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Call Now: 904-383-7448All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole. Public officers are the trustees and servants of the people and are at all times amenable to them.
- Art. I, Sec. II, Para. I.
- Recall of elected officials, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. II, Para. IV, and Ch. 4, T. 21.
- For article, "The Law of the Land," focusing on the role of the Supreme Court, see 6 J. of Pub. L. 444 (1957). For article, "Conflicts of Interests of Public Officers and Employees," see 13 Ga. St. B.J. 64 (1976). For article, "Some Thoughts on Lawyer/Legislators in the Georgia House of Representatives," see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 110 (1987). For annual survey of legal ethics, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 269 (1986). For article, "Administrative Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2001). For article, "Local Government Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (2001). For article, "The Status of Administrative Agencies under the Georgia Constitution," 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1109 (2006). For article, "Must Government Contractors 'Submit' to Their Own Destruction?: Georgia's Trade Secret Disclosure Exemption and United HealthCare of Georgia, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Community Health," see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 825 (2009). For comment on City of Atlanta v. Mapel, 121 Ga. App. 567, 174 S.E.2d 599 (1970), as to municipal corporations' negligence liability for injuries sustained at municipal golf courses, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 608 (1971).
- Under Georgia's system of government, the method of expressing the will of the people is by voting in a legally held election. Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).
- The general power or jurisdiction to elect a Governor remains in the people under the Constitution, and that as related to the election of such officer by the General Assembly, that body is an agency or tribunal of special or limited jurisdiction. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947).
This paragraph imposes no restriction on the legislative power to control municipal governments and appoint municipal officers. Mayor of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 40 S.E. 1004, 57 L.R.A. 230 (1902).
Territory may be annexed to a city without submission of question to the people. Toney v. Mayor of Macon, 119 Ga. 83, 46 S.E. 80 (1903), appeal dismissed, 195 U.S. 625, 25 S. Ct. 791, 49 L. Ed. 350 (1904); White v. City of Atlanta, 134 Ga. 532, 68 S.E. 103 (1910).
- The Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. I since the Act was enacted under the authority of an amendment approved by a majority of the voters. Dollar v. Dalton Pub. Schs., 233 Ga. App. 827, 505 S.E.2d 789 (1998).
Delegation to private organization of power of appointment to public office is unconstitutional. Rogers v. Medical Ass'n, 244 Ga. 151, 259 S.E.2d 85 (1979).
- County commissioners, in selling county property, act as fiduciaries or trustees for the taxpayers and citizens of the county, and it is their duty in making a sale of such property to do everything reasonably within their power to obtain the best possible price. DeKalb County v. Wilson, 217 Ga. 566, 124 S.E.2d 273 (1962).
- Neither this paragraph nor the Education Code (O.C.G.A. § 20-1-1 et seq.) presume that elected school board officials whose family members are employed by the local school system act in violation of their public duty merely by participating in decisions affecting school operations. Ianicelli v. McNeely, 272 Ga. 234, 527 S.E.2d 189 (2000).
- Whether characterized as setting a qualification for continued service on the local board in the extraordinary circumstance of an imminent loss of accreditation, or whether characterized as providing for removal for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-73 was held by the Georgia Supreme Court to be a permissible exercise of the legislative power to provide for the removal for cause of members of local boards. DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Ga. State Bd. of Educ., 294 Ga. 349, 751 S.E.2d 827 (2013).
- This paragraph forbids a mayor to take a contract which it is the mayor's duty to supervise. Mayor of Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221 (1878); Bates v. Bigby, 123 Ga. 727, 51 S.E. 717 (1905).
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. Malcom v. Webb, 211 Ga. 449, 86 S.E.2d 489 (1955).
- The Constitution prohibits a legislator from representing a client, for the legislator's own financial gain, in any civil transaction or matter wherein the State of Georgia shall be an opposing party. Such proscriptions of law are not confined to legislators who are lawyers, but extend to every public officer. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d 524 (1982).
Allocation of a portion of the fines and forfeitures collected in this state to the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund is not a violation of this paragraph because of the possibility that peace officers will institute prosecutions for the sole purpose of building the fund, as public officers are presumed to do their duty. Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 61 S.E.2d 814 (1950).
- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. I does not prohibit a legislator, who is an attorney, from representing clients before a state administrative agency when no fee is charged for the services rendered. Georgia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Lovvorn, 255 Ga. 259, 336 S.E.2d 238 (1985).
- The City Recorder of Commerce, as a public officer of the City of Commerce, was prohibited as attorney and for the attorney's own financial gain from initiating or defending a lawsuit on behalf of another which sought to defeat the official public actions of other trustees of the people - specifically, the mayor and two city councilmen of the City of Commerce - and a motion to disqualify the attorney should have been granted. Stephenson v. Benton, 250 Ga. 726, 300 S.E.2d 803 (1983).
- Trial court properly determined that the billboard advertising statute, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75.3(j), did not violate the trustees clause because the trustees clause did not apply because the city's challenges to the statute did not involve a public officer reaping personal financial gain at the expense of the public. City of Columbus v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 292 Ga. 878, 742 S.E.2d 728 (2013).
Cited in City of Macon v. Georgia Power Co., 171 Ga. 40, 155 S.E. 34 (1930); Curtis v. Town of Helen, 171 Ga. 256, 155 S.E. 202 (1930); Von Schmidt v. Noland Co., 176 Ga. 784, 169 S.E. 11 (1933); National Fin. Co. v. Citizens Loan & Sav. Co., 184 Ga. 619, 192 S.E. 717 (1937); Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938); De Berry v. City of La Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 8 S.E.2d 146 (1940); McRae v. Boykin, 73 Ga. App. 67, 35 S.E.2d 548 (1945); Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221 (1949); Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 61 S.E.2d 814 (1950); Cox v. Peters, 208 Ga. 498, 67 S.E.2d 579 (1951); Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 70 S.E.2d 360 (1952); Goodwin v. Allen, 89 Ga. App. 187, 78 S.E.2d 804 (1953); Moore v. Wells, 212 Ga. 446, 93 S.E.2d 731 (1956); Jones v. Mayor of Athens, 105 Ga. App. 86, 123 S.E.2d 420 (1961); Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169 (1964); Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975); Bradley v. Tenneco Oil Co., 146 Ga. App. 161, 245 S.E.2d 862 (1978); Chandler v. Miller, 952 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
- In view of the provisions of Ga. L. 1950, pp. 152 and 156, this paragraph, and the common law, any person who is a lessee or tenant of a governmental authority under a lease or rental agreement which that person originally executed, or which has been assigned or transferred to that individual, could not hold a position as a member of that authority so long as that person remained a lessee or tenant of the authority or had any interest in such lease or rental agreement. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-18.
Conflict of interest exists whenever state Representative acts as attorney at law in proceeding against state regardless of whether a fee is charged for the service. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-52.
- When a Representative argues for a client against the state, the power entrusted to the Representative by the people is wielded against its source on behalf of the client. This misuse of the Representative's power is a breach of fiduciary duty and is inconsistent with constitutional responsibility of public officers under this paragraph. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-52.
- A legislator/lawyer may represent a client before a state regulatory agency until such time as the lawyer's duty to the client demands that the lawyer advocate a position, on behalf of the client, which is different from the position taken by the state agency. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. U83-6.
- There is no per se conflict of interest if a member of the General Assembly also serves as either a city or county attorney or performs contract work for a city or county within that legislator's district. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-34.
- The chair of a board of county commissioners cannot sell groceries to the county when the nature of that contract would require the chair to judge the chair's own continual performance, notwithstanding the use of a competitive sealed bid in awarding the contract. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-8.
- A Regional Development Center's authority to contract with a nonprofit corporation is limited by the conflict of interest provisions in O.C.G.A. § 50-8-36. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-1.
- The Housing Trust Fund for the Homeless Commission's policy of having a member disclose the member's involvement and abstain from voting when the member is involved with an organization that applies to the Commission for funding is insufficient to relieve the conflict of interest. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-15.
- Even though O.C.G.A. § 45-10-25 potentially could authorize an attorney member of the State Ethics Commission to transact business with the Commission, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. I, and O.C.G.A. § 45-10-3 counsel against such a transaction as it could give rise to an appearance of impropriety if not an actual conflict of interest. 2002 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2002-4.
- Although serving as an officer in a private association may not involve any pecuniary gain, a servant of the people should guard against undertaking a position which could cause conflicting loyalties. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-25.
State Board of Funeral Service inspectors appointed pursuant to O.C.G.A. Ch. 18, T. 43 are not prohibited by state law from holding appointed or elected office in private associations of funeral service practitioners. However, serving as an officer in such private association could create an appearance of impropriety by competing loyalties which may be owed to the association and to the board. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-25.
- A legislator must exercise the legislator's duties in such a way that the legislator's loyalty is not divided and the legislator does not use the public's trust to promote the legislator's own personal financial gain. Thus, although no statute expressly prohibits a member of the legislator's law firm from acting as a registered agent during the tenure as a member of the General Assembly, such activity could in fact create a constitutional conflict of interest. 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U91-4.
- Lawyer/legislator may represent the legal interests of a Georgia company on matters in other states, including political consulting and the drafting of legislation. However, even if there may not be a per se conflict of interest, a lawyer/legislator must always vigilantly guard against such conflicts developing depending upon the facts and circumstances of each situation, especially when matters arise involving the lawyer/legislator's own actions in the consideration of legislation within the General Assembly. 2009 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U2009-3.
- 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 5 et seq.
- Bias or interest of administrative officer sitting in zoning proceeding as necessitating disqualification of officer or affecting validity of zoning decision, 4 A.L.R.6th 263.