§702-207 Specified state of mind applies to
all elements. When the definition of an offense specifies the state of
mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing
among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all
elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. [L 1972, c
9, pt of §1]
COMMENTARY ON §702-207
This section makes it clear that the specified state of mind
requirement applies to all elements of an offense. This resolves a latent
ambiguity found in many penal statutes. If, for example, a statute were to
make it an offense to intentionally or knowingly break and enter the dwelling
of another, it is probably clear that the specified state of mind applies to
entering as well as breaking, however it should also be made clear that it
applies to the attendant circumstances "dwelling of another."
The phrase "unless a contrary purpose plainly
appears" is intended to allow the courts to avoid an improper result when
the language of a statute fails to indicate that the specified state of mind
applies to less than all elements and legislative history indicates that this
was intended.
Prior Hawaii law did not recognize the principle that
culpability must be proven as to each element of an offense. This stems in
part from the fact that the concept of "elements of an offense" had
not been fully explored. A case involving a charge of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor stated by way of dictum that culpability with respect to
the age of the victim did not have to be proven.[1] To the extent that this
section modifies the previous law, it merely rejects those few instances where
absolute penal liability was imposed indirectly.
__________
§702-207 Commentary:
1. Territory v. Delos Santos, 42 Haw. 102 (1957).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
34
cases, 1993–2012 · leading case:
State v. Buch, 926 P.2d 599 (Haw. 1996).
State v. Buch, 926 P.2d 599 (Haw. 1996).
· cites it 128× “Act 9, § 207, at 44, now HRS § 702-207 (1993). The commentary to HRS § 702-207 makes clear that [t]he phrase "unless a contrary purpose plainly appears" is intended to allow the courts to avoid an improper result when the language of a statute fails to indicate that the…”
State v. Mainaaupo, 178 P.3d 1 (Haw. 2008).
· cites it 14× “In Judge Nakamura’s view, HRS § 702-207 (1993) 5 “provides guidance on how to apply the mental state specified in an offense to its elements” and “creates a presumption that the ‘intentionally or knowingly’ mental state specified in HRS § 708-836 applies to both the requirement…”
State v. Klinge, 994 P.2d 509 (Haw. 2000).
· cites it 16× “In addition, HRS § 702-207 provides that "[w]hen the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense,…”
State v. Gaylord, 890 P.2d 1167 (Haw. 1995).
· cites it 8× “" "HRS § 701-114(1)(a) and (b) (1985) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, as well as the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense." Moreover, HRS § 702-204 (1985) provides in relevant part that "a person is not guilty…”
State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42 (Haw. 2001).
· cites it 6× “3d 1224, 1229 (2000) (referring to HRS § 702-207, see supra note 5). Accordingly, an intentional, knowing, or reckless state of mind applies to all elements of HRS § 291-4.”
State v. Cabrera, 978 P.2d 797 (Haw. 1999).
· cites it 10× “) Pursuant to HRS § 702-207 (1993),[ 5 ] the state of mind of “intent” applies to each material element of the offense.”
State v. Arceo, 928 P.2d 843 (Haw. 1996).
· cites it 4× “HRS § 702-207 (1993) provides that "[when] the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a…”
State v. Nesmith, 276 P.3d 617 (Haw. 2012).
· cites it 4× “On appeal, the defendant *641 contended, pursuant to HRS § 702-207, that "[w]hen the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind, .”
State v. Holbron, 904 P.2d 912 (Haw. 1995).
· cites it 4× “” Finally, HRS § 702-207 [ (1993) ] provides that “[when] the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the…”
State v. Moser, 111 P.3d 54 (Haw. App. 2005).
· cites it 6× “) To cover the situation where a state of mind is specified in the definition of an offense without distinguishing among the elements, HRS § 702-207 (1993) provides: Specified state of mind applies to all elements.”
State v. Keomany, 34 P.3d 1039 (Haw. App. 2000).
· cites it 12× “Specifically, Defendant contends they were prejudicially insufficient because they inadequately informed the jury that the specified state of mind, "knowingly," applied to each element of each offense, pursuant to HRS § 702-207 (1993). HRS § 702-207 provides: When the definition…”
State v. Pone, 892 P.2d 455 (Haw. 1995).
· cites it 4× “” Finally, HRS § 702-207 (1985) provides that “[when] the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the…”
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