Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 24A-2801, pre-2000 Code Sections 15-11-37 and 15-11-42, and pre-2014 Code Sections 15-11-40 and 15-11-63, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Constitutionality.

- Order of restrictive custody was not sufficiently like a criminal adjudication to invoke a constitutional right to a trial by jury. In re L.C., 273 Ga. 886, 548 S.E.2d 335 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Construction with other statutes.

- When former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-40(b) and15-11-63(e)(1)(D) and (e)(2)(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-444,15-11-602 and15-11-608) were read together to effectuate their meaning, as required by O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(a), the juvenile court did not err in denying a juvenile's motion to commute or reduce the sentence imposed as allegations that the juvenile was rehabilitated while in restrictive custody and would benefit from being released were insufficient to grant the juvenile court authority to modify the court's commitment order once physical custody of the juvenile was transferred to the Department of Juvenile Justice. In the Interest of J.V., 282 Ga. App. 319, 638 S.E.2d 757 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(e)(1)(D) and (e)(2)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602), a juvenile court may order a child released from a youth development center or transferred to a nonsecure facility during the period of restrictive custody set out in the initial order or may discharge a child from the custody of the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice upon a motion after a year of custody. However, such an order may not be made on the ground that changed circumstances so require in the best interest of the child. Reading former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-40 and15-11-63(e) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-32,15-11-444, and15-11-602) together, such a motion for release should be based on other grounds. In the Interest of J.W., 293 Ga. App. 408, 667 S.E.2d 161 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Jurisdiction.

- Under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2(2)(B) and15-11-28(a)(1)(F) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-381, and15-11-471), a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, who was over 17 when a probation violation occurred; thus, the defendant's commitment under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-471, and15-11-602) was void. The state had not filed a petition for probation revocation, but only for a violation of probation. In the Interest of T.F., 314 Ga. App. 606, 724 S.E.2d 892 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Juvenile court had jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602 to modify the juvenile's disposition after the juvenile was committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice because the juvenile made a cognizable claim that the juvenile's disposition was void, contending that the juvenile did not qualify as a Class-B designated felon. In the Interest of D. B., 341 Ga. App. 559, 802 S.E.2d 19 (2017).

Delinquency adjudication.

- Defendant juvenile's appeal of an order denying a motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify the delinquent adjudication was proper because the denial of the motion was a final judgment and was directly appealable; therefore, the defendant could appeal the ruling on disposition as well as on the original finding of delinquency. An order denying a motion under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-32,15-11-444, and15-11-608) seeking a modification based on changed circumstances in a delinquency matter is a final judgment directly appealable under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) and former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-35). In the Interest of J. L. K., 302 Ga. App. 844, 691 S.E.2d 892 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40).

Modification of a sentencing order was proper since a juvenile had been committed to the Department of Children & Youth Services (DCYS) for a period of detention and treatment but had not been transferred to the physical custody of DCYS but was held in a detention center pending placement in a youth development campus. In re B.D.T., 219 Ga. App. 804, 466 S.E.2d 680 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-42).

Modification was improper.

- Since it was undisputed that after the juvenile court adjudicated the child as delinquent and committed the child to the Department of Juvenile Justice, and the child was placed in the physical custody of the Department, which confined the child for a year, the Department had already taken physical custody of the child and therefore the juvenile court could not subsequently modify the original dispositional order. In the Interest of S.S., 276 Ga. App. 666, 624 S.E.2d 251 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40).

Reduction in sentence not authorized.

- Although former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-32,15-11-444, and15-11-608) prohibited the change, modification, or vacation of a commitment order once a child is in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice "on the ground that changed circumstances so require in the best interest of the child" or because the child had been rehabilitated, the statute did not prohibit the change, modification, or vacation of a commitment order on other grounds. Further the application of former § 15-11-40(b) did not render former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(e)(2)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) purposeless in these circumstances when the juvenile based a reduction in sentence on rehabilitation. In re T. H., 298 Ga. App. 536, 680 S.E.2d 569 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40).

Commitment order could not be changed.

- Modification of a juvenile commitment order under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (see now O.C.G.A.15-11-32,15-11-444, and15-11-608) on the ground that changed circumstances required modification in the best interest of the child was not available to a minor because the minor was already in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice; the fact that the custody was based on the minor's restrictive custody under a different commitment order, and not on the commitment order the minor sought to modify, had no bearing on whether the modification could be made. In the Interest of P.S., 295 Ga. App. 724, 673 S.E.2d 74 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40).

Juvenile court did not err in dismissing a juvenile's motion to modify the commitment order on the basis that the purpose of rehabilitation was not being served because the motion was not accompanied by a written recommendation from the juvenile's Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice counselor or placement supervisor; thus, O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-32 and15-11-602 barred the juvenile court from modifying the commitment order as requested. In the Interest of D. H., 332 Ga. App. 274, 772 S.E.2d 70 (2015).

Contents of motion.

- If the substance of a post-trial motion made no reference to any of the factors which would warrant the vacation or modification of the juvenile court's order, it could not be considered a motion to modify or vacate, thus an appeal could not be taken. In re C.M., 205 Ga. App. 543, 423 S.E.2d 280, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 900, 423 S.E.2d 280 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-42).

Evidence insufficient to support finding of delinquency.

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant juvenile's motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify a delinquent adjudication for the offense of simple assault because the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of delinquency since, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the crime of simple assault required proof that the defendant's actions placed the defendant's grandmother in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, but the only evidence of that fact was hearsay; a police officer, who was the only witness, testified that the grandmother told the officer that the grandmother was afraid of the defendant, and that the defendant was perhaps going to hit the grandmother, but the officer admitted that there were no allegations that the defendant attempted to hit the grandmother, nor did the officer witness any of the alleged events. In the Interest of J. L. K., 302 Ga. App. 844, 691 S.E.2d 892 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40).

New disposition was sanction for original offense.

- Although the initial act of bringing a weapon to school was not a designated felony under the statute in effect when a juvenile's probation was revoked, a dispositional order imposed upon revocation of probation related to the original delinquent act because the new disposition was a sanction for the original offense. In the Interest of N.M., 316 Ga. App. 649, 730 S.E.2d 127 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40).

Modification based on failure to provide interpreter to parents.

- Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parents' motion to modify or set aside the termination of parental rights order based on the parents' claim that a language barrier existed at the time of the termination hearing and during critical times in their case because the parents did not assert that the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services should have provided them with an interpreter who spoke their Guatemalan dialect of Mam. In the Interest of A. M., 324 Ga. App. 512, 751 S.E.2d 144 (2013).

Claim for commutation or reduction.

- When former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-40(b),15-11-63(e)(1)(D) and (e)(2)(c) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-32,15-11-444,15-11-602, and15-11-608) were read together to effectuate their meaning as required by O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(a), the juvenile court did not err in denying a juvenile's motion to commute or reduce the sentence imposed. Allegations that the juvenile was rehabilitated while in restrictive custody and would benefit from being released were insufficient to grant the juvenile court authority to modify the juvenile court's commitment order once physical custody of the juvenile was transferred to the Department of Juvenile Justice. In the Interest of J.V., 282 Ga. App. 319, 638 S.E.2d 757 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40).

Credit for time served.

- Juvenile court erred in expressly denying a juvenile credit for the time served in detention prior to the delinquency adjudication because under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(11)(c), the juvenile court was required to give a child credit for time served in a secure residential facility and the credit for time served applies to the disposition of all offenses, including felonies, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-604(b). In the Interest of D. D., 335 Ga. App. 676, 782 S.E.2d 728 (2016).

Disposition as designated felon appropriate.

- Disposition of the defendant juvenile as a "designated felon" was not improper since the evidence provided by the victims, a sheriff's deputy, and the defendant's own statements were legally sufficient to support the delinquency adjudication for acts that if committed by an adult would constitute burglary, theft by taking-vehicle (three acts), and obstruction of an officer. In the Interest of E.J., 292 Ga. App. 69, 663 S.E.2d 411 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Disposition as designated felon inappropriate.

- Juvenile court erred by imposing restrictive custody against a juvenile under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) because the juvenile did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to counsel in a prior adjudication for motor vehicle theft; thus, that prior adjudication was inadmissible for the purposes of the designated felony statute, O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(E), as to the current adjudication for motor vehicle theft. In the Interest of S. M., 322 Ga. App. 678, 745 S.E.2d 863 (2013).

Petition necessary to revoke probation.

- Juvenile court cannot sua sponte revoke probation and order a disposition as for a "designated felony act" after conducting a hearing on a petition which alleges only delinquency by reason of the commission of an act not within the ambit of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-602). Before a juvenile court may revoke an order granting probation, a petition must be filed requesting such relief. In re B.C., 169 Ga. App. 200, 311 S.E.2d 857 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

No age requirement for previous designated felony acts.

- Juvenile court did not err in finding that the defendant committed a designated felony act under former subparagraph (a)(2)(D) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-602), although the previous adjudicated delinquent acts were not committed when the defendant was 13 or more years of age. The previous act of burglary to which former subparagraph (a)(2)(D) referred carried no age requirement. The only requirement was that the juvenile commit a felonious act after three previous adjudications for acts which would have been felonies if committed by an adult. In re K.A.B., 188 Ga. App. 515, 373 S.E.2d 395 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

Criteria must be expressed in writing.

- Court's failure in judgment and disposition to expressly recite all of the criteria set forth in subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) warranted reversal and remand, even though a staff report tracked the statutory language and contained ample facts to serve as a sufficient basis for the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re N.N.G, 196 Ga. App. 765, 397 S.E.2d 40 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

Extent and depth of analysis to which each of the "elements" in subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) must be subjected is in large measure within the sound discretion of the court. It was required, as a statutory minimum, that each of these "elements" must be specifically addressed in writing. In re C.T., 197 Ga. App. 300, 398 S.E.2d 286 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37); In re S.P., 240 Ga. App. 827, 525 S.E.2d 403 (1999);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

Trial court's failure to make written findings on each of the five elements set forth in subsection (c) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) required reversal of a delinquency adjudication. In re Y.E., 229 Ga. App. 506, 494 S.E.2d 297 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

Vacation of the juvenile court's judgment and remand of the case was required for compliance with the requirement that the court consider the needs and the best interests of the juvenile and enter appropriate written findings addressing this element after which an appropriate order of disposition may be entered. In the Interest of E.D.F., 243 Ga. App. 68, 532 S.E.2d 424 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

After the juvenile was convicted of aggravated assault, the trial court erred in failing to make written findings under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(c) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) regarding the necessity of confining the juvenile to restrictive custody because such findings were mandatory. In the Interest of M.D.L., 271 Ga. App. 738, 610 S.E.2d 687 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Notice of designated felony act charge not required.

- Due process does not require that the juvenile be informed either in writing or in the delinquency petition that the juvenile is being charged with a designated felony act which may require that the juvenile be sentenced to restrictive custody. In the Interest of A.T., 246 Ga. App. 30, 539 S.E.2d 540 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

Commitment order could not be changed.

- Defendant moved for early release from a youth development center on grounds that alleged changed circumstances required release in the best interests of the child. The motion was properly denied because under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-444 and15-11-608), once the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice had physical custody, a commitment order could not be changed on that basis but could only be made on other grounds. In the Interest of J.W., 293 Ga. App. 408, 667 S.E.2d 161 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Although former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (see now O.C.G.A. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-444 and15-11-608) prohibited the change, modification, or vacation of a commitment order once a child was in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice "on the ground that changed circumstances so require in the best interest of the child" or because the child had been rehabilitated, the statute did not prohibit the change, modification, or vacation of a commitment order on other grounds. Further the application of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) did not render former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 (e)(2)(C) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) purposeless in these circumstances when the juvenile based a reduction in sentence on rehabilitation. In re T. H., 298 Ga. App. 536, 680 S.E.2d 569 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Although former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) suggested that a juvenile defendant could move for early release from a youth development center after the juvenile was already in custody, former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-444 and15-11-608) prohibited modification of a commitment order on the grounds of changed circumstances. As a change in circumstances was the basis of the defendant's motion for early release, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion. In re K.F., 299 Ga. App. 685, 683 S.E.2d 650 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Predisposition detainment credit mandated.

- Juvenile court erred in ordering that a juvenile receive no credit for time served because former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(e)(1)(B) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) mandated that the juvenile's predisposition detainment had to be credited to the time set for confinement. In the Interest of L.R., 316 Ga. App. 374, 729 S.E.2d 520 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Judge's action not violation of juvenile's right not to testify.

- Juvenile court did not comment on the juvenile's right not to testify because the court was required to make the factual findings that the juvenile acted alone and the existence of aggravating or mitigating evidence in rendering the court's disposition. In the Interest of C. M., 331 Ga. App. 16, 769 S.E.2d 737 (2015).

Child molestation.

- Because child molestation was not an offense listed in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-401 and15-11-490), the trial court erred in using former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(D) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-602) to classify the offense as a designated felony act when the court sentenced a juvenile. In the Interest of M. S., 277 Ga. App. 706, 627 S.E.2d 422 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Burden of proof for modification is preponderance of the evidence.

- Trial court erred in requiring a father to prove by clear and convincing proof that changed circumstances warranted modification of an order placing the father's children with their maternal aunts; the father retained an interest in the children, under former O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-13 and15-11-58(i)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-30 and15-11-204), sufficient to support a right to petition for modification, and the father was only required to prove the motion under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40(b) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-444 and15-11-608) by a preponderance of the evidence. In re J. N., 302 Ga. App. 631, 691 S.E.2d 396 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-40).

Sufficient findings warranting restrictive custody.

- Juvenile court adequately set forth findings of fact required by former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(c) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) when the court imposed a sentence of restrictive custody on a minor for committing aggravated child molestation; the egregiousness of the offense made restrictive custody necessary to promote the best interests of the minor and to protect the community. In the Interest of T.N., 254 Ga. App. 330, 562 S.E.2d 374 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Trial court properly imposed restrictive custody on a juvenile after finding that the juvenile stole a second car in a single criminal episode as former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(E) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-602) did not require proof of a second adjudication of delinquency to authorize restrictive custody; it sufficed that the juvenile committed a second violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-2 through16-8-9, since the stolen property was a motor vehicle. In the Interest of L.J., 279 Ga. App. 237, 630 S.E.2d 771 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Juvenile court did not err in determining that a defendant juvenile was in need of restrictive custody with thirty months of confinement in a youth detention center because: (1) the court complied with former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(c) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) by making specific written findings of fact as to each of the statutory elements; (2) the court's findings analyzed the defendant's needs and best interest; and (3) the court properly considered the report of a psychological evaluation performed on the defendant, along with the defendant's background and prior juvenile history, in making the court's determination that the defendant's needs would be better served with restrictive custody; the juvenile court's findings accurately reflected the nature and circumstances of the aggravated assault the defendant committed, including the facts that the victim did receive a serious injury when the defendant shot the victim in the head and that the victim had to receive medical treatment for the victim's head injury, and the juvenile court's findings as to those basic facts were supported by the trial evidence and showed circumstances that authorized the order for restrictive custody. In the Interest of I.C., 300 Ga. App. 683, 686 S.E.2d 279 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in placing the defendant in restrictive custody because, once the juvenile court determined that the victim was sixty-two or older and suffered serious injuries, the court was required to sentence the defendant to restrictive custody under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(d) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602); having no discretion in the matter, the juvenile court was not required to make findings of fact regarding the factors listed in former § 15-11-63(c), which the court would otherwise have to consider to determine whether to place the defendant in restrictive custody. In the Interest of J. W., 306 Ga. App. 339, 702 S.E.2d 649 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Juvenile court, upon considering the evidence presented, made the requisite findings in the court's order, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(c) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602), to determine whether restrictive custody was required. In re S.F., 312 Ga. App. 671, 719 S.E.2d 558 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in placing the juvenile in restrictive custody because the juvenile court, following a hearing and upon considering the evidence presented, made the finding required under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(c) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) to determine whether restrictive custody was required; any alleged predisposition to commit the juvenile to restrictive custody was belied by the juvenile court's pronouncement of intent to review the record before issuing any ruling. In the Interest of R.W., 315 Ga. App. 227, 726 S.E.2d 708 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Juvenile court did not err in sentencing the juvenile as a designated felon because the juvenile court considered the factors in former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2,15-11-471, and15-11-602), and the court's findings that the juvenile had three prior separate felony adjudications, that the juvenile had a pistol during the commission of the crimes, and that the community needed protection from the juvenile were sufficient. In the Interest of K.F., 316 Ga. App. 437, 729 S.E.2d 575 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Juvenile court did not abuse the court's discretion in ordering a juvenile to serve 36 months in restrictive custody because the court's findings authorized the court to find that the juvenile's criminal history, repeated violations of probation, removal of the electronic tether, and frequent use of marijuana demonstrated that restrictive custody was in the juvenile's best interests, as well as the community's, and outweighed the absence of any physical harm to the victim of the theft by receiving incident. In the Interest of D.C., 324 Ga. App. 95, 748 S.E.2d 514 (2013).

Improper consideration of evidence required remand.

- Because two of three felony charges against a child were reversed on appeal, and the juvenile court improperly considered the victim's cognitive and memory losses when there was no evidence that the losses were caused by the child's beating of the victim and not by a preexisting brain tumor, remand was required for consideration of the sentence of restrictive custody on only the aggravated assault adjudication. In the Interest of Q. S., 310 Ga. App. 70, 712 S.E.2d 99 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Proper restrictive custody finding.

- In a juvenile delinquency case, the trial court did not make improper findings under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(c) (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) in the court's decision to impose restrictive custody. The finding that the defendant was "in need of treatment and rehabilitation" drew a conclusion about the needs and best interests of the defendant, and although a reference to "previous convictions" was a misnomer, it was clear that the trial court was aware that the defendant's record and background included only one delinquency adjudication. In the Interest of J.A.C., 291 Ga. App. 728, 662 S.E.2d 811 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Oral statements the juvenile court made during the hearing did not show that the juvenile court abused the court's discretion in placing the juvenile in restrictive custody because the statements were not replicated in the juvenile court's written order, which set forth the juvenile court's basis for committing the juvenile to restrictive custody. Furthermore, the commitment order showed that the juvenile court found the juvenile to be in need of secure confinement and rehabilitation before the juvenile was allowed to return to the community, and that was sufficient to show that the juvenile court considered the juvenile's needs and best interests. In the Interest of R.W., 315 Ga. App. 227, 726 S.E.2d 708 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Juvenile court erred by ordering a juvenile into restrictive custody under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602) after failing to make specific written findings of fact in the court's disposition order and, instead, relying on boilerplate text that the court had considered the necessary factors following the juvenile's delinquency adjudication for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1) for possession of a weapon in a school zone. In the Interest of J.X.B., 317 Ga. App. 492, 731 S.E.2d 381 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by ordering a juvenile to serve 12 months in restrictive custody as the juvenile's school disciplinary record; record of delinquency; violations of probation; immaturity; susceptibility to temptation; use of marijuana; lack of positive male role models; lack of structure; and the absence of other activities to occupy time demonstrated that restrictive custody was in the juvenile's best interests, as well as the community's, and was not arbitrary. In the Interest of C. M., 331 Ga. App. 16, 769 S.E.2d 737 (2015).

While not specifically delineated under a separate heading, the juvenile court considered and made specific written findings as to the child's record, background, and risk level as required by O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(b)(3): the juvenile court specifically noted that the Behavioral Health Evaluation revealed that the child had been diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, depressive disorder, cannabis abuse, and borderline intellectual functioning. In the Interest of C. S., 334 Ga. App. 153, 778 S.E.2d 396 (2015).

Second violation, not second adjudication.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(E) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-602) did not require proof of a second or subsequent "adjudication" of delinquency to authorize the imposition of restrictive custody; rather, former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(a)(2)(E) authorized restrictive custody when a child was found to have committed a second or subsequent "violation" of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-2 through16-8-9, if the property which was the subject of the theft was a motor vehicle. In the Interest of L.J., 279 Ga. App. 237, 630 S.E.2d 771 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63).

Violation of probation.

- Although the violation of probation may constitute a "delinquent act" in and of itself, a violation of probation which occurs after the juvenile's 17th birthday will not authorize the initiation of a new delinquency petition against the juvenile. The juvenile court's jurisdiction would extend only to revoking the juvenile's probation for the juvenile's previous adjudication of delinquency. In re B.S.L., 200 Ga. App. 170, 407 S.E.2d 123 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, §§ 24A-2301A and 24A-2302A, and pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-37, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Purpose.

- Former Code section was enacted to ensure that certain juveniles who commit serious acts ("designated felonies") are, upon judicial determination, placed in restrictive custody and that the option of the Division of Youth Services to release a juvenile so placed would be somewhat limited. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-160 (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 24A-2301A and 24A-2302A).

Participation in community work program violated spirit of former section.

- General Assembly intended that juveniles committed to the Division of Youth Services under a restrictive custody dispositional order should be held in secure facilities and should not be allowed to come in contact with the general public. Participation by designated felons in community work programs was at least a violation of the spirit, if not the interpretive letter, of the former statute. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-160 (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 24A-2301A and 24A-2302A).

Statutory rape and the combined offenses of statutory rape and criminal trespass may not be considered designated felony acts under paragraph (a)(2) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2 and15-11-602). 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-17 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

Designated felony act.

- Unless a juvenile had been adjudicated a delinquent in prior court appearances for acts of burglary, a multiple count petition was not sufficient to fall within former subparagraph (a)(2)(D) of former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63). 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-10 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-37).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 7, 56 et seq., 119.

42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants, § 51.

C.J.S.

- 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 245 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Juvenile Court Act (U.L.A.) § 37.