Exclusive jurisdiction where constitutionality of law or ordinance in question.

- Georgia Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of cases in which the constitutionality of a law or ordinance is in question without regard to the court from which the appeal is taken. Kariuki v. DeKalb County, 253 Ga. 713, 324 S.E.2d 450 (1985).

The Court of Appeals has no authority to determine the constitutionality of a state statute. Burson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 647, 359 S.E.2d 731, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905, 359 S.E.2d 731 (1987).

The state appellate court has no jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a state law, other than where the law has been held to be constitutional against the same attack being made, and only to decide the application of established constitutional law to the facts. Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 473 S.E.2d 523 (1996).

In reversing a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment, the Georgia Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction by construing a constitutional provision that had not previously been construed by the Georgia Supreme Court and then applying the newly construed provision to the facts of the case. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 284 Ga. 434, 668 S.E.2d 247 (2008).

A distinct, oral ruling, reflected in a transcript is sufficient and need not be reduced to writing in order to invoke the Supreme Court of Georgia's exclusive appellate jurisdiction in cases in which the constitutionality of a law has been drawn into question. Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642, 670 S.E.2d 425 (2008).

Georgia trial court erred by denying injunctive relief to a county and the county's chosen waste disposal company which sought to prohibit an unauthorized waste company from providing services in the county against an ordinance because the ordinance served a legitimate public purpose by establishing means reasonably necessary for providing a comprehensive solid waste management plan as the county was required to do under O.C.G.A. § 12-8-31.1. Advanced Disposal Servs. Middle Ga., LLC v. Deep S. Sanitation, LLC, 296 Ga. 103, 765 S.E.2d 364 (2014).

Under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II (1), the Supreme Court of Georgia had exclusive appellate jurisdiction in a case involving the construction of the Constitution of the State of Georgia or of the United States; therefore, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in a stalking case in which the defendant contended that publication of commentary about the victim and the victim's copyright enforcement practices was speech protected by the First Amendment, although the court did not reach that question. Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015).

Constitutional issue required.

- The Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over a discretionary appeal of a superior court order, based on a question as to the constitutionality of a statute, where the trial court had not specifically passed upon the issue of constitutionality. Marr v. Georgia Dep't of Educ., 264 Ga. 841, 452 S.E.2d 112 (1995).

Constitutional challenges considered.

- Trial court erred in determining that a defendant's challenges to the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-10 were waived; however, the Supreme Court of Georgia had jurisdiction to consider the constitutional challenges under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, § VI, Para. II, because the trial court also made a distinct ruling in the alternative rejecting the challenges on the merits. Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 690 S.E.2d 804, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 117, 178 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2010).

Federal preemption.

- The preemption doctrine is a product of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, Cl. 2, which invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law. The preemption argument invokes the Supreme Court of Georgia's constitutional question jurisdiction under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II (1). RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444, 807 S.E.2d 381 (2017).

Question of federal preemption.

- Supreme Court of Georgia properly has jurisdiction of an appeal that presents a question about the constitutionality of a statute, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II (1), namely, whether a Georgia statute is preempted by federal law. Cmty. & S. Bank v. Lovell, 302 Ga. 375, 807 S.E.2d 444 (2017).

A life without parole sentence imposed on a juvenile who is not properly determined to be in the very small class of juveniles for whom such a sentence may be deemed constitutionally proportionate is not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void; it follows that state collateral review courts that are open to federal law claims must apply the holding of Miller v. Alabama, - U.S. - , 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), retroactively if a petitioner challenges such a sentence under the Eighth Amendment, and it follows, as a matter of Georgia procedural law, that a defendant's Miller claim, a substantive claim that, if meritorious, would render a sentence void, can be properly raised in an amended motion for new trial and in a direct appeal, despite the failure to raise the claim before the defendant was sentenced. Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 784 S.E.2d 403 (2016).

Waiver of constitutional challenge.

- While a defendant challenged the constitutionality of the non-merger provision of the hijacking a motor vehicle statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(d), the state supreme court, where the initial appeal had been filed under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II, had determined that the challenge was untimely and thus had been waived; thus, the defendant could not pursue the challenge at the appellate court level after the case had been transferred. Rutland v. State, 296 Ga. App. 471, 675 S.E.2d 506 (2009).

Constitutional challenge not viable due to failure to raise in trial court.

- Because an appeal of the denial of a motion to seal a criminal record under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(m) failed to present a viable challenge to the statute's constitutionality, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II(1), because the challenge (a separation of powers argument, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, based on the Supreme Court's record-keeping authority under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Para. I, and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 21.4) was not raised below, jurisdiction was properly before the Court of Appeals, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(12). Doe v. State, 303 Ga. 237, 811 S.E.2d 413 (2018).

Direct appeal of administrative agency decision.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II does not permit the direct appeal of an administrative agency decision just because the constitutionality of an ordinance is drawn into question. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) requires the filing of an application for an appeal. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Midtown N., Ltd., 257 Ga. 496, 360 S.E.2d 569 (1987).

Questions of constitutionality of administrative regulations are not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Georgia Bd. of Dentistry v. Pence, 223 Ga. App. 603, 478 S.E.2d 437 (1996).

Appellate court had subject matter jurisdiction over two associations' claims that included a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative regulation, as the state supreme court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction extended to all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision was in question, but a regulation was not in any of those categories under the state constitution, and, thus, jurisdiction in the appellate court was proper. Ga. Oilmen's Ass'n v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 261 Ga. App. 393, 582 S.E.2d 549 (2003).

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Georgia under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II does not extend to questions concerning the constitutionality of an administrative regulation; thus, the Georgia Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to resolve whether Interim Ethics Rule 505-2-.03(1)(o), Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 505-2-.03(1)(o), which permitted suspension or revocation of an educator's certificate, was constitutional. Prof'l Stds. Comm'n v. Alberson, 273 Ga. App. 1, 614 S.E.2d 132 (2005).

Direct appeal not available from recorder's court.

- A direct appeal from the recorder's court to the Supreme Court was not available in a case challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance. Instead, the proper method of review was by certiorari to the superior court. Russell v. City of E. Point, 261 Ga. 213, 403 S.E.2d 50 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 971, 112 S. Ct. 448, 116 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1991).

Cases involving revenues of the state.

- The enactment of the 1983 Constitution superseded the Supreme Court's order in Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977), assuming jurisdiction over cases involving revenues of the state, thus, all pending cases which involve revenues of the state and which have been docketed in the Supreme Court will be transferred to the Court of Appeals. Collins v. AT & T Co., 265 Ga. 37, 456 S.E.2d 50 (1995).

Election contest must tie to specific election.

- Without a clear connection to a specific election, a challenge to a voter's qualifications brought under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-228 or O.C.G.A. § 21-2-229 does not come within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Georgia over "cases of election contest," Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II(2). To the extent that Jarrard v. Clayton County Bd.of Registrars, 425 S.E.2d 874 (1992), was decided as an election contest, it was overruled. Cook v. Board of Registrars, 291 Ga. 67, 727 S.E.2d 478 (2012).

Transfer to Court of Appeals.

- Transfer of a case to the Court of Appeals does not represent the Supreme Court's determination that no constitutional issue in the case has merit since there are a number of reasons why a case can fail to come with the court's exclusive jurisdiction. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 469 S.E.2d 22 (1996).

No preemption found by federal law.

- Grant of summary judgment to a railroad was reversed as to the property owner's claim for inverse condemnation for the property located to the east of the railroad tracks because it could not be said that the claim would unreasonably interfere with or otherwise burden rail transportation, thus, the trial court erred when the court found that this claim was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 10501 et seq. Fox v. Norfolk S. Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 802 S.E.2d 319 (2017).

Cited in Andrews v. State, 175 Ga. App. 22, 332 S.E.2d 299 (1985); Liles v. Still, 176 Ga. App. 65, 335 S.E.2d 168 (1985); In re W.M.F., 180 Ga. App. 397, 349 S.E.2d 265 (1986); In re C.D.B., 182 Ga. App. 263, 355 S.E.2d 759 (1987); Rybert & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 258 Ga. 347, 368 S.E.2d 739 (1988); Kolker v. State, 260 Ga. 240, 391 S.E.2d 391 (1990); Noland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 125, 413 S.E.2d 509 (1991); Forsyth County v. Greer, 211 Ga. App. 444, 439 S.E.2d 679 (1993); Board of Tax Assessors v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 264 Ga. 309, 444 S.E.2d 771 (1994); Smith v. State, 214 Ga. App. 631, 448 S.E.2d 906 (1994); Ryals v. State, 215 Ga. App. 51, 449 S.E.2d 865 (1994); Kelly v. City of Atlanta, 217 Ga. App. 365, 457 S.E.2d 675 (1995); Doe v. Department of Cors., 224 Ga. App. 494, 481 S.E.2d 837 (1997); Jenkins v. State, 235 Ga. App. 53, 508 S.E.2d 710 (1998); Metheny v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); Palmaka v. State, 280 Ga. App. 761, 634 S.E.2d 883 (2006); In the Interest of J.R.R., 281 Ga. 662, 641 S.E.2d 526 (2007); Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008); Wheatley v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Austin v. Bank of Am., N.A., 293 Ga. 42, 743 S.E.2d 399 (2013); Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013); Wilbros, LLC v. State, 294 Ga. 514, 755 S.E.2d 145 (2014); In the Interest of M. F., 298 Ga. 138, 780 S.E.2d 291 (2015); Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 298 Ga. 732, 783 S.E.2d 614 (2016); State of Ga. v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016); Merch. Law Firm, P.C. v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609, 800 S.E.2d 557 (2017); City of Atlanta v. Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 801 S.E.2d 1 (2017); Bruno v. Light, 344 Ga. App. 799, 811 S.E.2d 500 (2018); State v. Davis, 303 Ga. 684, 814 S.E.2d 701 (2018).

Jurisdiction of appeal from denial of equitable defense to alimony enforcement.

- Where an appeal arises from the trial court's judgment against a husband on his affidavit of illegality filed in response to his wife's fieri facias issued on the alimony provisions of their divorce decree where the appellant is seeking to have the superior court set aside the fieri facias on equitable grounds because of his former wife's apparent abandonment of their children over which she was charged with custody pursuant to the decree, this appeal is from a judgment rendered pursuant to a request for equitable relief, which places the appeal within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Iannicelli v. Iannicelli, 169 Ga. App. 155, 311 S.E.2d 850 (1983).