 702 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of malice murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, third-degree arson, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime when the evidence showed that the defendant made the defendant's accomplice shoot a convenience store clerk after the defendant forced the clerk at gunpoint into a wooded area, took money from a cash register in the store, and started a fire in the store. The accomplice's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the defendant's admission that the defendant owned the shotgun that was used in the shooting, the defendant's admission that the defendant gave the shotgun to the accomplice, the testimony of a third person that the accomplice gave the third person the shotgun after the robbery, and the fact that shotgun shells found in the defendant's home matched shells taken from the clerk's body. Judkins v. State, 282 Ga. 580, 652 S.E.2d 537 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, burglary, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Two off-duty police officers who worked as security guards for the apartment building where the victim was shot heard a "pop" and saw two people running from the apartment where the victim was shot; the victim's friend testified that the defendant and the codefendant had been at the apartment in the days before the murder and had asked about a gun the victim had; and a neighbor testified that around the time of the shooting, the defendant and the codefendant followed the victim to the apartment, then pushed open the door without knocking, and that the defendant had a weapon. Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 703, 653 S.E.2d 468 (2007).

Defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal because sufficient testimonial, identification, and physical evidence was presented to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime so that the jury could reject the defendant's self-defense claim. Rivers v. State, 283 Ga. 1, 655 S.E.2d 594 (2008).

Sufficient evidence existed to support a defendant's convictions of malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b): there was (1) eyewitness testimony that the defendant stabbed the victim, who was involved in a dispute with a relative of the defendant, in the chest with a knife; (2) evidence supporting a finding that the knife was three inches or longer; (3) the defendant's admission to "sticking" the victim; and (4) testimony that the defendant had twice pulled a knife on the victim before. Stanley v. State, 283 Ga. 36, 656 S.E.2d 806 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to find a defendant guilty of malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime: the defendant, who had shot the defendant's estranged spouse, (1) confessed both to the victim's sibling and to police; (2) was seen driving away from the scene shortly after the shooting; and (3) presented conflicting evidence as to an insanity defense. Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 47, 656 S.E.2d 838 (2008).

Evidence supported a defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Witnesses saw the defendant walk with the victim from a store to the victim's car and later run from the scene following the sounds of a gunshot and a car crash, and the defendant admitted pulling a gun on the victim and said that the gun had gone off during a struggle, after which the victim tried to drive away. Petty v. State, 283 Ga. 268, 658 S.E.2d 599 (2008).

Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The victim had been struck twice in the head with a pistol, strangled, and shot twice in the head; the victim's wallet and keys were missing; and the defendant, who told police where the wallet could be found, admitted shooting the victim and claimed that the defendant had done so after the victim tried to hug and kiss the defendant and things got "ugly." Brown v. State, 283 Ga. 327, 658 S.E.2d 740 (2008).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The four victims were found dead in two hotel rooms from gunshot wounds to the back of their heads; identification documents belonging to the four victims were found in the defendant's car; there was expert testimony that the defendant's gun had been used to kill the victims; the defendant's baseball cap contained one victim's deoxyribonucleic acid; there was evidence that the defendant and two friends used three victims' tickets to attend a football game after the victims were murdered; the defendant was identified as being in an elevator with one victim; the defendant was seen leaving the hotel with one victim's cooler; and a duffle bag belonging to one victim was in the defendant's car when the defendant was arrested on weapons charges. Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 169, 172 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2008).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions of felony murder during commission of aggravated assault and of possessing a firearm while committing the murder; after defendant argued with the victim and hit the victim while they were riding in a car, defendant and the victim got out of the car where defendant shot at the victim multiple times, defendant fled the scene but later surrendered to authorities and stated that defendant had murdered the victim, and at trial defendant claimed that the gun accidentally discharged when defendant was trying to return the gun to the victim. Lashley v. State, 283 Ga. 465, 660 S.E.2d 370 (2008).

Testimony from two eyewitnesses that the defendant fatally shot the victim with an assault rifle and aimed the rifle at one of the witnesses, and evidence that the defendant then fled and tried to elude authorities, was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 667 S.E.2d 43 (2008).

Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, concealing a death, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A codefendant testified that the defendant, who was jealous of one victim, shot the victims in the defendant's home, then put the bodies in the second victim's car, drove the car away, poured gasoline on the car, and set the car on fire; an officer who had known the defendant for years testified that the defendant called the officer twice about surrendering to authorities; police found blood, human tissue, shotgun pellets, part of a shotgun, and ammunition in the defendant's home, a trail of blood leading away from the house, and a shotgun shell casing and a gas can in the defendant's truck; and a cellmate testified that the defendant told the cellmate that the defendant shot two people, that the defendant inquired whether fingerprints could be retrieved from a burned vehicle, and that the defendant said that the defendant had soaked up blood on the defendant's carpet with cat litter. Hendrix v. State, 284 Ga. 420, 667 S.E.2d 597 (2008).

Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, possessing a firearm during the commission of that murder, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. A drug dealer told police that the drug dealer saw the defendant shoot the victim, although the drug dealer said at trial that the drug dealer did not see the shooting; the drug dealer's spouse testified as to a statement by the drug dealer that was inconsistent with the drug dealer's trial testimony; and another prosecution witness testified that before the shooting, the defendant said that the defendant was "going to get" the victim and that afterward, the defendant said, "I told you I was going to do" the victim. Broner v. State, 284 Ga. 402, 667 S.E.2d 613 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of malice murder and of the possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Witnesses testified that after getting into a confrontation with a second person at a nightclub, the defendant threatened to kill the second person, that the defendant retrieved a gun and waited outside the club for the second person, and that after being wrestled to the ground, the defendant fired shots, one of which fatally wounded a bystander. Savior v. State, 284 Ga. 488, 668 S.E.2d 695 (2008).

Following evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's conviction for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime: (1) a person fitting the defendant's description was seen talking to a person in a car at the victim's home; (2) a neighbor found the victim sitting behind the wheel of the car with gunshot wounds to the head; (3) the victim told several witnesses that the defendant was the shooter and described the vehicle the defendant had been driving; and (4) paint found on the bumper of the defendant's vehicle was consistent with the paint on the victim's car. Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 540, 668 S.E.2d 711 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder, felony murder, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime when the defendant stabbed the victim, the defendant's spouse, in the chest with a butcher knife after the victim accused the defendant of having an affair. Although the defendant claimed at the scene that the defendant did not mean for the knife to go so far into the victim's body and that the stabbing had occurred by accident, the defendant later admitted at trial that the defendant tried to force the victim back with the knife when the defendant felt the knife penetrate the victim's body. Hudson v. State, 284 Ga. 595, 669 S.E.2d 94 (2008).

Evidence supported the convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. The victim's grandchild saw the defendant stab the victim after an argument, then went to a relative for help; the defendant then attacked the relative and fled, throwing the knife the defendant used to stab the victim in the bushes; when the defendant was found by police shortly thereafter, the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim; and a medical examiner testified that the bulk of the victim's stabs came from behind and that the cut on the defendant's hand was an offensive wound likely sustained as the defendant was stabbing the victim with enough force to break one of the victim's ribs. Butler v. State, 285 Ga. 518, 678 S.E.2d 92 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under circumstances in which the victim's father received a call originating from the victim's cell phone, and, when that number was called back, all that could be heard were noises, including gasping, gurgling, and children screaming during the second call, before the line was disconnected; officers later found the victim lying on the kitchen floor with a cell phone in the victim's hand, dead from a single gunshot wound to the head, and a handgun retrieved on the premises was later determined to have fired the bullet that killed the victim. The defendant testified that the defendant and the victim were arguing inside the home, that the argument became physical, that the defendant took the children and a gun out to the defendant's truck, that the defendant returned to the house, and that the defendant did not know what happened after that. Paslay v. State, 285 Ga. 616, 680 S.E.2d 853 (2009).

Because defendant admitted to being in the back seat of the victims' car and that defendant sold the victims' drugs, and because bullets recovered from the bodies matched the pistol and ammunition found in a box in defendant's house, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Barnes v. State, 287 Ga. 423, 696 S.E.2d 629 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession of a knife during the commission of a crime because, after the entry of a family violence protective order, the defendant purchased a knife with a large blade, followed the victim, who was the defendant's estranged spouse, and attempted to talk with the victim, appeared at a grocery store where the victim was, yelled at the victim, and stabbed and slashed the victim multiple times, resulting in the victim's death. Weaver v. State, 288 Ga. 540, 705 S.E.2d 627 (2011).

Conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime was affirmed because evidence was presented that: (1) the defendant, the codefendant, and an accomplice went to a drug dealer's apartment to steal money; (2) the accomplice entered the apartment to buy marijuana; (3) the defendant and the codefendant then entered the apartment; (4) when the drug dealer resisted, the defendant shot and killed the drug dealer; (5) the accomplice, in exchange for a plea deal, assisted the police in recording incriminating telephone conversations with the codefendant; and (6) the gun that was used in the shooting was found in the codefendant's apartment. Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 705 S.E.2d 649 (2011).

Trial evidence authorized the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of drug felony offenses as the defendant had immediate access to a handgun when the defendant and a codefendant stood at the open trunk of a vehicle for approximately two or three minutes, depositing drugs in the defendant's bag, where the handgun was also located; the jury could conclude that the defendant had been within arm's reach of the handgun when the drugs and the handgun were placed together. Jackson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 272, 724 S.E.2d 9 (2012).

Robbery, other offenses, and possession shown.

- Testimony by the victim, in which the victim positively identified defendant as the man who entered the victim's home, and committed the crimes of robbery by intimidation, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated battery and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, charged in the indictment and eyewitness testimony that defendant entered the victim's premises minutes before the attack of the victim was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of committing the crimes charged in the indictment. Mobley v. State, 211 Ga. App. 709, 441 S.E.2d 73 (1994).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for robbery by intimidation, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as: (1) the defendant demanded that the victim give the defendant the victim's purse and then threatened the victim with a gun and told the victim that the defendant would use the gun; (2) feeling that the victim's life was in danger, the victim ran; (3) the defendant chased the victim and snatched the victim's purse; (4) two witnesses chased the defendant to an abandoned house, where the victim's purse was later found; and (5) a witness obtained the tag number of the defendant's vehicle and police traced the vehicle to the defendant's mother; even assuming that the pre-trial identification procedures were unduly suggestive, the in-court identifications by a witness and the victim were admissible as the identifications were based on independent recollections. Boatwright v. State, 281 Ga. App. 560, 636 S.E.2d 719 (2006).

Armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime convictions were upheld on appeal based on sufficient evidence supporting the defendant's guilt, specifically, a security surveillance videotape, eyewitness testimony, and the defendant's voluntary admission to police. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. App. 587, 636 S.E.2d 748 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1) because even though the defendant was found near a car similar to that involved in the robbery, with a shotgun similar to that used in the attack, and the defendant admitted being present at the scene of the robbery, the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Law v. State, 308 Ga. App. 76, 706 S.E.2d 604 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), because the victim testified about the assault and identified the defendant as the person who committed the assault; the competent testimony of even a single witness can be enough to sustain a conviction. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 198, 723 S.E.2d 520 (2012).

Armed robbery, other offenses, and possession shown.

- In light of the overwhelming evidence produced at trial, even though one victim expressed some uncertainty regarding defendant's identity, a rational trier of fact could determine defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 441 S.E.2d 262 (1994).

Voice identification testimony, along with circumstantial evidence showing invaders were familiar with the internal operations and layout of the store, allowed the jury to reach the conclusion that defendant was guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. 140, 499 S.E.2d 922 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a robbery since the victim testified that defendant robbed the victim of a wallet and car keys at gunpoint, the state introduced similar transaction evidence, and one of defendant's fellow inmates testified that defendant bragged to the fellow inmate that defendant had indeed robbed the victim. Cordy v. State, 257 Ga. App. 726, 572 S.E.2d 73 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of theft by taking, three counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), three counts of simple battery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime since: (1) there was evidence that defendant entered a store, placed a knife to the neck of one of the three victims, forced that victim to the back of the store, aided another assailant who was armed with a gun in binding the victims and dragging the victims to the back of the store, and stole money and other items from two of the victims; (2) defendant confessed to the crimes during interviews with law enforcement officials; and (3) defendant's confessions were corroborated by the testimony of one of the victims who, despite earlier being unable to identify the robbers, ultimately identified defendant as one of the robbers. The corroborating victim's initial inability to identify defendant posed an issue of credibility for the jury's resolution. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of armed robbery, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after the defendant directed the victim at gunpoint to walk toward a cash machine that could be used with the cash card in the victim's wallet, and when both the victim and a bystander had opportunities to view defendant. Wade v. State, 261 Ga. App. 587, 583 S.E.2d 251 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies because the only evidence of coercion came from defendant personally. To disprove the coercion defense, the victim testified that defendant did not appear nervous, that the robbery occurred very quickly, with no "fumbling" or "bumbling" on defendant's part, and that defendant commented that defendant was robbing the victim because the defendant needed a place to stay. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

Evidence that defendant, wielding a gun, barged into the victim's hotel room, demanded money, pistol whipped the victim, and took the victim's wallet sufficed to sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary. Bay v. State, 266 Ga. App. 91, 596 S.E.2d 229 (2004).

Evidence that defendants entered the victim's apartment, took the victim by the hands and demanded money, shoved a gun into the victim's side and removed the victim's ring, watch, and money, and then forced the victim into a closet blocked with a heavy table with instructions not to come out until defendants had left was sufficient to support convictions for false imprisonment, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pinson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 254, 596 S.E.2d 734 (2004).

Determination of witness credibility, including the accuracy of eyewitness identification, is within the exclusive province of the jury. Evidence that the defendant wielded, and attempted to use, a gun during the robbery of a pool hall owner was sufficient to convict the defendant for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime since the question of eyewitness identification of the defendant was a jury matter. Bartley v. State, 267 Ga. App. 367, 599 S.E.2d 318 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime based upon defendant's and an accomplice's robbing a store at gunpoint was affirmed because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction as latent fingerprints, which belonged to defendant, that were found in the car used in the armed robbery sufficiently corroborated the testimony of the accomplice who identified defendant as the driver of the car before the accomplice recanted the accomplice's custodial statement at trial. Brown v. State, 268 Ga. App. 24, 601 S.E.2d 405 (2004).

When defendant's victim identified defendant from a photo lineup and at trial as the person who forced the victim to open the vaults in the fast-food restaurant where the victim worked, then duct-taped the victim's limbs and repeatedly struck the victim as the victim lay face down on the floor, the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to allow the jury to convict defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes. Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (2004).

Because a burglary victim recognized defendant before a photographic lineup was introduced, defendant did not show deficient performance or prejudice based on trial counsel's failure to object to the lineup; in any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, making terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-7-1,16-8-41,16-11-37, and16-11-106. Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 845, 608 S.E.2d 310 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and three counts of kidnapping arising from an incident in which defendant and a companion robbed the victim at gunpoint, then forced the victim and the victim's children into their house and tied the victim up with duct tape; the victim identified defendant from a photo line-up, defendant's fingerprints were found at the scene, a store video showed defendant buying the duct tape which was used, and the store manager identified defendant as the buyer of the duct tape. Brownlee v. State, 271 Ga. App. 475, 610 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because evidence was seen in one of the defendant's vehicles during a traffic stop, defendants were identified from the videotape of the stop, and the shotgun used by the assailant in the home invasion was found in one of the defendant's homes. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, robbery by intimidation, and criminal damage to property in the second degree were supported by sufficient evidence because, inter alia, defendant's brother let defendant and two others into a restaurant after hours, defendant pointed a gun at the brother's co-worker, and then beat on a safe and pried open the cash registers looking for money; all four co-conspirators involved, including defendant, gave statements to police implicating themselves and their codefendants, and a bill was introduced showing that repair of the safe damaged during the robbery attempt cost $1,000.00. Polite v. State, 273 Ga. App. 235, 614 S.E.2d 849 (2005).

As a robber's unique shirt was recorded by a convenience store security camera, and the defendant's girlfriend identified the shirt as the defendant's shirt, and as the defendant could not say exactly where the defendant was that evening, the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. App. 169, 626 S.E.2d 128 (2006).

Because the person who stole the victim's vehicle had a distinctive hairstyle, and the defendant, who had the same hairstyle, was apprehended while in possession of the vehicle soon after the crime was committed, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault with intent to rob in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Hall v. State, 277 Ga. App. 413, 626 S.E.2d 611 (2006).

Evidence that defendant and others approached two separate victims while defendant brandished a shotgun, that defendant threatened the victims with the gun, and that defendant and the compatriots stole both of the victims' cars, sufficed to sustain defendant's convictions of two counts of hijacking a motor vehicle, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the jury was free to disbelieve defendant's testimony that defendant was coerced into threatening the victims at gunpoint and participating in the car thefts, and was authorized to find defendant guilty based on the evidence presented at trial. Martinez v. State, 278 Ga. App. 500, 629 S.E.2d 485 (2006).

Evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator who stole a victim's car and purse at gunpoint, coupled with evidence of the defendant's flight from police, possession of the stolen car, and possession of the revolver used in the crimes, was sufficient to support convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, armed robbery, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; however, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the armed robbery conviction and sentence. Doublette v. State, 278 Ga. App. 746, 629 S.E.2d 602 (2006).

Convictions of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, false imprisonment, and hijacking a motor vehicle were supported by sufficient evidence since a perpetrator identified as the defendant robbed a pizza restaurant at gunpoint, ordered everyone into a cooler, and took the restaurant manager's vehicle, after which an officer discovered the defendant the next day driving the manager's vehicle and wearing a hat identical to that worn by the perpetrator, and since a customer at the restaurant identified the defendant as the robber in a photo line-up and at trial; while three of the four crimes arising out of the incident were committed after the customer, who was the only witness to identify defendant, was ordered into the cooler, only one robber entered the restaurant and the jury was authorized to infer that the person identified by the customer also committed the crimes committed after the customer was in the cooler. Head v. State, 279 Ga. App. 608, 631 S.E.2d 808 (2006).

Convictions of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during a crime, and carrying a concealed weapon were supported by sufficient evidence, including guns, money, and a knife stolen from a robbery victim found in a car in which the defendant was a passenger, the fact that the defendant, when arrested, was wearing a sweatshirt identified by the victims as the sweatshirt worn by one of the perpetrators, and the testimony of another of the perpetrators, who stated that the defendant was one of the participants in the robbery. Callahan v. State, 280 Ga. App. 323, 634 S.E.2d 102 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a defendant's convictions for a total of 20 counts of armed robbery, possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime, terroristic threats and acts, kidnapping, and aggravated assault arising out of four separate robberies because the victims' testimony, the physical evidence, and one victim's identification of the defendant as the robber provided sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the defendant's accomplice. Metoyer v. State, 282 Ga. App. 810, 640 S.E.2d 345 (2006).

Because conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses, including the state's witness, were a matter of credibility for the jury to decide, and because the defendant cited no authority suggesting that the instructions in question were incorrect statements of the law, and did not explain an assertion that the instructions were confusing, convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence. Lattimore v. State, 282 Ga. App. 435, 638 S.E.2d 848 (2006).

Pictures of a defendant withdrawing money from a victim's ATM account and evidence that the defendant repeatedly asked the victim for the PIN number for the victim's ATM card, held a knife to the victim's neck, cut the cord used to tie the victim, and had cash, an ATM receipt, and the victim's car keys when the defendant was arrested were sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and two counts of possessing a knife during the commission of a crime. Wright v. State, 282 Ga. App. 649, 639 S.E.2d 581 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions of armed robbery and of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime since: (1) the defendant's codefendants testified that the defendant participated in the armed robberies of which the defendant was convicted; (2) one victim identified the defendant as the victim's assailant; (3) two victims identified a gun that was recovered from the vehicle of the defendant's girlfriend as the gun used to rob the victims; (4) a victim's purse was recovered from the residence where the defendant was arrested; and (5) police found a sweatshirt and a ski mask in the girlfriend's car that matched a victim's description of the items worn by one robber. Cartledge v. State, 285 Ga. App. 145, 645 S.E.2d 633 (2007).

Given that the testimony of the defendant's codefendants was sufficient to support convictions on four counts of armed robbery and four counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime, the convictions were not subject to reversal. Cartledge v. State, 285 Ga. App. 145, 645 S.E.2d 633 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence supporting the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and criminal trespass; the evidence included a custodial statement in which the defendant admitted participating in the crimes and testimony by a witness as to the preparations for the robbery, the clothing worn by the defendant and by the accomplice, and the defendant's disposal of a gun. Medlin v. State, 285 Ga. App. 709, 647 S.E.2d 392 (2007).

Because the state presented sufficient evidence supporting the convictions entered against the first two defendants, a letter one of the defendants wrote was admissible against all as a statement of a co-conspirator, no error resulted from the admission of a red baseball bat, and the first defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective; thus, the first defendant's convictions of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and the second defendants' convictions of the lesser included offense of robbery were upheld. Williamson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 779, 648 S.E.2d 118 (2007).

In a case where four persons riding in a stolen car robbed a cab driver at gunpoint, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime; the defendant led a detective to the gun the defendant possessed and admitted being in the stolen vehicle on the date in question, and a witness testified that the witness saw the defendant holding a gun and approaching the cab driver. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 866, 648 S.E.2d 183 (2007).

Because contradictions and uncertainties in the testimony did not render the evidence against the defendant insufficient, but were ultimately for the jury to decide, and the defendant's statement to the police was corroborated by other evidence, the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal. Sheely v. State, 287 Ga. App. 92, 650 S.E.2d 762 (2007).

When the victim identified the defendant less than 15 minutes after a robbery, had been face-to-face with the robber for three or four seconds, gave the police a substantially correct description of the defendant's person, and demonstrated a high degree of certainty in the identification, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, even though no physical evidence tied the defendant to the robbery; the fact that the defendant was handcuffed during the "showup" identification did not make the identification unreasonably or unfairly conducted, and the credibility of the victim was a jury question. Tiggs v. State, 287 Ga. App. 291, 651 S.E.2d 209 (2007).

Given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the effectiveness of trial counsel, and the absence of reversible error in excepting the lead detective from sequestration, instructing the jury, admitting similar transaction evidence, and admitting the defendant's custodial statement, the defendant's armed robbery and possession of a firearm convictions were upheld on appeal. Morgan v. State, 287 Ga. App. 569, 651 S.E.2d 833 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions of armed robbery and of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Both of the defendant's codefendants testified as to the defendant's participation in the events in question, which was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty; furthermore, the codefendants' testimony was corroborated by that of the victims. Hill v. State, 290 Ga. App. 140, 658 S.E.2d 863 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 405, 172 L. Ed. 2d 287 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and kidnapping under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-8-41, and16-11-106 as: (1) a robber ordered two store employees at gunpoint to give the robber money, then ordered the employees to go into a back room; (2) the employees described the robber and the robber's vehicle in detail; (3) the employees positively identified the defendant as the robber 15 to 20 minutes after the crime following a pursuit during which the defendant fled from police first in the defendant's vehicle, then on foot; and (4) the defendant had $281 in a pocket at the time of arrest. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).

Evidence was legally sufficient to convict a defendant on charges of armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; the testimony of one of the defendant's accomplices, which implicated the defendant in the crimes, was corroborated by evidence that the defendant was captured with the two accomplices shortly after the robbery, that defendant had a large amount of cash, a gun, and a roll of duct tape, and that the victim was able to identify all three men as the ones who robbed and assaulted the victim. Spragg v. State, 292 Ga. App. 37, 663 S.E.2d 389 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the state showed that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted a home invasion in which the home was burglarized and the homeowner's teenage child was detained and robbed by use of a handgun. Even in the absence of evidence sufficient to show that the defendant directly committed the charged offenses, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was a party to the offenses in that the defendant and a person armed with a gun loaded a truck with property stolen from the home during the two-hour home invasion, the defendant was present speaking with the armed person during the home invasion, and the defendant confirmed that the child was home alone. Whitley v. State, 293 Ga. App. 605, 667 S.E.2d 447 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support two juveniles' adjudications of delinquency for the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime based on the victim identifying the juveniles and the evidence that one of the juveniles used a gun to intimidate the victim into handing over the cash from the register of a gas station, shot the victim in the face causing severe injuries, and possessed a firearm during the commission of the crimes. In the Interest of R. S., 295 Ga. App. 772, 673 S.E.2d 280 (2009).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, kidnapping, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and financial transaction card fraud. Shortly after a man called the store where the victim worked to see if the store was open, a masked man with a gun came into the store, ordered the victim to the back, and then robbed the store and took the victim's credit cards; soon afterward that same morning, the defendant bought sneakers with the victim's credit card; the clerk who sold the defendant the sneakers identified the defendant at trial and in a photographic lineup and testified that the clerk knew the defendant because the defendant was a regular customer; and the defendant's cell phone records showed that just before the robbery, the defendant called the victim's store and blocked the defendant's number. Anderson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 733, 678 S.E.2d 498 (2009), aff'd, 287 Ga. 159, 695 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. 2010).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-11-106(b)(1) as a victim who was robbed at gunpoint by two assailants identified the defendant as one of the assailants; the victim had been walking on a college campus when the two assailants approached, held a gun on the victim, and searched the victim's backpack before fleeing with the victim's wallet. Ware v. State, 298 Ga. App. 232, 679 S.E.2d 797 (2009).

Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal attempt to commit aggravated sodomy, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime because the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support the convictions; regardless of any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, it was for the jury to assess witness credibility, and the jury chose to believe the victim's identification of the defendant as the individual who committed the crimes. Williams v. State, 300 Ga. App. 839, 686 S.E.2d 446 (2009).

Abduction and possession of weapon shown.

- Regardless of whether handgun used originally in abduction of victim was ever found, the fact that a rifle was "within arm's reach" of where defendants violated the victim and held the victim against the victim's will was sufficient for convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Smith v. State, 214 Ga. App. 631, 448 S.E.2d 906 (1994).

Aggravated assault and possession shown.

- Evidence that defendant threatened a daycare owner and two daycare workers with a handgun when they tried to stop defendant from taking defendant's daughter supported defendant's convictions of two aggravated assaults in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). Diaz v. State, 255 Ga. App. 288, 564 S.E.2d 872 (2002).

Evidence that defendant unlawfully entered the victim's residence with intent to commit a felony, aggravated assault, therein, and was in possession of a gun while doing so, was sufficient to uphold convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm/knife during commission of a felony. Simmons v. State, 262 Ga. App. 164, 585 S.E.2d 93 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the testimony of the victim was sufficient to establish that defendant was the perpetrator. Davis v. State, 267 Ga. App. 668, 600 S.E.2d 742 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as the evidence showed that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen and the arm with a gun and that defendant intended to cause serious physical harm and disfigurement to the victim. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support a jury's verdict convicting defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because, through the testimony of a woman whom defendant threatened with a gun after defendant shot a police officer, the evidence showed that the woman saw defendant fire a gun at the officer and recognized the gun later recovered as the weapon defendant used. Milton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 908, 614 S.E.2d 140 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-24,16-5-40, and16-11-106, respectively, were supported by the evidence as defendant was engaged in a domestic dispute with defendant's spouse and son, wherein defendant argued, threatened to kill them, and locked them in a bathroom, punched and hit the spouse, and stabbed them each multiple times with a decorative sword that defendant removed from the wall; there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant did not stab them in the midst of a struggle over possession of the sword, but instead, that defendant intended to stab or cut them. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject defendant's claim of self-defense and to support defendant's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime conviction because, inter alia, two witnesses yelled at defendant to put the gun away, but defendant shot the victim a second time, defendant testified that defendant believed that the victim was holding a weapon behind the victim's leg when the victim got out of the car and that defendant heard someone yell "bust," which defendant understood to mean "shoot," and another witness testified that the witness heard no such statement and that the witness did not see anything in the victim's hands when the victim exited the car. Hill v. State, 276 Ga. App. 874, 625 S.E.2d 108 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions for aggravated assault, kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, even though none of the victims could identify the defendant as the gunman in the robbery due to the fact that the defendant wore a mask, because defendant was found shortly after the robbery with cash, weapons, a ski mask, a car, and clothing matching the victims' description; surveillance videotape of the robbery was shown to the jury to determine whether defendant was the person on the videotape. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 625 S.E.2d 411 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon convictions since the jury was entitled to give greater weight to the victim's positive contemporaneous identification of the defendant as the shooter and to conclude that the victim's subsequent uncertainty resulted from fear of retaliation by the defendant rather than from any real confusion about who fired the shot; the jury was also entitled to give little weight to a negative gunshot residue test result on defendant's hands. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault with intent to rob and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime since the defendant and two others tried to rob a market, one of the others had a pistol, which was pointed at the market's owners, the armed participant forced one of the owners to try to open the register, and during the course of the robbery, one of the owners grabbed a hidden gun and shot and killed the armed robber, following which the defendant and the other participant fled. Laurel v. State, 278 Ga. App. 147, 628 S.E.2d 208 (2006).

Defendant's motion for a new trial on the defendant's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the aggravated assault charges was properly denied as the defendant's actions before, during, and after a friend's aggravated assault and firearm possession crimes at a home showed not only that the defendant was a party to those crimes, but that the defendant was a fellow conspirator in the assault against the woman as the defendant: (1) forced the woman at gunpoint to drive to the home; (2) stayed in the nearby living room while the friend shot a gun and threatened the woman (and defendant looked into the bedroom after the gun was fired); (3) accompanied the friend and the handcuffed woman in the vehicle following the incident while the friend searched for the boyfriend's residence; (4) encouraged the friend to kill the woman; and (5) did not protest any of the friend's actions throughout the evening. Sapp v. State, 280 Ga. App. 592, 634 S.E.2d 523 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by evidence that: (1) the victim and the defendant had an acrimonious relationship; (2) the defendant threatened to hit the victim with a jug; and (3) the defendant's statement that the victim was not "dead yet" after the victim was shot in the back; the jury could reject the defendant's claim that the defendant fired a warning shot away from the victim and could convict the defendant, even though the victim did not see the defendant point the gun at the victim. Rowe v. State, 280 Ga. App. 881, 635 S.E.2d 251 (2006).

Aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal based on the defendant's act of deliberately firing a gun in the direction of another; moreover, this same evidence was likewise sufficient to support the jury's convictions on three counts of the possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, namely the assaults. Thompson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006).

On appeal from the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and first-degree criminal damage to property convictions, the court held that the testimony provided by two of the victims identifying the defendant as one of the perpetrators was sufficient to uphold the convictions as: (1) the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact; and (2) under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620), the credibility of a witness was a matter to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Reid v. State, 281 Ga. App. 640, 637 S.E.2d 62 (2006).

Because sufficient evidence was presented supporting the jury's determination that the defendant's act of shooting the victim was not an accident and was not justified, the victim testified to knowing defendant had a gun, and the presence of a gun normally placed a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by the record. Dukes v. State, 285 Ga. App. 172, 645 S.E.2d 664 (2007).

Given that the circumstantial evidence presented against the defendant sufficiently showed that: (1) the victim shot one of the intruders who committed the burglary; (2) shortly after the burglary, the defendant was treated for a gunshot wound and arrived at the hospital in a vehicle matching the description of the automobile seen leaving the crime scene; (3) the DNA evidence on ski masks found at the scene matched that of the owner of the car and the other passenger, who was also the defendant's brother; and (4) according to the defendant's brother, the driver of the car admitted to shooting the victim, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were affirmed on appeal. Sherman v. State, 284 Ga. App. 809, 644 S.E.2d 901 (2007).

Because: (1) the testimony of two witnesses, as well as that of the defendant, sufficiently established the element of venue; and (2) the trial court gave complete instructions on the defendant's defense of justification and self-defense, and thus, a charge on mistake of fact was not warranted, there was no reason to reverse the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gaines v. State, 289 Ga. App. 339, 656 S.E.2d 871 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 379 (Ga. 2008).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant told the victim, who had walked into a common hallway in the defendant's apartment building, to leave, went inside, retrieved a gun, and shot the victim twice after the victim refused to leave, and then shot at the victim while the victim was fleeing. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 435, 657 S.E.2d 333 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-106 because the defendant's admission that the defendant was holding a rifle throughout the crimes' commission, along with evidence of the defendant's flight, authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant participated in the crimes by acting as a lookout. Gant v. State, 291 Ga. App. 823, 662 S.E.2d 895 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm based on the testimony of three separate witnesses, including the victim, that the defendant threateningly pointed a gun at the victim's head. Further, regarding the need to show the victim's reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, the state presented evidence from the victim that the victim feared the gun and that the fear resulted in the victim urinating on the victim's person and in the victim lying to an officer at the front door to protect the victim's children. Hardy v. State, 293 Ga. App. 265, 666 S.E.2d 730 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-106 when competent evidence showed that the defendant put a gun to the victim's chest and pulled the trigger. Furthermore, a jury could conclude that this was not the result of an accident. Jones v. State, 293 Ga. App. 218, 666 S.E.2d 738 (2008).

Based on the evidence that the defendant drove and deliberately followed the victims and pulled in behind the victims' vehicle, intentionally encouraged the shooter by telling the shooter "you better not let these guys get away, go ahead and handle your business, do what you got to do," and fled with the shooter after the shooting, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant was a party to the crimes of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Talifero v. State, 319 Ga. App. 65, 734 S.E.2d 61 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a juvenile court to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis from the victim's testimony that a juvenile stood in a nearby park and did not participate in an assault as the third, unidentified assailant, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6, and to adjudicate guilt for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm while committing a felony, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b)(2) and16-11-106(b)(1). In the Interest of C. S., 334 Ga. App. 153, 778 S.E.2d 396 (2015).

Acquittal of aggravated assault but conviction of possession.

- Although a defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault, the defendant was properly convicted of possession of a knife with a blade at least three inches long during the commission of the offense of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), based on evidence that the defendant fought the victim, who died from a five-inch stab wound. The doctrine of inconsistent verdicts has been abolished. Daniely v. State, 309 Ga. App. 123, 709 S.E.2d 274 (2011).

Assault with deadly weapon, other crimes, and possession shown.

- Evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and kidnapping; the victim's statement that the victim's sister was afraid of defendant because defendant had done the same thing to the victim was clearly admissible as part of the res gestae even if the statement incidentally placed defendant's character in evidence. McLendon v. State, 258 Ga. App. 133, 572 S.E.2d 763 (2002).

Burglary and possession shown.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendants' conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime where defendants in the commission of a spree of burglaries held various victims at gunpoint. Attaway v. State, 259 Ga. App. 822, 578 S.E.2d 529 (2003).

Rational trier of fact was authorized to find that both defendants burglarized the victims' residence; that, once inside, the defendants took money, clothing, and other personal property by use of a gun; that the first defendant also committed an aggravated assault on the female victim by striking her in the head with a handgun and was, therefore, in possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; and that both defendants, along with their cohorts, had been in possession of the cocaine which was tossed out the vehicle the defendants were riding in and found along the roadway. Davis v. State, 264 Ga. App. 221, 590 S.E.2d 192 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), (2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), since the evidence showed that three men forcibly entered the victims' apartment and demanded money, that all three men were in the car together on the way to the apartment and on the way to the hospital to drop off a bleeding codefendant, that all three men carried guns, that one of the victims was shot, and that defendant's statement that defendant was only involved to drop off the bleeding codefendant at the hospital was in contrast to the fact that defendant had blood on defendant's pants, shirt, boxer shorts, and that defendant ejected the bloody codefendant from the car in a hurried manner at the hospital. Brown v. State, 267 Ga. App. 642, 600 S.E.2d 731 (2004).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant juvenile committed burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2) because the defendant was in the vicinity of the victim's apartment shortly after the burglary, wearing a jacket that matched the victim's description of the jacket worn by the perpetrator, carrying a loaded pistol, and wearing shoes that matched the tread pattern and size of the muddy footprints found in the victim's apartment. In the Interest of J.D., 305 Ga. App. 519, 699 S.E.2d 827 (2010).

Inconsistent verdict rule inapplicable.

- Defendant's possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime was affirmed, even though defendant was acquitted of an attempted armed robbery charge, as the rule against inconsistent verdicts had been abolished in Georgia and as defendant was a willing accomplice throughout the entire criminal enterprise and could have been convicted as an aider and abettor despite the fact that an accomplice did not give defendant the weapon until after the shooting was over. Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 424, 606 S.E.2d 871 (2004).

Because Georgia did not recognize the inconsistent verdict rule, the state properly assigned error to the trial court's grant of defendant's motion in arrest of judgment; the evidence was sufficient to conclude that defendant was guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). State v. Robinson, 275 Ga. App. 117, 619 S.E.2d 806 (2005).

Kidnapping, other crimes, and possession shown.

- Because the victim's statement of sexual abuse was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to convict the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated child molestation, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, the victim's testimony did not have to be corroborated by physical evidence. Gartrell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 726, 613 S.E.2d 226 (2005).

Drug offenses and possession of weapon shown.

- Despite the defendant's denial of any knowledge of the existence of drugs and other contraband in a motel room, in which the defendant was the sole occupant, evidence of the contraband found in close proximity to other evidence which the defendant admitted owning, when coupled with the fact that only one key to the room existed, which the defendant admitted to having, and that no one had brought anything into the room since the person the defendant alleged was the owner of the evidence had left, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-106,16-13-2,16-13-30, and16-13-31. Hall v. State, 283 Ga. App. 266, 641 S.E.2d 264 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence of possession to support a defendant's convictions of trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime since: the defendant sped off when police tried to stop the defendant for running a stop sign; narcotics and a gun were found in the passenger side of the car; the passenger's story that the passenger had flagged down the defendant for a ride and that the passenger was unaware of the drugs and the gun was corroborated by the passenger's girlfriend; the defendant's sister, who owned the car, testified that there was no contraband in the car before the defendant took the car; the defendant had $1,755 in cash on the defendant's person; and the defendant had prior drug offenses. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 619, 644 S.E.2d 491 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1169, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 521 (Ga. 2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of a handgun during the commission of a crime after an undercover officer met the defendant in the defendant's car, the defendant had a handgun beside the defendant, the officer showed the defendant the money that the officer had brought to buy ten pounds of marijuana, and the defendant showed the officer a sample of the marijuana and told the officer that the marijuana was in a nearby van; after the transaction was called off because the officer would not give the defendant the money before receiving the marijuana, police found ten pounds of marijuana in the van and the handgun in the defendant's car. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 460, 646 S.E.2d 342 (2007).

Defendant's convictions for possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented via the direct testimony of the defendant's live-in girlfriend, which when combined with the evidence showing their joint constructive possession of the drugs and gun tended to connect and identify the defendant with the crimes charged. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583 (2007).

As the defendant admitted at trial that the defendant was in possession of a gun and cocaine when the defendant was stopped by the police and that the defendant was 16 years old at the time, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the defendant guilty of possession of cocaine, possession of a firearm while in the commission of a felony, and possession of a pistol by a person under the age of 18. Olive v. State, 291 Ga. App. 538, 662 S.E.2d 308 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug offense, and carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the items seized from the defendant's vehicle and the defendant's person after a traffic stop as the defendant's failure to wear a seatbelt and to have insurance on the vehicle justified the traffic stop. Thereafter, after being released from the traffic stop and being asked to come back, the defendant consented to the search of the vehicle and of the defendant's person, which led to the seizure of the contraband. Hughes v. State, 293 Ga. App. 404, 667 S.E.2d 163 (2008).

Convictions of manufacture, distribution, and possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), possession of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30.3(b)(1), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(4) were supported by the evidence. A panel van belonged to the defendant, had been modified as a methamphetamine lab, was located on the defendant's property, and was powered by an electrical cord running from the defendant's trailer; everything necessary to support the production of methamphetamine was present in the vicinity of the vehicle; the defendant's name and that of the defendant's spouse had been scrawled on an interior panel of the vehicle; the defendant offered to provide any methamphetamine that a house guest wanted; uncured methamphetamine and enough ephedrine was present at the scene to make 30 to 33 grams of methamphetamine; and the defendant admitted to giving methamphetamine to others and to owning the sawed-off shotgun recovered from the panel van. Boone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (2008).

Although a defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the defendant was unaware that a passenger in the defendant's car was in possession of two handguns, evidence that the two handguns were within the defendant's reach and that the defendant knew that the passenger carried guns for protection while in the drug trade in which the defendant actively participated was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant was aware of the presence of the guns and jointly possessed the guns with the passenger and to support the defendant's conviction. Driscoll v. State, 295 Ga. App. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, trafficking in 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as ecstasy, trafficking in cocaine, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for possession of the contraband, which was found in a backpack, based on the strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, the defendant's suspicious and nervous behavior, the defendant's joint living arrangement with two other defendants, the defendant's possession of ammunition for another one of the defendant's weapons, and the fact that the defendant was, at times, within arm's reach of the backpack, which showed an intent and power to exercise joint control over the backpack and the drugs found therein; likewise, there was sufficient evidence to support the trafficking charges based on the amounts of the contraband found; and, there was sufficient evidence to support the firearm possession charge since the defendant was found in possession of a magazine that fit the gun located within arm's reach. However, considering that there were four people in the vehicle, the court found that the state's evidence was insufficient to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the marijuana was intended for personal use; therefore, the conviction for the intent to distribute marijuana was reduced to possession. Vines v. State, 296 Ga. App. 543, 675 S.E.2d 260 (2009).

Sufficient evidence existed to convict a defendant of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(5) because a search warrant executed at the defendant's residence revealed a large amount of cocaine and cash as well as two handguns; the defendant was also convicted of trafficking in cocaine. Weems v. State, 295 Ga. App. 680, 673 S.E.2d 50 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and felony fleeing or attempting to elude based on the defendant's involvement in a police chase that included speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h. in a residential area and the defendant's attempt to flee on foot; a backpack that the defendant was carrying while running from the police and which was recovered from the roof of the house around which the defendant had disappeared had drugs and a pistol in the backpack. Hinton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 565, 677 S.E.2d 752 (2009).

Testimony that several firearms were seized from the vehicles involved in an attempt at trafficking marijuana, including a loaded handgun that was in plain view on a floorboard where the defendant's legs had been immediately before the defendant was ordered out of the vehicle, was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348 (2009).

Evidence of the quantum of marijuana seized in conjunction with the presence of the weapon and ammunition found in the bedroom the defendant ran to on being confronted by police, as well as the cell phones containing the defendant's photograph, the scholarship application in the defendant's name, the video security system, the police scanner, and the defendant's mother's pill bottle therein, linked the defendant to the marijuana and weapon. Copeland v. State, 327 Ga. App. 520, 759 S.E.2d 593 (2014).

Terroristic threats and possession of weapon shown.

- When the victim testified that the defendant pulled out a black and silver handgun and threatened the victim with the gun, an officer's testimony that the officer recovered a loaded silver handgun minutes after the incident in the vehicle in which the defendant was riding sufficiently corroborated the victim's testimony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37(a). Because the victim's testimony was sufficiently corroborated, there was no merit to the defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, which was based on the act of making terroristic threats. Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 263, 661 S.E.2d 634 (2008).

Aggravated sodomy and possession of weapon shown.

- There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony despite the victim not personally seeing the gun as the victim testified that the victim submitted to the aggravated sodomy because defendant said defendant had a gun and would shoot the victim and another if the victim did not comply; the victim believed defendant had a gun; and others saw the gun. As a result, sufficient circumstantial evidence supported a finding that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the aggravated sodomy. Jennings v. State, 292 Ga. App. 149, 664 S.E.2d 248 (2008).

Theft by receiving and possession of weapon shown.

- While an assailant pointed a handgun to the victim's neck, the defendant and another assailant held and searched the victim and took the victim's cell phone and cash; the armed assailant, who had stolen the handgun, displayed the handgun to the others before the crimes were committed. Under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant as an accomplice of theft by receiving and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (2008).

Hijacking a motor vehicle and possession of weapon shown.

- Defendant's possession of a vehicle within minutes of its hijacking, the defendant's attempted flight when police ordered the defendant out of the car, the recovery of a .40 caliber handgun in the car, and the victim's positive identification of the defendant authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of hijacking a motor vehicle and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Wilcox v. State, 297 Ga. App. 201, 677 S.E.2d 142 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1285, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 342 (Ga. 2009).

Aggravated battery, other offenses, and possession shown.

- Evidence that the defendant shot the victim at close range; that the victim, who knew the defendant well, identified the defendant from a photo line-up and at trial; and that a witness told police of driving the defendant to find the victim and of witnessing the shooting was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of those crimes. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 828, 676 S.E.2d 274 (2009).

Sufficient evidence of possession of knife.

- Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of possession of a knife during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 because the record showed that defendant cut a deep gash across the victim's abdomen using a knife with a 3.5 inch blade, stabbed the victim two more times, and then chased the victim as the victim fled. Brinkley v. State, 301 Ga. App. 827, 689 S.E.2d 116 (2009).

Voluntary manslaughter, other offenses, and possession shown.

- Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (voluntary manslaughter), O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (aggravated assault), O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant's explanation of the killing was inconsistent with and not explanatory of the other direct and circumstantial evidence, and, therefore, the jury was permitted to reject such explanation and convict on the remaining evidence; the defendant's son testified on direct that the defendant told the son that the defendant shot the victim once, that the victim ran, that the defendant pursued, and that although the victim begged for the victim's life, the defendant shot the victim again, and there also was forensic evidence indicating that the defendant fired three more rounds into the victim's body. Cantera v. State, 304 Ga. App. 289, 696 S.E.2d 354 (2010).

Because defendant admitted to police that defendant had planned the robbery that led to the victim's death, defendant was a willing participant in the robbery and shooting; consequently, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Branchfield v. State, 287 Ga. 869, 700 S.E.2d 576 (2010).

Since the victim was cut and hit by a shotgun during a struggle with defendant in defendant's attempt to obtain money for drugs, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-8-41(a),16-11-106(b)(1). Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 838, 700 S.E.2d 726 (2010).

Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice's testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testified that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury's determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a); hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b); aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1); theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2; theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal because the evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions for attempted armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), given the victim's eyewitness testimony that the defendant approached the eyewitness with a handgun while attempting to obtain money from the cash register of a store. Nyane v. State, 306 Ga. App. 591, 703 S.E.2d 53 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0420, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2011).

Evidence insufficient to support conviction.

- Although the trial court was without authority to vacate defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the order was issued after the filing of the notice of appeal, the conviction was clearly not supported by the evidence and was, therefore, reversed. Jones v. State, 270 Ga. App. 233, 606 S.E.2d 288 (2004).

Because no eyewitnesses saw a third defendant participate in an armed robbery, a kidnapping, an aggravated assault, or possess a firearm during the commission of the crimes, and because the third defendant was not implicated by the other defendants, did not confess to the crimes, and did not flee the jurisdiction, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the third defendant. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 499, 627 S.E.2d 116 (2006).

Because the state failed to present competent evidence showing that a firearm was on or within arm's reach of defendant's person, but instead, the only evidence of the gun's location was the hearsay testimony of two police officers, which was without probative value to establish any fact, even in the absence of objection, the defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was reversed. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. App. 83, 630 S.E.2d 601 (2006).

Evidence that the defendant drove a codefendant away from the crime scene in a subdivision after the codefendant shot the victim and that a box of bullets was found in the defendant's car when the defendant was later arrested did not support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant's possession of a box of bullets of the same caliber as those used in the murder weapon in no way proved the defendant's possession of the weapon during the commission of the assault; driving the codefendant away with knowledge that the codefendant had committed the crime did not, in and of itself, render the defendant guilty as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; and to the extent that the evidence that the defendant's car had been parked at some point with the car's front end facing in the direction going out of the subdivision constituted circumstantial evidence of guilt, the evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Ratana v. State, 297 Ga. App. 747, 678 S.E.2d 193 (2009).

Convictions of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, were not supported by sufficient evidence because, although the defendant's conduct before the crime was suspicious, the circumstantial evidence against the defendant was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6); the state did not show that the defendant was anywhere near the scene at the time of the shooting, did not present evidence connecting a weapon used in the shooting to the defendant, and, although a witness testified that three days before the shooting, the witness saw the defendant's brother hand the defendant a gun, the witness could not identify the type of gun involved, and this testimony did not connect the defendant with the shooting. The state also failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344 (2009).

There was insufficient evidence to support convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The firearm was wrapped in plastic and buried under cinder blocks in a backyard with nothing around it; there was no evidence that the defendant had it on the defendant's person or within arm's reach as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b). Clyde v. State, 298 Ga. App. 283, 680 S.E.2d 146 (2009).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possessing a knife during the commission of a crime because the defendant was acquitted of entering an automobile with intent to commit theft, and thus, the conviction for possession of a knife during the commission of a crime could not be predicated on that charge; the defendant's possession of a knife during the commission of a crime conviction could not be based on a conviction of criminal damage to property in the second degree because that felony was not listed as a predicate crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b). Johnson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 318, 690 S.E.2d 683 (2010).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), based upon the length of the blade of the knife because the length of the knife's blade was less than three inches long. Brown v. State, 313 Ga. App. 907, 723 S.E.2d 115 (2012).

Because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony based on the underlying felony of aggravated assault also had to be reversed. Touchstone v. State, 319 Ga. App. 477, 735 S.E.2d 805 (2012).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during a felony because there was no evidence showing that the defendant had a gun on the defendant's person; the gun was retrieved from the bedroom where it was found next to an unidentified individual; testimonial evidence established that at some point afterwards, the defendant was found in the room (with another person in custody) and the crack cocaine was found next to the defendant; and, while the defendant did not appear to dispute the defendant's possession of the crack cocaine, there was no evidence showing that the defendant, as opposed to some other person, exercised dominion over the gun. Harvey v. State, 344 Ga. App. 7, 806 S.E.2d 302 (2017).

Possession by defendant's passenger sufficient.

- In light of the trial court's findings that: (1) even if defendant was not physically present during the hijacking, given the evidence of defendant's agreement with defendant's passenger to steal a car, any act done in pursuance of that association by defendant's passenger would, in legal contemplation, be the act of defendant; and (2) that defendant could be convicted of hijacking a motor vehicle even if defendant had no knowledge that defendant's passenger was planning to use a gun to perpetrate the crime because defendant's passenger's use of the gun was naturally or necessarily done in furtherance of the conspiracy to steal a vehicle even though not part of the original agreement, the jury was entitled to conclude under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1) that defendant was a party to each of the four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for which the underlying felonies were hijacking a motor vehicle, two counts of aggravated assault, and first-degree child cruelty. Johnson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 706, 683 S.E.2d 659 (2009).

Mistrial was properly denied despite the allegation that the defendant's character was put in evidence, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and the fact that the defendant's counsel declined to offer a curative instruction regarding the witness's statement; moreover, given the nature of the character statement, such was non-responsive to the state's questioning and unintentional. Ivey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 232, 644 S.E.2d 169 (2007).

Driving a getaway car sufficient for conviction.

- Trial court had sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a party to those crimes by aiding and abetting, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, given evidence that the defendant helped plan the robberies of two game rooms, drove the getaway vehicle, and participated in the division of the proceeds. Norman v. State, 311 Ga. App. 721, 716 S.E.2d 805 (2011).

Joint charge of possession of firearm by convicted felon.

- In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, trial of the charges together was not required since defendant made no motion to sever and, in view of the limiting instructions given and the weight of the testimony of the victim and a corroborating witness, proof of a prior conviction did not place defendant's character in issue to such an extent as to affect the verdict on the armed robbery and firearm charges. Baker v. State, 214 Ga. App. 640, 448 S.E.2d 745 (1994).

Ineffective assistance of counsel related to instruction.

- When the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel relating to a jury instruction, and the assault charge was the predicate offense for a charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, it followed that the possession instruction was flawed as well, and if raised on appeal would have resulted in a reversal of that charge; counsel was therefore ineffective relating to the possession of a firearm conviction and the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the possession conviction as well. King v. Waters, 278 Ga. 122, 598 S.E.2d 476 (2004).

Charge on possession of a firearm was not in error, when, although the trial judge read from the title of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 referring to elements of the offense not in evidence, the remainder of the charge related only to possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Perkins v. State, 194 Ga. App. 189, 390 S.E.2d 273 (1990).

Trial court's omission from its charge on possession of a firearm the requirement that the firearm be on defendant's person or within the defendant's arm's reach was not erroneous where the omitted portion was not an issue under the evidence presented. Williams v. State, 214 Ga. App. 421, 447 S.E.2d 714 (1994).

In a prosecution for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the trial court did not err in charging the entire language of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), pertaining to possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the jury was also given two instructions which clearly outlined the crime as charged in the indictment. Day v. State, 242 Ga. App. 781, 531 S.E.2d 357 (2000).

Because the appeals court refused to find a reasonable probability that the jury convicted the defendant of the offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in a manner not charged in the indictment, and the trial court did not err in charging nearly the entire code section on the offense, there was no basis to reverse the defendant's conviction. Beals v. State, 288 Ga. App. 815, 655 S.E.2d 687 (2007).

Proper jury instructions.

- When the indictment charged the defendant with possession of a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault, the court properly instructed the jury that a person violates the statute when the person possesses a firearm "during the commission of, or the attempt to commit any crime against or involving the person of another, and which crime is a felony" since the evidence adduced in the case did not show that it was possible for the jury to have convicted the defendant of committing the offense in a manner not charged in the indictment. Isaac v. State, 269 Ga. 875, 505 S.E.2d 480 (1998).

Trial court did not err in refusing to define the term "firearm" during jury instructions because the word has a common and ordinary usage. Law v. State, 249 Ga. App. 253, 547 S.E.2d 784 (2001).

Trial court did not commit reversible error in the court's instruction to the jury regarding the offense of possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime because, in contrast to the language of the indictment, the court charged the jury that such crime was committed if a person has on or within arms reach of the person's person a knife, having a blade of three or more inches in length, during the commission of any crime against or involving the person of another as the jury received the indictment and the trial court instructed the jury that the indictment and the plea formed the issue that the jury was to decide. Thus, there was no reasonable probability that the jury could have convicted defendant of the offense based upon the trial court's instructional deviation from the language of the indictment. Whitaker v. State, 283 Ga. 521, 661 S.E.2d 557 (2008).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to an instruction that if the jury found the defendant was not guilty of armed robbery, the jury could not find the defendant guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b). As the commission of the underlying felony was an essential element of § 16-11-106(b), the instruction was a correct statement of the law. Soloman v. State, 294 Ga. App. 520, 669 S.E.2d 430 (2008).

Proper instructions.

- Trial court did not err in failing to employ the exact language of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 when instructing the jury on a firearms charge. Buford v. State, 264 Ga. 479, 448 S.E.2d 215 (1994).

In a prosecution for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and obstruction, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on allegations that trial counsel was ineffective as: (1) a jury charge on the testimony of an accomplice was not required; and (2) in light of trial counsel's cross-examination of the accomplice, the court's credibility charge, as well as the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, a leniency instruction was unnecessary. Hayes v. State, 281 Ga. App. 749, 637 S.E.2d 128 (2006).

Improper instructions required reversal.

- Because the trial court never instructed the jury that the offense of involuntary manslaughter was a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor, the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony had to be reversed. Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007).

Because the jury instruction given by the trial court regarding a charge of possession of a knife during the commission of a crime comported with the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and there was no reasonable probability that the jury could have convicted defendant based on the trial court's instructional deviation from the language of the indictment, no reversible error resulted. Mitchell v. State, 283 Ga. 341, 659 S.E.2d 356 (2008).

Trial court did not sua sponte err in failing to charge jury on identity because: (1) there was Georgia law requiring a trial judge to warn the jury against the possible dangers of mistaken identification of an accused as the person committing a crime; and (2) such was not required after the jury had already been charged as to the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, credibility of witnesses, and impeachment of witnesses. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. 776, 642 S.E.2d 835 (2007).

"Level of certainty".

- In a prosecution on four counts of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, given that the state did not rely upon eyewitness identification alone, but presented other evidence linking the defendant to the crimes charged, the trial court did not err in giving the "level of certainty" portion of an identity charge to the jury, which the defendant requested. Creamer v. State, 282 Ga. App. 411, 638 S.E.2d 832 (2006).

Failure to charge jury on justification and duty to retreat.

- Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and two related counts of possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime required reversal because the trial court erred by not charging the jury on the principle of no duty to retreat since the defense of justification was raised by the evidence, via defendant's testimony that the victim tried to stab defendant, and the state placed the issue of retreat before the jury. As a result of defendant making out a prima facie case of justification, the trial court erred by concluding otherwise. Lewis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 257, 663 S.E.2d 721 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1869, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 885 (Ga. 2008).

Court erred in failing to instruct on accident.

- Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony were reversed because the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the defense of accident as requested when that defense was raised by the evidence, and the Court of Appeals could not find that it was highly probable that the failure to give the requested charge did not contribute to the verdict; at least slight evidence supported the theory that the defendant armed oneself with a knife in order to fend off the victim's attack with a pipe wrench and that although the defendant was prepared to intentionally stab the victim in self-defense, the defendant did not do so, but the victim lunged at the defendant and impaled oneself on the knife. Hill v. State, 300 Ga. App. 210, 684 S.E.2d 356 (2009).

Failure to request limiting instruction.

- With regard to the defendant's trial for armed robbery and possession of a firearm, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to give the jury limiting instructions for evidence presented against the co-defendant concerning charges that were unique to the co-defendant because the defendant failed to make such a request. McNair v. State, 330 Ga. App. 478, 767 S.E.2d 290 (2014).

No merger of related offenses.

- Because: (1) evidence presented against the second of two defendants, jointly charged, that the victim was beaten over the head with a pistol showed a completed aggravated assault prior to the armed robbery; and (2) possession of a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault did not merge with armed robbery as there was an expressed legislative intent to impose double punishment for conduct which violated both O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 and other felony statutes, the offenses did not merge. Bunkley v. State, 278 Ga. App. 450, 629 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

Sentence not cruel and unusual punishment.

- Defendant's sentences of 20 years in confinement for the aggravated assault on the deceased victim, followed by 20 years for the aggravated assault on the second victim (with five years in confinement and the remainder on probation), followed by an additional 15 years of probation for the charge of participation in criminal street gang activity and another five years' probation for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, to run consecutively to the other sentences, were within the statutory range for those crimes, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Taylor v. State, 331 Ga. App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (2015).

Double punishment intended.

- There is express legislative intent to impose double punishment for conduct which violates both O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 and other felony statutes. Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092, 103 S. Ct. 580, 74 L. Ed. 2d 940 (1982), but see, Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996); Miller v. State, 250 Ga. 436, 298 S.E.2d 509 (1983); McGee v. State, 173 Ga. App. 604, 327 S.E.2d 566 (1985); Brown v. State, 191 Ga. App. 875, 383 S.E.2d 361 (1989).

It is not violative of double jeopardy to convict a person in a single prosecution of both possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and the accompanying felony. Wiley v. State, 250 Ga. 343, 296 S.E.2d 714 (1982); McKissic v. State, 178 Ga. App. 23, 341 S.E.2d 903 (1986).

Convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony did not merge, where one crime was not "included" in the other, and each involved proof of distinct essential elements. Scott v. State, 190 Ga. App. 492, 379 S.E.2d 199, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 899, 379 S.E.2d 199 (1989); Clark v. State, 206 Ga. App. 10, 424 S.E.2d 310 (1992).

Charges of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon each had their own distinctive element and did not merge. Smith v. State, 205 Ga. App. 810, 424 S.E.2d 56 (1992).

Offense of possession of a firearm during commission of a crime does not merge with offense of voluntary manslaughter, and sentences for possession of a firearm and manslaughter could run consecutively. Clark v. State, 206 Ga. App. 10, 424 S.E.2d 310 (1992).

Defendant was properly sentenced for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, predicated on a burglary count, since the crime involved illegal entry into a building. Clark v. State, 279 Ga. 243, 611 S.E.2d 38 (2005).

Offense of armed robbery did not merge with two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as the expressed legislative intent was to impose double punishment for conduct which violated both O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 and other felony statutes. Garibay v. State, 290 Ga. App. 385, 659 S.E.2d 775 (2008).

Merger not appropriate.

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's two convictions on possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as the crime involved two victims and two separate weapons. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).

Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's sentences for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime because the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime was a crime distinct from the predicate felony; and the legislature intended to impose additional punishment against a person who used a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, including aggravated assault. Garner v. State, 342 Ga. App. 824, 805 S.E.2d 464 (2017).

Double jeopardy provision superseded.

- Statutory double jeopardy provision, O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), is superseded by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 in that offense of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony "shall be considered a separate offense." Miller v. State, 250 Ga. 436, 298 S.E.2d 509 (1983).

Doctrine of collateral estoppel would not, as a matter of law, preclude retrial on the substantive crime when a defendant has been acquitted of possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime. Sanchez v. State, 242 Ga. App. 686, 530 S.E.2d 775 (2000).

No merger into conviction for felony murder.

- Conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106) does not merge with a conviction for felony murder. Hawkins v. State, 262 Ga. 193, 415 S.E.2d 636 (1992).

Double punishment included.

- Counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and armed robbery did not merge. Baker v. State, 214 Ga. App. 640, 448 S.E.2d 745 (1994).

Failure to merge offense.

- Trial court erred in failing to merge conviction for possession of a firearm during commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 with O.C.G.A. § 16-11-33, the statute governing the minimum period of confinement for persons convicted who had prior convictions, because the violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 was established by proof of less than all the facts necessary to establish the violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-133; therefore, the conviction for the lesser included offense was reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Davis v. State, 253 Ga. App. 803, 560 S.E.2d 711 (2002).

Sentences imposed against a defendant for possession of a handgun during the commission of aggravated assault, possession of a handgun during the commission of kidnapping, and possession of a handgun during the commission of hijacking a motor vehicle required merger with the defendant's conviction for possession of a handgun during the commission of rape since there was only one single victim; as such, the defendant could only be convicted once under each of the five subsections of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b). Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 114, 645 S.E.2d 602 (2007).

Trial court erred by sentencing a defendant to five years' imprisonment for possession of a firearm during commission of an aggravated assault, and a consecutive five-year sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of armed robbery. As both the assault and the robbery involved the same victim and both occurred in the same criminal episode, the possession counts merged, and the conviction and sentence for one of those crimes had to be vacated. Abdullah v. State, 284 Ga. 399, 667 S.E.2d 584 (2008).

Defendant's sentence for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), was not void as a result of the trial court's failure to merge the convictions because the defendant's conviction on possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony did not merge with either of the other convictions. McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga. App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (2010).

Trial court erred in failing to merge, for purposes of sentencing, the defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon with that for use of a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of another felony, because the same act was used to establish each of the offenses and each crime did not require proof of a fact not required by the other. Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 105, 733 S.E.2d 407 (2012).

Trial court erred in entering a judgment of conviction and sentence on the possession of a firearm verdict predicated on aggravated assault because the underlying crimes of murder and aggravated assault were committed against one victim; thus, the possession charge predicated on aggravated assault merged with the possession charge predicated on murder. Smith v. State, 297 Ga. 268, 773 S.E.2d 269 (2015).

Although the trial court properly sentenced the second defendant for the weapons charges associated with the first victim's rape, the second victim's armed robbery, and the third victim's aggravated assault, the trial court erred when the court sentenced the second defendant for possession of a firearm during the armed robbery and aggravated assault of the first victim, and the aggravated assault of the second victim because a defendant could only be convicted once for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as to each of the individual victims of the crime spree. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 796 S.E.2d 242 (2017).

Consecutive sentencing required.

- See Busch v. State, 241 Ga. App. 761, 527 S.E.2d 604 (2000).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel due to a failure to investigate defendant's mental health history as: (1) defendant did not claim that defendant was insane at the time of the crimes, was incompetent to stand trial, or was otherwise suffering from delusional compulsion; (2) there was no evidence that defendant was guilty, but mentally ill; and (3) felony murder carried a mandatory life sentence, firearm possession required a consecutive five-year sentence, and the trial court was lenient in sentencing defendant to half of the time allowed by law for an aggravated assault, so there was no harm in the failure to introduce more detail about defendant's mental health history at sentencing. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Consecutive sentencing expressly authorized.

- Five-year sentence imposed upon defendant for possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense of kidnapping was permitted to run consecutively to the separate sentence for kidnapping and Georgia statutory law expressly authorized such a sentence. Cutkelvin v. State, 258 Ga. App. 691, 574 S.E.2d 883 (2002).

Trial court's imposition of sentences of imprisonment on defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), which were to run consecutively to all other sentences imposed in defendant's criminal matter, was within the trial court's discretion under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-10 as the trial court was required to run the sentence consecutively to the underlying felony to that offense, and it had discretion as to other sentences imposed. Owens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (2005).

Consecutive sentence proper.

- On remand, the trial court properly imposed a five-year consecutive sentence for possession of a knife during the commission of crimes. Although consecutive sentences for separate offenses were imposed at the same time and an earlier kidnapping sentence was invalidated, the kidnapping conviction was upheld and the defendant was resentenced. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. App. 518, 662 S.E.2d 297 (2008).

Nothing in the record affirmatively indicated that a trial court erroneously believed that the court had no discretion under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a)(1) to suspend or probate a defendant's mandatory consecutive five-year sentence on a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b); thus, the sentence was properly imposed consecutively to the defendant's sentence for trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1). Weems v. State, 295 Ga. App. 680, 673 S.E.2d 50 (2009).

Defendant's sentence of 20 years to serve for armed robbery, 20 years probation for aggravated assault, and 5 years probation for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, each to run consecutively, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the trial court's sentence fell within the statutory range of punishment, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b),16-8-41(b), and16-11-106(b). McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga. App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (2010).

Consecutive sentencing not required.

- Provision of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b) that the five-year sentence must be imposed consecutively "to any other sentence which the person has received" means that a sentence for the possession offense be served consecutively only to the underlying felony for that offense. Busch v. State, 271 Ga. 591, 523 S.E.2d 21 (1999); Law v. State, 249 Ga. App. 253, 547 S.E.2d 784 (2001)reversing Busch v. State, 234 Ga. App. 766, 507 S.E.2d 868 (1998).

Trial court incorrectly ordered defendant's sentence for possession of a knife during the commission of a crime (five years) to run consecutively to defendant's sentence for kidnapping with bodily injury (life without parole). Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 157, 543 S.E.2d 439 (2000).

Double life sentence erroneous.

- Because sufficient evidence supported convictions for murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, and the state met the state's burden in establishing an adequate chain of custody, two life sentences for the murder of one victim was improper as the conviction for felony murder was simply surplusage; thus, the separate life sentence on the alternative felony murder count had to be vacated. Paschal v. State, 280 Ga. 430, 628 S.E.2d 586 (2006).

Concurrent sentencing not required.

- Trial court has discretion to run sentences concurrently or consecutively, and the trial court did not abuse that discretion in imposing five-year consecutive sentences for each of three firearm possession convictions; O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 did not require the trial court to run the sentences on these offenses concurrently with the sentence on an underlying felony. Pennymon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 450, 582 S.E.2d 582 (2003).

Sentence exceeded statutory maximum.

- Trial court's sentence of the defendant to life imprisonment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was vacated because the sentence far exceeded the statutory maximum term-of-years sentence under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Norris v. State, 289 Ga. 154, 709 S.E.2d 792 (2011).

Factual basis sufficient for guilty plea.

- Sufficient factual basis was established for a defendant's guilty plea to armed robbery, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime when the prosecutor stated that the defendant and an accomplice entered the victims' apartment, forced the victims into rooms at gunpoint, tied the victims up, and stole some items; the prosecutor also noted that much of the crime had been recorded by a9-1-1 operator; defense counsel stated that counsel had discussed the facts with the defendant; and the defendant conceded guilt. Therefore, it was not necessary that the indictment be read into the record. Leary v. State, 291 Ga. App. 754, 662 S.E.2d 733 (2008).

Motion to withdraw guilty plea.

- Defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea was properly denied as withdrawal of the plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice since: (1) defense counsel was not ineffective; (2) the state showed that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (3) the trial court was entitled to discredit contradictory testimony given by the defendant at the motion to withdraw the plea hearing; and (4) the defendant's claim that the defendant had nothing to gain by entering a "blind" plea failed as even assuming, that an aggravated assault conviction would have merged with an armed robbery conviction and that five convictions of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime would have merged with each other for sentencing purposes, the defendant still would have faced an additional five years' to serve if the defendant had not pled guilty. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 767, 634 S.E.2d 875 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), cruelty to children in the first degree, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because the state met the state's burden of showing that the defendant understood the constitutional rights the defendant was giving up by pleading guilty, that the defendant understood that since the plea was non-negotiated, the trial court would sentence the defendant to at least ten years imprisonment and could sentence the defendant to a maximum sentence of life in prison, and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea in order to avoid a trial on the indicted charges. Carson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 225, 723 S.E.2d 516 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013).

Sentence improper.

- Sentence imposed upon the defendant for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was improper because the sentence would require that before the defendant began the sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the defendant had to serve the sentence for the underlying felony of armed robbery and then the sentence for aggravated assault, which was not set forth as an underlying felony. Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 731 S.E.2d 51 (2012).

Trial court imposed a sentence that the law did not allow for unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the court sentenced the defendant to 15 years because O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 only authorized five to ten years. Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549, 748 S.E.2d 400 (2013).

Portion of the trial court's sentencing order in which the court merged the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime into the other crimes of which the defendant was convicted was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing because unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime is a crime distinct from the predicate felony and the defendant should have been sentenced on that count. Scudder v. State, 298 Ga. 438, 782 S.E.2d 638 (2016).

Separate sentences for possession during aggravated assault and burglary proper.

- Firearm possession counts predicated on aggravated assault and burglary were properly subject to separate sentences because O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 permitted one firearm possession conviction as to each victim in a criminal transaction under paragraph (b)(1) as well as an additional conviction for firearm possession during the commission of the crimes enumerated in paragraphs (b)(2) through (b)(5), and burglary fell within paragraph (b)(2). Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015).

Multiple firearms sentences for different crimes involving same victim.

- In the defendant's trial for rape, murder, and other crimes against three separate victims, the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant on six weapons counts, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because the rape, armed robbery, and aggravated assault carried out against the same victim, using the same handgun, permitted sentencing on only one weapons charge; also, the weapons sentence arising out of the aggravated assault of another victim was required to be vacated. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 796 S.E.2d 242 (2017).

ALR.

- Validity of state statute proscribing possession or carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.

Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 507.

Fact that gun was broken, dismantled, or inoperable as affecting criminal responsibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th 745.

What constitutes "use" of firearm for purposes of 18 USCS § 924(c)(1), providing penalty for use of firearm during drug trafficking crime or crime of violence, 125 A.L.R. Fed. 545.