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2018 Georgia Code 40-13-30 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 40 MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

Section 13. Prosecution of Traffic Offenses, 40-13-1 through 40-13-64.

ARTICLE 2 ARRESTS, TRIALS, AND APPEALS

40-13-30. Authority to make arrests.

Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial under this article, provided that officers of an incorporated municipality shall have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of such municipality unless such jurisdiction is given by local or other law.

(Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2785, § 29.)

Cross references.

- Provisions regarding procedure for arrests for violation of motor vehicle laws, § 17-4-23.

Display of driver's license in lieu of bail, formal recognizance, or incarceration for violations of traffic laws, § 17-6-11.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Outer limits of municipal officer's authority for misdemeanor arrests.

- Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30) defines outer limits of a municipal officer's authority in making arrest for misdemeanors and traffic offenses. Jones v. City of Pembroke, 220 Ga. 213, 138 S.E.2d 276 (1964).

Authority to issue citations.

- University police officer had authority under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30 to issue citations for an accident that occurred at an intersection that bordered the campus, and the trial court, therefore, properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal under O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 relating to the charge of failing to obey a traffic control device in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20; the broad language of § 40-13-30 gave any officer of Georgia that had authority to arrest for a misdemeanor the authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial. Hawkins v. State, 281 Ga. App. 852, 637 S.E.2d 422 (2006).

Arrest powers outside officers' appointed territories.

- Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30) provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside the officers' appointed territories. This interpretation is compelled by the statute's specific territorial restriction of only municipal officers. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 194 S.E.2d 623 (1972).

Under common law, even a municipal officer has power of arrest outside the officer's city limits when a hot pursuit situation exists; therefore, an officer's pursuit of the defendant in a truck matching the description of a stolen vehicle, which went into an adjoining county, was authorized. Hastings v. State, 211 Ga. App. 873, 441 S.E.2d 83 (1994).

Trial court did not err in granting police officers summary judgment in a citizen's action alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the defendant's arrest because the arrest was lawful under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 since obstruction occurred in the officers' presence; even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant, the officers had the authority and discretion to arrest outside the officers' jurisdiction for offenses committed in the officers' presence and, therefore, the officers' immunity could not be defeated by the officers' decision to arrest outside of the officers' jurisdiction. Taylor v. Waldo, 309 Ga. App. 108, 709 S.E.2d 278 (2011).

Even though the deputy sheriff thereafter crossed into an adjoining county in search of a safer location to conduct a DUI investigation, the sheriff was not deprived of the authority to then arrest the defendant for the crimes committed in the sheriff's presence. Suggs v. State, 343 Ga. App. 71, 806 S.E.2d 224 (2017).

"Hot pursuit" exception authorized.

- Exception to Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9 (see O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30) is an instance in which a crime is committed in the municipality and the officer's "hot pursuit" takes the officer beyond the officer's geographical limits to effectuate the arrest. Wooten v. State, 135 Ga. App. 97, 217 S.E.2d 350 (1975); Poss v. State, 167 Ga. App. 86, 305 S.E.2d 884 (1983).

Policeman's legal authority under the "hot pursuit" doctrine under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 558, § 9 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30) includes both the power to arrest and the power to perform other normal police functions incidental to and necessitated by the arrest. Wooten v. State, 135 Ga. App. 97, 217 S.E.2d 350 (1975).

Arrest is valid when the crime was committed in a municipality and a city officer gave "hot pursuit" which took the officer beyond the limits of the municipality to effectuate the arrest. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Head, 149 Ga. App. 528, 254 S.E.2d 747 (1979).

Critical elements characterizing "hot pursuit" are the continuity and immediacy of the pursuit, rather than merely the rate of speed at which pursuit is made. Poss v. State, 167 Ga. App. 86, 305 S.E.2d 884 (1983).

"Hot pursuit" doctrine applied.

- When the only violation committed in the presence of city officers was exceeding the speed limit in violation of a city ordinance, the "hot pursuit" doctrine still would apply. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Head, 149 Ga. App. 528, 254 S.E.2d 747 (1979).

Although an arresting officer of an incorporated municipality normally did not have the power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of that municipality, the officer's arrest of the defendant in a neighboring county was authorized under the "hot pursuit" doctrine since the officer spotted the car the defendant was reportedly traveling in inside the county where the officer had arresting authority, and the officer continuously and immediately pursued the defendant's car into the neighboring county where the officer waited for backup to arrive in order to make the arrest; thus, the traffic stop of the defendant following a dispatch that the defendant was a suspected shoplifter was legal and the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied. Margerum v. State, 260 Ga. App. 398, 579 S.E.2d 825 (2003).

Cited in Newmans v. State, 65 Ga. App. 288, 16 S.E.2d 87 (1941); Dodd v. State, 85 Ga. App. 589, 69 S.E.2d 784 (1952); Wright v. State, 134 Ga. App. 406, 214 S.E.2d 688 (1975); McLarty v. State, 176 Ga. App. 433, 336 S.E.2d 273 (1985); Delong v. State, 185 Ga. App. 314, 363 S.E.2d 811 (1987); Page v. State, 250 Ga. App. 795, 553 S.E.2d 176 (2001); Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003); Duprel v. State, 301 Ga. App. 469, 687 S.E.2d 863 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Zilke v. State, 299 Ga. 232, 787 S.E.2d 745 (2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sheriff is authorized to enforce traffic regulations on the highways of this state. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-385.

"Hot pursuit" doctrine.

- Municipal police officers may go beyond city limits in "hot pursuit" situations and make arrests. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-73.

Constable's authority limited.

- In the absence of a warrant, a constable does not have the authority to enforce the motor vehicle laws of this state. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-56.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 24, 106, 107, 273, 313,349, 361. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 955, 956, 963, 989.

ALR.

- Degree of force that may be employed in arresting one charged with a misdemeanor, 42 A.L.R. 1200.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 40-13-30

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Thornton v. State, 310 Ga. 460 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 12, 2020

...that the evidence failed to show that the game warden was in the lawful discharge of his official duties at the time of the incident. The Court of Appeals held that the game warden was authorized under OCGA 4 § 40-13-30 to enforce the Rules of the Road, see Thornton, 353 Ga. App....
...at 254-255 (1), and it cited OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2) for the proposition that the Rules of the Road apply in parking lots, see 353 Ga. App. at 255 (1) n.6. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, directing the parties to address these two questions: 1. Does OCGA § 40-13-30 grant statewide arrest powers to Department of Natural Resources game wardens for violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road? 2....
...by the public as through streets or connector streets, see OCGA § 40-6-3 (a) (2)? As we explain below, the answer to the first question is yes, game wardens do have authority to enforce the Rules of the Road at any location in Georgia where OCGA § 40-13-30 applies....
...the evidence is not, therefore, insufficient to sustain the convictions. 5 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 2. We first consider the extent to which game wardens have authority under OCGA § 40-13-30 to enforce the Rules of the Road, and we conclude the game warden in this case had such authority. We begin, however, by recalling some of the familiar and settled principles that inform our consideration of the meaning of a statute....
...d intelligent effect to each part.” Premier Health Care Investments v. UHS of Anchor, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (3) (c) (849 SE2d 441) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn now to the text and context of OCGA § 40-13-30. Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40, of which OCGA § 40-13-30 is a part, concerns the prosecution of misdemeanor traffic offenses in probate and municipal courts....
...7 that a prosecution of a misdemeanor traffic offense in a municipal court does not require an indictment or accusation, and such a prosecution instead may be commenced by a citation and complaint. To that end, OCGA § 40-13-30 provides: Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall hav...
...8 enforce the Rules of the Road by the issuance of a citation for a misdemeanor violation of the rules, see OCGA § 40-13-24,5 as well as the concomitant power to effectuate an arrest by citation.6 And the third part of OCGA § 40-13-30 appears to be a limitation of the 5 We understand the phrase “prefer charges” to refer generally to the initiation of proceedings before an adjudicatory body....
...have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of [their respective] municipalit[ies] unless such jurisdiction is given by local or other law.” We readily conclude that a DNR game warden is among the officers identified in the first part of OCGA § 40-13-30....
...dispute it. DNR is a department of the state government, and inasmuch as they are classified as “a unit of peace officers” within DNR, see OCGA § 27- 1-16 (a), game wardens undoubtedly are “officer[s] of this state” for purposes of OCGA § 40-13-30....
...18 (b); and “[t]o exercise the full authority of peace officers while in the performance of their duties[,]” OCGA § 27-1-20 (a) (10). We do not hesitate to conclude that DNR game wardens are among the officers identified in the first part of OCGA § 40-13-30. 11 As such, the game warden in this case was authorized under the second part of OCGA § 40-13-30 to enforce the Rules of the Road, including the provision of OCGA § 40-6-14 (a) limiting the sound emitted by a car stereo, with respect to a misdemeanor violation of the rules subject to the procedures of Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40....
...See OCGA § 27-1-20 (a) (10) (game 12 warden has power “[t]o exercise the full authority of peace officers while in the performance of [his] duties”). And the territorial limitation expressed in the third part of OCGA § 40-13-30 — which by its own terms is limited to municipal officers — does not apply to a DNR game warden....
...presence, OCGA § 17-4-23 (a), did not authorize a law enforcement officer “to make a custodial arrest outside the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency by which he is employed.” 299 Ga. at 235. We do not decide today whether the reasoning of Zilke would apply to OCGA § 40-13-30. 13 on all property owned or controlled by [DNR]”), and some of those powers are limited in terms of subject matter, see, e.g., OCGA § 27- 1-20 (a) (1) (power “[t]o enforce all laws, rules, and...
...laws of this state”); 27-1-20 (a) (10) (power “[t]o exercise the full authority of peace officers while in the performance of their duties”). In light of the breadth of the general law enforcement authority conferred by statute upon DNR game wardens, understanding OCGA § 40-13-30 to authorize game wardens to enforce the Rules of 14 the Road under Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40 would neither drastically expand the jurisdiction of DNR nor be inconsistent with any express statutory limitation on the authority of game wardens. Cf....
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Middleton v. State, 890 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2023 | 316 Ga. 808

...o suppress under 1 We thank the Attorney General of Georgia, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia for their briefs amicus curiae. 2 OCGA § 40-13-30, which provides that a municipality’s law enforcement officers lack arrest powers outside of the municipality’s city limits....
...especially where the State has failed to introduce evidence as to the scope and/or content of said deputization.” The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Officer Graw’s testimony that she was deputized in 2 OCGA § 40-13-30 provides: Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall ha...