O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10 (2019)

Employer’s duty with respect to provision of safe employment generally

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be reasonably safe for the employees therein, shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, shall adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such an employment and place of employment safe, and shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such employees. (b) Every employer and every owner of a place of employment, place of public assembly, or public building, now or hereafter constructed, shall so construct, repair, and maintain such facility as to render it reasonably safe.

History

(Ga. L. 1937, p. 230, § 10.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Safety and weight support requirements for scaffolding and staging design, § 25-15-110. Liability of employers for injuries to employees generally, § 34-7-20 et seq.

Law reviews. - For annual survey on insurance law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 151 (2012).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Employer, not union, obligated to provide safe workplace. - Common law places the duty to provide a safe workplace on an employer not on a union. By O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10, it is also true in Georgia. Skipper v. Hoff & Assocs., 684 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1987).

Master is to make effort to furnish safe place. - Fixed standard of the law that the master shall furnish a safe place for the servant to work does not impose an absolute duty to furnish a safe place, but the duty is placed upon the master to make an effort to do so. Smith v. Ammons,

228 Ga. 855, 188 S.E.2d 866 (1972). Master is held to only ordinary care in furnishing servant reasonably safe place to work. Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 188 S.E.2d 866 (1972). Jury charge on ordinary care. - It is a misdirection to charge the jury in language the effect of which is to subject the master to more extensive obligations than those indicated by the phrase ‘‘ordinary care’’ or its equivalents. Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 188 S.E.2d 866 (1972). Claim brought in employment discrimination case. - The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation in a case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq., in which (1) an employee alleged tangible employment action sexual harassment, a sexually hostile work environment, retaliation, and state law claims; (2) a magistrate judge found that an employee’s claim for negligent failure to provide a safe working environment arose out of O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10(a); (3) the magistrate judge noted that the employee had provided no citation to any case law that permitted such a claim to be raised on the facts in the present case; and (4) the employee had not filed any objec-

tion to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the claim be dismissed. Orquiola v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 16, 2007). Employer not responsible for an employee’s suicide. - Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an employer because the evidence failed to show that the employer was responsible for creating a situation which led to an employee’s suicide; therefore, the employer had no duty to make a reasonable effort to render aide for the employee’s emotional well-being and avoid any further harm. When a regional manager for the employer went to the office where the employee worked to investigate fictitious loans which were discovered in an audit, the employee, who was alleged to have participated in the loans, talked to the manager about the situation, asked if the employee could step outside to smoke a cigarette and make a phone call, left the premises, drove home, and committed suicide. McCrary v. Middle Ga. Mgmt. Servs., 315 Ga. App. 247, 726 S.E.2d 740 (2012). Cited in Horton v. Ammons, 125 Ga. App. 69, 186 S.E.2d 469 (1971); Sams v. United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union, 866 F.2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1989); Englehart v. Oki Am., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 151, 433 S.E.2d 331 (1993).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Employment Relationship, §§ 179 et seq., 239. 61 Am. Jur. 2d, Plant and Job Safety - OSHA and State Laws, § 1 et seq. ALR. - Duty of master providing machine of standard make and in common use to equip same with safety device or guard, 36 ALR 1477. Liability of contractee and contractor inter se with respect to injuries sustained while the stipulated work is in course of performance, 44 ALR 891. Duty of employer to furnish tools or appliances to be used in effecting rescues, 50 ALR 372. Duty of owner of premises to furnish independent contractor or his employee a safe place of work, where contract is for repairs, 31 ALR2d 1375. Liability of master for injury or death of servant on master’s premises where in-

jury occurred outside working hours, 76 ALR2d 1215. Shipowner’s liability for injury caused to seaman or longshoreman by cargo or its stowage, 90 ALR2d 710. Employer’s liability to employee for failure to provide work environment free from tobacco smoke, 63 ALR4th 1021. Tort liability for window washer’s injury or death, 69 ALR4th 207. Liability for retaliation against at-will employee for public complaints or efforts relating to health or safety, 75 ALR4th 13. When has employer ‘‘repeatedly’’ violated Occupational Safety and Health Act within meaning of § 17(a) of Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)), 151 ALR Fed. 1. What constitutes ‘‘willful’’ violation for purposes of § 17(a) or (e) of Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29

U.S.C.A. § 666(a) or § 666(e)), 161 ALR Fed. 561.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1987–2025 · leading case: Travis Pruitt & Assocs., P.C. v. Hooper, 625 S.E.2d 445 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
Travis Pruitt & Assocs., P.C. v. Hooper, 625 S.E.2d 445 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 16× “2) that after she complained to TPA about the harassment, TPA's negligence was a proximate cause of subsequent harassment because TPA continued to employ Taylor and failed to take appropriate action to prevent Taylor from continuing to harass her in the workplace; and (3) that…”
Smith v. Pefanis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2009). · cites it 16× “Plaintiff also asserted state law causes of action of negligent hiring and retention, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and failure to provide plaintiff with a safe work environment in violation of O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10. Defendants moved for summary…”
McCrary v. Middle Georgia Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 726 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 6× “(a) Specifically, McCrary claims that MGM breached its duty under OCGA § 34-2-10 to take reasonable actions to protect Morris’s well-being.”
Orquiola v. Nat'l City Mortg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ga. 2007). · cites it 2× “In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge King found that Plaintiffs claim for failure to provide a safe working environment arose out of O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10(a). Magistrate Judge King noted, however, that Plaintiff had provided no citation to any case law which permitted…”
Englehart v. Oki Am., Inc., 433 S.E.2d 331 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “(c) The Engleharts contend that OKI is liable for the alleged negligence of Weeks because OKI has a nondelegable duty, imposed by OCGA § 34-2-10 (b), to maintain a safe workplace.”
Georgia Power Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1989). · cites it 2× “For example, the public policy of the State of Georgia is reflected in O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10, which provides, Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be reasonably safe for the employees therein, .”
Bunch (M.D. Ga. 2025). · cites it 2× “See O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10; see also Cline v. McLeod, 349 S.”
Skipper v. Hoff & Assocs., 684 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1987). · cites it 2× “O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10. Under federal law, unions do have a duty to represent fairly all of the employees of the bargaining unit.”
— 34-2-10(a) — 2 cases
Orquiola v. Nat'l City Mortg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ga. 2007). “In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge King found that Plaintiffs claim for failure to provide a safe working environment arose out of O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10(a). Magistrate Judge King noted, however, that Plaintiff had provided no citation to any case law which permitted…”
Smith v. Pefanis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2009). “Plaintiff also asserted state law causes of action of negligent hiring and retention, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and failure to provide plaintiff with a safe work environment in violation of O.C.G.A. § 34-2-10. Defendants moved for summary…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.