Applicability of exception proviso.

- The exception of this paragraph applied to condemnation proceedings under former Civil Code 1895, § 4651 (see now O.C.G.A. § 22-1-8). Whitney v. Central Ga. Power Co., 134 Ga. 213, 67 S.E. 197, 19 Ann. Cas. 982 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

Case of ejectment or complaint for land.

- If the allegations in a petition are sufficient to show that the plaintiff can recover on the plaintiff's title alone without the aid of a court of equity, the case is one of ejectment or complaint for land; but if this is not the case, and equitable aid is necessary, the petition is equitable in character. Cook v. Grimsley, 175 Ga. 138, 165 S.E. 30 (1932).

When court is without jurisdiction to grant equitable relief.

- In a suit which is strictly an action respecting the title to lands, and which is brought in the county in which the land is situated, the court has no jurisdiction to grant equitable relief as to a defendant who is a resident of another county in this state. Cook v. Grimsley, 175 Ga. 138, 165 S.E. 30 (1932).

Basis of action ascertained from pleader's intention.

- A rule, perhaps the cardinal rule, by which to determine whether an action is based on equity or title to land is to ascertain the intention of the pleader. Where the pleader's intention is not clearly manifest as to what form of action is relied on in the petition, the courts will prima facie presume that the pleader's purpose was to serve his best interest and will construe the pleadings so as to uphold and not to defeat the action. Cook v. Grimsley, 175 Ga. 138, 165 S.E. 30 (1932).

An Act changing county lines cannot legally deprive a county of its county site. County of DeKalb v. City of Atlanta, 132 Ga. 727, 65 S.E. 72 (1909).

Merger of equity and common law.

- This paragraph was not affected by merger of equitable and common law jurisdictions of superior court. Clayton v. Stetson, 101 Ga. 634, 28 S.E. 983 (1897) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

Jurisdiction and venue distinguished.

- Jurisdiction means the power of a court to render a binding judgment in the case, and venue means the place of trial. Williams v. Fuller, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979).

General Assembly cannot declare individual resident of another county in contradiction of the general law.

- The General Assembly has no right to provide that a natural person, an individual, who lives and has a domicile and residence in one county, and a domicile and residence is fixed there under the law as it stands, should be deemed also to be a resident, for certain purposes, of another county. A general law may fix the general place of residence; but when a person has a residence and domicile fixed and established in accordance with the law, the legislature cannot declare that the person may also be a resident of another county at the same time. Youmans v. Hickman, 179 Ga. 684, 177 S.E. 238 (1934).

Special finding by jury as to ownership in actions for trespass.

- In actions for trespass to realty, ownership of the premises is incidentally involved, and while in such cases a special finding by the jury as to ownership is not required, the incorporation of such a finding into the verdict will not vitiate it, if the verdict is in other particulars regular and proper. Anderson v. Black, 191 Ga. 627, 13 S.E.2d 650 (1941).

Venue properly established.

- Because a neighbor's claims were incidental to that of the adjoining landowner's, the suit was properly brought in the neighbor's home county, thus supporting a denial of the neighbor's motion for a change of venue. Norton v. Holcomb, 285 Ga. App. 78, 646 S.E.2d 94 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1221, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 654 (Ga. 2007).

Cited in Madronah Sales Co. v. Wilburn, 180 Ga. 837, 181 S.E. 173 (1935); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 191 Ga. 294, 12 S.E.2d 53 (1940); Anderson v. Black, 199 Ga. 59, 33 S.E.2d 298 (1945); Brown v. Mathis, 201 Ga. 740, 41 S.E.2d 137 (1947); Brunswick Peninsular Corp. v. Daugharty, 203 Ga. 454, 47 S.E.2d 275 (1948); Larkins v. Boyd, 205 Ga. 69, 52 S.E.2d 307 (1949); Dooley v. Scoggins, 208 Ga. 200, 66 S.E.2d 62 (1951); Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962); Register v. Stone's Indep. Oil Distribs., 122 Ga. App. 335, 177 S.E.2d 92 (1970); Southall v. Carter, 229 Ga. 240, 190 S.E.2d 517 (1972); Peacock v. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 241 Ga. 280, 244 S.E.2d 816 (1978); Tingle v. Georgia Power Co., 147 Ga. App. 775, 250 S.E.2d 497 (1978); Lake Lanier Islands Dev. Auth. v. Village Harbor, Inc., 152 Ga. App. 705, 264 S.E.2d 23 (1979).

Distinction between suits to establish title and suits to recover land.

- There is a distinction between suits to establish title to land or to establish the evidence of title, and suits to recover the land upon legal title; the former being suits in equity, and the latter actions at law. Owenby v. Stancil, 190 Ga. 50, 8 S.E.2d 7 (1940).

Place of trial.

- Generally, cases respecting title to land shall be tried in the superior court where the land lies. Pearson v. George, 211 Ga. 18, 83 S.E.2d 593 (1954).

Law governing title and disposition of land is exclusively subject to laws of the state where it is situated.

- Such a rule is essential to the sovereignty of the state over the land within its borders. Where a court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of a suit, the parties cannot waive it. King v. King, 203 Ga. 811, 48 S.E.2d 465 (1948).

This paragraph concerns actions at law, such as ejectment and statutory substitutes, in which the plaintiff asserts a presently enforceable legal title against the possession of the defendant, for the recovery of land or recovery of the land and mesne profits. This paragraph does not apply to suits in equity to establish title to land or to establish evidence of title. Owenby v. Stancil, 190 Ga. 50, 8 S.E.2d 7 (1940); Stolaman v. Stolaman, 220 Ga. 799, 142 S.E.2d 70 (1965); Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612 (1970) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

The test as to whether a suit to recover land is one of ejectment and is a "case respecting title to land" within the purview of the venue provisions of this paragraph is whether the plaintiff can recover on the plaintiff's title alone or whether the plaintiff must ask the aid of a court of equity in order to recover. Owenby v. Stancil, 190 Ga. 50, 8 S.E.2d 7 (1940); Screven County v. Reddy, 208 Ga. 730, 69 S.E.2d 186 (1952); White v. Gordon, 213 Ga. 730, 101 S.E.2d 759 (1958); State Hwy. Dep't v. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 216 Ga. 547, 117 S.E.2d 897 (1961); Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612 (1970) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

Action in ejectment brought in proper county.

- An action in ejectment wherein the plaintiff claims title to the land in question on the basis of the plaintiff's abstract of title, which the plaintiff incorporated in the plaintiff's petition by amendment, and seeks to recover the described tract of land and damages for the cutting of timber thereon, sought no equitable relief and was properly brought in the county where the land lies. White v. Gordon, 213 Ga. 730, 101 S.E.2d 759 (1958).

Statutory adverse possession.

- A landowner's suit is clearly not in equity where the landowner seeks to establish legal title by adverse possession as a matter of law in reliance on a statute. Venue is constitutionally in the county in which the land lies, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 44-5-168(b)(1). Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580, 308 S.E.2d 170 (1983).

A statutory partition action under former Code 1933, § 85-1504 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160) was a case "respecting title to land" under this paragraph since it can bestow title on both parties and divest both parties of title, and must be brought in the county where the land laid. Schuehler v. Pait, 239 Ga. 520, 238 S.E.2d 65 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

A petition stating a case at law for recovery of land, where no equitable relief is sought, is a case respecting title to land, and under this paragraph properly brought in the county where the land lies. Strickland v. Jenkins, 198 Ga. 15, 31 S.E.2d 18 (1944).

Other proceeding adjudicating title to property properly brought in county where land lies.

- A petition by the widow and sole heir at law of a named person who died intestate with no administration on his estate, alleging that before her husband's death, he had purchased a tract of land, paid the purchase money, and entered into possession of the land, and that since his death other claimants had entered into possession thereof, where the plaintiff merely sought to recover the land with mesne profits, and the suit was filed in the county where the land lies, stated a cause of action. Strickland v. Jenkins, 198 Ga. 15, 31 S.E.2d 18 (1944).

The allegations of the petition showing an actual controversy, in which petitioner and one of the defendants were claiming title to realty under separate chains of title, coupled with a prayer for a declaratory judgment adjudicating title to the property to be in petitioner, were sufficient to constitute an action respecting title to land under this paragraph and the petition was properly brought in the county where the land lies. Shaw v. Crawford, 207 Ga. 67, 60 S.E.2d 143 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

Situation where action cannot be brought in county land lies.

- Where a petition shows that the defendant has legal title to the land and seeks to set up a perfect equity in the plaintiff, and prays that the property be decreed to be that of the plaintiff, such action cannot be brought in the county where the land lies if the defendant is not a resident thereof. Screven County v. Reddy, 208 Ga. 730, 69 S.E.2d 186 (1952).

Nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are not cases respecting title to land.

- A suit seeking a rule nisi to require defendants to show cause why a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding should not be allowed to proceed is not a case respecting title to land within the meaning of this paragraph, and is without any jurisdictional basis in the Supreme Court. Graham v. Tallent, 235 Ga. 47, 218 S.E.2d 799 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

Striking prayer for equitable relief and praying for legal remedy does not result in suit respecting title to land.

- Suit by assignee of obligee of a bond for title for an accounting and setoff against the purchase price of rents, appointment of a receiver to collect rents, specific performance and other relief, should have been brought in the county wherein the obligor under the bond for title resided, and not in the county of the tenant's residence; nor did plaintiff's striking of plaintiff's prayer of injunction, and praying for possession of the premises, make the suit one respecting title to land, to be tried in the county where the land lies, as only after relief in equity decreeing title in plaintiff would the plaintiff have an action at law for recovery of the land. Bradley v. Burns, 188 Ga. 434, 4 S.E.2d 147 (1939).

In rem jurisdiction by state's courts over property of nonresident.

- While a petition to cancel a deed or lien or to remove a cloud on the title to land is not a suit "respecting titles to land," within the meaning of this paragraph, so as to give jurisdiction against a resident of another county of this state to the superior court of the county where the land lies, still, if the only defendant in an equitable petition for relief in rem is a nonresident of the state, the courts of this state may take jurisdiction for the purpose of applying any recognized equitable principle affecting property located in this state, such as the removal of a cloud on the title, the cancellation or foreclosure of liens thereon, and may grant an order or decree operating in rem with reference to such property, and having the effect of excluding the nonresident from an interest therein. Sweat v. Arline, 186 Ga. 460, 197 S.E. 893 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

A petition to set aside and cancel a deed is not a suit respecting title to land as must be brought in the county where the land lies, but must be brought, if the defendant resides in this state, in the county of defendant's residence. Borden v. I.B.C. Corp., 220 Ga. 688, 141 S.E.2d 449 (1965).

Establishment of boundary line not a case respecting title to land.

- Petition predicated upon the ownership by the plaintiff of certain described lands upon which the defendants allegedly committed acts of trespass, and which of necessity required the ascertainment and establishment of the boundary line in controversy, was a case in equity seeking injunctive relief against trespass to land, and was not a case respecting title to land within the venue provisions of this paragraph, and the case was properly brought in the county of the residence of a defendant against whom substantial equitable relief is prayed, as required by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III). Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co., 215 Ga. 700, 113 S.E.2d 129 (1960); Georgia Power Co. v. Harrison, 253 Ga. 212, 318 S.E.2d 306 (1984) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

Where equitable relief is sought in conjunction with a boundary-line dispute (i.e., removal of a fence and ejectment from a disputed strip of land), the county of the defendant's residence is the proper venue forum. Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 409 S.E.2d 208 (1991).

Action against multiple defendants to restrain continuing trespass maintainable in county or residence of one defendant.

- Where a petition for injunction brought in the county where one defendant resides, seeks to restrain a continuing trespass which all of the defendants are committing, the court is not without jurisdiction to grant such relief, even though all except the one defendant are residents of other counties in the state. Bennett v. Bagwell & Stewart, Inc., 214 Ga. 115, 103 S.E.2d 561 (1958).

A bill in equity to enjoin a trespass upon realty by felling timber is not a suit respecting the title to land as must be brought in the county where the land lies. The proper venue of such a case is the county of the residence of a defendant against whom substantial relief is prayed. Powell v. Cheshire, 70 Ga. 357, 48 Am. R. 572 (1883); Chase v. Endsley, 165 Ga. 292, 140 S.E. 876 (1927), commented on in 1 Ga. L. Rev. 49 (1927).

Actions to cancel deed based on fraud and coercion.

- An action to cancel a deed conveying land, alleging the deed to have been obtained by fraud and coercion, is not a suit respecting the title to land within the meaning of this paragraph, but is an equitable action, and must be brought in the county of the residence of the defendants, as required by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Para. III (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III). Hawkins v. Pierotti, 232 Ga. 631, 208 S.E.2d 452 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

Exception contained in

§ 9-10-30 does not affect venue of suit brought against nonresident of county suit brought in. - The exception contained in former Code 1933, § 3-202 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-10-30) to the effect that injunction suits to stay pending proceedings may be filed in the county where the proceedings were pending, provided no relief was prayed as to matters not included in such litigation, did not affect the venue of a suit, in which independent relief was sought against one who was a nonresident of the county in which the suit was brought, and who was not a party to the suit there pending. Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793, 25 S.E.2d 660 (1943).

A petition for interpleader is an equitable proceeding within this paragraph. Terhune v. Pettit, 195 Ga. 793, 25 S.E.2d 660 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II).

Removal of cloud on title based on certain year's support was equity action.

- Suit to remove from the record a certain year's support proceeding as a cloud upon the title of described land in plaintiff's possession was one in equity and not one respecting title to land, and should have been brought in the county of a defendant against whom substantial relief was sought; since the suit was brought in a county where neither defendant resided, the court was without jurisdiction of the subject matter and such jurisdiction could not be conferred by consent or waived by the parties. Sweatman v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 112, 97 S.E.2d 320 (1957).

Venue improper in nuisance action.

- Action brought by plaintiff landowner against defendant landowner for conducting road construction without adequate barriers, causing silt and debris to leave defendant's land, enter a river, and flow onto plaintiff landowner's property was in the nature of a nuisance making venue proper in the county in which defendant landowner resided under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. III; venue was improper in the county in which the land lay under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. II. Hopkins v. Baker, 258 Ga. App. 14, 572 S.E.2d 716 (2002).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, § 10 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 92A C.J.S., Venue, §§ 20 et seq., 61 et seq.

ALR.

- Jurisdiction of action at law for damages for tort concerning real property in another state or country, 42 A.L.R. 196; 30 A.L.R.2d 1219.

Leasehold as real property or an interest in real property within statute relating to venue, 104 A.L.R. 235.

Right to maintain single suit to foreclose separate mortgages, securing same debt or portions thereof, upon real property in different counties, 110 A.L.R. 1477.

Venue of action relating to real property as affected by joining cause of action or prayer for personal relief, 120 A.L.R. 790.

Venue of suit for partition of land, 128 A.L.R. 1232.

Judgment in action for damages to real property situated in another state or county as conclusive in respect of title, 158 A.L.R. 362.

Location of land as governing venue of action for damages for fraud in sale of real property, 163 A.L.R. 1312.

Venue of action involving real estate situated in two or more counties or districts, 169 A.L.R. 1245.

Consent decree as affecting title to real estate in another state, 2 A.L.R.2d 1188.

Lien as estate or interest in land within venue statute, 2 A.L.R.2d 1261.

Venue of suit to enjoin nuisance, 7 A.L.R.2d 481.

Venue of action to set aside as fraudulent conveyance of real property, 37 A.L.R.2d 568.

Venue of action for rescission or cancellation of contract relating to interests in land, 77 A.L.R.2d 1014.

Independent venue requirements as to cross complaint or similar action by defendant seeking relief against a codefendant or third party, 100 A.L.R.2d 693.