O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-59 (2019)

Removal of transportable housing from lands subject to writ of possession

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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If the court issues a writ of possession to property upon which the tenant has placed a manufactured home, mobile home, trailer, or other type of transportable housing and the tenant does not move the same within ten days after a final order is entered, the landlord shall be entitled to have such transportable housing moved from the property at the expense of the tenant by a motor common carrier licensed by the Public Service Commission for the transportation of manufactured housing. There shall be a lien upon such transportable housing to the extent of moving fees and storage expenses in favor of the person performing such services. Such lien may be claimed and foreclosed in the same manner as special liens on personalty by mechanics under Code Sections 44-14-363 and 44-14-550, except that storage fees not to exceed $4.00 per day shall be expressly allowed.

History

(Code 1981, § 44-7-59, enacted by Ga. L. 1987, p. 842, § 1.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Cited in Coweta County Impound & Storage, Inc. v. Security Pacific Fin. Servs., 216 Ga. App. 664, 455 S.E.2d 370 (1995); GMC

Group, Inc. v. Harsco Corp., 293 Ga. App. 707, 667 S.E.2d 916 (2008).

ARTICLE 4 DISTRESS WARRANTS Law reviews. - For comment discussing due process problems with Georgia’s distress warrant proceedings prior to the adoption

of the 1975 Acts, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 336 (1973).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Remedy strictly construed. - Remedy of distraint is purely a creature of statute, and is subject to strict rules of construction. D. Jack Davis Corp. v. Karp, 175 Ga. App. 482, 333 S.E.2d 685 (1985). Contracting to avoid statutory requirements. - Landlord may not avoid in any lease ‘‘for the use or rental of real property as a dwelling place’’ any of the requirements set forth in former Code 1933, § 61-401 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 7, T. 44);

however, a landlord may contract to avoid these statutory requirements when renting property which was not to be used as a dwelling place. Colonial Self Storage of S.E., Inc. v. Concord Properties, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 493, 249 S.E.2d 310 (1978); Wilkerson v. Chattahoochee Parks, 244 Ga. 472, 260 S.E.2d 867 (1979). Cited in Chatham v. World Arts & Crafts Ctr., Inc., 147 Ga. App. 421, 249 S.E.2d 139 (1978).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Subject matter covered by landlord’s statutory lien for rent, 9 ALR 300; 96 ALR 249.

Goods owned by stranger or subject to an encumbrance in his favor as subject to distraint for rent, 62 ALR 1106.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1 case, 1995–1995 · leading case: Coweta Cnty. Impound & Storage, Inc. v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., 455 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
Coweta Cnty. Impound & Storage, Inc. v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., 455 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 4× “Security Pacific moved for summary judgment on the ground that under OCGA § 11-9-310, its perfected security interest in the mobile home is superior to Coweta’s lien for moving fees and storage expenses under OCGA § 44-7-59 which is of no higher priority than a mechanics lien.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.