Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22, which permits a county board of commissioners to create the office of county manager, is constitutional. Gray v. Dixon, 249 Ga. 159, 289 S.E.2d 237 (1982).

When section applicable.

- Provisions of this section apply only when county attempts to amend or repeal local Acts applicable to its governing authority. Local 189 Int'l Union of Police Ass'ns v. Barrett, 524 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Powers of county commissioners are strictly limited by law, and they can do nothing except under authority of law. Mobley v. Polk County, 242 Ga. 798, 251 S.E.2d 538 (1979).

Neither the counties of this state nor their officers can do any act, make any contract, nor incur any liability not authorized by some legislative Act applicable thereto. Mobley v. Polk County, 242 Ga. 798, 251 S.E.2d 538 (1979).

County governing authority only has the powers given to it by the legislature. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983).

If there is reasonable doubt of existence of a particular power of a county, the doubt is to be resolved in the negative. Mobley v. Polk County, 242 Ga. 798, 251 S.E.2d 538 (1979).

Transfer of chairperson's power to county board constitutional.

- The Constitution did not prevent the county board from passing resolutions which effectively transferred much of the power of the county chairperson to the county board. Krieger v. Walton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 269 Ga. 678, 506 S.E.2d 366 (1998).

County governing authority powers.

- Any attempt by the board of commissioners to confer "executive powers" on the office of county manager would be an "action affecting the . . . form . . . of the county governing authority" in violation of subsection (c)(2) of this paragraph. Gray v. Dixon, 249 Ga. 159, 289 S.E.2d 237 (1982) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

An ordinance creating the office of county manager which tracked the language of O.C.G.A. § 36-5-22 and which vested in that office certain administrative functions, and did not attempt to confer the executive powers reserved for the chairman, was consistent with the county's home rule authority and did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I. Krieger v. Walton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 271 Ga. 791, 524 S.E.2d 461 (1999).

County's method of counting abstentions.

- A county's method of not counting abstentions by county commissioners, and therefore not considering abstentions either affirmative or negative votes, was within the county's authority; as a result, a citizen challenging the method of counting votes was not entitled to declaratory relief. Merry v. Williams, 281 Ga. 571, 642 S.E.2d 46 (2007).

Fee for utility use of rights of way.

- County was not entitled to extract from power company a tax, franchise fee, rental fee, or other charge in return for permission to use county's road rights of way outside of municipalities for erection, maintenance, and use of power transmission lines. DeKalb County v. Georgia Power Co., 249 Ga. 704, 292 S.E.2d 709 (1982).

County cannot prohibit electric lines.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 46-3-201(b)(9), the electric corporation, which had to condemn property in order to effectuate its project, did not have to demonstrate to the county the necessity or the appropriateness of its proposed project; thus, the county ordinance prohibiting the electric lines for three years was unconstitutional. Rabun County v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 276 Ga. 81, 575 S.E.2d 474 (2003).

Home rule ordinances enacted in compliance with this paragraph would supersede specified provisions of a local Act. Guhl v. Williams, 237 Ga. 586, 229 S.E.2d 382 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Cannot interfere with provisions of general law.

- The "home rule" provision of this paragraph explicitly disallows any attempt by a local governing authority to change or to interfere with operation of provisions of general law. Commissioners of Wayne County v. Smith, 240 Ga. 540, 242 S.E.2d 47 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

The Constitution limits legislative action by the board of commissioners to matters for which no provision has been made by general law.

- Furthermore, the "home rule" powers of the board of commissioners do not extend to any matters which the General Assembly by general law has preempted. Commissioners of Wayne County v. Smith, 240 Ga. 540, 242 S.E.2d 47 (1978).

Section31-7-72. - The language of former Code 1933, § 88-1802 (see now O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72), providing for appointment of members of the boards of hospital authorities, was not subject to change by exercise of the home rule powers contained in this paragraph. Commissioners of Wayne County v. Smith, 240 Ga. 540, 242 S.E.2d 47 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Proof of facts needed to show county created public authority not extension of county.

- Where an act of a political subdivision of the state creates a public facilities authority with provisions which shows that the authority shall be separate from the county governing authority in membership, powers, and duties, and that revenue bonds of the authority shall bear a notation that they are not a debt of the county nor has the county any obligation whatever for the authority, then the authority is not an extension of the county, and the act creating the authority is not a "local Act . . . applicable to the county's governing authority . . ." which may be amended by the county commissioners under this paragraph. Wood v. Gwinnett County, 243 Ga. 833, 257 S.E.2d 258 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

County business must be conducted at county site.

- Deliberation and voting on any issue must be conducted at county site and citizens of the county must be afforded an opportunity to be heard at the county site on any issue of county business. Brewster v. Houston County, 235 Ga. 68, 218 S.E.2d 748 (1975).

Contracts for distribution of public records.

- A contract between a county and a company to allow the company to obtain copies of certain public indices and records and make them available for a fee is not invalid under subparagraph (c)(7) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I because it is not an act of legislation and because it does not affect the manner in which the clerk of the county court performs the clerk's duties. Price v. Fulton County Comm'n, 170 Ga. App. 736, 318 S.E.2d 153 (1984).

Act may require that judges of courts of limited jurisdiction must devote minimum time to official duties to be entitled to be paid for those duties. McCray v. Cobb County, 251 Ga. 24, 302 S.E.2d 563 (1983).

Minority business enterprise program.

- Home rule charter did not authorize county to enact a 1982 minority business enterprise program where provision had been made by general law for the letting of public works contracts and the program conflicted with that general law. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Fulton County, 920 F.2d 752 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959, 111 S. Ct. 2274, 114 L. Ed. 2d 725, 501 U.S. 1252, 111 S. Ct. 2893, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (1991).

Employment of counsel.

- A county governing authority has the implicit power to employ counsel for county officers. Stephenson v. Board of Comm'rs, 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991).

County governing authority's employment of counsel to represent a superior court clerk did not violate subparagraphs (c)(1) and (c)(7) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I. Stephenson v. Board of Comm'rs, 261 Ga. 399, 405 S.E.2d 488 (1991).

Sheriff is not county policymaker for purposes of county's liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Georgia's Constitution created the sheriff's office as a separate constitutionally protected entity independent from the county. Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003).

Redistricting legislation for the counties.

- In Georgia, the General Assembly is the only legislative body with the power to enact redistricting legislation for the counties; therefore, where the General Assembly failed to enact reapportionment legislation for a certain county, although it was entitled to consideration as an expression of county policy, a reapportionment plan proposed by a county was not a legislatively enacted plan requiring deferential treatment and the district court was required to fashion a reapportionment plan. Bodker v. Taylor, (N.D. Ga. June 5, 2002).

Ordinance covering payment of garbage collection fees.

- The state constitution, statutes, and case law permit a county to enact an ordinance making property owners responsible for the payment of garbage collection fees for their rental property. Board of Comm'rs v. Guthrie, 273 Ga. 1, 537 S.E.2d 329 (2000).

Ordinance constitutional.

- Trial court erred in declaring Miller County, Ga., Ordinance No. 10-01, § 2 unconstitutional because the ordinance did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I(c)(2) by affecting the composition or form of the Board of Commissioners of Miller County but conferred only administrative, rather than executive, authority on the chair of the Board's finance committee; pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I(b), the county had authority, as an incident of the county's home rule power, to amend Ga. L. 1983, p. 4594, § 14. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Callan, 290 Ga. 327, 720 S.E.2d 608 (2012).

Trial court erred in declaring Miller County, Ga., Ordinance No. 10-01, § 3 unconstitutional because the ordinance did not constitute an action affecting the elective office of commissioner in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I(c)(1); section 3 did not, by itself, negatively impact on the ability of the commissioners to carry out the commissioners' duties, but instead, § 3 gave the Commissioners of Miller County an additional option, similar to that given by general law to many other county governing authorities, for purchasing goods, property, or services. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Callan, 290 Ga. 327, 720 S.E.2d 608 (2012).

It could not be said that a county's method of providing solid waste collection services by contracting with private solid waste collection companies, and paying for those services through the property tax bill procedure, was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious; it had real and substantial relation to the provision of those services, and the county's solid waste ordinance was valid. Mesteller v. Gwinnett County, 292 Ga. 675, 740 S.E.2d 605 (2013).

Legislation bodies governed by establishment clause for evaluating legislative prayer.

- Under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I, a county commission and a county planning commission are legislative bodies governed by the U.S. Supreme Court's Marsh standard for evaluating legislative prayer under the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008).

Cited in Richmond County v. Pierce, 234 Ga. 274, 215 S.E.2d 665 (1975); Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 216 S.E.2d 250 (1975); Dozier v. Norris, 241 Ga. 230, 244 S.E.2d 853 (1978); Earth Mgt., Inc. v. Heard County, 248 Ga. 442, 283 S.E.2d 455 (1981); Local 189 Int'l Union of Police Ass'ns v. Barrett, 524 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Mullis Tree Serv. v. Bibb County, 828 F. Supp. 53 (M.D. Ga. 1993); Malcom v. Newton County, 244 Ga. App. 464, 535 S.E.2d 824 (2000); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003).

Counties and municipalities may appropriate and expend for public purposes connected with administration of local government.

- Under Constitution and state statutes, both county governments and municipalities may levy taxes for public purposes connected with administration of county and city governments; as a corollary to this principle, it follows that counties and municipalities may appropriate and expend money for such public purpose. Peacock v. Georgia Mun. Ass'n, 247 Ga. 740, 279 S.E.2d 434 (1981).

Permit fees allocated to education prohibition.

- This provision does not give a county authority to impose a tax or charge in addition to all charges currently imposed for building permits where those funds are allocated directly to the board of education. DeKalb County v. Brown Bldrs. Co., 227 Ga. 777, 183 S.E.2d 367 (1971) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Instead of granting authority, this paragraph specifically denies authority to impose taxes and declares that such authority must be found elsewhere in the laws or the Constitution. Richmond County Bus. Ass'n v. Richmond County, 224 Ga. 854, 165 S.E.2d 293 (1968) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Ordinance imposing tax void.

- A trial court does not err in granting an injunction against implementation of an ordinance which purports to impose regulatory license fees, but which, in fact, imposes taxes and is null and void for lack of statutory or constitutional authority. Richmond County v. Richmond County Bus. Ass'n., 225 Ga. 568, 170 S.E.2d 246 (1969).

One criteria for a licensing ordinance is that it have a primarily regulatory intention. Richmond County v. Richmond County Bus. Ass'n., 225 Ga. 568, 170 S.E.2d 246 (1969).

Municipal bylaws and ordinances undertaking to regulate useful business enterprises are subject to investigation in the courts with a view to determining whether they are a lawful exercise of police power, or whether, under the guise of enforcing police regulation, there has been an unwarranted and arbitrary interference with the constitutional right to carry on a lawful business or use and enjoy property. Borough of Atlanta v. Kirk, 175 Ga. 395, 165 S.E. 69 (1932).

Ordinance levying occupation tax must have statutory authority.

- Because levying of an occupation or business tax, although called a license fee for regulatory purposes under the police power, is a tax within the purview of subsection (c)(4) of this paragraph, the enactment of an ordinance for this purpose must be preceded and authorized by statutory or constitutional authority. Richmond County v. Richmond County Bus. Ass'n., 225 Ga. 568, 170 S.E.2d 246 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Court should not void ordinance on whim.

- If the facts and evidence before the municipal body at time of passing the ordinance would authorize the exercise by that body of discretion in passing or refusing to pass the ordinance, then a court should not declare the ordinance unreasonable, arbitrary, and void merely because the court should take the view that it would be best for the public that the ordinance should not be enforced. Borough of Atlanta v. Kirk, 175 Ga. 395, 165 S.E. 69 (1932).

Reasonable necessity required for regulating business.

- Regulation of a lawful business is dependent upon some reasonable necessity for protection of public health, safety, morality, or other phase of the general welfare. Richmond County v. Richmond County Bus. Ass'n., 225 Ga. 568, 170 S.E.2d 246 (1969).

Liquor permits.

- Section of DeKalb County Code requiring all employees of an establishment holding a license for consumption of beer or wine, except busboys, cooks, and dishwashers, to have permits was not unconstitutional and did not exceed the county's powers of home rule. Kariuki v. DeKalb County, 253 Ga. 713, 324 S.E.2d 450 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Russell v. City of E. Point, 261 Ga. 213, 403 S.E.2d 50 (1991).

Power over zoning granted to county authorities.

- The authority to amend or repeal existing planning and zoning laws or to enact new planning and zoning laws with respect to unincorporated areas has been granted to the county authorities. Johnston v. Hicks, 225 Ga. 576, 170 S.E.2d 410 (1969).

This paragraph does not enlarge or diminish the power of a county to zone as set forth in the Constitution. It merely eliminates the necessity for prior authorization by the General Assembly to use the power conferred by the Constitution for counties to zone. Gifford-Hill & Co. v. Harrison, 229 Ga. 260, 191 S.E.2d 85 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Legislature no longer has authority to enact local laws concerning planning and zoning for unincorporated areas. Johnston v. Hicks, 225 Ga. 576, 170 S.E.2d 410 (1969).

Instance of unauthorized exercise of power.

- The General Assembly had no authority in 1968 to pass an amendment to the 1956 zoning and planning Act for an unincorporated area in DeKalb County, and its attempt to amend the 1956 local Act with Ga. L. 1968, p. 3406 was wholly beyond its power and without legal effect. Johnston v. Hicks, 225 Ga. 576, 170 S.E.2d 410 (1969).

Zoning Procedures Law.

- The Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq., preempted the provisions in a city charter for the purposes of the adoption and amendment of zoning ordinances. Little v. City of Lawrenceville, 272 Ga. 340, 528 S.E.2d 515 (2000).

Locating offices outside of county seat.

- Administrative facilities and services such as jails, correctional camps, health clinics, hospitals, public housing and the like can be located outside the county seat. Jackson v. Gasses, 230 Ga. 712, 198 S.E.2d 657 (1973).

County board of commissioners is authorized to locate administrative offices and facilities outside county seat. Brewster v. Houston County, 235 Ga. 68, 218 S.E.2d 748 (1975).

County board of commissioners is granted authority to enact ordinances pertaining to civil service boards affecting that county, rather than the General Assembly. Forbes v. Lovett, 227 Ga. 772, 183 S.E.2d 371 (1971).

Sheriff's offices.

- There is no statutory prohibition against sheriff maintaining offices in county outside of county site so long as the sheriff complies with the statute which requires the sheriff to maintain an office in the county site. Brewster v. Houston County, 235 Ga. 68, 218 S.E.2d 748 (1975).

Paragraph divested General Assembly of authority to enact county retirement system.

- This paragraph vested sole authority over compensation, retirement, and other benefits of employees of county governing authorities, in the county governing authorities, and thus divested the General Assembly for authority to enact a retirement Act for a county. Richmond County v. Pierce, 234 Ga. 274, 215 S.E.2d 665 (1975).

Court clerk not subject to county merit system.

- A county merit board can take no action affecting the clerk of the superior court and the clerk's employees unless the clerk of the superior court has asked that the clerk's office be subject to the merit system and the county has provided for such coverage through an appropriate resolution or ordinance. Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504, 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995).

The clerk of the Superior Court of Gwinnett County is not subject to the Gwinnett County Merit System. Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504, 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995).

Tax commissioner's personnel decisions not state functions.

- Madison County Tax Commissioner was not acting as an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution when making the decision to terminate an employee; although the Tax Commissioner was an elected state constitutional officer pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III, and the Tax Commissioner's Office was not a division of Madison County or its governing authority pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I, since the Tax Commissioner's duties included both state functions and county functions to be performed within Madison County and, with regard to personnel administration, the state distinguished between employees of the county and employees of elected county officials, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I(c)(1), and so the Tax Commissioner, and not the county, defined certain work regulations for the Tax Commissioner's employees, a fact that did not transform the Tax Commissioner's administration of personnel into a state function, however, because, although state law provided the Tax Commissioner with the authority to manage office personnel, the state exercised little control over the use of that authority. Epps v. Watson, U.S. (M.D. Ga. May 25, 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2007).

As for funding, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-183 provided that the county, not the state, funded the Tax Commissioner's office expenses, including personnel expenses, and gave the Tax Commissioner the authority to set employee salaries, limited to the budget provided by the county; based on these considerations, the court found that the Madison County Tax Commissioner did not wear a "state hat" when making personnel decisions for the Tax Commissioner's office. Epps v. Watson, U.S. (M.D. Ga. May 25, 2006), aff'd, 492 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff could not dispute that the Tax Commissioner's Office (TCO) was a separate entity from Madison County. Plaintiff did not submit evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that plaintiff was an employee of the county, not the TCO. Epps v. Watson, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008).

County commissioners not empowered to fix salaries of sheriff and deputies.

- This paragraph, which authorizes the governing authority of each county "to fix the salary, compensation and expenses of those employed by such governing authority," does not empower the county commissioners to fix the salaries and expenses of the sheriff and the sheriff's deputies without other legislation empowering the commissioners to employ the sheriff and deputies. Warren v. Walton, 231 Ga. 495, 202 S.E.2d 405 (1973).

Sovereign immunity of deputy sheriff.

- Deputy sheriff in the deputy's official capacity was entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to a former inmate's claims arising from denial of a dietary request; the sheriff's powers were derived from the state, and provision of food to county jail inmates was a state function. Lake v. Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016).

County could not infringe on utility's eminent domain power.

- Forsyth County, Ga., Unified Development Code §§ 21-6.1 and 21-6.5 were defective because they required a utility to successfully comply with the ordinance's procedures, and authorized the county to deny "any or all" portions of an application; as such, they were unconstitutional infringements on the utility's legislatively-delegated power of eminent domain. Forsyth County v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 280 Ga. 664, 632 S.E.2d 101 (2006).

Services which counties may provide individually or jointly subject to this paragraph.

- Georgia Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III) was intended to supplement and enumerate services which counties and municipalities may provide, and to permit them to combine to provide the services, but the ordinances which counties may enact to provide these services are subject to the general terms and restrictions of this paragraph, including the prohibition against the enactment of criminal sanctions by counties. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-96 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Charter consolidating governments of a city and a county should set out the desired powers of the consolidated government in an enumerated and specific manner. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-413.

County cannot impose a tax upon retail sales of beer. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-6.

Federal funds for housing.

- A county may, in certain circumstances, apply to the federal government for funds to be used for urban redevelopment and for public housing within the county. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-35.

Governing authority of an affected municipality or county has authority to control boxing events in its jurisdiction. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-167.

Commissioners of a county can pass a resolution on the subject of dogs running unattended and which apparently are unowned. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-151.

This paragraph prohibits passing of an ordinance which provides criminal punishment for operating a business without a license; with no authority to enforce any ordinances enacted with criminal sanctions, a county could not effectively enforce the regulations of business establishments which it desires to control. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-295 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

By general law, the General Assembly has preempted the field of county business licenses so that the counties may not provide for the issuance of such licenses under the home rule amendment. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. 67-295.

County precluded from creating new probation system without legislative authority.

- Subsection (c) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I would appear to preclude a county from taking any action to create a new system of probation, private or otherwise, without specific legislative authority. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U89-8.

There is no general authority for counties to enact criminal ordinances. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-15.

Amendment of zoning restrictions.

- Under the home rule power of a county, electors may petition the probate judge to hold an election to amend zoning resolutions passed by the governing authority. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-2.

Creation of county fire districts.

- County fire districts can be created only by action of the General Assembly or by action of the county governing authority and may not be established by petition and referendum pursuant to the home rule provisions of the Constitution. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-54.

Qualifications of persons signing petitions.

- Persons signing a petition pursuant to the provisions of this Article must be persons who are currently registered to vote in the county and who were registered to vote in the county during the last general election. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-40.

Petitions in Murray County under the home rule provisions of the constitution should be filed with the judge of the probate court, rather than with the board of elections. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U88-15.

Traffic control ordinances.

- Counties may enact ordinances regarding enforcement of traffic control devices by the use of cameras. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U00-12.

Required stipulation for participation by county in retirement annuity for employees.

- A county can participate in a retirement annuity for its employees contracted through an insurance company with the understanding that payments for public school teachers and personnel, their dependents and survivors, shall be paid from education funds. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-474; 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-37.

County cannot establish retirement plan for elected officials.

- A county board of commissioners may not, by ordinance, resolution, or regulation, institute a retirement or pension program for the elected officials of that county; such a program must, under the Georgia Constitution, be created by local or general Act of the General Assembly. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-40.

County authorization of insurance and retirement benefits unauthorized.

- An authorization by county commissioners of retirement and insurance benefits for elected officials without specific authorization of the General Assembly would not be legal. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-77.

General act required to establish retirement program for elected officials.

- Under this paragraph, a county's retirement plan cannot constitutionally apply to employees of the county sheriff, nor to other employees of elected county officers who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the board of commissioners; retirement plans or programs for these employees may only be instituted by general or local Act of the General Assembly. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-37 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Where compensation of deputy sheriff is fixed by a local Act, the county commissioners have no authority to increase it. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-64.

The governing authority may increase salary of personnel employed by it, but not the personnel of any other county elective office. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-68 (decided under Ga. Const. 1945, Art. XV, Sec. II, Para. I(c)(1) and Art. XV, Sec. II, Para. II).

Clerks are court personnel, as shown by their inclusion in former Code 1933 (see now O.C.G.A. Title 15), and are included under this paragraph. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-4 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. I).

Under home rule, the salary of a clerk of the county commissioners may be raised. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-143 (decided under Ga. Const. 1945, Art. XV, Sec. II, Para. I (c)(1) and Art. XV, Sec. II, Para. II).

County employees who work for elected officials may be included in county pension plans without the need for general or local legislation enacted by the General Assembly. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U88-8.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 109 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 70 et seq.

ALR.

- Right of county or municipal authorities temporarily to loan or transfer money from one fund or department to another, 70 A.L.R. 431.

Statutes relating to establishment or administration of parks, as encroachment on right of local self-government, 88 A.L.R. 228.

Inclusion in single initiative or referendum petition of proposed constitutional or statutory enactments covering different and distinct subjects, 90 A.L.R. 572.

Power of Legislature to raise the constitutional minimum of favorable votes imposed upon adoption of special proposition submitted to voters, 91 A.L.R. 1021.

Retroactive effect of zoning regulation, in absence of saving clause, on pending application for building permit, 50 A.L.R.3d 596.

Validity, construction, and application of zoning ordinance relating to operation of junkyard or scrap metal processing plant, 50 A.L.R.3d 837.