O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 33-24-9 (2019)

Approval or disapproval of forms

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) No basic insurance policy or annuity contract form or application form where written application is required and is to be made a part of the policy or contract or printed rider or endorsement form or form of renewal certificate shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state unless the form has been filed with and approved by the Commissioner. This subsection shall not apply to surety bonds or to specially rated inland marine risks nor to policies, riders, endorsements, or forms of unique character designed for and used with relation to insurance upon a particular subject or which related to the manner of distribution of benefits or to the reservation of rights and benefits under life or accident and sickness insurance policies and are used at the request of the individual policyholder, contract holder, or certificate holder.

(b) Every filing shall be made not less than 90 days in advance of any delivery. At the expiration of 90 days the form filed shall be deemed approved unless prior thereto it has been approved or disapproved by the Commissioner. Approval of any form by the Commissioner shall constitute a waiver of any unexpired portion of the waiting period. The Commissioner may extend by not more than an additional 90 days the period within which he may approve or disapprove any form by giving notice of the extension before expiration of the initial 90 day period. At the expiration of the period as so extended and in the absence of prior approval or disapproval, any form shall be deemed approved. The Commissioner may at any time, after notice and for cause shown, withdraw any approval after notice and hearing as provided in Code Sections 33-2-17 through 33-2-23 and 33-2-26 through 33-2-28. (c) Any order of the Commissioner disapproving any form or withdrawing a previous approval shall state in reasonable detail the grounds for that action. (d) The Commissioner may by order, in exceptional cases, exempt from the requirements of this Code section for so long as he deems proper any insurance document or form or type of insurance document or form as specified in the order to which, in his discretion, this Code section may not practicably be applied or the filing and approval of which are, in his discretion, not desirable or necessary for the protection of the public. (e) This Code section shall apply also to any form used by domestic insurers for delivery in a jurisdiction outside this state, if the insurance supervisory official of that jurisdiction informs the Commissioner that the form is not subject to approval or disapproval by the official and upon the Commissioner’s order requiring the form to be submitted to him for approval or disapproval. The standards applicable to forms for domestic use shall apply to such forms. (f ) Each filing made pursuant to this Code section shall be accompanied by a fee or fees as provided in Code Section 33-8-1.

History

Code 1933, § 56-2410, enacted by Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 499, § 5; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2725, § 27.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘The Chevron Two-Step in Georgia’s Administrative Law,’’ see 46 Ga. L. Rev. 871 (2012).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Insurance providing coverage for aerial pesticide contractors is of a unique character and is thereby expressly covered by the exclusionary language of subsection (a) of O.C.G.A.

§ 33-24-9. Kelly v. Lloyd’s of London, 255 Ga. 291, 336 S.E.2d 772 (1985). Assault and battery exclusions. - Failure of an insurer to file and obtain administrative approval of an assault and

battery exclusion in a liability insurance policy did not render the exclusion void and unenforceable. Penn Am. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 228 Ga. App. 659, 492 S.E.2d 571 (1997). Cited in Sollek v. Laseter, 126 Ga. App.

137, 190 S.E.2d 148 (1972); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 542 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Page, 188 Ga. App. 876, 374 S.E.2d 768 (1988).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Group coverage of domestic partnerships violative of public policy. - Municipal ordinances which create the status of domestic partnership are violative of constitutional and statutory provisions precluding municipal legislation re-

lating to legal status and relationship; thus, group health insurance coverage provided pursuant to such ordinances is violative of the public policy of this state. 1993 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 93-26.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, §§ 19 et seq., 31. C.J.S. - 44 C.J.S., Insurance, 478 et seq. ALR. - Right of insured or beneficiary to enforce a policy provision more favorable to him than the standard policy; or to

have policy reformed so as to include such a provision, 113 A.L.R. 773. Validity, construction, and effect of approval or disapproval by Insurance Commissioner (or similar official) of policy, 119 A.L.R. 877.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 11 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1983–2021 · leading case: Kelly v. Lloyd's of London, 336 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. 1985).

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Kelly v. Lloyd's of London, 336 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. 1985). · cites it 10× “First Certified Question “(l)-(a) Whether the policy form used by Lloyd’s to issue a policy of aircraft and aerial application insurance to R & B Helicopters is excepted from the filing requirement of OCGA § 33-24-9 (a)? “(b) If not, does Lloyd’s failure to file the form in…”

Sec. Life Ins. v. Clark, 494 S.E.2d 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 6× “Penn America also relies upon OCGA § 33-24-12 (a) which provides that “[a]ny insurance policy, rider, or endorsement . . . otherwise valid which contains any condition or provision not in compliance with the requirements of this title shall not be rendered invalid due to the…”

Penn Am. Ins. v. Miller, 492 S.E.2d 571 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 12× “Penn, however, had issued the policy without complying with OCGA § 33-24-9 (a), which provides that “[n]o basic insurance policy .”

Clark v. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 509 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 2× “The third question posed on certiorari concerns whether an insurer’s failure to file a policy with the insurance commissioner as required by OCGA §§ 33-24-9 and 33-1-7 can serve as a basis for liability under RICO.”

Purcell v. Allstate Ins., 310 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 33-24-9 (Code Ann. § 56-2410). The relevant endorsement in the instant case is entitled “Individual Named Insured” and is headed by the following cautionary language: “THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY.”

Cincinnati Ins. v. Page, 374 S.E.2d 768 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “The court further noted that Cincinnati failed to provide a definition or explanation of the critical term “Single Limit” anywhere within the policy, even though its policy and endorsement forms approved and on file with the State Commissioner of Insurance pursuant to OCGA §…”

Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indem. Ins., 202 F.R.D. 484 (S.D. Tex. 2001). “2000); Ga Code Ann. § 33-24-9 (1996); Haw.Rev.Stat.”

Lloyds of London v. Kelly, 760 F.2d 240 (11th Cir. 1985). · cites it 3× “PER CURIAM: This diversity action presents questions concerning the construction of O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-9(a) and 2-7-103(a) (1982) and the interpretation of the Georgia Court of Appeals’s decision in Richmond v.”

Jenkins v. Prime Ins. Co. (N.D. Ga. 2021). · cites it 4× “They additionally allege that CLJ was not provided with the disclosures required under Georgia law, and the Policy was not filed with or approved by the Georgia Commissioner of Insurance pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-9. Defendants, however, contend that Plaintiffs have failed to…”

Lloyd's of London v. Kelly, 785 F.2d 276 (11th Cir. 1986). “We certified the following three questions: 1— (a) Whether the policy form used by Lloyd’s to issue a policy of aircraft and aerial application insurance to R & B Helicopters is excepted from the filing requirement of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-9(a)? (b) If not, does Lloyd’s failure to…”

Jenkins v. Prime Ins. Co. (D. Utah 2021). “They additionally allege that CLJ was not provided with the disclosures required under Georgia law, and the Policy was not filed with or approved by the Georgia Commissioner of Insurance pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-9. Defendants, however, contend that Plaintiffs have failed to…”

— 33-24-9(a) — 2 cases

Lloyds of London v. Kelly, 760 F.2d 240 (11th Cir. 1985). “PER CURIAM: This diversity action presents questions concerning the construction of O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-9(a) and 2-7-103(a) (1982) and the interpretation of the Georgia Court of Appeals’s decision in Richmond v.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.