§386-82 Claim for compensation; limitation
of time. The right to compensation under this chapter shall be barred
unless a written claim therefor is made to the director of labor and industrial
relations[:]
(1) Within two years after the date at which the effects
of the injury for which the employee is entitled to compensation have become
manifest; and
(2) Within
five years after the date of the accident or occurrence which caused the
injury.
The foregoing limitations of time shall not
apply to a claim for injury caused by compressed air or due to occupational
exposure to, or contact with, arsenic, asbestos, benzol, beryllium, zirconium,
cadmium, chrome, lead, fluorine, or other mineral or substance with
carcinogenic properties, as incorporated in the Hawaii Occupational Safety and
Health Standards, or to exposure to X-rays, radium, ionizing radiation, or
radioactive substances, but such claim shall be barred unless it is made to the
director, in writing, within two years after knowledge that the injury was
proximately caused by, or resulted from the nature of, the employment. The
claim may be made by the injured employee or the employee's dependents or by
some other person on the employee's or their behalf. The claim shall state in
ordinary language the time, place, nature, and cause of the injury. [L 1963, c
116, pt of §1; Supp, §97-91; HRS §386-82; am L 1979, c 114, §1; gen ch 1985]
Revision
Note
In the first paragraph, (1) and (2) reformatted
as paragraphs (1) and (2), and in paragraph (1), punctuation changed pursuant
to §23G-15.
Case Notes
Statute of limitations for asserting claim starts from
discovery of injury or illness. 50 H. 1, 427 P.2d 845 (1967).
Condition which causes no loss of function and having no
treatment should not be considered an injury. 71 H. 269, 788 P.2d 170 (1990).
No lawful claim for workers’ compensation benefits were filed
with the director where employer’s filing of "WC-1" form did not
constitute a claim for workers’ compensation benefits on employee’s behalf and
no evidence that employer had been "duly empowered to act" on injured
employee’s behalf. 89 H. 411, 974 P.2d 51 (1999).
Under this section, the two-year statute of limitations for
the filing of a workers' compensation claim begins to run when the claimant, as
a reasonable person, should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable
compensable character of claimant's injury or disease. 93 H. 8, 994 P.2d 1054
(2000).
In order to identify the "date of injury" required
by the department of labor and industrial relations in connection with the
filing of a workers' compensation claim under this section, a claimant in a
case arising under the "injury-by-disease" prong of §386-3 may rely
upon the last day of employment as the "date of disability", but this
"date of disability" may also be the date of diagnosis of the
disabling condition. 94 H. 70, 9 P.3d 382 (2000).
Tolling of limitation period. 2 H. App. 136, 627 P.2d 288
(1981).
The two-year limitation period begins at a point where the
employee's injury has had a disabling effect that prevents employee from
working. 2 H. App. 157, 628 P.2d 205 (1981).
Cited: 24 H. 97, 101 (1917); 24 H. 731, 738 (1919).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
16
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1972–2025 · leading case:
Flor v. Holguin, 9 P.3d 382 (Haw. 2000).
Flor v. Holguin, 9 P.3d 382 (Haw. 2000).
· cites it 8× “The “Date of Injury” In Occupational Disease Claims Under The Workers’ Compensation Law HRS § 386-82 (1993) 6 establishes the time within which a claimant must file a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Law.”
Potter v. Hawaii Newspaper Agency, 974 P.2d 51 (Haw. 1999).
· cites it 6× “928 (1933), this court construed the statute to mean that claims made on behalf of a minor must be made by “a ‘guardian’ or ‘next friend’ duly empowered to act for the minor.”
Hayashi v. Scott Co., 994 P.2d 1054 (Haw. 2000).
· cites it 20× “1 Specifically, the question is whether, as Scott and Argonaut argue, appellee Kenneth Hayashi’s (Hayashi) workers’ compensation claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations as set forth in HRS § 386-82. For the following reasons, we affirm both the LIRAB’s decision…”
Tomita v. Hotel Serv. Ctr., 628 P.2d 205 (Haw. App. 1981).
· cites it 10× “The employer and insurance carrier have, in this appeal, raised one issue, and that is whether the appellee’s claim for workman’s compensation benefits was barred by the time limitation provision of HRS § 386-82. We hold that it was not. The relevant facts are as follows: The…”
Asato v. Meadow Gold Dairies-Hawaii, 706 P.2d 13 (Haw. 1985).
· cites it 12× “The Appeals Board held that claimants-appellants Asato’s and Nobuji’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, and that claimant-appellant Yama-moto’s claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations under HRS § 386-82. *113 A. Claimant-appellant Asato…”
Yamada v. Royal Hawaiian Macadamia Nut Co., 704 P.2d 914 (Haw. App. 1985).
· cites it 9× “On May 23, 1978, the Director issued his decision concluding that (1) Yamada’s claim for compensation for the 12-day period in July 1973 was barred under HRS § 386-82, 2 (2) Appellees were liable for all of Yamada’s medical expenses and compensation for temporary total…”
Miyake v. Welders, Inc., 788 P.2d 170 (Haw. 1990).
· cites it 5× “The relevant statute, HRS § 386-82, reads: Claim for compensation; limitation of time.”
Kalapodes v. E. E. Black, Ltd., 669 P.2d 635 (Haw. 1983).
· cites it 2× “An employer who makes voluntary compensation payments to an employee waives the written claim requirement of HRS § 386-82(a). HRS § 386-83(a). Nothing in its joinder rules prevents the Appeals Board from joining as an additional party to a permanent disability hearing an…”
Demond v. Univ. of Hawaii, 503 P.2d 434 (Haw. 1972).
“HRS § 386-83 (b) sets forth circumstances in which an employer may be deemed to have waived the limitation period: (b) Unless the employer is prejudiced thereby, failure to make a claim within the time prescribed in section 386-82 shall not bar a claim to compensation if…”
Chung v. Food Pantry, Ltd., 627 P.2d 288 (Haw. App. 1981).
· cites it 4× “” However, Employer has failed to show that it incurred prejudice as a result of the delay.”
Alkire-Clemen v. Castle Med. Ctr., 222 P.3d 466 (Haw. App. 2010).
· cites it 12× “28765 is whether the LIRAB erred in concluding that the workers' compensation claim filed by Claimant on August 22, 2002, for injuries arising out of the February 20, 1999, work incident was not barred by the statute of limitations set forth in HRS §§ 386-82. The LIRAB concluded…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-82(a) — 1 case
Kalapodes v. E. E. Black, Ltd., 669 P.2d 635 (Haw. 1983).
“An employer who makes voluntary compensation payments to an employee waives the written claim requirement of HRS § 386-82(a). HRS § 386-83(a). Nothing in its joinder rules prevents the Appeals Board from joining as an additional party to a permanent disability hearing an…”
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