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Call Now: 904-383-7448However, no child who in good faith is being treated solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be considered to be an abused child.
(6.1) "Endangering a child" means:
Sexual abuse shall include consensual sex acts when the sex acts are between minors if any individual is less than 14 years of age; provided, however, that it shall not include consensual sex acts when the sex acts are between a minor and an adult who is not more than four years older than the minor. This provision shall not be deemed or construed to repeal any law concerning the age or capacity to consent.
(Code 1933, § 74-111, enacted by Ga. L. 1965, p. 588, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1196, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 309, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 438, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 242, §§ 1-3; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2059, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1980, p. 921, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1034, §§ 1-3; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1624, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1761, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1695, §§ 1, 1.1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 97, § 19; Ga. L. 1999, p. 81, § 19; Ga. L. 2006, p. 485, § 1/SB 442; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 2-2/HB 228; Ga. L. 2009, p. 733, § 1/SB 69; Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 5-1/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 19/HB 79; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-23/HB 242; Ga. L. 2013, p. 524, § 2-1/HB 78; Ga. L. 2015, p. 906, § 1/HB 268; Ga. L. 2016, p. 773, § 2/HB 905; Ga. L. 2017, p. 343, § 1/HB 86; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 19/HB 323.)
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, added subparagraph (b)(4)(C); redesignated former subparagraphs (b)(4)(C) and (b)(4)(D) as present subparagraphs (b)(4)(D) and (b)(4)(E), respectively; substituted "abused" for " 'abused'" near the end of the undesignated language following present subparagraph (b)(4)(E); added paragraph (b)(6.1); inserted "the" preceding "federal Health Insurance" in the middle of subparagraph (b)(7)(D); substituted "such person's" for "that person's" in paragraph (b)(10); and substituted the present provisions of the undesignated language following subparagraph (b)(10)(I) for the former provisions, which read: "'Sexual abuse' shall not include consensual sex acts involving persons of the opposite sex when the sex acts are between minors or between a minor and an adult who is not more than five years older than the minor. This provision shall not be deemed or construed to repeal any law concerning the age or capacity to consent."
The 2017 amendments. The first 2017 amendment, effective May 8, 2017, in paragraph (b)(10), deleted "or" at the end of subparagraph (b)(10)(H), substituted "; or" for the period at the end of subparagraph (b)(10)(I), and added subparagraph (b)(10)(J). The second 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "provided that such participation" for "provided such participation" near the end of the first sentence of subsection (f).
- Criminal penalty for cruelty to children, § 16-5-70.
Battery, assault, stalking, and other offenses involving family members, § 19-13-1 et seq.
Restriction of access to records concerning reports of child abuse and neglect, § 49-5-40 et seq.
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, "willfully" was substituted for "wilfully" near the end of subsection (h) (formerly subsection (e)).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1990, "provided" was substituted for "providing" in the first sentence of subsection (f).
- Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1(a)/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2012, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of imposing a sentence that provides for a different penalty for a subsequent conviction for the same type of offense, of whatever degree or level, pursuant to this Act."
Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date. Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions."
- Student support, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Department of Education, Chapter 160-4-8.
Day care centers, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Human Resources, Family and Children Services, Subject 290-2-2.
Family day care homes, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Human Resources, Family and Children Services, Subject 290-2-3.
Rules and regulations for child caring institutions, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Human Resources, Family and Children Services, Subject 290-2-5.
Rules and regulations for children's transition care centers, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Human Resources, Family and Children Services, Subject 290-2-6.
Rules and regulations for outdoor child caring programs, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Human Resources, Family and Children Services, Subject 290-2-7.
Rules and regulations governing the child protective services information system, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Rules of Department of Human Services, Family and Children Services, Subject 290-2-30.
- For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 189 (1969). For article citing developments in Georgia juvenile court practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 167 (1981). For annual survey of criminal law and procedure, see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 115 (1989). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 290 (2012). For article, "See No Evil, Speak No Evil: Georgia Supreme Court Narrows Requirements for Mandatory Reporters in May v. State," see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 837 (2015). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For note on 1990 amendment of this Code section, see 7 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 268 (1990). For note on 1993 amendment of this Code section, see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 131 (1993). For note, "Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Laws in Georgia: Strengthening Protection for Georgia's Children," see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 643 (2015). For comment, "Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Laws in Georgia: Strengthening Protection for Georgia's Children," see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 643 (2015).
- Immunity provided by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 is applicable only to such civil or criminal liability as might otherwise result from the act of reporting suspected child molestation or abuse, not to such criminal liability as may arise from the commission of the molestation or abuse itself. Austin v. State, 179 Ga. App. 235, 345 S.E.2d 688 (1986).
- Term "psychologist", as contained in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5, includes only licensed psychologists. Gladson v. State, 258 Ga. 885, 376 S.E.2d 362 (1989).
Counselor, who held a doctoral degree in human development from an accredited university but was not a licensed psychologist, could not be held criminally liable for failure to report alleged child abuse. Gladson v. State, 258 Ga. 885, 376 S.E.2d 362 (1989).
- Statutory obligation to report the abuse of a child is limited to the abuse of a child to whom the mandatory reporter attends pursuant to the reporter's duties in the profession, occupation, employment, or volunteer work by which the reporter is identified as a mandatory reporter. May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 761 S.E.2d 38 (2014).
- Because, by the time the defendant learned of the sexual abuse, the child was no longer the defendant's student, was no longer enrolled in the school at which the defendant taught, and was no longer enrolled at any school in the same school system, the defendant was not attending to the child pursuant to the defendant's duties as a school teacher, and had no legal obligation to report the sexual abuse. May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 761 S.E.2d 38 (2014).
- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 does not expressly create a civil cause of action for damages in favor of the victim or anyone else. Cechman v. Travis, 202 Ga. App. 255, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 905, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1992); Vance v. T.R.C., 229 Ga. App. 608, 494 S.E.2d 714 (1997).
There is nothing within the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 which purports to create a private cause of action in tort in favor of an alleged victim of child abuse against the physician. Cechman v. Travis, 202 Ga. App. 255, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 905, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1992); Vance v. T.R.C., 229 Ga. App. 608, 494 S.E.2d 714 (1997).
No private cause of action lies for a failure to report child abuse in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5. Odem v. Pace Academy, 235 Ga. App. 648, 510 S.E.2d 326 (1998).
Psychologist was not subject to malpractice liability for failure to report suspected child sexual abuse pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5; prior case law established that O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 did not create a private cause of action for the failure to report child abuse. McGarrah v. Posig, 280 Ga. App. 808, 635 S.E.2d 219 (2006).
- As a tenant admitted at a deposition that the tenant's son was sometimes in their home, which the tenant knew was contaminated with toxic mold, without a mask, the landlord had reasonable cause to allege to authorities that the tenant was guilty of child abuse, and was thus entitled to immunity from the tenant's slander claim under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(f). Brown v. Rader, 299 Ga. App. 606, 683 S.E.2d 16 (2009).
- Trial court did not err in granting a protective order under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90(a)(1) against a foster parent who had placed a family under extensive surveillance through a combination of Internet searches and third party observations of the family's home and contacted law enforcement, causing groundless investigations. The foster parent was not immune from liability under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(f) because the foster parent had not received any information that a child in the home had been subjected to abuse. Owen v. Watts, 307 Ga. App. 493, 705 S.E.2d 852 (2010).
Plaintiff, staff member at defendant's school, was not within class of protected persons contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5, and the plaintiff's claim for damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 could not survive summary judgment. Odem v. Pace Academy, 235 Ga. App. 648, 510 S.E.2d 326 (1998).
- Grant of immunity from liability, under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5, extended to a psychologist to whom a child welfare agency referred a child for evaluation as part of an investigation of suspected child abuse and the evidence did not establish bad faith on the part of the psychologist in making a report to the agency that the child had been sexually abused. Michaels v. Gordon, 211 Ga. App. 470, 439 S.E.2d 722 (1993).
- When children's allegations were sufficient to cause a reasonable person to suspect that child abuse occurred, a doctor had to report the suspected abuse and had immunity from suit for that report. O'Heron v. Blaney, 276 Ga. 871, 583 S.E.2d 834 (2003).
- As a student's personal injury damages claims against three school employees were based on the employees negligent failure to supervise the student when the student was with a non-party, and that such failure allegedly led to the student being molested by the third-party, the supervisory decisions made were discretionary acts requiring personal deliberation and judgment; hence, any reliance on O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 did not provide a basis for civil liability against the employees for a negligent breach of a ministerial duty, and the student's claims were barred by the doctrine of official immunity as a matter of law. Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 643 S.E.2d 814 (2007).
- Preponderance of the evidence supported an ALJ's finding that an offender committed an act of child sex abuse on the 14-year-old victim, who testified that the offender humped the victim like a dog twice although the victim tried to get away from the offender; the term "hump like a dog" was within common understanding; the ALJ could have found that the offender performed an act of apparent sexual stimulation under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(b)(10)(G), for purposes of listing the offender on the child abuser registry. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Steiner, 303 Ga. 890, 815 S.E.2d 883 (2018).
- Under the Child Protective Services Information System, O.C.G.A. § 49-5-180 et seq, an alleged child abuser has the right to a hearing before an administrative law judge, who makes the final agency decision after hearing evidence and argument from the alleged abuser and from DFCS. The role of the abuse investigator in the determination of whether an incident should be in the child abuse registry does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Steiner, 303 Ga. 890, 815 S.E.2d 883 (2018).
Hospital's report of the results of a drug test administered to a child was not made in bad faith, and summary judgment for the hospital based on the good faith immunity provision of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(f) was warranted. Baldwin County Hosp. Auth. v. Trawick, 233 Ga. App. 539, 504 S.E.2d 708 (1998).
- O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 does not require that notice be given by those physicians who should have had reasonable cause to suspect child abuse, and it does not penalize those physicians who fail to discover and report suspected instances of child abuse. Cechman v. Travis, 202 Ga. App. 255, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 905, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1992).
As a general rule, when the injury is not due to the fault of the person to be charged, the fact that a person sees another who is injured does not, of itself, impose on that person any legal obligation to afford relief or assistance, but the person may have a strong moral and humanitarian obligation to do so. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 may change this common-law rule to the extent of imposing upon the physician, who has reasonable cause to believe that a child has been abused, a legal duty to the state to report that suspicion. That section does not, however, change that common-law rule by imposing upon the physician, who merely failed to discover and report suspected child abuse, a legal liability to the child for future acts of child abuse. Cechman v. Travis, 202 Ga. App. 255, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 905, 414 S.E.2d 282 (1992).
- Denial of the plea in bar, asserting immunity from prosecution pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5, does not constitute a final judgment, nor is the order otherwise directly appealable. Austin v. State, 179 Ga. App. 235, 345 S.E.2d 688 (1986).
- Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury regarding O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 because the defendant cited no authority in support of the defendant's proposition that the trial court erred in refusing to give the instruction; the individual whom the defendant alleged failed to report the abuse as required by the statute was not a witness at trial, and the issue was irrelevant to the jury's determination of the defendant's guilt. Hamrick v. State, 304 Ga. App. 378, 696 S.E.2d 403 (2010).
Cited in Lipsey v. State, 170 Ga. App. 770, 318 S.E.2d 184 (1984); Perguson v. State, 221 Ga. App. 212, 470 S.E.2d 909 (1996); Moss v. State, 244 Ga. App. 295, 535 S.E.2d 292 (2000); Hubert v. State, 297 Ga. App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (2009).
- For purposes of Georgia's child abuse reporting statute, providing for protection of children whose health and welfare are adversely affected and threatened, "cause to believe" is equivalent to "cause to suspect." 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-131.
- Although the statute did not explicitly mention "deprived" children as defined in Juvenile Court Code, the definition was certainly inclusive of a child who is abused, neglected, or exploited. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-131.
Phrase "participating in any judicial proceeding" clearly extended to filing of petition as well as mere testimony in proceeding initiated by others. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-70.
- Personnel of public and private schools are "caretakers" as defined in O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-29.
- Department of Human Resources, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5, has authority and responsibility only for investigating reports of suspected abuse when it is alleged or reasonably suspected that the abuse of the child was by a parent or caretaker. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-29.
Trial Report: Third Party Suit Against Therapists for Implanting False Memory of Childhood Molestation, 57 Am. Jur. Trials 313.
When Clergy Fail Their Flock: Litigating the Clergy Sexual Abuse Case, 91 Am. Jur. Trials 151.
- Failure to provide medical attention for child as criminal neglect, 12 A.L.R.2d 1047.
Right, in child custody proceedings, to cross-examine investigating officer whose report is used by court in its decision, 59 A.L.R.3d 1337.
Admissibility of expert medical testimony on battered child syndrome, 98 A.L.R.3d 306.
Validity and construction of penal statute prohibiting child abuse, 1 A.L.R.4th 38.
Admissibility at criminal prosecution of expert testimony on battering parent syndrome, 43 A.L.R.4th 1203.
Validity, construction, and application of statute limiting physician-patient privilege in judicial proceedings relating to child abuse or neglect, 44 A.L.R.4th 649.
Validity, construction, and application of state statute requiring doctor or other person to report child abuse, 73 A.L.R.4th 782.
Denial or restriction of visitation rights to parent charged with sexually abusing child, 1 A.L.R.5th 776.
Total Results: 12
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-09-17
Snippet: report such abuse only a misdemeanor. See OCGA §§ 19-7-5 (c) (1), (h). Because what “causes” means as it
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-06-18
Citation: 815 S.E.2d 883
Snippet: defined in OCGA § 49-5-180 (8) & (10) and OCGA § 19-7-5 (b) (10).2 *889Steiner's name and identifying information
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-11-21
Citation: 300 Ga. 403, 794 S.E.2d 37, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 791
Snippet: this teacher had no legal obligation under OCGA § 19-7-5 to report the disclosure of sexual contact.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-06-30
Snippet: This case concerns the meaning of OCGA § 19-7-5, which requires school teachers1 and certain other
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-06-30
Citation: 295 Ga. 388, 761 S.E.2d 38, 2014 WL 2924949, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 537
Snippet: This case concerns the meaning of OCGA § 19-7-5, whichrequires school teachers 1 and
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-06-28
Citation: 697 S.E.2d 166, 287 Ga. 448, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2051, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 478
Snippet: cause of action arose from the violation of OCGA § 19-7-5, which makes it a crime for certain people to fail
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-02-16
Citation: 592 S.E.2d 830, 277 Ga. 588, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 596, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 140
Snippet: consider and address this issue. Compare OCGA § 19-7-5 (b) (3) (A) (for mandatory reporting purposes,
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2003-06-30
Citation: 583 S.E.2d 834, 276 Ga. 871, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2022, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 608
Snippet: judgment based on the immunity provided in OCGA § 19-7-5 (f). The Court of Appeals reversed.1 Because the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2000-10-02
Citation: 535 S.E.2d 492, 272 Ga. 788
Snippet: or health care facility. Compare, e.g., OCGA § 19-7-5, dealing with reporting requirements when a child
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-03-03
Citation: 267 Ga. 728, 482 S.E.2d 275
Snippet: children); OCGA § 16-6-4 (child molestation); OCGA § 19-7-5 (b) (3) (defining child abuse for purposes of terminating
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-03-03
Citation: 482 S.E.2d 275, 267 Ga. 728, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 691, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 83
Snippet: children); OCGA § 16-6-4 (child molestation); OCGA § 19-7-5(b)(3) (defining child abuse for purposes of terminating
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1989-02-17
Citation: 376 S.E.2d 362, 258 Ga. 885, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 78
Snippet: charging that they were persons required by OCGA § 19-7-5 to report child abuse; that they had reasonable