O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 53-4-50 (2019)

Republication of revoked will

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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A revoked will may be republished by a writing executed by the testator and subscribed and attested by witnesses with the same formality required for a will.

History

Code 1981, § 53-4-50, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 504, § 10.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey of

law of wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (2004).

COMMENT This section revises former OCGA Sec. 53-2-77 by limiting the methods of republishing a will to a republication by a writing that satisfies the formalities for executing a will. This Code section also supplements Code Sec. 53-4-45 by providing an alternative means of reinstating a will that was expressly revoked by a written instrument that itself was later revoked. JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 113-409, are included in the annotations for this Code section. When alterations in a will occur, the law presumes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the alterations were made after the execution of the will. Hicks v. Rushin, 228 Ga. 320, 185 S.E.2d 390 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-409). In construing codicil, parole evidence properly admitted to determine testator’s intent. - Under

O.C.G.A. § 53-4-50, a decedent could have revoked a later will by a codicil that referred to an earlier will. But as the codicil was attached to the later will, the appellees offered parol evidence stating that the codicil’s reference to the later will was a scrivener’s error, and the appellants offered no evidence in response, the appellees were entitled to summary judgment on their claim that the later will and codicil together constituted the decedent’s last will and testament. Dyess v. Brewton, 284 Ga. 583, 669 S.E.2d 145 (2008). Cited in Cubbedge v. Cubbedge, 287 Ga. App. 149, 650 S.E.2d 805 (2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills, §§ 597, 606 et seq. C.J.S. - 95 C.J.S., Wills, §§ 431 et seq., 437 et seq. ALR. - Codicil as affecting application of statutory provision to will, or previous codicil not otherwise subject, or as obviating objections to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, or defective execution otherwise fatal to will, 87 A.L.R. 836. Retrospective application of statute concerning execution of wills, 111 A.L.R. 910.

Admissibility of declarations by testator on issue of revocation of will, 172 A.L.R. 354. Codicil as validating will or codicil which was invalid or inoperative at time of its purported execution, 21 A.L.R.2d 821. Codicil as reviving revoked will or codicil, 33 A.L.R.2d 922. Codicil as reviving or satisfied, bequest or devise, 58 A.L.R.2d 1072. Revocation of will as affecting codicil and vice versa, 7 A.L.R.3d 1143.

ARTICLE 6 CONSTRUCTION OF WILL; TESTAMENTARY GIFTS

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 4 cases, 1996–2008 · leading case: Dyess v. Brewton, 669 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. 2008).

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Dyess v. Brewton, 669 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. 2008). · cites it 2× “Also believing the language of the codicil to be unambiguous in its reference to the March will, appellants further contend that it was erroneous for the superior court to allow the introduction of parol evidence, in particular parol evidence which established that the codicil’s…”

Stewart v. Walters, 602 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. 2004). · cites it 4× “OCGA§ 53-4-50 (a). The intent to treat a lifetime transfer as a satisfaction or an advancement is shown only if the will provides for the deduction of the lifetime transfer or its value or if the satisfaction or advancement is declared in a writing signed by the transferor…”

Tankesley v. Thompson, 469 S.E.2d 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “(SBF). Concluding that the probate court did not err in reaching its determination, we affirm.”

Cubbedge v. Cubbedge, 650 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “7 See former OCGA § 53-4-50 (defining an “advancement” as “any provision made by a parent out of his estate, for and accepted by a child, either in money or property, during the *152 parent’s lifetime, over and above the obligation of the parent for maintenance and education”).”

— 53-4-50(a) — 1 case

Stewart v. Walters, 602 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. 2004). “OCGA§ 53-4-50 (a). The intent to treat a lifetime transfer as a satisfaction or an advancement is shown only if the will provides for the deduction of the lifetime transfer or its value or if the satisfaction or advancement is declared in a writing signed by the transferor…”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.