Standing.

- In order to have standing to bring claims under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V, or O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(a)(2), plaintiff must be a party to the alleged illegal contract or agreement. Valley Prods. Co. v. Landmark, 877 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Tenn. 1994), aff'd, 128 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1997).

Creation of Municipal Electric Authority constitutional.

- As the Municipal Electric Authority is a public corporation of the state, the creation of the authority and the granting of powers to it do not constitute a grant of corporate powers and privileges to a private company in violation of paragraph (a). Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

State Bar of Georgia is not private corporation under paragraph (a), but is an administrative arm of the court. Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939, 90 S. Ct. 369, 24 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Object of paragraph (b) is to subject corporations to taxing power of the state, although exempted therefrom under their original charters, and the proviso was made for the purpose of encouraging the building of railroads. State v. Central of Ga. Ry., 109 Ga. 716, 35 S.E. 37, 48 L.R.A. 351 (1900) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Change of penalty during life of charter.

- Where the charter of a turnpike company granted in 1840 provided for a penalty for neglect of certain duties, the legislature could not change the penalty during the life of the charter. Habersham Tpk. Co. v. Taylor, 73 Ga. 552 (1884).

Restrictive covenant for subdivision.

- A restrictive covenant barring "For Sale" signs in a subdivision was not an unenforceable restraint on trade; the cases citing such authority referred to restrictive covenants in the employment area, not to restrictive covenants on the use of real property, and it was well settled that a grantor of real property could restrict the use of it by restrictive covenants. Godley Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Bowen, 286 Ga. App. 21, 649 S.E.2d 308 (2007).

Contracts in special charters creating perpetual tax exemptions are not revocable by paragraph (b). Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 248 U.S. 525, 39 S. Ct. 181, 63 L. Ed. 401 (1919) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

The fact that contracts in special charters creating perpetual tax exemptions are not revocable by paragraph (b) applies to lessees of the original contracting company. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 250 U.S. 519, 40 S. Ct. 1, 63 L. Ed. 1123 (1919) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Paragraph (c) based on common law.

- Paragraph (c) is based on the common-law principle which invalidates contracts creating monopolies or defeating competition. Central R.R. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 (1869); State v. Central of Ga. Ry., 109 Ga. 716, 35 S.E. 37 (1900) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Contracts in restraint of trade void generally.

- Contracts which tend to lessen competition or which are in restraint of trade are against public policy and are void. Wedgewood Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Color-Set, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 417, 254 S.E.2d 421 (1979).

Common law tort actions.

- Georgia recognizes a common law tort action in favor of third parties who are injured by a conspiracy in restraint of trade. United States Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221, 114 S. Ct. 2710, 129 L. Ed. 2d 2837 (1994).

Legal effect of restrictive covenant determines enforceability.

- In carrying out the policy stated in subsection (c) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V, regarding defeating or lessening of competition, it is the legal effect of a restrictive covenant in a contract, not the parties' specified manner of enforcement of the provision, that determines enforceability of a contract. Dougherty, McKinnon & Luby v. Greenwald, Denzik & Davis, 213 Ga. App. 891, 447 S.E.2d 94 (1994).

Paragraph (c) has same meaning as former Code 1933, § 20-504 (see now O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2), prohibiting restraint of trade and monopoly. Griffin v. Vandegriff, 205 Ga. 288, 53 S.E.2d 345 (1949), commented on in 11 Ga. B.J. 491 (1949) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Application of term "competition."

- The term "competition" is relative and dependent upon public benefits. State v. Central of Ga. Ry., 109 Ga. 716, 35 S.E. 37 (1900).

Paragraph (c) does not impose absolute bar against every kind of restrictive agreement. Howard Schultz & Assocs. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 236 S.E.2d 265 (1977), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938, 100 S. Ct. 1332, 63 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1980); Adcock v. Speir Ins. Agency, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 317, 279 S.E.2d 759 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Restraints to be considered against public policy background.

- Contractual restraints which tend to diminish competition and trade have to be considered against a background of public policy generally disfavoring contracts which have that effect. Farmer v. Airco, Inc., 231 Ga. 847, 204 S.E.2d 580 (1974).

Factors for consideration in restraint of trade.

- Covenants in restraint of trade may be enforced if they are reasonable as to time and place and are not overly broad as to the activities proscribed, taking into consideration the interests of individuals in gaining and pursuing a livelihood, of commercial concerns in protecting property, confidential information and relationships, good will and economic advantage, and of the broader public policy favoring individual freedom to enter into contracts. Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 230 Ga. 558, 198 S.E.2d 145 (1973), commented on in 8 Ga. L. Rev. 526 (1974).

Not all restraints of trade are unconstitutional and the test in this state is whether the restraint involved is "injurious to the public interest." City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975).

A contract which tends to lessen competition or which is in restraint of trade may be upheld if the restraint is reasonable and the contract is valid in other respects. Wedgewood Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Color-Set, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 417, 254 S.E.2d 421 (1979).

Statement of "rule of reason."

- When a contract in restraint of trade is considered in the circumstances in which it is made, and the restraint appears to have been for the legitimate interests of the party in whose favor it is imposed, and is not specially injurious to the public, the restraint will be held valid. Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 230 Ga. 558, 198 S.E.2d 145 (1973), commented on in 8 Ga. L. Rev. 526 (1974); Interstate Sec. Police, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Emory Bank, 237 Ga. 37, 226 S.E.2d 583 (1976).

The broad language of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V has been narrowed by the application of a court created "rule of reason." Thus, the legislature may encourage narrowly tailored contracts, which do not unreasonably chill competition, based upon the legislature's evaluation of the public interest. Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).

Contract in partial restraint may be upheld provided restraint is reasonable and the contract is valid in other essentials. Britt v. Davis, 239 Ga. 747, 238 S.E.2d 881 (1977).

A contract in partial restraint of trade is enforceable if it is reasonably limited as to time and territory and not otherwise unreasonable. Watkins v. Avnet, Inc., 122 Ga. App. 474, 177 S.E.2d 582 (1970).

Limited restraints, if not greater than protection the other party requires, are not outlawed. Interstate Sec. Police, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Emory Bank, 237 Ga. 37, 226 S.E.2d 583 (1976).

Former O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1, permitting contracts in partial restraint of trade, did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V. Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1991).

"Blue-pencil theory of severability" rejected.

- If a contract contains illegal and unenforceable clauses within a restrictive covenant, the entire covenant must fail because the "blue-pencil theory of severability" is rejected. McNease v. National Motor Club of Am., Inc., 238 Ga. 53, 231 S.E.2d 58 (1976); Uni-Worth Enters., Inc. v. Wilson, 244 Ga. 636, 261 S.E.2d 572 (1979).

Rule of reason prevails.

- In all cases involving covenants not to compete, whether in sales of businesses or covenants ancillary to employment contracts, the rule of reason prevails. Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 230 Ga. 558, 198 S.E.2d 145 (1973), commented on in Ga. L. Rev. 526 (1974).

Three prerequisites for enforcement of noncompetition provisions.

- There are three prerequisites which must be met before noncompetition provisions in contracts may be enforced without contravening public policy: (1) the provision must be reasonable as to the time of the restraint; (2) the provision must be definite and reasonable as to the territorial extent of the duty owed not to compete; (3) the provision must be definite and reasonable as to nature of the business activities proscribed by the noncompetition covenant. Farmer v. Airco, Inc., 231 Ga. 847, 204 S.E.2d 580 (1974).

Standard of review.

- Covenants not to compete are scrutinized to determine if they are sufficiently limited in time and territorial effect and are otherwise reasonable, considering the interests to be protected and the effects on both parties to the contract. Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical Assocs., 253 Ga. 322, 320 S.E.2d 170 (1984).

Preferred interpretation of restrictive covenant.

- When a court is presented with a restrictive covenant that is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the preferred interpretation is the one that lease restricts competition, thereby posing the least affront to the public policy of the State of Georgia. Atlanta Ctr. Ltd. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 848 F.2d 146 (11th Cir. 1988).

Contract in restraint of trade.

- Small movie theater company sufficiently alleged that a large theater chain forced movie distributors to enter into exclusive dealing agreements by threatening that their refusal to grant clearances in the local area would result in adverse economic consequences; thus, the company could pursue the company's claims for both tortious interference and for violations of Georgia law prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade. Cobb Theatres III, LLC v. AMC Entm't Holdings, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015).

Greater latitude given to covenants relating to sale of business.

- What is reasonable in a restrictive covenant is a matter of law for the court to decide, allowing greater latitude for covenants relating to the sale of a business than for covenants ancillary to employment. Watkins v. Avnet, Inc., 122 Ga. App. 474, 177 S.E.2d 582 (1970).

Since the employee who agrees to the covenant may have done so from an inferior bargaining position, and since the covenant may seriously impair the employee's ability to earn a living, courts traditionally give greater scrutiny to restrictive covenants within employment contracts, as opposed to such covenants contained in business sales or partnership agreements. Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical Assocs., 253 Ga. 322, 320 S.E.2d 170 (1984).

Reasonableness of restraint a question of law.

- Whether the restraints imposed by an employment contract are reasonable under paragraph (c) is a question of law for determination by the court. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Pelfrey, 237 Ga. 284, 227 S.E.2d 251 (1976); McNease v. National Motor Club of Am., Inc., 238 Ga. 53, 231 S.E.2d 58 (1976); Koger Properties, Inc. v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68, 274 S.E.2d 329 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Public policy generally disfavors such covenants.

- Covenants not to compete ancillary to employment contracts must be scrutinized in terms of the public policy generally disfavoring such contracts as restraints on trade and competition. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 233 Ga. 423, 211 S.E.2d 720 (1975).

Covenant valid.

- Restrictive covenant in employment contract between defendant broadcasting corporation and plaintiff meteorologist/television personality which prohibited competition "on air" in the Atlanta market for a period of six months after termination of employment was valid. Beckman v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 250 Ga. 127, 296 S.E.2d 566 (1982).

Trial court erred in striking down non-solicitation of customer covenants in an employment contract between former employees and their employer, as the restrictive covenants were reasonable, limited in scope, and not against public policy under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V(c) and O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2; the covenants only included current, existing clients and not former customers of the employer, the employees were only prohibited from soliciting the current customers that they had served during their employment, and they were only prohibited from selling them insurance or employee benefit plans that were offered by the employer during their employment. Palmer & Cay of Ga., Inc. v. Lockton Cos., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 196, 643 S.E.2d 746 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 503 (Ga. 2007).

Covenant valid if not against public interest and not unnecessarily injurious to obligor.

- So long as a noncompetition provision in an employment contract does not adversely affect the interest of the public or injure the obligor beyond what is necessary to protect the legitimate rights of the obligees, it is valid. Griffin v. Vandegriff, 205 Ga. 288, 53 S.E.2d 345 (1949), commented on in 11 Ga. B.J. 491 (1949); Wulfhorst v. Hudgins & Co., 231 Ga. 170, 200 S.E.2d 743 (1973).

Non-competition and non-solicitation covenants were reasonable and enforceable where they were of a two-year duration, were limited to a seven-county territorial area, and where prohibiting the professional activity of accounting and the solicitation of clients pursuant to the covenant in light of the firm's need to protect its investment in defendant's skills. Habif, Arogeti & Wynne v. Baggett, 231 Ga. App. 289, 498 S.E.2d 346 (1998).

Covenants against competition must be limited in time and territorial effect.

- A restrictive covenant in a contract of employment whereby a person agrees not to engage in an occupational activity of a particular kind which is reasonably limited as to time and territory is valid and enforceable so long as it is not unreasonable in other respects. Baxley v. Black, 224 Ga. 456, 162 S.E.2d 389 (1968).

Covenants against competition contained in employment contracts are considered in partial restraint of trade and are to be tolerated only if strictly limited in time and territorial effect and otherwise reasonable considering the business interest of the employer sought to be protected and the effect on the employee. Purcell v. Joyner, 231 Ga. 85, 200 S.E.2d 363 (1973); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 233 Ga. 423, 211 S.E.2d 720 (1975); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Pelfrey, 237 Ga. 284, 227 S.E.2d 251 (1976); McNease v. National Motor Club of Am., Inc., 238 Ga. 53, 231 S.E.2d 58 (1976); Fuller v. Kolb, 238 Ga. 602, 234 S.E.2d 517 (1977); Howard Schultz & Assocs. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 236 S.E.2d 265 (1977); Uni-Worth Enters., Inc. v. Wilson, 244 Ga. 636, 261 S.E.2d 572 (1979); Koger Properties, Inc. v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68, 274 S.E.2d 329 (1981); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Stidham, 506 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 658 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1981); Adcock v. Speir Ins. Agency, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 317, 279 S.E.2d 759 (1981); Barnes Group, Inc. v. Harper, 653 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921, 102 S. Ct. 1278, 71 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1982).

A contract which includes a noncompetition agreement must specify a time that is reasonable and a territory that is reasonable for the protection of the employer's legitimate business interests in order to be enforced. Wulfhorst v. Hudgins & Co., 231 Ga. 170, 200 S.E.2d 743 (1973).

A restriction against doing business with any actual or potential customers of the employer located in a specific geographical area in which the employee had not actually done business is overbroad and unreasonable. Hulcher Servs. v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co. L.L.C., 247 Ga. App. 486, 543 S.E.2d 461 (2000).

Restrictive covenant must be reasonably necessary to protect interest of the party in whose favor it is imposed. Baxley v. Black, 224 Ga. 456, 162 S.E.2d 389 (1968).

Restrictions which place greater limitations than are necessary to protect employer render contract void and unenforceable. Watkins v. Avnet, Inc., 122 Ga. App. 474, 177 S.E.2d 582 (1970).

Language which restricts former employees from activities in a much more limited fashion than is necessary for the protection of the employer will not withstand the reasonableness test so as to uphold the covenant. Puritan/Churchill Chem. Co. v. Eubank, 245 Ga. 334, 265 S.E.2d 16 (1980).

Three elements are essential in determining reasonableness.

- These three elements may be categorized as: (1) the restraint in the activity of the employee, or former employee, imposed by the contract; (2) the territorial or geographical restraint; and (3) the length of time during which the covenant seeks to impose the restraint. Britt v. Davis, 239 Ga. 747, 238 S.E.2d 881 (1977).

Covenant supported by sufficient consideration and rendered definite by performance valid.

- Where a restrictive clause in a contract of employment was supported by sufficient consideration in the form of mutual promises and had been rendered definite by performance of the main contract, and was reasonable as to time and area, it was not void under this paragraph or former Code 1933, § 20-504 (see now O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2). Griffin v. Vandegriff, 205 Ga. 288, 53 S.E.2d 345 (1949), commented on in 11 Ga. B.J. 491 (1949) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

"Blue-pencil theory of severability" rejected.

- The court will not sever or "blue pencil" a covenant not to compete ancillary to an employment contract so as to remove the offending restraint of trade provision and give effect to the remaining portions of the contract. Interstate Transp., Inc. v. Syfan, 154 Ga. App. 413, 268 S.E.2d 751 (1980).

Generally, territorial restrictions which relate to territory in which employee was employed will be enforced. Adcock v. Speir Ins. Agency, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 317, 279 S.E.2d 759 (1981).

Employee must be able to forecast territorial extent of duty.

- A contractual provision which prohibits an employee upon termination of employment from entering into any competitive activity within a 50-mile radius of where the employer is operating is overly broad and unreasonable because of the employee's inability to forecast with certainty the territorial extent of the duty owed the former employer. Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 230 Ga. 558, 198 S.E.2d 145 (1973), commented on in 8 Ga. L. Rev. 526 (1974).

Where the employee is unable to forecast with certainty the territorial extent of the duty owed the former employer, the contract is void for indefiniteness. Britt v. Davis, 239 Ga. 747, 238 S.E.2d 881 (1977).

A territorial restriction in a covenant not to compete which cannot be determined until the date of the employee's termination is too indefinite to be enforced. Koger Properties, Inc. v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68, 274 S.E.2d 329 (1981).

Restriction relating to entire business territory of employer generally unenforceable.

- A territorial restriction which relates to the territory in which an employer does business (as opposed to the territory serviced by the employee) is generally unenforceable unless an employer shows a legitimate business interest to be protected. Koger Properties, Inc. v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68, 274 S.E.2d 329 (1981); Adcock v. Speir Ins. Agency, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 317, 279 S.E.2d 759 (1981).

Insofar as territorial restrictions are concerned, some of them relate to the territory in which the employee was employed; others relate to the territory in which the employer does business. The former generally will be enforced while the latter generally are unenforceable absent a showing by the employer of the legitimate business interests sought to be protected. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Stidham, 506 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 658 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1981).

Covenant related to territory where employer does business where only justification is that employer wants to avoid competition by employee in that area is not prima facie valid. Adcock v. Speir Ins. Agency, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 317, 279 S.E.2d 759 (1981).

Provisions which allow employer to assign employee to new territory, with restrictive covenants following the employee wherever the employee might be assigned, are too indefinite to be enforced. McNease v. National Motor Club of Am., Inc., 238 Ga. 53, 231 S.E.2d 58 (1976).

Contract embracing too much territory not enforceable in smaller area.

- A contract enumerating numerous territories which are not necessary for the protection of legitimate business interests of the employer is not an enforceable contract, and as a result is not enforceable in even the smallest area specified, though that smaller area would be a legitimate and enforceable restricted area standing alone. Wulfhorst v. Hudgins & Co., 231 Ga. 170, 200 S.E.2d 743 (1973).

Restrictive covenant held invalid for including too much territory. Purcell v. Joyner, 231 Ga. 85, 200 S.E.2d 363 (1973).

Three year and world-wide restrictions unenforceable.

- Covenant prohibiting former employee from working in any capacity in the world in the business of developing or selling electronic firearm systems for three years following the employee's termination was overbroad in terms of territorial coverage. Firearms Training Sys. v. Sharp, 213 Ga. App. 566, 445 S.E.2d 538 (1994).

Absence of geographical limitation.

- A nonsolicitation clause in an employment contract prohibiting solicitation of the employer's clients that the employee actually contacted while serving the employer is enforceable notwithstanding the absence of explicit geographical limitation. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464, 422 S.E.2d 529 (1992).

Effect of prohibition against entering into same or similar business.

- A contract not to enter into a certain business or the same kind or similar business is unambiguous and excludes on the part of one who makes such a covenant any participation or sharing or taking a part in the aid of such sales. Farmer v. Airco, Inc., 231 Ga. 847, 204 S.E.2d 580 (1974).

Agreement is enforceable which prohibits employee from pirating the former employer's customers served by the employee, during the employment, at the employer's direct or indirect expense. Adcock v. Speir Ins. Agency, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 317, 279 S.E.2d 759 (1981).

Overbroad and unreasonable covenant unenforceable.

- A post-employment restriction in a covenant not to compete was overbroad, unreasonable, and unenforceable where it prohibited a former employee from performing services not only for former customers of the employer with whom the employee had personal contact, but also for anyone in protected areas, and which prohibited the employee from accepting business from former customers of the employer, regardless of who initiated the contact. AmeriGas Propane, L.P. v. T-Bo Propane, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Ga. 1997).

A covenant not to compete in an employment contract that was overbroad as to its territorial coverage and the scope of activity prohibited was unenforceable. Harville v. Gunter, 230 Ga. App. 198, 495 S.E.2d 862 (1998).

Agreement prohibiting a physician from practicing within a 20-mile radius of any of the employer's medical centers for two years from termination, even centers where the physician never worked and those opened during the physician's tenure, was overly broad and not enforceable. Davis v. Albany Area Primary Health Care, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 311, 503 S.E.2d 909 (1998).

Trial court erred by not determining, as a matter of law, whether noncompete agreements were enforceable; because the agreements contained neither specific territorial limits nor limited their restrictions to customers with whom the former employees had contacts during their employment, the restrictions were unreasonable, overbroad, and unenforceable. Fellows v. All Star, Inc., 272 Ga. App. 262, 612 S.E.2d 86 (2005).

Employment contract which contained noncompete and nonsolicitation clauses was deemed unenforceable, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V(c) and O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2, because the noncompete clause was overly broad in that it attempted to preclude the former employee not only from performing painting services for prior clients, but also from acting as a sales person in the decorative or faux painting business; there was no evidence that the employer had employed "sales persons" or that the employee had ever acted in that capacity on behalf of the employer, and summary judgment to the employee was proper. Whimsical Expressions, Inc. v. Brown, 275 Ga. App. 420, 620 S.E.2d 635 (2005).

A noncompetition agreement that provided that an employee of a drug and alcohol testing service would not compete with the employer "in any area of business" of the employer's, including solicitation of existing accounts, was unreasonable as overly broad and indefinite; when read as a whole, the noncompetition agreement was plainly intended to prevent any type of competing activity whatsoever, with the reference to solicitation merely being illustrative of one type of prohibited activity. Stultz v. Safety & Compliance Mgmt., 285 Ga. App. 799, 648 S.E.2d 129 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 812 (Ga. 2007).

A non-compete clause in a Software Agreement between an employer and employee was unenforceable as a restraint of trade under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V(c), because it was unlimited as to time and territory. However, under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-762(d), the employee was prohibited from using a software version that incorporated the employer's trade secrets and confidential information, regardless of the non-compete clause. Coleman v. Retina Consultants, P.C., 286 Ga. 317, 687 S.E.2d 457 (2009).

Covenant attempting to prohibit all activities of employee in connection with another real estate business is overly broad, in excess of any legitimate protection necessary for the employer, and unreasonable. C.V. Mosley Constr. Co. v. McCuin, 238 Ga. 503, 233 S.E.2d 763 (1977).

Covenant not to compete was overbroad in territory and scope.

- The restrictive covenant not to compete contained in former employee's employment agreement with plaintiff-company was overbroad as to territory and scope of activities where it included all of Georgia and Florida and was not tailored to the job the employee performed for the company, but instead, prohibited the employee from being connected in any way with a similar business. Ceramic & Metal Coatings Corp. v. Hizer, 242 Ga. App. 391, 529 S.E.2d 160 (2000).

Covenant wherein employee agrees not to accept employment with competitor "in any capacity" imposes greater limitation upon employee than is necessary for the protection of the employer and, therefore, is unenforceable. Uni-Worth Enters., Inc. v. Wilson, 244 Ga. 636, 261 S.E.2d 572 (1979).

Covenant unenforceable when it prohibits competition with any services or products of employer.

- Where each of the four subparagraphs of the restrictive covenant in this case prohibits the employee from doing certain enumerated acts "competitive with any services or products offered or possessed by employer," the entire restrictive covenant is too indefinite to be enforced. Uni-Worth Enters., Inc. v. Wilson, 244 Ga. 636, 261 S.E.2d 572 (1979).

Mere agreement in covenant of areas of employer's business insufficient to enforce contract.

- A post-employment covenant containing an agreement between the parties that the employer is doing business in a specified area is not enough, standing alone, to warrant enforcement of the covenant. Wulfhorst v. Hudgins & Co., 231 Ga. 170, 200 S.E.2d 743 (1973).

Injunction enforcing restrictive covenants against employee amounted to wrongful restraint.

- Injunction enforcing restrictive covenants against the employee amounted to a wrongful restraint under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V(c) since the non-disclosure provisions in the form and the agreement were unenforceable on their face because the provisions were not limited in time, and Georgia law was clear that, if one covenant in an agreement subject to strict scrutiny was unenforceable, then the other covenants were all unenforceable. Therefore, the appellate court remanded the case for a determination of the amount of actual damages, if any, suffered by the employee during the period of the injunction's enforcement. Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28, 706 S.E.2d 660 (2011).

Non-solicitation of patients clause unenforceable.

- Non-solicitation covenant in physicians' pre-2011 employment contracts would prevent the physicians from having any communication with the employer's patients, even if those patients sought out the physicians, which was unreasonable and unenforceable, but geographic limitations were not unreasonable and were enforceable. Burson v. Milton Hall Surgical Associates, LLC, 343 Ga. App. 159, 806 S.E.2d 239 (2017).

Given broader latitude than covenants ancillary to employment contracts.

- Covenants not to compete incorporated in agreements for the sale of a business or its assets have been given greater latitude and broadness in their interpretation and enforcement than those noncompetition covenants ancillary to contracts of employment. Farmer v. Airco, Inc., 231 Ga. 847, 204 S.E.2d 580 (1974).

Reasonable time limitation not applicable.

- A contract in the sale of properties and good will of a business not to engage in such a business within a reasonable space of territory need not be limited as to time in order to be a valid and binding contract. Watkins v. Avnet, Inc., 122 Ga. App. 474, 177 S.E.2d 582 (1970); Farmer v. Airco, Inc., 231 Ga. 847, 204 S.E.2d 580 (1974).

Contract can extend to all territory covered by business.

- A contract which affords a fair protection to the party in whose favor it is made and is not injurious to the public may extend to all the territory covered by the business, the good will of which has been sold. Farmer v. Airco, Inc., 231 Ga. 847, 204 S.E.2d 580 (1974).

Duty not to compete for customers is reasonable and definite where it extends only to those customers existing at time of the sale as shown by the seller's accounts receivable. Farmer v. Airco, Inc., 231 Ga. 847, 204 S.E.2d 580 (1974).

Sale of franchise.

- A noncompetition covenant in a franchise contract which purported to be effective for one year after the franchise was terminated was void as overbroad. Allen v. Hub Cap Heaven, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 533, 484 S.E.2d 259 (1997).

Factors in determining reasonableness.

- In determining whether a covenant not to disclose is reasonable, two factors are important: (1) is the information confidential and related to the business; and (2) is the restraint reasonably related to the protection of such information? Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969), commented on in 4 Ga. L. Rev. 541 (1970).

Nondisclosure covenants bear no relation to territorial limitations.

- Covenants not to disclose and utilize confidential business information are related to general covenants not to compete because of the similar employer interest in maintaining competitive advantage. Unlike general noncompetition provisions, however, specific nondisclosure covenants bear no relation to territorial limitations and their reasonableness turns on factors of time and the nature of the business interest sought to be protected. Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 230 Ga. 558, 198 S.E.2d 145 (1973), commented on in 8 Ga. L. Rev. 526 (1974).

Nondisclosure covenants are separately enforceable.

- Although noncompetition covenants in employment contracts may not be enforceable, nondisclosure clauses in the same contract can be separately enforced under a reasonableness test. Nolan v. Meyners-Robinson Co., 246 Ga. 49, 268 S.E.2d 656 (1980).

Covenant overbroad when reaches beyond trade secrets.

- Restricting an employee from utilizing the experience gained and using information not designated as trade secrets and attempting to extend the restriction beyond the employer's business in perpetuity to that of its clients, customers, consultants, licensees, or affiliates without geographic restriction reaches beyond the scope permitted in terms of time, territory, and activities protected. Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 234 Ga. 787, 218 S.E.2d 68 (1975).

Noncompetition agreement alone not personal service contract.

- While a noncompetition agreement joined with affirmative promises is a personal services contract which terminates upon the death of the promisor, a noncompetition agreement standing alone, with no affirmative promises, is not. Mail & Media, Inc. v. Rotenberry, 213 Ga. App. 826, 446 S.E.2d 517 (1994).

Sections of Franchise Practices Act unconstitutional.

- Code 1933, §§ 84-6603(s) and 84-6610(a)(4) of the Franchise Practices Act (Ga. L. 1976, p. 1440) are unconstitutional, null and void because their purpose is to enable franchised dealers of motor vehicles to establish a monopoly in violation of paragraph (c). Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Exclusive privilege to Municipal Electric Authority.

- Right granted by Ga. L. 1975, p. 107, § 17 (see now O.C.G.A. § 46-3-129) to political subdivisions to give exclusive privilege or monopoly to Municipal Electric Authority does not violate paragraph (c). Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Paragraph (c) not violated by purchase of stock of insurance company by securities company. Clarke v. Central R.R. & Banking Co., 50 F. 338 (S.D. Ga. 1892); Winter v. Southern Sec. Co., 155 Ga. 590, 118 S.E. 214 (1923) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Purchase of controlling stock to create illegal consolidation is prohibited. Clarke v. Central R.R. & Banking Co., 50 F. 338 (S.D. Ga. 1892).

Mere issuance of bonds contrary to bylaws may not violate paragraph (c). Georgia G.R.R. v. Miller, 144 Ga. 665, 87 S.E. 897 (1916) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Paragraph (c) applies to street railways. Trust Co. v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S.E. 323 (1900) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Granting of concessions by carrier not necessarily unconstitutional.

- Paragraph (c) does not deny a carrier the right to grant concessions to some patrons if no public duty is involved. Kates v. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Co., 107 Ga. 636, 34 S.E. 372 (1899); Atlanta Term. Co. v. American Baggage & Transp. Co., 125 Ga. 677, 54 S.E. 711 (1906); Hart v. Atlanta Term. Co., 128 Ga. 754, 58 S.E. 452 (1907) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Contract binding only one party violates paragraph.

- Where a contract prohibits B from selling 12 colors of its product at all except to A, yet A has no requirements to make any purchases at all, admitting of no exceptions, the contract is a clear violation of paragraph (c) and O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2. Wedgewood Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Color-Set, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 417, 254 S.E.2d 421 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Contract preventing incurrence of additional debt not illegal.

- Contract provision which prohibits the borrower from incurring additional debt for business operations without the consent of the lender while the loan is still unpaid is not an unreasonable restraint on trade because it protects the legitimate rights of the lender by promoting the solvency of the borrower. Interstate Sec. Police, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Emory Bank, 237 Ga. 37, 226 S.E.2d 583 (1976).

Water power contract may be assigned. Columbus R.R. v. City Mills Co., 135 Ga. 626, 70 S.E. 242 (1911).

Contract to sell official Code does not violate paragraph.

- Contract which grants to publishing company "the exclusive right to distribute and sell sets and volumes of the 'Official Code of Georgia Annotated,'" the copyright for which will be in the name of the state, does not prevent other companies from publishing a competitive product and therefore does not violate the constitutional prohibition against a monopoly. Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm'n, 244 Ga. 325, 260 S.E.2d 30 (1979).

State's purchase of Code from publishing company as provided for in contract does not tend to create monopoly merely because it gives publishing company a subsidy and a substantial competitive advantage, within paragraph (c). Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm'n, 244 Ga. 325, 260 S.E.2d 30 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Rental of space in state-owned exhibition center.

- The decision of the George L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority, which operated a state-owned exhibition center, not to rent space to a promoter for a proposed fall home show but to rent instead to a competitor to hold its own fall home show did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V. Exposition Enters., Inc. v. George L. Smith II Ga. World Congress Ctr. Auth., 177 Ga. App. 211, 338 S.E.2d 726 (1985).

Contracts in partial restraint of trade.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1 (contracts in partial restraint of trade) was beyond the power of the General Assembly, and was unlawful and void, inasmuch as it authorizes contracts and agreements which may have the effect of or which were intended to have the effect of defeating or lessening competition or encouraging monopoly. Jackson & Coker, Inc. v. Hart, 261 Ga. 371, 405 S.E.2d 253 (1991).

Covenant prohibiting former employee from accepting unsolicited former clients.

- Covenant not to solicit was unenforceable where it prohibited former insurance representative from accepting applications for insurance from employer's policyholders who wished to transfer to the new company without any solicitation on the representative's part. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 208 Ga. App. 282, 430 S.E.2d 166 (1993).

Covenant prohibiting supervisory work.

- Covenant was overbroad because it did not permit employee to "assist, aid or abet" others, which, in effect, prohibited employee from working as a supervisor or in other capacities. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 208 Ga. App. 282, 430 S.E.2d 166 (1993).

Restrain trade of alcoholic beverages.

- State revenue department's regulation regarding distribution of malt beverages in Georgia did not violate the provision of the Georgia Constitution that prohibited the General Assembly from creating a monopoly in a business by passing laws that appeared to restrain trade because the authority to sell alcoholic beverages was a privilege and not a right; as a result, a monopoly in such a business created by the General Assembly, by engaging in the traffic upon a body corporate, was not violative of the Georgia Constitution. Ga. Oilmen's Ass'n v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 261 Ga. App. 393, 582 S.E.2d 549 (2003).

Injunction as remedy.

- The remedy for a breach of paragraph (c) may be injunction, and it is not always necessary to forfeit the charter. Trust Co. v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S.E. 323, 48 L.R.A. 520 (1900) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Private citizen cannot question illegal purchase of stock. Brown v. Atlanta Ry. & Power Co., 113 Ga. 462, 39 S.E. 71 (1901); Cox v. Hardee, 135 Ga. 80, 68 S.E. 932 (1910).

Private citizen cannot bring suit to enjoin contract in restraint of trade.

- At common law, contracts in restraint of trade were unenforceable, just as they are unenforceable under paragraph (c); but a mere member of the public cannot bring a suit to enjoin it. Palmer v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp., 178 Ga. 405, 173 S.E. 424 (1934) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Bondholders have no standing to attack illegal contract.

- The state, the stockholders, and the parties alone can attack a contract as being ultra vires or in restraint of trade; bondholders cannot do so. Palmer v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp., 178 Ga. 405, 173 S.E. 424 (1934).

Who may bring action against railroad company.

- If a railroad company violates its public duty to the injury of the traveling public, an action for damages will lie by a proper party plaintiff so injured, or remedy may be had by injunction or mandamus in a proper case; or probably the Attorney General might proceed on behalf of the public. Palmer v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp., 178 Ga. 405, 173 S.E. 424 (1934).

Removal of case.

- A case may be removed to federal court where a domestic corporation violated paragraph (c) by purchasing stock in a foreign corporation. South Carolina v. Port Royal & Augusta Ry., 56 F. 333 (D.S.C. 1893) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Ruling in interlocutory order a finding of law.

- Where court rules that a restrictive covenant is illegal and unenforceable, a court makes a determination of a legal question, not an adjudication of contested facts. Uni-Worth Enters., Inc. v. Wilson, 244 Ga. 636, 261 S.E.2d 572 (1979).

Prohibition against fixing municipal utility rates does not affect broader powers of General Assembly.

- The provision of paragraph (d) which prohibits the General Assembly from regulating or fixing the charges of municipally owned or operated public utilities does not deal with every aspect of the General Assembly's broad, inherent powers over both public utilities and municipal corporations. City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Term "regulate or fix" refers to dollar amount to be charged electric customers. City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. IX and antecedent provisions, describing with specifity the power of the state to regulate public utilities, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

General Assembly possesses inherent power to regulate public utilities, independent of this paragraph. Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 212 S.E.2d 628 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Paragraph not intended to limit powers.

- Independently of this paragraph, the General Assembly possesses the inherent power to regulate public utilities. The conference upon the General Assembly of the powers stated in this paragraph was not intended to limit its powers to those expressed in this paragraph. Atlanta Term. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 163 Ga. 897, 137 S.E. 556 (1927) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

This paragraph is not construed to restrict powers of General Assembly over public utilities and municipal corporations unless it is clearly and indisputably shown that the legislation in question is intended as a restriction regulating or fixing charges. City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Power to regulate electric light company.

- The Railroad Commission (now Public Service Commission) has power to prescribe schedules of just and reasonable rates of charges for services by electric light and power companies. City of Atlanta v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 149 Ga. 411, 100 S.E. 442 (1919).

Right to and standard for judicial review of utility rates are not found in this paragraph. Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 212 S.E.2d 628 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Mandatory form of this paragraph is intentional. Southern Ry. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Creation of Public Service Commission object of paragraph.

- The object of this paragraph was attained by creation of the Public Service Commission and conferring of powers thereon. Tilley v. Savannah, Fla. & W. R.R., 5 F. 641 (S.D. Ga. 1881); Georgia R.R. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694 (1883) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Public Service Commission has power to regulate rates and practices of public utilities. Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062, 92 S. Ct. 732, 30 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1972).

Commission jurisdiction ousted by contract.

- The jurisdiction of the commission was ousted by a contract between a city and street railway providing for transfers upon payment of a full fare. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 149 Ga. 1, 98 S.E. 696 (1919).

Reasonableness of rates is judicial question. Richmond & Danville R.R. v. Trammel, 53 F. 196 (N.D. Ga. 1892).

Industrial and economic facts are considered in rate fixing. Southern Ry. v. Atlanta Stove Works, 128 Ga. 207, 57 S.E. 429 (1907); Hill v. Wadley S. Ry., 128 Ga. 705, 57 S.E. 795 (1907).

Single continuous rate over separate lines void. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 289 F. 878 (N.D. Ga. 1923).

Rate fixing contracts between shippers and carriers void. Wight v. Pelham & Havana R.R., 18 Ga. App. 195, 89 S.E. 176 (1916).

Group of railroad companies may refuse to renew lease of part of terminal property constructed for the purpose of encouraging traffic. Williams-Thompson Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 159 Ga. 793, 126 S.E. 833 (1925).

Paragraph based on common law.

- Paragraph (c) was an embodiment of the common-law rule which prohibited contracts in general restraint of trade, and thus it had the same meaning as former Code 1933, § 20-504 (see now O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2) which states that contracts in general restraint of trade cannot be enforced. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 429 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. V).

Applicability to public service corporations.

- The principle that contracts even in partial restraint of trade are void if contrary to the interest of the public is applicable to public service corporations. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 429.

Jurisdiction of Public Service Commission.

- The Public Service Commission maintains its jurisdiction over the services and property of that portion of a municipally-owned, revenue bond-financed natural gas distribution system which has been extended beyond the boundaries of the county in which the municipality is located even if the revenue bonds have been paid off by the municipality. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-39.

The Public Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the services and property of a natural gas distribution system owned and operated by and within a municipality. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-39.

The Public Service Commission has no jurisdiction over master-metered customers so long as the activities of the customers do not constitute furnishing service to the public. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-39.

Validity of partial restraints of trade.

- While contracts in general restraint of trade are void, contracts in partial restraint of trade are valid if they are reasonable and not injurious to the public interest. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 429.

Paragraph (c) applies to governmental departments.

- The phrase, "General Assembly of this State shall have no power to authorize any such contract or agreement" means that governmental departments receiving their power from the General Assembly shall likewise have no such power. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-2 (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. VIII).

Reservation of state jobs for bid by designated contractors.

- Program whereby certain state jobs or parts of state jobs would be reserved to be bid upon exclusively by designated class of contractors would tend to defeat or lessen competition and any contract entered into pursuant to such a program would be null and void. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-2.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 54 Am. Jur. 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices, § 443 et seq. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Utilities, § 67 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 58 C.J.S., Monopolies, § 66 et seq. 73B C.J.S., Public Utilities, § 18 et seq. 74 C.J.S., Railroads, § 85 et seq.

ALR.

- Federal control of public utilities, 8 A.L.R. 969; 10 A.L.R. 956; 11 A.L.R. 1450; 14 A.L.R. 234; 19 A.L.R. 678; 52 A.L.R. 296.

Power of state to change private contract rates for public utilities, 9 A.L.R. 1423.

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance authorizing use of public funds, credit, or power of taxation for restoration or repair of privately owned public utility, 13 A.L.R. 313.

Special services or facilities afforded by shipper as a factor in carrier's rates, 25 A.L.R. 191.

Right to cut off water supply because of nonpayment of water bill or charges for connections, etc., 28 A.L.R. 472.

Right of manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler to control resale price, 32 A.L.R. 1087; 103 A.L.R. 1331; 125 A.L.R. 1335.

Validity, construction, and effect of provisions for the appropriation of excess income of public utility, 33 A.L.R. 488.

Regulation of food service in connection with passenger transportation, 36 A.L.R. 1451.

Discrimination by carrier between shippers as to use of right of way or wharf, 44 A.L.R. 1526.

Discrimination in the operation of a municipal utility, 50 A.L.R. 126.

Application of anti-trust laws to combinations to maintain prices of commodities as affected by reasonableness of prices fixed, 50 A.L.R. 1000.

Power of state to amend charter of a private incorporated charity, 62 A.L.R. 573.

Power of state or municipality to fix minimum public utility rates, 68 A.L.R. 1002.

Validity of stipulation in contract of employment against connection with labor union or employers' association, and power of Legislature to prohibit such contract, 68 A.L.R. 1267.

Removal or attempted removal of one from field of competition by inducing him to enter another's employment as violation of anti-monopoly Act, 74 A.L.R. 289.

Power of state or public service commission to regulate rates of municipally owned or operated public utility, 76 A.L.R. 851; 127 A.L.R. 94.

Sale of business and "good will," or of interest in partnership and "good will," as implying restriction against competition in absence of provision in that regard, 82 A.L.R. 1030.

Construction of contract or regulations regarding time of payment for public utility service, 97 A.L.R. 982.

Power of corporation to amend its charter in respect of character or kind of business, 111 A.L.R. 1525.

Right of user of public utility to discontinue use, 112 A.L.R. 230.

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance requiring public utility to supply fixtures or accessories or incidental service to customers free of charge or for fixed charge, 115 A.L.R. 1162.

Price fixing by Legislature or administrative body, 119 A.L.R. 985.

Validity of covenant by employee or seller of business not to enter employment of customers, clients, or patrons of the business, 119 A.L.R. 1452.

Constitutionality of statute fixing or regulating (or authorizing the fixing or regulating) of prices for personal services, 119 A.L.R. 1481.

Right of public utility to make a fixed monthly service charge or a minimum monthly bill, 122 A.L.R. 193.

Right of manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler to control resale price, 125 A.L.R. 1335.

Constitutional and statutory provisions relating to consolidation, merger, or reorganization of corporations as applicable retrospectively to corporation previously chartered, 131 A.L.R. 734.

Danger to person or property as affecting right of public utility to discontinue its service upon failure of consumer to comply with reasonable and valid regulations, 132 A.L.R. 914.

Operation of negative or restrictive covenant in contract of employment for a specific period, as extended by continuance in the employment after the expiration of that period, 163 A.L.R. 405.

Who are entitled to benefit of statutes giving right to combine, 166 A.L.R. 161.

Discrimination between property within and that outside municipality or other governmental district as to public service or utility rates, 4 A.L.R.2d 595.

Right of public utilities to discontinue line or branch on ground that it is unprofitable, 10 A.L.R.2d 1121.

Right of customers of public utility with respect to fund representing a refund from another supplying utility upon reduction of latter's rates, 18 A.L.R.2d 1343.

Variations of utility rates based on flat and meter rates, 40 A.L.R.2d 1331.

Enforceability of covenant against competition, ancillary to sale or other transfer of business, practice, or property, as affected by duration of restriction, 45 A.L.R.2d 77; 13 A.L.R.4th 661.

Enforceability of covenant against competition, ancillary to sale or other transfer of business, practice, or property, as affected by territorial extent of restriction, 46 A.L.R.2d 119; 13 A.L.R.4th 661.

Application to banks and banking institutions of antimonopoly or antitrust laws, 83 A.L.R.2d 374.

Validity, construction, and effect of lessor's covenant against use of his other property in competition with the lessee-covenantee, 97 A.L.R.2d 4.

Rendering financial or other assistance to another as breach of covenant not to compete, 1 A.L.R.3d 778.

Covenant restricting use of land, made for purpose of guarding against competition, as running with land, 25 A.L.R.3d 897.

Employee's duty, in absence of express contract, not to disclose or use in new employment special skills or techniques acquired in earlier employment, 30 A.L.R.3d 631.

Validity and construction of restrictive covenant not to compete ancillary to franchise agreement, 50 A.L.R.3d 746.

Sufficiency of consideration for employee's covenant not to compete, entered into after inception of employment, 51 A.L.R.3d 825.

Enforceability, insofar as restrictions would be unreasonable, of contract containing unreasonable restrictions on competition, 61 A.L.R.3d 397.

Validity and construction of contractual restrictions on right of medical practitioner to practice, incident to sale of practice, 62 A.L.R.3d 918.

Validity and construction of contractual restrictions on right of medical practitioner to practice, incident to partnership agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 970.

Validity and construction of contractual restrictions on right of medical practitioner to practice, incident to employment agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 1014.

Validity and construction of state statutes forbidding area price discrimination, 67 A.L.R.3d 26.

Application of state antitrust laws to athletic leagues or associations, 85 A.L.R.3d 970.

Practices forbidden by state deceptive trade practice and consumer protection Acts, 89 A.L.R.3d 449.

Validity and construction of contractual restriction on right of accountant to practice, incident to sale of practice or withdrawal from accountancy partnership, 13 A.L.R.4th 661.

Application of state antitrust laws to activities or practices of real-estate agents or associations, 22 A.L.R.4th 103.

Reinstatement of repealed, forfeited, expired, or suspended corporate charter as validating interim acts of corporation, 42 A.L.R.4th 392.

Propriety, under state law, of manufacturer's or supplier's refusal to sell medical product to individual physician, hospital, or clinic, 45 A.L.R.4th 1006.