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Call Now: 904-383-7448The General Assembly may provide by law for the self-government of municipalities and to that end is expressly given the authority to delegate its power so that matters pertaining to municipalities may be dealt with without the necessity of action by the General Assembly.
- Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I.
- Force of law of local Acts, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV, and §§ 36-34-8 and36-35-7.
Self-government by municipalities generally, Ch. 34, T. 36, and Ch. 35, T. 36.
- For article analyzing alternative means of implementing home rule legislation and advocating home rule for municipalities in light of numerous attempts to pass such legislation in Georgia, prior to repeal of municipal Home Rule Law of 1951 (Ga. L. 1951, p. 116) and adoption of the municipal Home Rule Act of 1965 (Ch. 35, T. 36), see 8 Mercer L. Rev. 337 (1957). For article tracing the history of municipal annexation, and the General Assembly's role therein, see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 35 (1967). For article, "The Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965 (Ch. 35, T. 36)," see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 333 (1967). For article discussing constitutional provisions authorizing municipal home rule prior to the adoption of the 1976 Georgia Constitution, see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 317 (1968). For article discussing the evolution of municipal annexation law in Georgia in light of Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970), see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1971). For article, "Home Rule: Its Impact on Georgia Local Government Law," see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 277 (1972). For article discussing the "void-from-inception" doctrine as applied to statutory law in Georgia, see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 101 (1973). For article, "Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law," see 8 Ga. L. Rev. 614 (1974). For article, "Selected Oddities in Georgia Municipal Law," see 9 Ga. L. Rev. 783 (1975). For article discussing limitations on municipalities "home rule" powers, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 805 (1978). For article surveying recent legislative and judicial developments in zoning, planning, and environmental law, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1979). For survey article on environment, natural resources, and land use, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 145 (1982). For article, "The United States Supreme Court as Home Rule Wrecker," see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 363 (1982). For annual survey article on local government law, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (1998). For note discussing home rule in Georgia under 1947 Home Rule Act (now Ch. 35, T. 36), see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 280 (1950). For note on the validity of population statutes in Georgia, see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 533 (1966). For comment on Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953), see 16 Ga. B.J. 343 (1954).
Uniform Beer Tax Act (Ga. L. 1974, p. 1447) was not violative of this paragraph. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).
- As the Constitution stood, before it contained this paragraph, all legislative power reposed in the General Assembly, and could not constitutionally be delegated by the General Assembly. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953).
Under this paragraph and Ga. L. 1973, p. 778, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6), cities do not have power to adopt entirely new charters changing their form of government, so that a new charter created by the state legislature by a special law does not contravene Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), which forbids the state legislature from adopting a special law covering subject matter dealt with by existing general law. Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 207 S.E.2d 475 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
Cited in Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 70 S.E.2d 360 (1952); Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954); Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505, 186 S.E.2d 719 (1972); Thigpen v. State, 229 Ga. 820, 194 S.E.2d 423 (1972); Bruck v. City of Temple, 240 Ga. 411, 240 S.E.2d 876 (1977); Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978); City of Mt. View v. Clayton County, 242 Ga. 163, 249 S.E.2d 541 (1978); City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014).
Phrase "self-government" in this paragraph is not an expression of limitation confining delegation of legislative powers to strictly intramural affairs. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970), commented on in 5 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1971) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
Local decision on local affairs is "self-government." Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970), commented on in 5 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1971).
State-imposed tax for local purposes violates no municipality's right to govern itself even if it denies the municipality discretion to determine whether a tax on malt beverages is necessary to provide for the public need of its citizens. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).
Annexation comes within purview of this constitutional paragraph and the purview of "self-government" as expressed therein. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970), commented on in discussing the evolution of municipal annexation law in Georgia, see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1971) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
- A constitutional provision which expressly prescribes the manner of doing a particular thing is exclusive in that regard and impliedly prohibits performance in a substantially different manner. However, this paragraph does not come within this principle so as to impliedly restrict the General Assembly in directing local taxation because this paragraph is permissive, and because it relates to the delegation of power and not to the exercise of power. Blackmon v. Golia, 231 Ga. 381, 202 S.E.2d 186 (1973), commented on in 16 Ga. B.J. 343 (1954) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
This paragraph is not in derogation of legislative power and it does not conflict with it. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
- The legislative power of the General Assembly is in no way impaired by this paragraph and municipalities can receive and retain only such legislative power as that body determines from time to time they should exercise. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 178 S.E.2d 868 (1970), commented on in 5 Ga. L. Rev. 499 (1971) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
Municipalities can receive and retain only such legislative power of the General Assembly as that body determines from time to time they should exercise. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).
This paragraph does not grant legislative powers to municipalities directly and independently of the General Assembly. It authorizes the General Assembly to delegate its legislative powers to municipalities. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
- This paragraph does not function as a limitation on the power of the legislature but rather grants to the General Assembly additional authority "to delegate its power so that matters pertaining to municipalities upon which, prior to the ratification of this paragraph, it was necessary for the General Assembly to act, may be dealt with without the necessity of action by the General Assembly." State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
- The attempt to confer legislative authority by Ga. L. 1951, p. 116, as amended by Ga. L. 1952, p. 46 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 35, T. 36) was unconstitutional and void because it was not embraced in enactments by the General Assembly of uniform systems of government. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953), commented on in 16 Ga. B.J. 343 (1954).
This paragraph unquestionably authorizes the General Assembly to delegate legislative power to municipalities by embodying initiative, referendum, and recall in some of the systems of government which this paragraph directs the legislature to provide. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953), commented on in 16 Ga. B.J. 343 (1954) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
- Fact that General Assembly may have delegated to municipalities certain authority pursuant to this paragraph does not raise constitutional bar prohibiting General Assembly from legislating directly in the same area at a later date. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
- Since the language of this paragraph does not provide a uniformity requirement for new municipal charters, the General Assembly is constitutionally free to exercise its reserved legislative power on a nonuniform basis when it enacts a new charter for a municipality. Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 207 S.E.2d 475 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
- The only procedure by which power to legislate - and this includes extending corporate limits of municipalities - can be delegated by the General Assembly under this paragraph is by incorporating such delegated power in systems of government enacted by the General Assembly. Systems of government and municipal charters are synonymous. Each confer and define powers and provide for machinery to operate the government. Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953), commented on in 16 Ga. B.J. 343 (1954) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. II).
- A city code section which makes it unlawful for a wrecker service to refuse to accept checks and major credit cards is constitutional, and is not ultra vires the home rule powers conferred by O.C.G.A. § 36-35-6(a). Upton v. City of Atlanta, 260 Ga. 250, 392 S.E.2d 244 (1990).
- Trial court properly granted the city defendants summary judgment on the city employees' claims of breach of contract and unconstitutional impairment of contract regarding an ordinance increasing their pension plan contribution rate because the Georgia General Assembly expressly contemplated that a municipal corporation's provision for employee retirement or pension benefits would be subject to being supplemented by local law. Borders v. City of Atlanta, 298 Ga. 188, 779 S.E.2d 279 (2015).
Constitutional provisions pertaining to home rule are permissive in nature, and require affirmative enabling legislation. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 488.
- County boards of education, even though appointive and created by statute prior to and existing at the time of adoption of the Constitution of 1877, have consistently been held by the appellate courts to be county offices. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 58.
City may establish a personnel department and a merit board without necessity of special Acts of the General Assembly. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-310.
- A county may, in certain circumstances, apply to the federal government for funds to be used for urban redevelopment and for public housing within the county. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-35.
- Assuming that a city possesses legal authority to borrow funds via a 20-year loan for purpose of constructing a library building, it would be legal for city and county to enter into the proposed agreement whereunder the building would be leased to the county for the term of the loan at an annual rental sufficient to meet loan payments; it would also be legal for the county to levy taxes for the purpose of making the rental payments. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-120.
- Unless a provision in the city charter allows such an expenditure, a city may not contribute to a day care center. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-14.
- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 163 et seq.
- 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 1 et seq.
- Proposition submitted to people with reference to erection or purchase of plant or other public utility as single or double proposition, 5 A.L.R. 538.
Liability of town or municipality for libel or slander, 9 A.L.R. 351.
What are "public utilities" within constitutional or statutory provisions relating to purchase, construction, or repair of same by municipal corporation, 9 A.L.R. 1033; 35 A.L.R. 592.
Power to forbid or restrict repair of wooden building within fire limits, 26 A.L.R. 1219; 56 A.L.R. 878.
Power of municipal corporation to submit to arbitration, 40 A.L.R. 1370.
Validity of municipal regulation requiring vehicles for hire to make use of "taxicab stands," 55 A.L.R. 1132.
Constitutionality of city manager or commission form of municipal government, 67 A.L.R. 737.
Right of county or municipal authorities temporarily to loan or transfer money from one fund or department to another, 70 A.L.R. 431.
Referendum of general legislative act to people in absence of constitutional requirement in that regard, 76 A.L.R. 1053.
Power of municipality to make expenditures for advertising or other forms of publicity, 79 A.L.R. 466.
Statutes relating to establishment or administration of parks, as encroachment on right of local self-government, 88 A.L.R. 228.
Power of legislature to raise constitutional minimum of favorable votes imposed upon adoption of special proposition submitted to voters, 91 A.L.R. 1021.
Matters pertaining to police department as within exclusive control of municipalities under home-rule charters, 105 A.L.R. 259.
Power of municipality to classify for purposes of taxation as affected by classification made by state or its failure to classify, 110 A.L.R. 1203.
Construction and application of constitutional or statutory provisions expressly excepting certain laws from referendum, 146 A.L.R. 284; 100 A.L.R.2d 314.
Doctrine of de facto existence or powers of municipal corporation as applicable to amendment or revision of charter, 7 A.L.R.2d 1407.
What land is contiguous or adjacent to municipality so as to be subject to annexation, 49 A.L.R.3d 589.
Standing of municipal corporation or other governmental body to attack zoning of land lying outside its borders, 49 A.L.R.3d 1126.