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O.C.G.A.Title 40Chapter 13

O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30 (2019)

Authority to make arrests

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2018 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1983–2025 28citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 28 opinions since 1983, 4 of them in the last five years.

Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial under this article, provided that officers of an incorporated municipality shall have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of such municipality unless such jurisdiction is given by local or other law.

History

(Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2785, § 29.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Provisions regarding procedure for arrests for violation of motor vehicle laws, § 17-4-23.

Display of driver's license in lieu of bail, formal recognizance, or incarceration for violations of traffic laws, § 17-6-11.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Outer limits of municipal officer's authority for misdemeanor arrests. - Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30) defines outer limits of a municipal officer's authority in making arrest for misdemeanors and traffic offenses. Jones v. City of Pembroke, 220 Ga. 213, 138 S.E.2d 276 (1964).

Authority to issue citations. - University police officer had authority under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30 to issue citations for an accident that occurred at an intersection that bordered the campus, and the trial court, therefore, properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 relating to the charge of failing to obey a traffic control device in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20; the broad language of § 40-13-30 gave any officer of Georgia that had authority to arrest for a misdemeanor the authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial. Hawkins v. State, 281 Ga. App. 852, 637 S.E.2d 422 (2006).

Arrest powers outside officers' appointed territories. - Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30) provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside the officers' appointed territories. This interpretation is compelled by the statute's specific territorial restriction of only municipal officers. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 194 S.E.2d 623 (1972).

Under common law, even a municipal officer has power of arrest outside the officer's city limits when a hot pursuit situation exists; therefore, an officer's pursuit of the defendant in a truck matching the description of a stolen vehicle, which went into an adjoining county, was authorized. Hastings v. State, 211 Ga. App. 873, 441 S.E.2d 83 (1994).

Trial court did not err in granting police officers summary judgment in a citizen's action alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the defendant's arrest because the arrest was lawful under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 since obstruction occurred in the officers' presence; even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant, the officers had the authority and discretion to arrest outside the officers' jurisdiction for offenses committed in the officers' presence and, therefore, the officers' immunity could not be defeated by the officers' decision to arrest outside of the officers' jurisdiction. Taylor v. Waldo, 309 Ga. App. 108, 709 S.E.2d 278 (2011).

Even though the deputy sheriff thereafter crossed into an adjoining county in search of a safer location to conduct a DUI investigation, the sheriff was not deprived of the authority to then arrest the defendant for the crimes committed in the sheriff's presence. Suggs v. State, 343 Ga. App. 71, 806 S.E.2d 224 (2017).

"Hot pursuit" exception authorized. - Exception to Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9 (see O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30) is an instance in which a crime is committed in the municipality and the officer's "hot pursuit" takes the officer beyond the officer's geographical limits to effectuate the arrest. Wooten v. State, 135 Ga. App. 97, 217 S.E.2d 350 (1975); Poss v. State, 167 Ga. App. 86, 305 S.E.2d 884 (1983).

Policeman's legal authority under the "hot pursuit" doctrine under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30) includes both the power to arrest and the power to perform other normal police functions incidental to and necessitated by the arrest. Wooten v. State, 135 Ga. App. 97, 217 S.E.2d 350 (1975).

Arrest is valid when the crime was committed in a municipality and a city officer gave "hot pursuit" which took the officer beyond the limits of the municipality to effectuate the arrest. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Head, 149 Ga. App. 528, 254 S.E.2d 747 (1979).

Critical elements characterizing "hot pursuit" are the continuity and immediacy of the pursuit, rather than merely the rate of speed at which pursuit is made. Poss v. State, 167 Ga. App. 86, 305 S.E.2d 884 (1983).

"Hot pursuit" doctrine applied. - When the only violation committed in the presence of city officers was exceeding the speed limit in violation of a city ordinance, the "hot pursuit" doctrine still would apply. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Head, 149 Ga. App. 528, 254 S.E.2d 747 (1979).

Although an arresting officer of an incorporated municipality normally did not have the power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of that municipality, the officer's arrest of the defendant in a neighboring county was authorized under the "hot pursuit" doctrine since the officer spotted the car the defendant was reportedly traveling in inside the county where the officer had arresting authority, and the officer continuously and immediately pursued the defendant's car into the neighboring county where the officer waited for backup to arrive in order to make the arrest; thus, the traffic stop of the defendant following a dispatch that the defendant was a suspected shoplifter was legal and the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied. Margerum v. State, 260 Ga. App. 398, 579 S.E.2d 825 (2003).

Cited in Newmans v. State, 65 Ga. App. 288, 16 S.E.2d 87 (1941); Dodd v. State, 85 Ga. App. 589, 69 S.E.2d 784 (1952); Wright v. State, 134 Ga. App. 406, 214 S.E.2d 688 (1975); McLarty v. State, 176 Ga. App. 433, 336 S.E.2d 273 (1985); Delong v. State, 185 Ga. App. 314, 363 S.E.2d 811 (1987); Page v. State, 250 Ga. App. 795, 553 S.E.2d 176 (2001); Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003); Duprel v. State, 301 Ga. App. 469, 687 S.E.2d 863 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Zilke v. State, 299 Ga. 232, 787 S.E.2d 745 (2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sheriff is authorized to enforce traffic regulations on the highways of this state. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-385.

"Hot pursuit" doctrine. - Municipal police officers may go beyond city limits in "hot pursuit" situations and make arrests. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-73.

Constable's authority limited. - In the absence of a warrant, a constable does not have the authority to enforce the motor vehicle laws of this state. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-56.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 24, 106, 107, 273, 313,349, 361. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 955, 956, 963, 989.

ALR. - Degree of force that may be employed in arresting one charged with a misdemeanor, 42 A.L.R. 1200.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENThornton v. State, 851 S.E.2d 564 (Ga. 2020).
cites § 40-13-30 29×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“Does OCGA § 40-13-30 grant statewide arrest powers to Department of Natural Resources game wardens for violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road? 2.”
The case’s holding
Municipal officers may not make arrests beyond corporate limits unless local or other law grants that jurisdiction, and the statute on misdemeanor traffic charges empowers game wardens to enforce Rules of the Road.
Later courts cite it for
“when . . . confronted with a statute having several parts, we must endeavor to harmonize those parts so as to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENBacon v. State., 820 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 40-13-30 10×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“*691 OCGA § 40-13-30 provides: Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer charges and bring…”
Later courts cite it for
“a police officer is not discharging his lawful duties when he is making an unlawful arrest, and a person who resists an unlawful arrest does not hinder the officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENState v. Heredia, 555 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 40-13-30 6×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“ss otherwise provided by law, (1) No county may exercise any of the [police protection] powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the…”
The case’s holding
Searches incident to arrest and inventory searches serve as two alternative means for establishing the reasonableness of a search.
Later courts cite it for
“our law regarding searches incident to arrest and inventory searches provides two alternative means for finding that a particular search was reasonable.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENGrech v. Clayton Cnty., GA, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 369 cases
The case’s holding
A county is not liable under section 1983 for the actions of a sheriff if the county lacks constitutional authority and control over the sheriff's law enforcement functions.
Later courts cite it for
“an unofficial custom or practice of the county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county.” · 72 citing courts
5
GREENGlazner v. State, 318 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 40-13-30 12×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“He bases his enumeration of error on the illegality of arrest based upon OCGA § 40-13-30. In pertinent part that statute provides that officers of a municipality have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of the municipality "unless such jurisdiction is given by…”
6
GREENMiddleton v. State, 890 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. 2023).
cites § 40-13-30 8×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“The trial court granted Middleton’s motion to suppress under OCGA § 40-13-30, which provides that a municipality’s law enforcement officers lack arrest powers outside of the municipality’s city limits.”
Later courts cite it for
“never raised in proceedings below” · 1 citing court
7
YELLOWSullivan v. State, 706 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 40-13-30 6×cited by 6 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Disapproved in part by Zilke v. State: 1 citing opinion says disapproved.
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“” 7 Indeed, “[t]his court has held that two statutes, OCGA §§ 40-13-30 and 17-4-23 (a), . . . authorize police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses in other jurisdictions.”
8
GREENState v. Bethel, 705 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 40-13-30 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“Bethel points to OCGA § 40-13-30 as authority for his contention that Turner was without authority to arrest him.”
Later courts cite it for
“where... the issue turns on the question of whether a trial court committed an error of law in granting a motion to suppress, we apply a de novo standard of review.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENHawkins v. State, 637 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 40-13-30 6×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“” 6 Hawkins attempts to persuade us that OCGA§ 40-13-30 does not apply to Officer Washington as a university police officer and that he therefore had no authority to issue a traffic citation regardless of the proximity of the intersection to campus.”
10
GREENTaylor v. Waldo, 709 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“He also contends there are material issues of relevant fact.”
Later courts cite it for
“public agents are immune from liability for their discretionary acts unless they are done with malice or intent to injure.” · 5 citing courts
11
GREENGriffis v. State, 673 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 40-13-30 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“Griffis argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges because Sergeant Curry lacked authority to arrest him pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-30. As this presents a question of law, “the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject…”
12
GREENSuggs v. State., 806 S.E.2d 224 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 40-13-30 8×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial under this article,…”
13
GREENState v. Picot, 565 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county *515 affected. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Const, of 1983, Art.”
14
GREENDuprel v. State, 687 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“Duprel cites OCGA § 40-13-30 for the proposition that municipal officers cannot make arrests outside of city limits unless jurisdiction is granted pursuant to a local or other law.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is a fundamental rule in georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENPoss v. State, 305 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“*87 The officers testified at trial that they did not turn on the patrol car’s blue lights or siren while appellant’s vehicle was in the curve for reasons of safety, as there was a ditch beside the road and no shoulder on which to pull over. One of the officers testified, “We do…”
Later courts cite it for
“the critical elements characterizing 'hot pursuit' are the continuity and immediacy of the pursuit, rather than merely the rate of speed at which pursuit is made.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Hoover, 558 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“The trial court further concluded that the officer was not in “hot pursuit” and was without jurisdiction to follow Hoover into Fulton County, thereby making the seizure and arrest unlawful.”
Later courts cite it for
“in reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion in limine where the evidence is uncontested and there is no question regarding witness credibility, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of law to undisputed facts.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENPage v. State, 553 S.E.2d 176 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“See OCGA § 40-13-30 (“officers of an incorporated municipality shall have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of such municipality unless such jurisdiction is given by local or other law”).”
18
REDWeldon v. State, 661 S.E.2d 672 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 7 cases
Disapproved by Zilke v. State on other grounds: 1 citing opinion limits it to other grounds and 1 says disapproved outright.
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“In interpreting this constitutional provision and in conformance with its specific directive allowing for modification via statute, “this court has held that two statutes, OCGA §§ 40-13-30 and 17-4-23 (a), authorize county police officers to arrest persons for traffic offenses…”
19
GREENHastings v. State, 441 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“§ 92A-509 (substantially identical to current OCGA § 40-13-30), dealing with arrests for traffic offenses, “provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. This interpretation is…”
20
GREENState v. Gehris, 528 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 40-13-30 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 40-13-30
“5 See OCGA § 40-13-30. 6 Edge v. State, 226 Ga.”
Later courts cite it for
“an officer has authority to arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation of a vehicle where the offense is committed in his presence regardless of territorial limitations.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

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198320042025

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2001. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Ga. Ct. App.25Ga.211th Cir.1
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Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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