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Haw. Rev. Stat.Haw. Rev. Stat.Chapter 386

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-5 (2025)

  Exclusiveness of right to compensation; exception

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included cited 1971–2026 78citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 78 opinions since 1971, 9 of them in the last five years.

     §386-5  Exclusiveness of right to compensation; exception.  The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or the employee's dependents on account of a work injury suffered by the employee shall exclude all other liability of the employer to the employee, the employee's legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, or anyone else entitled to recover damages from the employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of the injury, except for sexual harassment or sexual assault and infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy related thereto, in which case a civil action may also be brought. [L 1963, c 116, pt of §1; Supp, §97-5; HRS §386-5; gen ch 1985; am L 1992, c 275, §2]

 

Law Journals and Reviews

 

  Makaneole v. Gampon:  Site Owners Vicariously Liable for Negligence of Contractors and Their Employees.  12 UH L. Rev. 481 (1990).

  Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:  Remedies Available to Victims in Hawai`i.  15 UH L. Rev. 453 (1993).

  Hawai`i's Workers' Compensation Scheme:  An Employer's License to Kill?  29 UH L. Rev. 211 (2006).

 

Case Notes

 

  Statute provides exclusive remedy against fellow employees for work-related injuries.  818 F.2d 210 (1987).

  Emotional distress claim was barred.  899 F.2d 845 (1990).

  Since Hawaii law bars action for contribution by a third party tortfeasor against the plaintiff's employer, it would preclude employee of government contractor from recovering from the United States the full amount of employee's damages where a portion of those damages were attributable to negligence of the employer.  473 F. Supp. 1077 (1979).

  Injured seaman, section does not oust admiralty court of its jurisdiction.  557 F. Supp. 1024 (1983).

  No indemnity from United States available to asbestos manufacturers sued for asbestos-related diseases.  603 F. Supp. 599 (1984).

  Remedy exclusive.  611 F. Supp. 1285 (1985).

  Exclusive remedy for emotional distress claims.  720 F. Supp. 829 (1989).

  Claim of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress preempted by workers' compensation law.  763 F. Supp. 1544 (1990); 768 F. Supp. 734 (1991).

  Section, as amended, could not be applied retroactively.  910 F. Supp. 479 (1995).

  Barred emotional distress claims where no sexual harassment or sexual assault alleged.  938 F. Supp. 1503 (1996).

  Defendant's motion for partial dismissal denied, where defendant sought dismissal of all negligence-based claims in the action and the gravamen of the motion was that exclusivity provision of Hawaii's workers' compensation statute barred all work-related actions sounding in negligence.  112 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (2000).

  Exclusivity provision barred plaintiff's negligence-based counts against defendants, where the counts arose "on account" of a work injury suffered by plaintiff; exception provided in exclusivity provision did not afford plaintiff a cause of action, where plaintiff did not allege sexual harassment or sexual assault.  266 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (2003).

  Barred plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, where plaintiff did not claim sexual harassment or assault.  284 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (2003).

  Plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was barred by this section because the claim did not arise out of sexual harassment or sexual assault; "dual persona exception" did not apply to the facts as alleged.  721 F. Supp. 2d 968 (2010).

  Where defendant claimed that defendant was entitled to summary judgment based upon worker's compensation exclusivity, as set forth in this section, defendant failed to establish that defendant was plaintiff's employer, as opposed to plaintiff's supervisor, for purposes of this section.  937 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (2013).

  Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim relating to plaintiff's claim for disability discrimination under §378-2 was barred by this section.  Even if that were not so, nothing in the record indicated that defendant's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to justify damages for an independent intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.  At most, plaintiff asserted a disability discrimination claim under §378-2 based on defendant's alleged failure to engage in an interactive process that might have led to a reasonable accommodation allowing plaintiff to return to work.  124 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (2015).

  Exclusive remedy.  24 H. 97 (1917); 28 H. 383 (1925).

  History; purpose of Workmen's Compensation Act; exclusiveness of remedy.  41 H. 442 (1956).

  Exclusiveness of remedy, bars wrongful death action.  42 H. 518 (1958).

  Right of employee of subcontractor to workers' compensation from the subcontractor did not exclude remedy against general contractor.  50 H. 293, 439 P.2d 669 (1968).

  Exclusiveness of remedy.  52 H. 595, 483 P.2d 187 (1971).

  Employer may be liable for indemnity based on breach of indemnity agreement.  54 H. 153, 504 P.2d 861 (1972).

  Section precludes defendant in tort action from obtaining contribution from employer on theory that the employer was a joint tortfeasor.  54 H. 153, 504 P.2d 861 (1972); 56 H. 598, 546 P.2d 527 (1976); 67 H. 357, 688 P.2d 1139 (1984); 68 H. 22, 702 P.2d 772 (1985).

  Third party general contractors are not immune to common law negligence actions by employees of their subcontractors.  54 H. 578, 513 P.2d 156 (1973).

  Section precludes third party tortfeasor from bringing action against employer for contribution.  55 H. 375, 520 P.2d 62 (1974).

  Section does not preclude per se, third party's indemnity claim against employer.  65 H. 232, 649 P.2d 1149 (1982); 68 H. 171, 707 P.2d 365 (1985).

  Where subcontractor fails to provide benefits to its injured worker and the general contractor pays those benefits, the latter is immunized from negligence action brought by injured worker.  66 H. 568, 670 P.2d 457 (1983).

  Owner of premises who hired an independent contractor to do work on the premises was not considered an employer.  70 H. 501, 777 P.2d 1183 (1989).

  Court did not adopt dual capacity doctrine; found exclusivity of the workers' compensation law constitutional.  71 H. 358, 791 P.2d 1257 (1990).

  Claimant not precluded by exclusivity provision of this section from seeking common law tort remedies against employer's insurer where injuries allegedly caused by insurer's denial of medical benefits and disability payments not "work injuries" within scope of chapter 386.  83 H. 457, 927 P.2d 858 (1996).

  This chapter does not bar relief on claims filed with the civil rights commission.  85 H. 7, 936 P.2d 643 (1997).

  Where statutory employer secured workers’ compensation coverage as required under this chapter by paying a fee for that purpose to the lending employer, and employee received a statutory award for work-connected injuries, statutory employer was entitled to tort immunity.  88 H. 140, 963 P.2d 349 (1998).

  Where employer newspaper hired newspaper carrier as "independent contractor" under the express terms of employer’s own agreement, employer was estopped from claiming tort protection under this section unless and until injured carrier challenged the form-over-substance nature of the agreement and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits by the director or appeals board.  89 H. 411, 974 P.2d 51 (1999).

  Where plaintiff's claims did not arise under this chapter, the exclusive remedy and original jurisdiction provisions in the workers' compensation statute did not apply, and where plaintiff's claims for relief of tortious conduct on the part of workers' compensation insurer were not within the original jurisdiction of the labor director, trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that basis.  90 H. 407, 978 P.2d 845 (1999).

  Section bars neither a minor's tort claims for the minor's in utero injuries, nor any otherwise valid claims of any other party that allegedly derive from minor's injuries.  91 H. 146, 981 P.2d 703 (1999).

  The exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation law does not bar claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress related to sexual harassment.  97 H. 376, 38 P.3d 95 (2001).

  Where law firm's actions as an employer and law firm were not inconsistent and law firm's status as an employer and law firm involved a single legal entity for purposes of the "dual persona" doctrine, trial court did not err in granting law firm's motion to dismiss terminated attorney's negligent investigation claim.  117 H. 92, 176 P.3d 91 (2008).

  Where this section unambiguously provides that claims for infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy are not subject to the exclusivity provision when such claims arise from claims for sexual harassment or sexual assault, in which case a civil action may be brought, and plaintiff alleged a claim for emotional distress (negligent investigation) that did not arise out of sexual harassment or sexual assault, such claim was, pursuant to this section, barred.  117 H. 92, 176 P.3d 91 (2008).

  Bars third party's indemnity claim against employer where latter owed no duty to third party.  6 H. App. 525, 735 P.2d 939 (1987).

  Exclusive remedy for claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  9 H. App. 21, 821 P.2d 937 (1991).

  An employee may bring action against employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by discrimination in violation of §378-2, and this action is not barred by exclusivity provision of this section.  87 H. 57 (App.), 951 P.2d 507 (1998).

  Section does not bar a child from bringing a tort action against mother's employer for in utero injuries child personally sustained, allegedly as a result of a work-related accident involving the mother.  91 H. 157 (App.), 981 P.2d 714 (1999).

  Where record revealed that the parties disputed at least two material facts--whose work was being done by plaintiff when plaintiff was injured and who controlled plaintiff's work at the job site--defendant failed to produce evidence that defendant was a "statutory employer" for workers' compensation purposes; thus, circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant because defendant had not demonstrated that it was immune from suit and was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  124 H. 230 (App.), 239 P.3d 1280 (2010).

  This section and the workers' compensation law as a whole mandated the conclusion that the workers' compensation remedies granted to employee excluded all other liabilities of employer to employee on account of personal injuries employee allegedly suffered arising out of and in the course of employee's employment; also, §386-8 and this section did not allow employee to pursue suit against the employer for the alleged wilful and wanton misconduct of employee's fellow employees acting in the course and scope of their employment.  128 H. 173 (App.), 284 P.3d 946 (2012).

  Where the plaintiffs alleged damages resulting from exposure to a chemical pesticide allegedly manufactured or utilized by the employers, the workers' compensation law was the exclusive remedy for claims against the employers for the alleged injuries.  Also, more than one employing entity can claim the liability protection of the exclusivity provision in this section.  132 H. 478 (App.), 323 P.3d 122 (2014).

  Where the plaintiffs proposed an amended complaint that no longer alleged that the defendants were the plaintiffs' employers, taking the amended allegations as true, the workers' compensation law would not bar the claims against the defendants.  132 H. 478 (App.), 323 P.3d 122 (2014).

  Cited:  23 H. 291, 294 (1916); 56 H. 544, 545 P.2d 687 (1976).

 

 

The 20 cases that cite Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-5 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENIddings v. Mee-Lee, 919 P.2d 263 (Haw. 1996).
cites § 386-5 58×cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“Mee-Lee would therefore be barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of HRS § 386-5 (1985), [3] Iddings stipulated to dismiss her negligence claims against Dr.”
The case’s holding
The statutory exception for wilful and wanton misconduct encompasses reckless conduct and does not require a specific intent to cause injury.
Later courts cite it for
“where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to the statute's plain and obvious meaning.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENNelson v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 38 P.3d 95 (Haw. 2001).
cites § 386-5 36×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“, HRS § 386-5 (1993), quoted infra. The trial court agreed and granted Defendants' *112 motion for JNOV.”
The case’s holding
A hostile environment sexual harassment claim requires proof that conduct was severe or pervasive and had the purpose or effect of either interfering with work performance or creating a hostile environment.
Later courts cite it for
“motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENKamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 176 P.3d 91 (Haw. 2008).
cites § 386-5 10×cited by 108 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“” HRS § 386-5, entitled “Exclusiveness or right to compensation; ex *109 ception[,]” (bold emphasis omitted), provides in pertinent part: The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or the employee’s dependents on account of a work injury[ 18 ] suffered by the employee…”
The case’s holding
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo, while a denial of leave to amend a complaint is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo.” · 9 citing courts
4
GREENKamali v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 504 P.2d 861 (Haw. 1972).
cites § 386-5 34×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“*864 DOES THE EXCLUSIVE LIABILITY PROVISION OF HRS § 386-5 PRECLUDE HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC'S CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION? Initially, it should be noted that though Hawaiian Electric's third-party-complaint is couched in terms of indemnity, portions of the complaint are in substance claims…”
The case’s holding
A third-party claim for indemnity is based on a contract or an independent duty between the parties rather than the underlying injury to an employee.
Later courts cite it for
“a third party claim for indemnity is not based on the employee's injury but is for reimbursement based upon contract or some other independent duty existing between indemnitor and indemnitee.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENYang v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 284 P.3d 946 (Haw. App. 2012).
cites § 386-5 32×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“As discussed herein, we hold that the exclusivity provision in HRS § 386-5 bars Yang’s claims against A & F for the personal injuries she allegedly suffered arising out of and in the course of her employment, which were allegedly caused by the willful acts of her co-employees…”
Later courts cite it for
“furulcawa does not create an exception to the exclusive remedy provision under hrs 386-5 for all intentional torts.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENChan v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (D. Haw. 2015).
cites § 386-5 23×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“Inasmuch as Kamaka has alleged a claim for emotional distress, that does not arise out of sexual harassment or sexual assault, such claim is, pursuant to HRS § 386-5, barred. Consistent with this reading of section 386-5, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that IIED claims arising out…”
Later courts cite it for
“summary judgment is available to the employer only when a reasonable factfinder 'must conclude that there would in any event have been no reasonable accommodation available.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENNakamoto v. Kawauchi., 418 P.3d 600 (Haw. 2018).
cites § 386-5 8×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“The WCL exclusivity provision, HRS § 386-5, provides: The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or the employee's dependents on account of a work injury suffered by the employee shall exclude all other liability of the employer to the employee ... at common law or…”
The case’s holding
Reputational harm is not a personal injury under the workers' compensation exclusivity statute, so employees may pursue defamation and false light claims against their employer despite that bar.
8
GREENFurukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc'y, 936 P.2d 643 (Haw. 1997).
cites § 386-5 12×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“We hold that the exclusion of Chang’s testimony was in error. C. The Trial Court Erred in Excluding Evidence of Furukawa’s Emotional Distress.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination need not compare treatment to identical employees but only to those subject to the same policies and decision-makers.
Later courts cite it for
“a circuit court's findings of fact are reviewed to see if they are clearly erroneous.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENTakaki v. Allied Mach. Corp., 951 P.2d 507 (Haw. App. 1998).
cites § 386-5 16×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“We do so because (1) HRS § 386-5 (1985), the exclusivity of remedies provision under our workers’ compensation law, does not bar an employee’s claim against an employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress when the employer has unlawfully discriminated against the…”
The case’s holding
A motion for summary judgment must be decided solely on the basis of admissible evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“only on the basis of admissible evidence.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENHough v. Pac. Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 858 (Haw. 1996).
cites § 386-5 16×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“On March 9, 1992, one week before trial, Pacific brought a third motion for summary judgment on the Houghs’ remaining claims, arguing that all claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of HRS § 386-5. On March 19, 1992, the trial court filed its order granting…”
The case’s holding
The workers' compensation exclusivity provision does not bar tort claims against an insurer for injuries caused by bad faith conduct during the claims process.
Later courts cite it for
“in interpreting a statute, we give words their common meaning, unless there is something in the statute requiring a different meaning.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENPotter v. Hawaii Newspaper Agency, 974 P.2d 51 (Haw. 1999).
cites § 386-5 16×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“Upon payment of such benefits by the HNA, Potter conceded, the HNA would be entitled to the tort defense afforded by HRS § 386-5 (1993). 1 However, Potter reasoned, inasmuch as the HNA had elected to contract with Potter as an independent contractor, it chose not to come under…”
The case’s holding
An employer who contracts with a worker as an independent contractor is estopped from asserting the workers' compensation tort defense unless the worker successfully challenges the agreement's validity.
Later courts cite it for
“our rules of statutory construction require us to reject an interpretation of a statute that renders any part of the statutory language a nullity.” · 7 citing courts
12
GREENHanagami v. China Airlines, Ltd., 688 P.2d 1139 (Haw. 1984).
cites § 386-5 13×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“HRS § 386-5 (1976) provides for this exclusive liability as follows: § 386-5 Exclusiveness of right to compensation.”
The case’s holding
The construction and legal effect of a contract is a question of law, while the intent of the parties is a question of fact.
Later courts cite it for
“as a general rule, the construction and legal effect to be given a contract is a question of law.” · 5 citing courts
13
GREENTri-S Corp. v. W. World Ins. Co., 135 P.3d 82 (Haw. 2006).
cites § 386-5 7×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“As such, the circuit court concluded that he was immune from suit under HRS § 386-5, and entered an order to that effect on February 13, 1998.”
The case’s holding
Ambiguities in insurance policies are resolved in favor of the insured according to the reasonable expectations of a layperson.
Later courts cite it for
“the circuit court has discretion to grant extensions of time, and thus we review its orders in this regard for abuse of that discretion.” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENArquero v. Hilton Hawaiian Vill. LLC, 91 P.3d 505 (Haw. 2004).
cites § 386-5 8×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“Hilton also argued that the negligent supervision claim was barred by the exclusivity of benefits provision of HRS § 386-5 (1993) 5 and that the sexual assault, battery, and infliction of emotion distress claims were barred because Rodas was acting outside the scope of his…”
Later courts cite it for
“in interpreting hrs 378-2, we have held that federal courts' interpretations of title vii ... are persuasive, but not controlling.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENWaltrip v. TS Enter., Inc., 398 P.3d 815 (Haw. 2016).
cites § 386-5 4×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or the employee’s dependents on account of a work injury suffered by the employee shall exclude all other liability of the employer to the employee, the employee’s legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, or…”
The case’s holding
Courts must construe pro se filings reasonably and liberally to promote access to justice, so a litigant should not be barred from proceeding on a pleading if a reasonable construction permits it.
Later courts cite it for
“a fundamental tenet of hawaiʻi law is that 'pleadings prepared by pro se litigants should be interpreted liberally.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENBlack v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Haw. 2000).
cites § 386-5 12×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“Haw.Rev.Stat. § 386-5. The plain language of § 386-5 states an exception for sexual harassment and sexual assault, among other related causes of action.”
17
GREENEspaniola v. Cawdrey Mars Jt. Venture, 707 P.2d 365 (Haw. 1985).
cites § 386-5 9×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit ruled the claim for indemnity was barred by virtue of HRS § 386-5. But we conclude it was not and vacate the award of summary judgment to the employer.”
The case’s holding
A workers' compensation exclusive liability clause does not preclude a claim for contractual indemnity based on a clear and unequivocal assumption of liability.
Later courts cite it for
“a departure from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute cannot be justified without a clear showing that the legislature intended some other meaning would be given the language.” · 2 citing courts
18
YELLOWMarshall v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 821 P.2d 937 (Haw. App. 1991).
cites § 386-5 8×cited by 39 cases
Abrogated by Hac v. University of Hawai'i on other grounds: 8 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 386-5
“However, summary judgment in favor of UH on Marshall’s claims in Counts I and II for alleged breach of the Agreement was proper. IV. A. In Count HI, Marshall alleged that Defendants negligently inflicted emotional distress on him through the investigation and through the delay…”
The case’s holding
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proving the conduct was intentional, unreasonable, and likely to result in illness.
Later courts cite it for
“premeditated; malicious; done with evil intent, or with a bad motive or purpose, or with indifference to the natural consequences; unlawful; without legal justification.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENAdams v. Dole Food Co., 323 P.3d 122 (Haw. App. 2014).
cites § 386-5 19×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in dismissing their complaint because (1) only one employing entity can claim the protection of the WCL exclusive remedy; (2) the civil conspiracy claim does not involve “work injuries” and thus should not be barred by…”
20
GREENEst. of Coates ex rel. Abrew v. Pac. Eng'g, 791 P.2d 1257 (Haw. 1990).
cites § 386-5 8×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 386-5
“Appellants also argue that the exclusivity provisions of HRS § 386-5 unconstitutionally and impermissibly deny them equal protection and due process of law by denying any recovery to non-dependent relatives while allowing dependent relatives to recover benefits.”
The case’s holding
A workers' compensation exclusivity provision is constitutional under the rational basis test if it rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.
Later courts cite it for
“under the rational basis test, we inquire as to whether a statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.” · 4 citing courts

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Citing cases by year
197119982026

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1999. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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D. Haw.31Haw.30Haw. App.15N.D. Tex.1W.D. Wash.1
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