O.C.G.A. § 34-6-21 (2019)
Membership in or resignation from labor organization as condition of employment or continuation of employment; application of federal law
(a) No individual shall be required as a condition of employment or continuance of employment to be or remain a member or an affiliate of a labor organization or to resign from or to refrain from membership in or affiliation with a labor organization.
(b) No governmental body may pass any law, ordinance, or regulation or impose any contractual, zoning, permitting, licensing, or other condition that requires any employer or employee to waive statutory rights under federal labor laws.
(c) No governmental body may pass any law, ordinance, or regulation that would require, in whole or in part, an employer or multiple employer association to accept or otherwise agree to any provisions that are mandatory or nonmandatory subjects of collective bargaining under federal labor laws, including, but not limited to, any limitations on an employer’s or multiple employer association’s right to engage in collective bargaining with a labor organization, to lock out employees, or to operate during a work stoppage; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not invalidate or otherwise restrict the application of federal labor laws.
(d) No employer or labor organization shall be forced to enter into any agreement, contract, understanding, or practice, written or oral, implied or expressed, that subverts the established process by which employees may make informed and free decisions regarding representation and collective bargaining rights provided for by federal labor laws.
History
(Ga. L. 1947, p. 616, § 2; Ga. L. 2013, p. 623, § 3/HB 361.)
Annotations
Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2013, p. 623, § 6/HB 361, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.
Law reviews. - For article discussing right of Georgia public employees to organize into labor unions, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activity, see 4 Ga. L. Rev. 110 (1969). For article suggesting that Georgia’s prohibition against closed shops may be an incentive
for establishment of non-Georgia business enterprises in the state, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 629 (1976). For article on the 2013 amendment of this Code section, see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 191 (2013). For note advocating reassessment of state authority towards injunctions in labor disputes, see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 461 (1967).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Remedy for discharged employees is action for damages. - When employees have been wrongfully, but finally, discharged by the employer, the remedy available to the employees so discharged
is an action for damages; a mandatory injunction will not be granted against the completed acts of discharge. Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951). Upon general rules of law. - If em-
ployees, in violation of this section were wrongfully discharged, their right to damages, if any, would rest upon the general rules of law of Georgia. Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951). Amount of damages. - When petitioners were employed on a week-to-week basis, being paid weekly, and their discharge was based on their affiliation with a labor union and contrary to the pronouncement of this section, the most that the petitioners could collect in damages would be the full term of their employment (one week). Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951). Right to work law violation under state law. - In a state which has a ‘‘right to work’’ law, such as the one provided for in this section, the right to work is a state-conferred right, and a violation of this right creates a cause of action which arises under state law rather than under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. McDowell v. Clement Bros. Co., 260 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ga. 1966). No private right of action. - Because O.C.G.A. § 34-6-21 did not provide a private remedy and was only a statement of public policy by the State of Geor-
gia, the plaintiff temporary Mexican farm workers’ claim that the defendant employer discriminated against union members in recruiting and hiring the workers in violation of O.C.G.A. § 34-6-21 failed. Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Ga. 2010). Claim of Mexican farm workers rejected. - Nothing showed the defendant employer was directly involved in removing union workers from a preferred worker list; thus, a breach of contract claim filed by the plaintiff temporary Mexican farm workers, premised on an immigration conveyance order’s promise to comply with all employment-related law, which included O.C.G.A. § 34-6-21, failed. Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Ga. 2010). Cited in Carpenters Local Union No. 3024 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 220 Ga. 596, 140 S.E.2d 876 (1965); Martell v. Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp., 114 Ga. App. 646, 152 S.E.2d 579 (1966); Stein Printing Co. v. Atlanta Typographical Union 48, 329 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Nixon v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 249 Ga. 862, 295 S.E.2d 78 (1982).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Union shop agreement. - A union shop is not legal in Georgia. 1952-53 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 124. A union shop agreement between a railroad and a union is enforceable in Georgia
in light of the amendment to the federal Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., authorizing union shop agreements notwithstanding any state right to work law. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-12.
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 48 Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, §§ 1059, 1086. 48A Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, § 2232 et seq. C.J.S. - 51 C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 13. 51A C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 549. ALR. - Who are entitled to benefit of statutes giving right to combine, 166 ALR 161. Rights in union label, shop card, or other insignia denoting union shop or workmanship, 42 ALR2d 709.
Labor relations acts: discharge of employee as reprisal or retaliation for union organizational activities, 83 ALR2d 532. Validity, construction, and application of state right-to-work provisions, 105 ALR5th 243. Damages for allegedly wrongful interference with employment rights as received ‘‘on account of personal injuries,’’ so as to be excludible from income tax under 26 USC § 104(a)(2), 106 ALR Fed. 321.