Acceptable fines.

- It is not an excessive fine to require the perpetrator of fraud to pay double the amount of the debt sought to be evaded by the fraudulent act. Conley v. State, 85 Ga. 348, 11 S.E. 659 (1890); Hathcock v. State, 88 Ga. 91, 13 S.E. 959 (1891).

Excessive damages.

- In an action against a truck manufacturer, a punitive damages award of $2 million was not so excessive as to violate the due process clauses of the Georgia and United States Constitutions, the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the excessive fines clause of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 436 S.E.2d 635 (1993).

Duty of police to refrain from unlawfully assaulting or killing prisoner.

- It is the duty of an arresting officer who has a person under arrest for a violation of law to refrain from unlawfully assaulting or killing the prisoner. Powell v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 45 Ga. App. 88, 163 S.E. 239 (1932).

Actions of deputy at security checkpoint.

- In a suit based on the actions of a deputy sheriff at a courthouse security checkpoint, official immunity barred the plaintiff attorney's battery claim under the Georgia Constitution because the summary judgment evidence did not show actual malice or intent to cause injury. West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2014).

Imposition of consecutive sentence to replace concurrent sentence may be impermissible.

- The imposition of a new sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence on a prior conviction, in place of a vacated sentence that was to be served concurrently with the sentence on that prior conviction, may constitute an impermissible harsher punishment. Thomas v. State, 150 Ga. App. 341, 258 S.E.2d 28 (1979).

Contempt sentence imposed on defendant contrary to spirit of law.

- When, in sentencing the defendant for contempt of court for failure to obey a court order to return the daughter to custody of the wife after a one-day visitation, the court imposed a sentence for each technical contempt, and the court rendered but one judgment, a fine of $11,900.00 and confinement in jail for over three years, the sentence is contrary to the spirit of the law of the state and against the state's policy since the law limits the punishment for a single contempt to the maximum of $200.00 and 20 days in jail, no matter how malicious, how flagrant, and how iniquitous the act of contempt might be. Kenimer v. State ex rel. Webb, 81 Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E.2d 296 (1950), later appeal, 83 Ga. App. 264, 63 S.E.2d 280 (1951).

Death penalty instructions must include life sentence alternative.

- It is error to provide a sentencing phase instruction in a death penalty case which fails to explain that a life sentence may be recommended even in the presence of statutory aggravating circumstances. Stynchcombe v. Floyd, 252 Ga. 113, 311 S.E.2d 828 (1984).

State need not reduce capital sentence which is authorized under its own laws merely because of the effects of another state's judicial processes, brought about by the operation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60 (1979).

Forfeiture of property.

- Case involving the forfeiture of 5.1 acres of land and a dwelling house on the basis of the discovery of 8.8 ounces of marijuana would be remanded to the trial court for consideration in light of the decision in Thorp v. State, 264 Ga. 712, 450 S.E.2d 416 (1994). Evans v. State, 217 Ga. App. 646, 458 S.E.2d 859 (1995).

Cited in Payne v. State, 180 Ga. 609, 180 S.E. 130 (1935); Crosby v. Courson, 181 Ga. 475, 182 S.E. 590 (1935); McGraw v. State, 85 Ga. App. 857, 70 S.E.2d 141 (1952); Massey v. State, 220 Ga. 883, 142 S.E.2d 832 (1965); Massey v. State, 222 Ga. 143, 149 S.E.2d 118 (1966); Reid v. State, 116 Ga. App. 640, 158 S.E.2d 461 (1967); Strozier v. State, 116 Ga. App. 777, 159 S.E.2d 182 (1967); Irwin v. Arrendale, 117 Ga. App. 1, 159 S.E.2d 719 (1967); Stuart v. State, 117 Ga. App. 183, 160 S.E.2d 409 (1968); Grice v. State, 224 Ga. 376, 162 S.E.2d 432 (1968); Henderson v. Dutton, 397 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1968); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Cushway v. State Bar, 120 Ga. App. 371, 170 S.E.2d 732 (1969); Goodine v. Griffin, 309 F. Supp. 590 (S.D. Ga. 1970); Callahan v. State, 229 Ga. 737, 194 S.E.2d 431 (1972); Reed v. State, 134 Ga. App. 47, 213 S.E.2d 147 (1975); Crawford v. State, 236 Ga. 491, 224 S.E.2d 365 (1976); Gunn v. State, 150 Ga. 730, 257 S.E.2d 538 (1979); Southerland v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 293 Ga. App. 56, 666 S.E.2d 383 (2008).

Use of choke-hold resulted in officer's suspension.

- Police officer was properly suspended for using a choke-hold on a handcuffed suspect in an attempt to prevent the suspect from swallowing narcotics in violation of department rules; there was nothing in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, to suggest that because the use of a choke-hold was reasonable under some circumstances, the officer had the right to use it. Mercure v. City of Atlanta Civil Service Board, 327 Ga. App. 840, 761 S.E.2d 393 (2014).

Discretion of court in setting bail amount.

- The amount of bail to be assessed in each criminal case is left to the sound legal discretion of the court required to fix it and, in the absence of a flagrant abuse of such discretionary power, the court's action will not be controlled. Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950).

Entitlement to bail as matter of right.

- The accused in all criminal cases less than capital felonies, before trial, is entitled to bail, at least twice, as a matter of right and not as a matter of discretion. Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950).

Excessive bail is equivalent of refusal to grant bail, and in such a case habeas corpus is an available and appropriate remedy for relief. Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950).

Excessive bail prohibitions apply in misdemeanor cases after conviction.

- The constitutional prohibitions against excessive bail set forth in U.S. Const., amend. 8 and this paragraph apply in misdemeanor cases after conviction. Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585, 134 S.E.2d 790 (1964).

$100,000 bail in cocaine case held not excessive.

- Setting bail in the total amount of $100,000 in a case involving two charges of selling crack cocaine was not excessive when the trial judge was apprised of the defendant's lengthy residency in the community and the defendant's financial status, and weighed these factors against the serious nature and potential consequences of the charges. Mayfield v. State, 198 Ga. App. 252, 401 S.E.2d 297 (1990).

$250,000 bail in murder case held not excessive.

- In a prosecution for murder, based upon the seriousness of the offense charged and the likelihood that defendant would not appear at trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that bail of $250,000, as originally set, was not excessive. Mullinax v. State, 271 Ga. 112, 515 S.E.2d 839 (1999).

Bail in the amount of $750,000 was not excessive since the defendant had prior felony convictions and the trial court's decision to increase bail at this habeas proceeding was based on other information not available at the first hearing. Pullin v. Dorsey, 271 Ga. 882, 525 S.E.2d 87 (2000).

Waiver of Fourth Amendment rights proper as condition of bail.

- Waiver by the defendant, while free on bond for drug offenses, of rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII as a bond condition, was constitutional under U.S. Const., amend. 8 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII; it was a reasonable exercise of the trial court's function of balancing the rights of the accused with public safety interests. Rocco v. State, 267 Ga. App. 900, 601 S.E.2d 189 (2004).

Denial of bail not an abuse of discretion nor grounds for habeas petition.

- Petitioner charged with 16 counts of violating the Georgia RICO Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1, securities fraud, and theft, who owned no assets in the United States and had allegedly funneled significant assets to Belize, where the petitioner traveled frequently, was not entitled to bail as of right under O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(a), Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII, or U.S. Const., amend. VIII. The denial of bail was not an abuse of discretion, and petitioner was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Constantino v. Warren, 285 Ga. 851, 684 S.E.2d 601 (2009).

Provisions of Tort Reform Act unconstitutional.

- Provisions of the Tort Reform Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1, relating to punitive damages, violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, violated the excessive fines provisions of both constitutions, and violated the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution. McBride v. GMC, 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).

Fine did not violate defendant's constitutional rights.

- When the defendant was convicted of trafficking cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and fined $100,000, the fine was not out of proportion to the severity of the crime and not constitutionally infirm either because of the fine's mandatory nature or the fine's amount. Wyatt v. State, 259 Ga. 208, 378 S.E.2d 690 (1989).

Punitive damages in civil cases.

- The excessive fines clause of this section applies to the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827, appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 36, 102 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1988).

A $5,000,000 punitive damages award to the owner of a bulldozer which was destroyed when it hit an improperly marked underground petroleum pipeline was excessive since: (1) any negligence present was passive; (2) there was no bodily injury to the plaintiff and the award did not bear a rational relationship to the actual damages award; and (3) there was no rational relationship between the offense and the punishment in that the punitive damage award was 100 times the property damage award. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827, appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 36, 102 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1988).

State constitution provides same protection as Fourteenth Amendment.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII, which states that no person shall be abused while under arrest, provides an independent state ground for this action, and provides at least as much protection to pretrial detainees under certain circumstances as the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Long v. Jones, 208 Ga. App. 798, 432 S.E.2d 593 (1993).

Arrestee's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against a county sheriff, alleging that the arrestee was raped by a deputy at the county jail, failed as a matter of law because § 1983 relief did not extend to inadequate hiring practices, and the arrestee failed to raise a fact question as to the constitutional failure to protect, staff, and train claims against the sheriff individually; because the arrestee had not suffered a federal Eighth Amendment violation, the arrestee also had not suffered a violation under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII. Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Ga. 2009).

Prohibition relates to sentences for criminal convictions.

- The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has relation to punishment imposed by sentences on conviction for criminal offenses. Hill v. State, 119 Ga. App. 612, 168 S.E.2d 327 (1969).

Statutes authorizing capital punishment constitutional.

- The imposition of the penalty of death upon one who rapes a woman is not "cruel and unusual" punishment. Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d 766 (1964); Vanleeward v. State, 220 Ga. 135, 137 S.E.2d 452 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982, 85 S. Ct. 1348, 14 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1965).

A sentence to death by electrocution for murder is not "cruel and unusual punishment". Trimble v. State, 220 Ga. 229, 138 S.E.2d 274 (1964).

The death penalty for the crime of murder is not cruel and unusual punishment. Whisman v. State, 221 Ga. 460, 145 S.E.2d 499 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 895, 86 S. Ct. 1977, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1001 (1966).

The statutes of this state authorizing capital punishment have repeatedly been held not to be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. Hart v. State, 227 Ga. 171, 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971).

Petitioner, a death row inmate, challenged the imposition of the death penalty, in a federal habeas petition arguing that the death penalty was being administered in a racially discriminatory manner; however, the argument failed because the statistical evidence was not so strong as to permit no inference other than that the results were the product of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose in that the death penalty was sought in 58 percent of the possible death penalty cases where the defendant was black but in only 40 percent of the cases where the defendant was white, and sought in only 25 percent of the cases where the victim was black and 54 percent of the cases where the victim was white. Jefferson v. Terry, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 570 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. Ga. 2009).

Proportionality review.

- Defendant's conviction was affirmed as the Georgia Supreme Court's proportionality review was neither unconstitutional nor inadequate under Georgia statutory law. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 2d 50 (2007).

Execution by electrocution.

- As electrocution inflicts purposeless violence and needless mutilation, in violation of the Georgia Constitution's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments, future executions of death sentences are to be carried out by lethal injection only. Dawson v. State, 274 Ga. 327, 554 S.E.2d 137 (2001).

Execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989).

Death sentence proper despite defendant's mental illness.

- Defendant, who was not found by the jury to be mentally ill, was not entitled to have the death sentence vacated on mental illness grounds, as O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 did not preclude a death sentence on mental illness grounds, and there was no constitutional prohibition under U.S. Const., amend. 8 or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII against a death sentence for a competent but mentally ill defendant. Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1116, 126 S. Ct. 1917, 164 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2006).

Death penalty for codefendant not proven to have directly committed murderous act.

- Since the defendant was not only present but active and participating throughout the commission of kidnapping, rape, murder and aggravated assault of which the defendant was convicted, imposition of the death penalty was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases even though it was not established whether defendant or the codefendant fired the gunshots which killed the victim. Johnson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 812, 295 S.E.2d 63 (1982).

Barbarities of quartering are forbidden. Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297 (1872).

Paddling of children in public school is not cruel and unusual punishment, yet any punishment beyond corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary may result in remedial action to deter excesses. Fuller v. Williams, 150 Ga. App. 730, 258 S.E.2d 538, rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979).

This paragraph does not put any limit upon legislative discretion to punish one convicted of crime so long as the legislature does not provide cruel and unusual punishments such as disgraced the civilization of former ages, and make one shudder with horror to read of them, as drawing, quartering, burning, or other acts; this paragraph does not put any limit upon legislative discretion to punish one convicted of a crime. Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d 766 (1964); Dutton v. Smart, 222 Ga. 35, 148 S.E.2d 396 (1966).

Certain discretion as to term of imprisonment may be left to trial judge. Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297 (1872).

Prosecutors did not have unfettered discretion.

- Defendant's claim that the prosecutor's authority to choose in which cases to seek the death penalty permitted the possibility of an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion and was unconstitutional was rejected as prosecutors did not have unfettered discretion to seek the death penalty, and challenges to the Georgia legislature's determination that district attorneys should have the discretion to decide whether a murder defendant met the statutory criteria for the death penalty and whether to pursue the death penalty when a defendant was eligible had been repeatedly rejected. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 2d 50 (2007).

Sentence not for unspecified period.

- Defendant's sentences did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Although defendant was remanded to jail for an unspecified period, until there was an opening for the defendant at a detention center, the defendant had not been sentenced for an unspecified period of time. The defendant received a 12 month sentence and had been permitted to serve that sentence on probation, provided the defendant comply with certain conditions. Boyd v. State, 204 Ga. App. 729, 420 S.E.2d 389 (1992).

Sentence within statutory limit will not be set aside.

- When the sentence imposed by the trial court is within the limit fixed by the statute, the sentence will not be set aside and a new trial granted on the ground that the sentence imposed is excessive and the punishment cruel and unusual, and, therefore, in violation of the state Constitution. Curtis v. State, 102 Ga. App. 790, 118 S.E.2d 264 (1960).

A sentence is not cruel and inhumane within the constitutional inhibition so long as it is within the statutory limit. Boyd v. State, 204 Ga. App. 729, 420 S.E.2d 389 (1992).

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1, imposing mandatory minimum sentences in certain cases, does not impose unconstitutionally excessive punishment, and the fact that the defendants were 18 years old at the time of sentencing and may have been first offenders did not render the statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendants. Campbell v. State, 268 Ga. 44, 485 S.E.2d 185 (1997).

Claim by the defendant that a sentence pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-22.2(b) and17-10-6.1(b)(2) constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence was grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime, and that the sentence was overly severe under the circumstances, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Georgia Supreme Court where the claim challenged the constitutionality of the statutes themselves; as the sentence was legally authorized and within statutory limits, the sentence was upheld. Colton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 795, 678 S.E.2d 521 (2009).

Sentence is not cruel and inhumane within constitutional inhibition so long as it is within statutory limit. Bearden v. State, 122 Ga. App. 25, 176 S.E.2d 243 (1970).

When the sentence imposed was the mandatory minimum sentence and was no greater than what could have been imposed under prior law, the punishment was not cruel and unusual as to be completely disproportionate to the offense. Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 274 S.E.2d 451 (1981).

A life without parole sentence imposed on a juvenile who is not properly determined to be in the very small class of juveniles for whom such a sentence may be deemed constitutionally proportionate is not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void; it follows that state collateral review courts that are open to federal law claims must apply the holding of Miller v. Alabama, - U.S. - , 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), retroactively if a petitioner challenges such a sentence under the Eighth Amendment, and it follows, as a matter of Georgia procedural law, that a defendant's Miller claim, a substantive claim that, if meritorious, would render a sentence void, can be properly raised in an amended motion for new trial and in a direct appeal, despite the failure to raise the claim before the defendant was sentenced. Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016).

Consecutive sentencing permissible.

- Defendant who was convicted of simple battery and criminal trespass after defendant attacked defendant's spouse and defendant's mother-in-law and broke the windshield and at least one other window on the spouse's car was not subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because the trial court imposed a sentence of 12 months' incarceration for each charge, and ordered that the defendant serve the sentences consecutively. Hill v. State, 259 Ga. App. 363, 577 S.E.2d 61 (2003).

Imposition of maximum misdemeanor punishment excessive.

- Imposition of the maximum misdemeanor punishment upon conviction for criminal trespass exceeded constitutional bounds against cruel and unusual punishment since the trespass involved the defendant's trimming of the defendant's neighbor's hedge. Haygood v. State, 225 Ga. App. 81, 483 S.E.2d 302 (1997).

Excessive, unusual, and cruel sentence imposed.

- Although under the law of the case, the trial court may be authorized to hold the defendant guilty of 238 separate contempts when the offenses are all nevertheless based on only one culpable intent there is one contempt coupled with that culpable intent, and 237 other technical violations. Therefore, all of the sentence of the trial court over and above the maximum fixed for the first offense, and in addition thereto amounts of imprisonment and fines for each of the remaining 237 technical violations totalling the equivalent of one other maximum offense, is an abuse of judicial discretion and so cruel and unusual as to contravene the state Constitution. Kenimer v. State, 83 Ga. App. 264, 63 S.E.2d 280 (1951).

No merit to contention that separate sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

- Contention that imposition of 36 separate sentences, to be computed consecutively, upon convictions on 36 separate and distinct counts, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, is without merit. Curtis v. State, 102 Ga. App. 790, 118 S.E.2d 264 (1960).

More severe sentence may be imposed upon resentencing, but vindictiveness must not be motivating force.

- There is no absolute constitutional bar to imposing a more severe sentence upon resentencing, but vindictiveness must not be the motivating force behind an increased sentence. Pressley v. State, 158 Ga. App. 638, 281 S.E.2d 364 (1981).

Conduct justifying imposition of more severe sentence upon resentencing.

- Reasons for imposing a more severe sentence must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. Pressley v. State, 158 Ga. App. 638, 281 S.E.2d 364 (1981).

Factual data upon which increased sentence is based must be made part of record, so that constitutional legitimacy of increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. Pressley v. State, 158 Ga. App. 638, 281 S.E.2d 364 (1981).

Maltreatment prior to trial does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

- Maltreatment occurring prior to the time of the trial constitutes no part of the sentences imposed as a result of the trial and, therefore, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Hill v. State, 119 Ga. App. 612, 168 S.E.2d 327 (1969).

Permissible punishment.

- Violator of an ordinance may be compelled to work on city streets. Loeb v. Jennings, 133 Ga. 796, 67 S.E. 101, 18 Ann. Cas. 376 (1910), aff'd, 219 U.S. 582, 31 S. Ct. 469, 55 L. Ed. 345 (1911).

Defendant failed to establish the threshold gross disproportionality inference needed to support a claim that the 10 years confinement, 10 years probation sentence imposed on the defendant violated U.S. Const., amend. VIII and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII; the sentence was within the sentencing range in O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(b)(1), the 2006 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(b)(2) did not apply to the defendant, so it did not provide a basis for any proportionality argument, and the evidence showed that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a 12-year-old child without the child's consent, and Georgia's child molestation law punished acts that were far less severe. Bragg v. State, 296 Ga. App. 422, 674 S.E.2d 650 (2009).

Juvenile's sentence of four years in custody was proper on six counts of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a handgun by an underage person because the juvenile was not subject to one of the most severe punishments allowed by law, but was sentenced under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-602), which had the central purpose of rehabilitation and treatment of the child and not punishment. In the Interest of T. D. J., 325 Ga. App. 786, 755 S.E.2d 29 (2014).

Appellant's sentence of two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus 85 years was not cruel and unusual punishment, despite being 17 years old at the time of the crimes, since the trial court balanced the appellant's youth against the violent behavior and the adult conduct engaged in, which included the murder of two innocent bystanders. Jones v. State, 296 Ga. 663, 769 S.E.2d 901 (2015), overruled in part by Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016).

Impermissible punishment prescribed.

- A municipal ordinance authorizing punishment of its prisoners by working on a chain gang with state prisoners is void. Pearson v. Wimbish, 124 Ga. 701, 52 S.E. 751, 4 Ann. Cas. 501 (1906).

Fine for contempt of discovery order.

- When the per diem fine for contempt of a discovery order imposed by the trial court totaled $193,500, the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant that the fine imposed was substantial but found no basis in the record for concluding that this punishment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Carey Can., Inc. v. Hinely, 181 Ga. App. 364, 352 S.E.2d 398 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 257 Ga. 150, 356 S.E.2d 202, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898, 108 S. Ct. 233, 98 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1987).

Life sentence for second conviction of selling cocaine not cruel and unusual punishment.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), which mandates a life sentence for a second conviction of selling cocaine, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII. Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991).

O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(d), which mandates a sentence of life imprisonment upon a second conviction for selling cocaine, does not violate due process or equal protection and does not violate state or federal constitutional guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment. Isom v. State, 261 Ga. 596, 408 S.E.2d 701 (1991); Crutchfield v. State, 218 Ga. App. 360, 461 S.E.2d 555 (1995).

Mandatory child molestation sentence.

- Mandatory sentence for aggravated child molestation of 10 years without parole pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-6-4(d)(1) and 17-10-6.1 was not cruel and unusual punishment as applied to the defendant, despite the fact that the defendant was 18 years old at the time of the act and the victim was only 4 years younger. Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675, 631 S.E.2d 675 (2006).

Twenty-five year sentence for trafficking in methamphetamine.

- When the defendant was in possession of 434.72 grams of methamphetamine, the sentence of 25 years in prison and a one million dollar fine was mandated; given the large quantity and value of the methamphetamine, the sentence required by the legislature was not wholly irrational or grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, and because trafficking in methamphetamine was so lucrative, the mandatory sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Flores v. State, 277 Ga. App. 211, 626 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

Death by lethal injection is not unconstitutional under U.S. Const., amend. 8 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII, both of which prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1116, 126 S. Ct. 1917, 164 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2006).

Defendant's pre-trial motion regarding lethal injection and the defendant's amended motion for a new trial addressing lethal injection were properly denied as the defendant failed to identify any particular aspect of the evidence admitted in the trial court that would require a departure from the prior decisions holding that lethal injection was a constitutional form of execution. Williams v. State, 281 Ga. 87, 635 S.E.2d 146 (2006), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004, 128 S. Ct. 2046, 170 L. Ed. 2d 793 (2008).

Trial court did not err in rejecting a defendant's claim that lethal injection was unconstitutional as the defendant proffered no evidence to sustain the claim. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 2d 50 (2007).

Life sentence for repeat offense of failing to register as sexual offender unconstitutional.

- Imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment imposed against a defendant, who was a second time offender, for failing to register as a sexual offender was held unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate to the crime of failing to register. Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008).

Sentence of life in prison plus years consecutive for convictions of felony murder and armed robbery did not exceed the statutorily authorized maximum and did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment; the felony murder statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, authorized a sentence of life in prison on conviction for felony murder, and the armed robbery statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, authorized a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than 10 nor more than 20 years. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison for the felony murder conviction plus two 20-year terms, running concurrent to each other but consecutive to the felony murder sentence, for the two convictions for armed robbery, and thus the statutory maximum was not exceeded. Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 678 S.E.2d 900 (2009).

Life sentence for aggravated child molestation not cruel and unusual.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the life sentence for aggravated child molestation as the defendant's sentence did not raise a threshold inference of gross disproportionality because the evidence established that the defendant, while engaged in sexual intercourse with a girlfriend, summoned the 14-year-old victim, who was working alongside other young women as a prostitute on the defendant's behalf, to the defendant's room and placed the defendant's sexual organ in the victim's mouth while the defendant's testicles were placed in the girlfriend's mouth. Pepe-Frazier v. State, 331 Ga. App. 263, 770 S.E.2d 654 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1105, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 412 (Ga. 2015).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bail and Recognizance, §§ 29, 30. 21A Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 858 et seq.

Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 22 Am. Jur. Trials 1.

Asserting Claims of Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 64 Am. Jur. Trials 425.

C.J.S.

- 6A C.J.S., Arrest, § 59. 8 C.J.S., Bail; Release and Detention Pending Proceedings, § 69. 24B C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1984.

ALR.

- Manner of inflicting death sentence as cruel or unusual punishment, 30 A.L.R. 1452.

Liability for death of or injury to prisoner, 46 A.L.R. 94; 50 A.L.R. 268; 61 A.L.R. 569.

Constitutionality of statutes in relation to treatment or discipline of convicts, 50 A.L.R. 104.

Amount of bail required in criminal action, 53 A.L.R. 399.

Rights and responsibilities, civil or criminal, of police officers in respect of examination of persons under arrest ("third degree"), 79 A.L.R. 457.

Constitutionality and construction of statute enhancing penalty for second or subsequent offense, 82 A.L.R. 345; 116 A.L.R. 209; 132 A.L.R. 91; 139 A.L.R. 673.

Constitutionality of statute providing for penalty or forfeiture as affected by failure to fix maximum amount, 114 A.L.R. 1126.

Court's power and duty, pending determination of habeas corpus proceeding on merits, to admit petition to bail, 56 A.L.R.2d 668.

Insanity of accused as affecting right to bail in criminal case, 11 A.L.R.3d 1385.

Right of motorist stopped by police officers for traffic offense to be informed at that time of his federal constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 25 A.L.R.3d 1076.

Length of sentence as violation of constitutional provisions prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, 33 A.L.R.3d 335.

Applicability, in proceedings under statutes relating to sexual psychopaths, of constitutional provisions for the protection of a person accused of crime, 34 A.L.R.3d 652.

Right of exonerated arrestee to have fingerprints, photographs, or other criminal identification or arrest records expunged or restricted, 46 A.L.R.3d 900; 58 A.L.R.4th 902.

Prison conditions as amounting to cruel and unusual punishment, 51 A.L.R.3d 111.

Review for excessiveness of sentence in narcotics case, 55 A.L.R.3d 812.

Drug addiction or related mental state as defense to criminal charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 16.

Pretrial preventive detention by state court, 75 A.L.R.3d 956.

Application of state statutes establishing pretrial release of accused on personal recognizance as presumptive form of release, 78 A.L.R.3d 780.

Validity of a state statute imposing mandatory sentence or prohibiting granting of probation or suspension of sentence for narcotics offenses, 81 A.L.R.3d 1192.

Modern status of right of peace officer to use deadly force in attempting to arrest fleeing felon, 83 A.L.R.3d 174.

Validity, construction, and effect of Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, 85 A.L.R.3d 701.

Constitutionality of state legislation imposing criminal penalties for personal possession or use of marijuana, 96 A.L.R.3d 225.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance mandating imprisonment for habitual or repeated traffic offender, 2 A.L.R.4th 618.

Judicial power to order discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment, 48 A.L.R.4th 67.

False light invasion of privacy - accusation or innuendo as to criminal acts, 58 A.L.R.4th 902.

Propriety of imposing capital punishment on mentally retarded individuals, 20 A.L.R.5th 177.

State statutes or ordinances requiring persons previously convicted of crime to register with authorities, 36 A.L.R.5th 161.

Propriety of carrying out death sentences against mentally ill individuals, 111 A.L.R.5th 491.

Application of constitutional rule of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002), that execution of mentally retarded persons constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of Eighth Amendment, 122 A.L.R.5th 145.

When does forfeiture of real property violate excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment or state constitutions - State cases, 124 A.L.R.5th 509.

When does use of pepper spray, mace, or other similar chemical irritants constitute violation of constitutional rights, 65 A.L.R.6th 93.

Prison inmate's Eighth Amendment rights to treatment for sleep disorders, 68 A.L.R.6th 389.

When does forfeiture of currency, bank account, or cash equivalent violate excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment, 164 A.L.R. Fed. 591.

When does forfeiture of real property violate excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment - post-Austin cases, 168 A.L.R. Fed. 375.

When does forfeiture of motor vehicle pursuant to federal statute violate excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment, 169 A.L.R. Fed. 615.

Excessive fines clause of Eighth Amendment - Supreme Court cases, 172 A.L.R. Fed. 389.

When does use of pepper spray, mace, or other similar chemical irritants constitute violation of constitutional rights, 65 A.L.R.6th 93.

Prison inmate's Eighth Amendment rights to treatment for sleep disorders, 68 A.L.R.6th 389.

Due process afforded in drug court proceedings, 78 A.L.R.6th 1.

Propriety of holding prisoner in isolation, 96 A.L.R.6th 269.

Retroactive application, in postconviction proceedings, of constitutional rule of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), that mandatory life sentence without parole for those under age of 18 at time of their homicide crimes violates Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, 102 A.L.R.6th 637.

Prison inmate's or pretrial detainee's eighth amendment rights, or rights related to claims of "deliberate indifference," with respect to pregnancy, 5 A.L.R.7th 7.

Adequacy, under Strickland standard, of defense counsel's representation of client in sentencing phase of state court death penalty case - investigation of client's drug or alcohol use, 10 A.L.R.7th 3.

Construction and application of rule announced in Miller v. Alabama that sentences of life without parole for persons under 18 at time of committing homicide offense violate Eighth Amendment if mandatory and imposed without considering youth-related factors. 16 A.L.R.7th 4.

Construction and application of Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment - U.S. Supreme Court cases, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Comment note: propriety of holding prisoner in isolation - federal cases, 82 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 315.