O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 40-9-2 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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As used in this chapter, the term: (1) ‘‘Accident’’ means the collision of any motor vehicle with another vehicle or with any object or fixture, or involvement of a motor vehicle in any manner in which any person is killed or injured or in which damage to the property of any one person to an extent of $500.00 or more is sustained. (2) ‘‘Commissioner’’ means the commissioner of driver services. (3) ‘‘Department’’ means the Department of Driver Services. (4) ‘‘Operator’’ means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle. (5) ‘‘Proof of financial responsibility’’ means proof of ability to respond in damages for liability on account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof in the amounts specified in subparagraph (a) (1) (A) of Code Section 33-7-11. (6) ‘‘Suspension of driver’s license’’ means the temporary withdrawal by formal action of the department of a resident’s license or nonresident’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways.

History

(Ga. L. 1951, p. 565, § 1; Ga. L. 1956, p. 543, §§ 2-5; Code 1933, § 68C-101, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 1014, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1494, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 1751, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 29; Ga. L. 1983, p. 938, § 2; Ga. L. 1990, p. 649, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 2.2; Ga. L. 1994, p. 363, § 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 6-1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1516, § 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 20-1/HB 501.)

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1982, p. 1751, § 1, effective July 1, 1982, amended Code 1933, § 68C-101, the basis for this Code section. Since the 1982 Act did not specifically amend this Code section, and since the Code of Georgia of 1933, as amended, stood repealed on November 1, 1982 (see

Code Section 1-1-10(a)(1)), no effect could be given to the 1982 amendment after that date. The provisions of the 1982 Act were reenacted in substantially similar form as an amendment to this Code section by Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 29. Law reviews. - For note on the 1991

amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 99 (1992). For comment on Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971),

see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (1972). For comment on Pope v. Cokinos, 232 Ga. 425, 207 S.E.2d 63 (1974), see 26 Mercer L. Rev. 337 (1974).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS When coverage requirements not applicable. - Minimum compulsory liability limits established by a rule of the Public Service Commission were applicable to personal injury claims asserted by passengers in a tractor-trailer, when the passengers sought recovery up to minimum limits of $100,000/$300,000 as established by the rule, and were not subject to the lower limits established by

O.C.G.A. § 40-9-2, even though the tractor-trailer was not a passenger carrier. Guinn Transp., Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co., 234 Ga. App. 235, 507 S.E.2d 144 (1998). Cited in Smith v. Employers’ Fire Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 596, 340 S.E.2d 606 (1986); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burch, 222 Ga. App. 749, 476 S.E.2d 62 (1996).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Accidents occurring on private property. - All accidents, as defined by Ga. L. 1951, p. 565, must be reported,

even though the accident may occur on private property. 1972 Op. Att’y Gen. No. U72-34.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 57 et seq., 113 et seq., 142 et seq. C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 282, 310. ALR. - Insurance covering damage to

automobile by accident or collision, 105 A.L.R. 1426. Automobile insurance: umbrella or catastrophe policy automobile liability coverage as affected by primary policy ‘‘other insurance’’ clause, 67 A.L.R.4th 14.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases, 1986–1998 · leading case: Rabinovitz v. Accent Rent-A-Car, Inc., 446 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
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Rabinovitz v. Accent Rent-A-Car, Inc., 446 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 4× “" OCGA § 40-9-2 (5) (A). It appears that the amounts now described as minimum financial responsibility was the coverage Accent provided for the rental car it turned over to Brewer.”
Wilson v. Cotton States Mut. Ins., 358 S.E.2d 874 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 40-9-2 (5) (A). Our review of the bodily injury liability coverages in these four policies shows that two have coverage of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident, and two have $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.”
Smith v. Employers'fire Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 1986). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 40-9-2. Since this case involves a financially responsible tortfeasor, we look to the portion of OCGA § 33-34-3 (d) (1) which governs actions involving that type of tortfeasor.”
Martin v. Chicago Ins., 361 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 40-9-2 (1). We can discern no reason why this same definition, which quite clearly encompasses intentional as well as unintentional injuries, should not be *474 applied to the construction of the word “accident” as it appears in OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1) (A).”
NAT. Servs. INDUS. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 425 S.E.2d 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying NSI's motion for summary judgment and in granting the respective motions for summary judgment of Transamerica and the Hutchisons.”
Guinn Transp., Inc. v. Canal Ins., 507 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “Held: In seven related enumerations of error, defendants Guinn Transport, Sara Belk Cleveland, and William Moss contend the trial court erred in enforcing the policy exclusion above the minimum statutory requirements as established by OCGA § 40-9-2 (5) (A), rather than the…”
Ryan v. Boyd, 911 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Ga. 1996). · cites it 2× “The court held that from the standpoint of the innocent third party who was intentionally injured by the insured, the injury was caused by an “accident” as defined in O.C.G.A. § 40-9-2(1). In the instant ease the court finds that under Georgia law Budget’s use restriction is…”
Com. Union Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 449 (11th Cir. 1987). “OCGA § 40-9-2.” 340 S.E.2d at 607 . The tort-feasor in Smith and the tort-feasor in the instant case are both “financially responsible” in this sense.”
Nat'l Servs. Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Inurance, 425 S.E.2d 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying NSI’s motion for summary judgment and in granting the respective motions for summary judgment of Transamerica and the Hutchisons.”
Employers' Fire Ins. v. Canal Ins., 788 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1986). “OCGA § 40-9-2. Since this case involves a financially responsible tort-feasor, we look to the portion of OCGA § 33-34-3(d)(l) which governs actions involving that type of tort-feasor.”
Burress v. Sanders (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). “§ 33-34-3 (a)(1), -4 (1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 40-9-2 (5)(A), -37(a) (1997).”
— 40-9-2(1) — 1 case
Ryan v. Boyd, 911 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Ga. 1996). “The court held that from the standpoint of the innocent third party who was intentionally injured by the insured, the injury was caused by an “accident” as defined in O.C.G.A. § 40-9-2(1). In the instant ease the court finds that under Georgia law Budget’s use restriction is…”
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