This paragraph and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. I being in pari materia must be construed together.

- Georgia Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. I), and subparagraph (a) of this paragraph were each in the Constitution of 1945 when it was adopted. They deal with the same subject matter, namely, finance, taxation, and public debt. They are of equal dignity and to give full force and effect to the will of the people, as thus expressed, they must be construed together, being in pari materia. The latter lifts out of the former any inhibition against the creation of a debt insofar as the creation of a debt is authorized by the latter clause. Any other construction would render one of them meaningless and the Supreme Court will not ascribe to the people an intention to adopt a Constitution containing inconsistent provisions. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Authority to contract necessarily confers power to pay for use of contracted facilities.

- By this paragraph, and in addition to other contracts which may be constitutionally made pursuant thereto, the people authorized the state and state institutions - which includes, of course, the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) - to contract for a period not exceeding 50 years with an authority then or thereafter created for the use of its facilities or services, but the power to so contract was limited to such activities and transactions as the state or a state institution is by law authorized to undertake. The power to so contract for the use of such facilities or services as thus conferred carries with it, by necessary implication, authority to pay for the use of such facilities or services during the contract period. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Department of Transportation authorized to rent bridge facilities from Georgia Highway Authority.

- When so construed, authority is found in the Constitution for those provisions of Art. 1, Ch. 10, T. 32, which authorize the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) to expend appropriated tax funds for renting bridge facilities from the State Bridge Building Authority (now Georgia Highway Authority) for state highway uses. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953).

Proper interpretation and construction of this paragraph.

- This provision of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to authorize the state and its institutions and subdivisions to enter into any and every contract which they might in their discretion deem advisable. It simply means that the state and its agencies and subdivisions may contract with each other with reference to facilities and services theretofore authorized by the Constitution. This provision does not supersede all other provisions of the Constitution with reference to the limitations on and powers of the state, its agencies and subdivisions and authorize them to undertake to maintain and provide additional facilities and services which are prohibited under other provisions of the Constitution, except to undertake to contract with reference to facilities and services authorized by other provisions of the Constitution. Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 507, 100 S.E.2d 268 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Purpose of this paragraph was to authorize counties and municipalities to create an organization which could carry out and make more workable the duty which the state owed to its indigent sick; and therefore the court should construe it most liberally. DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Parties.

- This paragraph relates to and deals only with contracts and conveyances which are authorized between parties who are empowered to contract with each other for services which one of the contracting parties is authorized to render for the other. McKelvey v. Logan, 220 Ga. 197, 137 S.E.2d 651 (1964) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Limited applicability of clause.

- This clause has reference only to corporations and authorities created by the state of Georgia, and does not include any public authorities created by another state or country. State v. Blasingame, 212 Ga. 222, 91 S.E.2d 341 (1956).

General term "any" given restricted construction.

- Although the general term "any" is employed, it is given a restricted construction that excludes corporations of foreign states and countries. This clause contemplates performance within this state of services that are essentially governmental and therefore constitutes the exercise of the powers of the sovereign. State v. Blasingame, 212 Ga. 222, 91 S.E.2d 341 (1956).

Constitutional amendment prevails over previous constitutional provision when conflict arises.

- If a constitutional amendment duly adopted dealing with the establishment of area schools necessarily conflicts with some previous provision, the amendment, being the last expression of the sovereign will of the people, will prevail as an implied modification pro tanto of the former provision. Cason v. State, 217 Ga. 339, 122 S.E.2d 232 (1961).

Constitutional amendment on area schools germane to constitutional provisions.

- A constitutional amendment, adopted by the voters in a general election, that deals with only one subject matter, the establishment of area schools, which under the amendment can be established only by contract between counties, or municipalities, or a county and a municipality, or combination thereof, is germane to the provisions of the Constitution, pertaining to the contractual powers of counties and municipalities, and does not violate the Constitution. Cason v. State, 217 Ga. 339, 122 S.E.2d 232 (1961).

Contract between county and cities.

- Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Homestead Option Sales Tax Act (HOST), O.C.G.A. § 48-8-100 et seq., did not allow a county to disburse funds to various cities in order to facilitate the capital outlay requirement under O.C.G.A. § 48-8-104(c)(2)(A), as HOST was implemented under the "special district" provision of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VI, and as it was not a "county tax," it was subject to such an arrangement; however, the intergovernmental agreement between the county and cities had to be authorized under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I in order to be valid. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 277 Ga. 292, 589 S.E.2d 561 (2003).

Intermediate appellate court erred in holding that because an agreement between a county and cities did not pertain to the provision of services for purposes of the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. 1(a), but was a tax-sharing agreement, it was constitutionally invalid. The court lacked appellate jurisdiction to construe the meaning of "services" as used in the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause, because that term had not previously been construed by the Georgia Supreme Court. DeKalb County v. City of Decatur, 297 Ga. App. 322, 677 S.E.2d 391 (2009).

Trial court did not err in granting a county summary judgment in cities' action for breach of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) the parties entered into pursuant to the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act (HOST), O.C.G.A. § 48-8-100 et seq., because the IGA was not a valid intergovernmental contract under the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a), since the focus and clear purpose of the IGA was to provide a formula for the distribution of the HOST revenues, and the IGA could not be deemed an agreement for the provision of authorized "services"; the IGA was an agreement about how to divide and distribute HOST revenues between the county and the cities, with the cities agreeing to expend the monies disbursed solely for capital outlay projects to be located within the geographical boundaries of the county and to be owned, operated, or both either by the county, one or more cities or any combination thereof, and the fact that the IGA required the cities to expend the tax proceeds in accordance with the mandates of the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act, O.C.G.A. § 48-8-102, did not transform it into either a contract for services or one for the use of facilities. City of Decatur v. Dekalb County, 289 Ga. 612, 713 S.E.2d 846 (2011).

Contracts between counties.

- Although this paragraph does not expressly authorize a county board of education to enter into a contract with a county board of education of another county, contracts made by a county board of education are corporate actions of the county. Therefore, this constitutional authority given to counties includes county boards of education. Walker v. McKenzie, 209 Ga. 653, 74 S.E.2d 870, later appeal, 210 Ga. 189, 78 S.E.2d 486 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Counties authority to enter rental contracts mechanism for rental agreements by Georgia Education Authority (Schools).

- Although the constitutional provision upon which Ga. L. 1949, p. 1009, (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 5, Ch. 3, T. 20), and all proceedings taken thereunder are based does not expressly authorize a county board of education as such to enter rental contracts, it does expressly authorize counties to do so, and, under repeated rulings of the Georgia Supreme Court, such contracts by the county boards of education are the corporate actions of the counties. Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952).

Entire plan of securing school buildings under Ga. L. 1949, p. 1009 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 5, Ch. 3, T. 20) is bottomed upon this paragraph.

- There the Constitution plainly and unmistakably empowers the state, state institutions, municipalities, and counties to contract for any period not exceeding 50 years with each other or with any public agency, public corporation, or authority "for the use by such subdivisions or the residents thereof of any facilities or services" of the state, state institution, municipalities, counties, public agency, public corporation, or authority, provided such contract deals with activities which such subdivisions are by law authorized to undertake. Municipalities and counties are empowered in connection with such contracts to convey existing facilities to public agencies, public corporations, or authorities operated by such municipalities, and counties for the benefit of the residents thereof, provided such facilities are to be used by such grantee for the same purposes. Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 208 Ga. 575, 68 S.E.2d 590 (1952) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Legislature cannot limit power.

- Full power being vested under the Constitution in the county boards of education to make contracts, the legislature has no authority to limit this power. Walker v. McKenzie, 209 Ga. 653, 74 S.E.2d 870, later appeal, 210 Ga. 189, 78 S.E.2d 486 (1953).

Contract between the county and the airport authority, which managed the airport, qualified as an enforceable intergovernmental agreement (IGA) that did not violate the Debt Clause in the Georgia Constitution because the IGA was between appropriate governmental entities; the agreement's term did not exceed 50 years; the agreement related to both the provision of services and the joint use of facilities as the airport authority agreed to manage and maintain the expanded taxiway, and the county, in return, agreed to provide funding and manage the debt required to be incurred to complete the expansion; and the agreement dealt with services and facilities about which the county had the authority to enter contracts. Avery v. State of Ga., 295 Ga. 630, 761 S.E.2d 56 (2014).

Limitations on indebtedness.

- This paragraph does not operate to relax in any degree the existing limitation as to indebtedness, or as to the exclusive manner in which it may be incurred. DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Effect of creation and activation of authority before November 8, 1960.

- Where a state agency known as an authority was created prior to 1960 and activated to deal with a part of a particular subject matter, amendatory Act of 1961 which merely changed its name and expanded its power to operate upon the whole of the same subject matter did not change the authority's identity; such authority was properly "created and activated" before November 8, 1960, and came within this provision. Weeks v. Georgia State Hwy. Auth., 217 Ga. 14, 120 S.E.2d 620 (1961).

Office building used and operated as provided in Ga. L. 1973, p. 190, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 31-7-71) is for a public purpose and that section is constitutional. Petty v. Hospital Auth., 233 Ga. 109, 210 S.E.2d 317 (1974).

Contract for sewer project.

- After a trial court required two intervenors to post a bond of $625,000 with regard to their challenge to the public improvement bond approved by a city's building authority for a sewer project, the trial court properly validated the bond by following all necessary procedural requirements and the bond did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a) since the city's payment for the use of the sewer project was a debt specifically authorized under the constitution pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a). Berry v. City of E. Point, 277 Ga. App. 649, 627 S.E.2d 391 (2006).

Loaning of money to political subdivisions of this state or authorities controlled by them is not a permitted purpose for which public funds may be used under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I), and, therefore, it is not a facility or service of the state within the meaning of that term in this paragraph. Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 507, 100 S.E.2d 268 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

City contracts with Department of Transportation for building and repairing city streets valid.

- The authority of the city of Carrollton under its charter, Ga. L. 1891, p. 474, to build and repair streets within its incorporate limits does not require actual supervision by the mayor and council, but this may be done by contract with the State Highway Department of Georgia (now Department of Transportation) under the provisions of the Constitution. City of Carrollton v. Walker, 215 Ga. 505, 111 S.E.2d 79 (1959).

City and county not authorized to operate joint tax receiving or assessing program.

- City and county could not close their books prior to April 1 because neither Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I nor provisions of the city charter satisfied the requirement of former subsection (e) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-18 pertaining to the operation of a joint tax receiving or assessing program. Board of Tax Assessors v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 264 Ga. 309, 444 S.E.2d 771 (1994).

Contract between county and airport authority.

- Even though, under a contract between the county and an airport authority for use by the county of an expanded airport facility, the consideration to be paid by the county was not expressed in terms of a definite dollar amount, it was not an unconstitutional "new debt." The contract was a valid intergovernmental contract and the consideration represented the authority's lawful "revenue pledged to the payment of" the bonds. Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State, 265 Ga. 24, 453 S.E.2d 8 (1995).

Contracts with Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia.

- The political subdivisions have authority under subparagraph (a) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I to enter into contracts with the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia and to pledge their full faith and credit and levy taxes to meet their contractual obligations pursuant to the law of contracts. Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).

Where two different proposed changes to a power sales contract between a city and the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia did not result in the city being contractually bound for more than 50 years, both proposals passed muster under the intergovernmental contracts clause, pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a). City of Cartersville v. Mun. Elec. Auth. of Ga., 277 Ga. 575, 592 S.E.2d 677 (2004).

Agreement for use of hotel/motel taxes.

- Consistent with the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I (a), a Hotel/Motel Tax Operation and Maintenance Agreement was solely between two governmental entities, a city and the Congress Center Authority; the agreement did not exceed 50 years; the agreement involved the provision of services or the joint or separate use of facilities or equipment; and the agreement dealt with a facility (domed stadium) which the contracting parties were authorized to provide. Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 297 Ga. 1, 770 S.E.2d 616 (2015).

Georgia Hospital Authorities Law, O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 7, T. 31, is constitutional. Cheely v. State, 251 Ga. 685, 309 S.E.2d 128 (1983).

Contracts for provision of water service.

- City did not impermissibly cede away its legislative authority to establish water rates by entering into a written contract for a 40-year period whereby an adjoining county agreed to provide water service to the city at a specified rate. City of Fayetteville v. Fayette County, 171 Ga. App. 13, 318 S.E.2d 757 (1984).

Contract for new stadium.

- Intergovernmental Agreement was valid under the intergovernmental contracts clause, as it was a contract between political subdivisions, was not for a period exceeding 50 years, the services provided by the Cobb-Marietta Coliseum and Exhibit Hall Authority were proper subjects for such a contract, and the Authority and the county were authorized to provide the stadium, which would provide the citizens recreational benefit and promote tourism and the economy. Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 774 S.E.2d 624 (2015).

Authorization to contract with "public foreign corporations."

- Section 3 of the 1982 amendment to the County Building Authority Act, which authorized a county building authority to enter into contracts with "public foreign corporations," meant "public" in the sense of nondomestic corporations whose shares are traded over the counter and not governmental corporations of foreign states and nations and, therefore, does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I. Building Auth. v. State, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Taxing power available to pay rent under contract.

- City's pledge of its taxing power to make up any deficit in the rents it is obligated to pay under a valid intergovernmental contract is permissible under the intergovernmental contracts clause and does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII. Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 256 Ga. 158, 345 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Downtown Development Authorities Law, O.C.G.A. Ch. 42, T. 36, is solely based upon development authorities provision, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. III, and not Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I. Odom v. Union City Downtown Dev. Auth., 251 Ga. 248, 305 S.E.2d 110 (1983).

Bond guarantee by city-lessor not an intergovernmental contract.

- Lease provision whereby a city-lessor agreed to guarantee the bond payments of a development authority-lessee did not come within the intergovernmental contracts clause in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I and, therefore, was barred by the debt clause in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII. Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 255 Ga. 324, 338 S.E.2d 240 (1985).

Lease for 50 years, with option to extend, violates paragraph.

- Lease which allowed for an initial period of 50 years plus an option to extend the duration of the lease for an additional 25 years was the equivalent of a 75 year contract and therefore exceeded the authority given in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I. Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 255 Ga. 324, 338 S.E.2d 240 (1985).

"Stadium Funding Agreement" for construction of a domed facility, entered into by a city, a county, and a stadium authority, was authorized by the intergovernmental contracts clause of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I., and therefore did not violate the special district debt clause of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II. Youngblood v. State, 259 Ga. 864, 388 S.E.2d 671 (1990).

Contracts for industrial park.

- Contracts between counties and a joint development authority for the development of trade and industry through the acquisition of an industrial park were valid intergovernmental contracts authorized by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I. Hay v. Newton County, 246 Ga. App. 44, 538 S.E.2d 181 (2000).

Homestead Option Sales Tax.

- The Homestead Option Sales Tax (HOST), O.C.G.A. § 48-8-100 et seq., implements a district tax under the "special district" provision of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VI; intergovernmental contracts which are authorized under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I cannot be limited by HOST. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 277 Ga. 292, 589 S.E.2d 561 (2003).

Cited in Reed v. City of Smyrna, 201 Ga. 228, 39 S.E.2d 668 (1946); Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 70 S.E.2d 360 (1952); Smith v. Hospital Auth., 210 Ga. 801, 82 S.E.2d 827 (1954); State v. Georgia Rural Rds. Auth., 211 Ga. 808, 89 S.E.2d 204 (1955); Tipton v. Speer, 211 Ga. 886, 89 S.E.2d 633 (1955); Tippins v. Cobb County Parking Auth., 213 Ga. 685, 100 S.E.2d 893 (1957); Smith v. Maynard, 214 Ga. 764, 107 S.E.2d 815 (1959); Smith v. Hayes, 217 Ga. 94, 121 S.E.2d 113 (1961); Stephenson v. State, 219 Ga. 652, 135 S.E.2d 380 (1964); Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. McClain, 112 Ga. App. 209, 144 S.E.2d 565 (1965); Daughtrey v. State, 226 Ga. 758, 177 S.E.2d 670 (1970); Miller v. Columbus, 229 Ga. 234, 190 S.E.2d 535 (1972); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978); Griffin v. Chatham County, 244 Ga. 628, 261 S.E.2d 570 (1979); Frazer v. City of Albany, 245 Ga. 399, 265 S.E.2d 581 (1980); AMBAC Indem. Corp. v. Akridge, 262 Ga. 773, 425 S.E.2d 637 (1993); Reed v. State, 265 Ga. 458, 458 S.E.2d 113 (1995).

Paragraph's limited applicability.

- This paragraph applies only to contracts for the use of public facilities and in no way restricts the general contractual powers of the Georgia Ports Authority set out in Ga. L. 1945, p. 464, (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 2, T. 52). 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 8 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

This paragraph permits public bodies created by the General Assembly to contract for use of public facilities with other public bodies only; it does not give agencies of the state the right to contract with private concerns for the use of public facilities. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 8 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Indian tribe not public entity.

- The Georgia Tribe of Eastern Cherokee Indians is not a "public agency, public corporation, or public authority" as the phrase is used in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-21.

Environmental loans exempt from debt limitations.

- Loans made by the Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority to local governments pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I., the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause, are not subject to the debt limitations of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-6.

Public facilities contracts are not extended to private corporations or associations. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 341.

Transfer of property by city.

- City may not transfer real property by deed of gift to a county recreation department for recreational use, but may transfer real property pursuant to a valid intergovernmental contract. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-12.

Cooperative agreements between counties and municipalities for purchase and use of riot control equipment valid.

- All counties and those municipalities having requisite charter authority may enter into cooperative agreements with one another for the purchase and use of equipment to be employed in jointly administered riot control programs. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-141.

Authority to the counties includes county boards of education; the same reasoning would apply to cities including city boards of education. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 116.

This paragraph applies to boards of education and their authority to contract. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 168 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Limitation on delegation of contractual power.

- The constitutional powers to contract in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. V), and this paragraph are limited by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. II), which states that control and management of county schools shall be confined to the county board of education; the power to exercise judgment and discretion cannot be delegated by a county board of education. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 116 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

State cannot issue general obligation debt with the contemplation that title to the financed facility will be given to the county, municipality, or school district because of the constitutional limitation on the purposes for which general obligation debt can be issued. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-51.

Financing construction of environmental facilities.

- The Georgia Development Authority may enter into contracts with local governments, including local water and sewer authorities, for any period not to exceed 50 years to provide funds to finance the construction of environmental facilities by local governments and for related services. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-29.

The (State) Department of Public Health has authority to contract direct with hospital authorities for construction of hospitals. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 340.

Public health authorities have authority to contract with local hospital authorities for construction of hospitals. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 340.

County's subsidizing hospital authority ambulance service permissible.

- An agreement by a county with a hospital authority in the nature of a contract in which the county agrees to subsidize an ambulance service operated by a hospital authority would not violate any of the provisions of the Georgia Constitution and the county would be authorized to pay sums of money to the hospital authority for this service. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-280.

Retirement system for county hospital employees.

- A county should not execute a guaranty contract guaranteeing primary obligation of a county hospital authority to contribute to a retirement system for its employees; by appropriate contract with the authority, a county may compute such contributions in arriving at the costs necessary to provide for the continued maintenance and use of the facilities of the authority and this sum can be paid by the county to the county hospital authority under the law of this state. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-211.

Contract with state for work on state property permitted.

- The state may contract with county for installation by county of pump and tank on property of a state hospital where facilities are to be used by both. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 284.

Receipt and disbursement of federal funds to private nonprofit hospital associations prohibited.

- In view of this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Para. XII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. VI), the State treasurer (now director of the Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services) and the (State) Department of Public Health are without authority to receive and disburse federal funds under the provisions of the Hill-Burton Act (Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 42 U.S.C., § 291 et seq.) to private nonprofit hospital associations or corporations. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 341 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Restriction on Department of Community Affairs authority to apply for federal grants.

- Where the funds are not sought to create a planning service or to provide technical assistance, information or advice in accordance with the purposes of Title II of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.), the Bureau (now Department) of Community Affairs does not have the requisite statutory authority to apply for, receive, or administer federal grants under Section 8 housing assistance payments program for existing units established pursuant to the Act. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-15.

State departments and agencies can contract with each other with reference to facilities and services, with limitations that such contracts may not exceed 50 years duration, and that contracts deal only with such activities and transactions as the agencies are authorized by law to undertake. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-9.

Department of Transportation and Department of Human Resources have general constitutional authority to contract with each other for services which deal with activities that they are authorized by law to undertake. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-23.

Department of Transportation contracting with financial backing from State Road and Tollway Authority.

- The Department of Transportation may enter into transportation construction contracts with all or a portion of the financial backing for the contracts coming from a contractual promise from the State Road and Tollway Authority to borrow and provide money to DOT as and when needed to expend on projects that are the subjects of the construction contracts. 2001 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-10.

Contracting permitted between Department of Agriculture and University of Georgia for disease eradication program services to livestock owners.

- Georgia Department of Agriculture may contract with Department of Veterinary Medicine at University of Georgia to provide certain veterinary services to livestock owners in conjunction with brucellosis and tuberculosis testing and eradication programs. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-62.

Length of time municipalities permitted to bond by contract.

- Municipalities may enter into a valid and binding contract to provide a system of water supply mutual to all for a period not to exceed 50 years; further, municipalities may not bind themselves by any agreement respecting the sewage system or regulation of the rates of water or sewage for a period longer than the life of the council. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 126.

Cities and counties may work through a single joint hospital authority. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 272.

There is no statutory limitation upon the percentage of total investments which a bank may have in bonds of public authorities which are obligations of the state. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 19.

County cannot make donations to a water and sewerage authority, but it can enter into contracts with such an authority. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-225.

Action of county tax commissioner collecting city taxes not facially illegal.

- By contract, a county tax commissioner could add a city's tax notices to the county commissioner's computerized tax cards and collect taxes for the city, and, further, such a contract could be drawn without special legislation; however, while the plan is not facially illegal under the general law, special clarifying legislation is recommended. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-120.

Construction of library building by city for lease to county legal.

- Assuming that a city possesses legal authority to borrow funds via a 20-year loan for the purpose of constructing a library building, it would be legal for the city and county to enter into the proposed agreement whereunder the building would be leased to the county for the term of the loan at an annual rental sufficient to meet the loan payments; it would also be legal for the county to levy taxes for the purpose of making the rental payments. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-120.

Valid use of county board of education funds.

- The expenditure of public school funds by a county board of education to run sewer lines from its schools to city sewer lines on nearby city streets, and to purchase sewage disposal services from the city, would not violate any constitutional or statutory provision of the state. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-85.

County board of education authorized to construct facility on property of Georgia Education Authority (Schools).

- Since a board of education can expend money to construct a facility and then convey that facility to a public authority, a county board of education is constitutionally authorized to expend funds on a facility that will be located on property owned by the Georgia Education Authority (Schools) since the legal and practical effect is no different; the specific authority in any particular situation will be governed by any local law that might exist. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-51.

County and municipal school system may provide by contract for continued operation of school by and for county school system. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-7.

Agreements between counties and school districts for lease of property.

- Counties and school districts have authority under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-520 and36-9-3(c) to enter into intergovernmental contracts in which the county leases real property to the school board for use as a site for a public school or other educational purpose. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 98-13.

Permissible for county board of education to contract with independent school system for educating certain county school children.

- Under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Para. V), a county board of education can contract to pay county school funds to an independent school system in consideration for the latter educating certain school children of the former; this authority would include all the funds necessary to educate these children including capital outlay, i.e., funds for school buildings and additions thereto of the independent school district. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 116.

Contract with out-of-state school system void.

- The general school laws of Georgia do not authorize local boards of education to enter into contracts with out-of-state school systems for the education of pupils residing in this state. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-98.

Transfer of school buildings following annexation.

- In the absence of an express intent on part of the legislature to the contrary, or, in absence of an agreement to the contrary on the part of interested parties, annexation of property containing buildings and school facilities of a county school system by a municipality having an independent school system results in a transfer of the ownership and control of such building and facilities to the municipal school system; however, it would be possible for such school buildings and facilities to continue to be operated or owned by the county school system either where the legislature so provides in the annexation legislation, or, where the interested parties, i.e., the county and municipal school systems, so agree. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-7.

Unit of the university system may enter into contract with a county or city for paving of a small area on campus, the county or city to perform this service on a fixed cost or reimbursable cost basis. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-71.

Contract between Department of Transportation and Jekyll Island State Park Authority for airport improvements legal.

- The Department of Transportation by definition is the state; therefore, by virtue of this paragraph, the Department of Transportation may contract with an authority if the particular authority is otherwise authorized by law to enter into such a contract; the Jekyll Island Authority may contract for airport construction through power granted in subsection (d) of former Code 1933, § 43-606 (see now O.C.G.A. § 12-3-235(5)); therefore, the Department of Transportation may legally enter into an airport contract with the Jekyll Island State Park Authority covering improvements to the Jekyll Island Airport. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-195 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

State Board of Corrections may contract with a county to furnish water to prison camp. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 239.

While power to contract is not conferred upon Economic Development Council by Ch. 8, T. 10, contracts with other state agencies with respect to payroll, procurement, budgeting, and accounting are authorized by virtue of this paragraph; therefore, such council may enter into a contract with another department whereby that department will perform payroll, procurement, budgeting, and accounting functions for the council. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-23 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

County participating in watershed project.

- A county participating in a watershed project could pay the cost of condemning necessary easements and land rights upon entry into an appropriate contract or agreement with the participating Soil and Water Conservation District. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-108.

Collection of child support.

- In the absence of express authority empowering the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Department of Corrections) to collect child support recovery unit money, a contractual agreement between the Department of Human Resources and the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Department of Corrections) regarding a proposed arrangement between these agencies for such collections would not meet the requirements of this provision pertaining to contracts between state agencies that the contracts deal "with such activities and transactions as such subdivisions are by law authorized to undertake." 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-99 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I).

Loans by Department of Natural Resources and Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority.

- Loans by the Department of Natural Resources pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-5-38.1 and loans by the Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-23-1 et seq. do not cause a city or county to incur debt in accordance with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I. The constitutional underpinning of these programs is in the intergovernmental contract clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a). Thus, the procedural requirements in O.C.G.A. § 48-8-111 for submitting a debt question are not triggered where proceeds derived from the sales tax are to be applied to repayment of the loans by Department of Natural Resources or the Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-7.

Authority of Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority and city of Atlanta regarding loans.

- The Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority is statutorily empowered to make the administrative and policy determinations requiring the city of Atlanta to pledge its full faith and credit as security for a loan from the Authority, there are no constitutional prohibitions upon the city pledging its full faith and credit for such a loan, and a referendum is not required prior to the city making the pledge. 2004 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-8.

Intergovernmental agreements for probation services are legal in instances in which the contracting parties are authorized by law to provide probation services. Also, when providing probation services for a judicial circuit, a probation entity must be authorized to provide the service and must enter into separate agreements with the court of each county that composes that judicial circuit. 2012 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12-7.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 423 et seq., 487.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 173 et seq. 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 1167 et seq. 81A C.J.S., States, § 285 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity of contract intended or tending to influence location of county seat or public building, 13 A.L.R. 734.

Power of municipal corporation to provide hospital, 25 A.L.R. 612.

Liability of municipal corporation upon implied contract for use of property which is received under an invalid contract, 42 A.L.R. 632.

Power of board to appoint officer or make contract extending beyond its own term, 70 A.L.R. 794; 149 A.L.R. 336.

Right of municipality or other political subdivision to enforce against other party contract which was in excess of former's power, or which did not comply with the conditions of its power in that regard, 122 A.L.R. 1370.

Power of municipality to fix specific scale of wages or hours for employees of contractors or subcontractors for municipal contracts, 129 A.L.R. 763.

Subsequent exhaustion of funds as affecting contract validly entered into by political subdivision under constitutional provision limiting indebtedness to revenues for current year, 159 A.L.R. 1261.