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Hawaii Revised Statutes

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 580-56 (2026)

  Property rights following dissolution of marriage

✓ current as of July 2026
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     §580-56  Property rights following dissolution of marriage.  (a)  Every decree of divorce which does not specifically recite that the final division of the property of the parties is reserved for further hearing, decision, and orders shall finally divide the property of the parties to such action.

     (b)  Following the entry of a decree of divorce in any matrimonial action in which the final division of the property of the parties to the action is reserved for further hearings, decisions, and orders, notwithstanding the provisions of section 560:2-802, or any other provisions of the law to the contrary, each party to the action shall continue to have all of the rights to and interests in the property of the other party to the action as provided by chapters 533 and 560, or as otherwise provided by law, to the same extent the party would have had the rights or interests if the decree of divorce had not been entered, until the entry of a decree or order finally dividing the property of the parties to the matrimonial action, or as provided in subsection (d).

     (c)  When a party to a matrimonial action has remarried following the entry of a decree of divorce, in which the final division of the property of the parties is reserved for further hearings, decisions, and orders, but before the entry of a decree or order finally dividing the property owned by the parties to that action, notwithstanding the provisions of chapters 533 and 560, the spouse of the remarried party shall have none of the rights or interests in the former spouse's real property or personal estate as provided in chapters 533 and 560, or as otherwise provided by law, until the time as a decree or order finally dividing the property owned by the parties or either of them as of the effective date of the entry of the decree of divorce dissolving the party's prior marriage shall be entered.  Upon the entry of a decree or order finally dividing the property of the parties to a matrimonial action in which a decree of divorce has been entered, the spouse of a party to the action who has remarried shall have all of the rights of a spouse as provided by chapters 533 and 560, or as otherwise provided by law, in and to the property of the former spouse vested in the spouse by the decree or order finally dividing the property of the parties or either of them, as of the effective date of the entry of the decree of dissolution of the prior marriage.

     (d)  Following the entry of a decree of divorce, or the entry of a decree or order finally dividing the property of the parties to a matrimonial action if the same is reserved in the decree of divorce, or the elapse of one year after entry of a decree or order reserving the final division of property of the party, a divorced spouse shall not be entitled to dower or curtesy in the former spouse's real estate, or any part thereof, nor to any share of the former spouse's personal estate. [CC 1859, §1332; RL 1925, §2986; RL 1935, §4483; RL 1945, §12234; RL 1955, §324-45; HRS §580-56; am L 1973, c 192, §2; am L 1983, c 209, §1; am L 2023, c 160, §13]

 

Case Notes

 

  Divorce cuts off right to dower.  12 H. 265 (1899); 35 H. 440 (1940).

  Divorce court in one state does not have power to directly affect, by decree, title to real property in another state.  56 H. 295, 535 P.2d 1109 (1975).

  One-year limitation applies to all entitlements to former spouse's personal estate; "personal estate" includes living person's property.  Section does not violate due process by imposing unreasonable procedural requirement on adjudication of claim.  69 H. 1, 730 P.2d 338 (1986).

  Section 580-47 controls the division of property of divorced parties in the event one dies in the interim between their divorce and the division of property.  70 H. 605, 780 P.2d 80 (1989).

  Where family court's domestic relations order amending the initial divorce decree was not inconsistent with the language of the initial divorce decree or this section, the family court possessed appropriate jurisdiction to amend the divorce decree.  100 H. 397, 60 P.3d 798 (2002).

  Subsection (d) was intended to apply only in the narrow context of limiting a spouse's right to dower or curtesy in his or her deceased former spouse's estate; thus, subsection (d) did not divest family court of jurisdiction over the property division in the case.  128 H. 1, 282 P.3d 543 (2012).

  Where jurisdiction to divide the parties' property is not reserved, it terminates when the time to appeal the decree expires.  1 H. App. 605, 623 P.2d 893 (1981).

  No inchoate dower right in property if only a reservation to purchase property existed on date of divorce decree.  4 H. App. 41, 659 P.2d 759 (1983).

  Divorced spouse not entitled to former spouse's personal estate.  7 H. App. 286, 758 P.2d 197 (1988).

  Does not divest family court of jurisdiction under family court rule to change division of property issue when request for change is based on a retroactive change in relevant federal law.  8 H. App. 559, 815 P.2d 28 (1991).

  Section does not apply where family court lacks jurisdiction to finally adjudicate division and distribution of property and debts of parties.  9 H. App. 176, 830 P.2d 1158 (1992).

  When computing subsection (d)'s "one year" period, the time from filing a notice of appeal of the family court's decree deciding division and distribution of property and debts to the entry of the appellate court's judgment on appeal is excluded.  9 H. App. 214, 832 P.2d 280 (1992).

  In light of subsection (a), when the divorce decree ordered husband to transfer a specified value of husband's stocks and funds to wife, that specified value of husband's stocks and funds, for purposes of subsection (d), was no longer a part of husband's personal estate.  108 H. 504 (App.), 122 P.3d 284 (2005).

  Subsection (d) does not divest the family court of jurisdiction to issue further property distribution orders in response to an order of remand from an appellate court of a timely-decided property division order under §580-47(b); upon remand and absent extraordinarily compelling circumstances, the family court retains jurisdiction for no more than one year after the date that the case is lodged again on remand in order to redivide and redistribute the parties' property to the extent required on remand.  127 H. 346 (App.), 279 P.3d 11 (2012).

  Where the divorce decree was filed on July 17, 2006 and the decision, entered on June 18, 2007, did not merely state findings of fact and conclusions of law, but also contained the order which divided the parties' property and addressed all remaining claims, the family court fully and finally divided the parties' assets within one year of the decree in compliance with subsection (d).  127 H. 346 (App.), 279 P.3d 11 (2012).

  Where divorce agreement registered in a foreign country was valid and effective under the foreign country's law, but the agreement did not expressly address property owned by husband or wife in Hawaii, and where wife did not assert that under the foreign country's law the registration of the divorce agreement would preclude any other further actions to address division of Hawaii property, then, if the family court has in personam jurisdiction over both parties, the family court may exercise jurisdiction to divide the property of husband and wife located in Hawaii; the family court erroneously concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.  137 H. 90 (App.), 365 P.3d 1019 (2016).

  Cited:  21 H. 264, 266 (1912).

 

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 40 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1977–2025 · leading case: Riethbrock v. Lange., 282 P.3d 543 (Haw. 2012).
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Riethbrock v. Lange., 282 P.3d 543 (Haw. 2012). · cites it 94× “5 In 1973, the legislature recodified RLH § 324-45 as HRS § 580-56. 6 In apparent recognition of the increasingly common practice of a bifurcated divorce, the legislature made several amendments.”
Chen v. Hoeflinger, 279 P.3d 11 (Haw. App. 2012). · cites it 68× “Haw.Rev.Stat. § 580-56 (2006). . The Honorable Terrence T.”
Torres v. Torres, 60 P.3d 798 (Haw. 2003). · cites it 52× “Jurisdiction of the Family Court Pursuant to the Language of the Decree and HRS § 580-56 Louan contends that the language of the Decree and HRS § 580-56 (quoted infra ) do not permit the family court to exercise jurisdiction over the rights to survivor benefits from Alfred's…”
Boulton v. Boulton, 730 P.2d 338 (Haw. 1986). · cites it 50× “See HRS § 580-56(a); DeMello v. DeMello, 3 Haw.”
Kakinami v. Kakinami, 276 P.3d 695 (Haw. 2012). · cites it 18× “The ICA held that the family court retained jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree notwithstanding *713 HRS § 580-56(d) because the post-decree motion sought enforcement, rather than modification of the divorce decree.”
Magoon v. Magoon, 780 P.2d 80 (Haw. 1989). · cites it 33× “” HRS § 580-56(a). In effecting a division of the properly the family court is governed by HRS § 580-47.”
Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie, 254 P.3d 439 (Haw. 2011). · cites it 8× “The family court noted "there were sufficient questions raised by the discovery of this document to have required or conducted a further fact finding hearing to determine the validity of the document[,]" but concluded, based on its interpretation of HRS § 580-56(d) (1976) [13]…”
Bank of Hawaii v. Shinn, 200 P.3d 370 (Haw. 2008). · cites it 8× “We additionally determined that, although neither the parties nor the circuit court had discussed the implications of HRS § 580-56 (1985), the statute did not deprive the family court of its authority to incorporate the settlement agreement into the decree.”
DeMello v. Home Escrow, Inc., 659 P.2d 759 (Haw. App. 1983). · cites it 15× “Finally, plaintiff argues that (1) defendant knew that the matter of property division between plaintiff and Denis was pending in the divorce proceeding; (2) until entry of a property division order, HRS § 580-56(b) (1976) preserved to plaintiff her rights in Lot 29, and then in…”
Lowther v. Lowther, 57 P.3d 494 (Haw. App. 2002). · cites it 10× “Timothy challenges paragraph 4 based on the last sentence of HRS § 88-83 (1993) stating that “[a]ny election of a mode of retirement allowance shall be irrevocable.”
Richter v. Richter, 122 P.3d 284 (Haw. App. 2005). · cites it 13× “” HRS § 580-56 (1993) states, in relevant part, as follows: Property rights following dissolution of marriage, (a) Every decree of divorce which does not specifically recite that the final division of the property of the parties is reserved for further hearing, decision, and…”
Todd v. Todd, 832 P.2d 280 (Haw. App. 1992). · cites it 13× “HRS § 580-56(d) (1985) provides as follows: Following the entry of a decree of divorce, or the entry of a decree or order finally dividing the property of the parties to a matrimonial action if the same is reserved in the decree of divorce, or the elapse of one year after entry…”
Show all 40 citing cases →
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 580-56(a) — 10 cases
Boulton v. Boulton, 730 P.2d 338 (Haw. 1986). “See HRS § 580-56(a); DeMello v. DeMello, 3 Haw.”
Richter v. Richter, 122 P.3d 284 (Haw. App. 2005). “” HRS § 580-56 (1993) states, in relevant part, as follows: Property rights following dissolution of marriage, (a) Every decree of divorce which does not specifically recite that the final division of the property of the parties is reserved for further hearing, decision, and…”
Magoon v. Magoon, 780 P.2d 80 (Haw. 1989). “” HRS § 580-56(a). In effecting a division of the properly the family court is governed by HRS § 580-47.”
Carroll v. Nagatori-Carroll, 978 P.2d 814 (Haw. 1999).
Bienvenue v. Bienvenue, 72 P.3d 531 (Haw. App. 2003).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 580-56(b) — 5 cases
DeMello v. Home Escrow, Inc., 659 P.2d 759 (Haw. App. 1983). “Finally, plaintiff argues that (1) defendant knew that the matter of property division between plaintiff and Denis was pending in the divorce proceeding; (2) until entry of a property division order, HRS § 580-56(b) (1976) preserved to plaintiff her rights in Lot 29, and then in…”
Magoon v. Magoon, 780 P.2d 80 (Haw. 1989). “” HRS § 580-56(a). In effecting a division of the properly the family court is governed by HRS § 580-47.”
Boulton v. Boulton, 730 P.2d 338 (Haw. 1986). “See HRS § 580-56(a); DeMello v. DeMello, 3 Haw.”
Riethbrock v. Lange., 282 P.3d 543 (Haw. 2012). “5 In 1973, the legislature recodified RLH § 324-45 as HRS § 580-56. 6 In apparent recognition of the increasingly common practice of a bifurcated divorce, the legislature made several amendments.”
Richter v. Richter, 122 P.3d 284 (Haw. App. 2005). “” HRS § 580-56 (1993) states, in relevant part, as follows: Property rights following dissolution of marriage, (a) Every decree of divorce which does not specifically recite that the final division of the property of the parties is reserved for further hearing, decision, and…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 580-56(c) — 3 cases
Riethbrock v. Lange., 282 P.3d 543 (Haw. 2012). “5 In 1973, the legislature recodified RLH § 324-45 as HRS § 580-56. 6 In apparent recognition of the increasingly common practice of a bifurcated divorce, the legislature made several amendments.”
Boulton v. Boulton, 730 P.2d 338 (Haw. 1986). “See HRS § 580-56(a); DeMello v. DeMello, 3 Haw.”
Magoon v. Magoon, 780 P.2d 80 (Haw. 1989). “” HRS § 580-56(a). In effecting a division of the properly the family court is governed by HRS § 580-47.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 580-56(d) — 27 cases
Chen v. Hoeflinger, 279 P.3d 11 (Haw. App. 2012). “Haw.Rev.Stat. § 580-56 (2006). . The Honorable Terrence T.”
Riethbrock v. Lange., 282 P.3d 543 (Haw. 2012). “5 In 1973, the legislature recodified RLH § 324-45 as HRS § 580-56. 6 In apparent recognition of the increasingly common practice of a bifurcated divorce, the legislature made several amendments.”
Kakinami v. Kakinami, 276 P.3d 695 (Haw. 2012). “The ICA held that the family court retained jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree notwithstanding *713 HRS § 580-56(d) because the post-decree motion sought enforcement, rather than modification of the divorce decree.”
Boulton v. Boulton, 730 P.2d 338 (Haw. 1986). “See HRS § 580-56(a); DeMello v. DeMello, 3 Haw.”
Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie, 254 P.3d 439 (Haw. 2011). “The family court noted "there were sufficient questions raised by the discovery of this document to have required or conducted a further fact finding hearing to determine the validity of the document[,]" but concluded, based on its interpretation of HRS § 580-56(d) (1976) [13]…”
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