Hawaii Revised Statutes homeSearch Hawaii
Haw. Rev. Stat.Haw. Rev. Stat.Chapter 706

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-601 (2025)

  Pre-sentence diagnosis and report

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included cited 1975–2025 30citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 30 opinions since 1975, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (9 cases).

     §706-601  Pre-sentence diagnosis and report.  (1)  Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4), the court shall order a pre-sentence correctional diagnosis of the defendant and accord due consideration to a written report of the diagnosis before imposing sentence where:

     (a)  The defendant has been convicted of a felony; or

     (b)  The defendant is less than twenty-two years of age and has been convicted of a crime.

     (2)  The court may order a pre-sentence diagnosis in any other case.

     (3)  With the consent of the court, the requirement of a pre-sentence diagnosis may be waived by agreement of both the defendant and the prosecuting attorney; provided that in felony cases, the prosecuting attorney shall inform, or make reasonable efforts to inform, the victim or the victim's surviving immediate family members of their rights to be present at the sentencing hearing and to provide information relating to the impact of the crime, including any requested restitution.

     (4)  The court on its own motion may waive a pre-sentence correctional diagnosis where:

     (a)  A prior pre-sentence diagnosis was completed within one year preceding the sentencing in the instant case;

     (b)  The defendant is being sentenced for murder or attempted murder in any degree; or

     (c)  The sentence was agreed to by the parties and approved by the court under rule 11 of the Hawaii rules of penal procedure. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 314, §11; am L 1997, c 275, §1; am L 2016, c 231, §15]

 

COMMENTARY ON §706-601

 

  In any system which vests discretion in the sentencing authority, it is necessary that the authority have sufficient and accurate information so that it may rationally exercise its discretion.  In our penal system which vests sentencing authority in the court, it is extremely unlikely that without a special provision providing for a pre-sentence investigation and report that the relevant information will be brought to the attention of the court.  The vast majority of cases are disposed of upon pleas of guilty.  It is obvious that in such cases the court has no information upon which to select between and among various sentencing alternatives.  Even where the case is tried before the sentencing judge, the evidence at trial is not likely to produce information relevant to sentencing a subsequently convicted defendant.  Relevant information, such as the defendant's history of delinquency or criminality, physical and mental condition, family situation and background, economic status, education, occupation, and personal habits, are not likely to be fully explored in an adversary proceeding designed to decide the issue of guilt.

  This section requires a pre-sentence investigation in the cases specified; it allows the court to order a pre-sentence investigation in any other case.  In a system with unlimited resources, a pre-sentence investigation and report might be required in the case of every convicted defendant regardless of whether the offense was a felony, misdemeanor, or violation.  However, realizing the limitations of the State's resources, the Code has required a pre-sentence investigation and report only in cases of felons and youthful offenders.  This requirement is in substantial accord with recent studies on sentencing.[1]

  This section is also in substantial accord with Hawaii rules of procedure governing criminal cases in the circuit courts,[2] which have jurisdiction over felony cases and over some misdemeanor cases (those which are tried before a jury).  However, it is left to the circuit court's discretion whether a pre-sentence investigation and report is or is not ordered.  In candor, it must be pointed out that as a regular practice such reports are ordered and the Code in large degree brings the law into conformity with existing circuit court practice.

  District courts, which have original jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases, presently have no procedure or authorization for pre-sentence investigation.  Supplemental services will have to be added to the district courts, either by legislation, court rule, or administratively, so the pre-sentence investigators (probation officers or otherwise) are available in all courts which would be required or authorized to take into consideration a pre-sentence report before imposing sentence.

  Subsection (3) was added to the Code to accommodate the request of some defendants for immediate sentence.  The court has sometimes granted this request where the offense is of a very minor nature and the court is inclined to impose only a fine or to suspend imposition of sentence.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §706-601

 

  In 1972 the legislature, when enacting the Penal Code, substituted the phrase "pre-sentence correctional diagnosis" for "pre-sentence investigation," in order to conform the language to the new correctional procedures provided for with the establishment of the Correctional Diagnostic Center.  The Conference Committee stated that "a 'correctional diagnosis' will provide a more comprehensive psychiatric, social, and correctional analysis of a defendant than previously provided with a 'pre-sentence investigation'."  Conference Committee Report No. 2 (1972).

  Act 275, Session Laws 1997, amended this section to allow courts to waive the pre-sentence diagnosis and report under certain specified circumstances.  The legislature found that under current law, a pre-sentence diagnosis and report must be prepared for all individuals convicted of a felony offense and all convicted defendants less than twenty-two years of age, unless the report is waived by both the defendant and the prosecuting attorney.  However, in certain cases, the sentence to be imposed is predetermined due to plea agreements or sentencing guidelines; thus, the diagnosis and report are unnecessary.  The amendment expedites the disposal of criminal cases and reduces unnecessary delays in sentencing.  Conference Committee Report No. 72, House Standing Committee Report No. 1650.

  Act 231, Session Laws 2016, amended subsection (3) to implement recommendations made by the Penal Code Review Committee convened pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution No. 155, S.D. 1 (2015).

 

Rules of Court

 

  Plea agreements, see HRPP rule 11(f).

 

Case Notes

 

  Commentary quoted in holding that it was proper to include in a pre-sentence diagnosis and report the defendant's juvenile court record for consideration by the sentencing court.  56 H. 75, 527 P.2d 1269 (1974).

  In extended sentence hearing, pre-sentence report held inadmissible hearsay.  56 H. 628, 548 P.2d 632 (1976).

  Cited as requiring court to consider pre-sentence report before sentencing for a felony.  60 H. 100, 588 P.2d 409 (1978).

  In resentencing cases, ordering of updated pre-sentence report is within discretion of court.  61 H. 226, 602 P.2d 13 (1979).

  No merit to defendant's point on appeal that contended that circuit court violated right to due process when it assumed role of prosecutor and attempted to establish a record on which to base a minimum mandatory sentence; circuit court was mandated by this section and §706-606.5 to do what it did.  9 H. App. 583, 854 P.2d 238 (1993).

  Pre-sentence report sufficiently complied with §706-602 and chapter 706 was not violated, where defendant asserted that court did not order or receive a pre-sentence correctional diagnosis and report as required by subsection (1)(a), therefore, since the information required under §706-602 was not furnished to the court for its consideration in imposing sentence, the sentences were not imposed in accordance with provisions of chapter 706 and were illegal.  10 H. App. 535, 880 P.2d 208 (1992).

  Court properly relied on defendant's pre-sentence investigation report that included two prior convictions that had been dismissed fifteen years earlier, where defendant had an opportunity to object to the validity of these prior convictions as contained in the pre-sentence investigation report, but failed to do so; defendant waived the argument that the court should not have considered the two prior convictions.  129 H. 135 (App.), 295 P.3d 1005 (2013).

  Cited:  73 H. 259, 831 P.2d 523 (1992).

 

__________

§706-601 Commentary:

 

1.  American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures §4.1 (Tentative Draft, 1967) hereinafter cited in this chapter as A.B.A. Standards; National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Sentencing Act 2 (1963) [hereinafter cited in this chapter as M.S.A.]; and M.P.C. §7.07(1).

 

2.  H.R.Cr.P., Rules 1, 32, and 54 (1960).

 

 

The 20 cases that cite Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-601 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Hussein. , 229 P.3d 313 (Haw. 2010).
cites § 706-601 19×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“3d at 362 (quoting HRS § 706-601 (Supp.2003)). Based on the foregoing, in Heggland , the contents of the PSI were a subject of discussion at the sentencing hearing and in this court’s opinion on appeal.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court must state its reasons on the record at the time of sentencing for imposing a consecutive sentence rather than a concurrent one.
Later courts cite it for
“circuit courts must state on the record at the time of sentencing the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.” · 17 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Heggland, 193 P.3d 341 (Haw. 2008).
cites § 706-601 20×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“" HRS § 706-601 (Supp.2003). In light of Heggland's stipulation, the combined evidence should have "reasonably satisfied" the court as to the prior conviction and its sentence date.”
The case’s holding
Mandatory parole is a distinct penal concept that does not extend the maximum term of imprisonment for purposes of determining mandatory minimum sentencing.
Later courts cite it for
“each conviction listed may be used against defendant except those as to which the defendant timely responds with a good faith challenge on the record that the prior criminal conviction was ... not against the defendant.” · 2 citing courts
3
YELLOWState v. Sinagoga, 918 P.2d 228 (Haw. App. 1996).
cites § 706-601 16×cited by 48 cases
Overruled by State v. Veikoso on other grounds: 8 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 706-601
“HRS § 706-601 (1993). The law presumes that judges will conscientiously fulfill their duty to obey the directive of HRS § 706-668.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court may not rely on prior uncounseled felony, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor convictions to impose or enhance a prison sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) uncounseled, (2) otherwise invalidly entered, and/or (3) not against the defendant.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Kong., 315 P.3d 720 (Haw. 2013).
cites § 706-601 11×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“See Commentary to HRS § 706-601 (Supp.1997) 13 . References to good faith challenges only serve to obscure the court’s own error in relying on an inaccurate PSI prepared by its probation officers.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court must articulate the specific facts or circumstances relied upon to impose consecutive sentences but is not required to address every statutory factor.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) identify the facts or circumstances within the range of statutory factors that the court considered, and (2) confirm for the defendant, the victim, the public, and the appellate court that the decision was deliberate, rational, and fair.” · 5 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Lau, 831 P.2d 523 (Haw. 1992).
cites § 706-601 7×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“HRS §706-601. Under HRS § 706-602, a pre-sentence report shall include an analysis of the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality, physical and mental condition, family situation and background, economic status…”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court is not required to state its reasons for imposing a sentence but must consider all available sentencing alternatives.
Later courts cite it for
“wjhenever a defendant is qualified for sentencing alternatives and the sentence imposed is unsatisfactory to the defendant, we strongly encourage and recommend that ... the sentencing court ... state its reasons for imposing the particular sentence.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Kahawai, 83 P.3d 725 (Haw. 2004).
cites § 706-601 4×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“2d 523, 525 (1992) (quoting Commentary on HRS § 706-601)) (brackets omitted). This proposition is exemplified in United States v.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court may not impose discretionary probation conditions unless the record contains a factual basis showing the conditions are reasonably related to statutory sentencing factors and necessary purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“the term 'may' used in describing the court's power ... denotes discretion.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENKeawe v. State, 901 P.2d 481 (Haw. 1995).
cites § 706-601 4×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“” Commentary to HRS § 706-601 (1985). In State v. Fry, 61 Haw.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing judge possesses broad discretion to consider any accurate information that bears on the proper sentence for a defendant.
Later courts cite it for
“a sentencing court may consider any and all accurate information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed.” · 5 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Barnes., 450 P.3d 743 (Haw. 2019).
cites § 706-601 4×subsections: (1)(a) 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“2 HRS § 706-601 (2014) required that a pre-sentence diagnosis and report be prepared regarding Barnes.”
9
GREENState v. Harter., 340 P.3d 440 (Haw. 2014).
cites § 706-601 4×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“HRS § 706-601(1) & (2) (Supp.1997). Had the court requested a pre-sentence report, the court would have received a report on Harter’s physical and mental condition, which likely would have more fully informed the court’s sentencing decision.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must conduct a penetrating and comprehensive inquiry into a request to substitute appointed counsel, and denying it without such inquiry violates effective assistance of counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court may consider the delay or inconvenience that would result from a substitution of counsel in addition to its consideration of the status and quality of the attorney-client relationship.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENState v. Lessary, 925 P.2d 1104 (Haw. App. 1996).
cites § 706-601 7×subsections: (2) 2× (1)cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“Prior to being sentenced, Defendant filed a motion on September 28, 1994, to compel amendment of the pre-sentence report prepared for Defendant’s sentencing as required under HRS § 706-601 (1993). 1 The report was prepared by an Adult Probation Officer (the APO).”
11
GREENState v. Schroeder, 880 P.2d 192 (Haw. 1994).
cites § 706-601 2×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“1992); (2) the mandatory minimum sentence imposed in connection with the kidnapping conviction was illegal because (a) the indictment did not give him notice of the possibility of its imposition, and (b) at sentencing, the circuit court did not find beyond a reasonable doubt…”
The case’s holding
Due process requires that a defendant receive notice of the intended application of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment prior to being sentenced to such a term.
Later courts cite it for
“an indictment must be read in a common-sensical fashion in order to ascertain whether the material aggravating circumstance has been sufficiently alleged therein to support the imposition of enhanced sentencing.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Schaefer, 184 P.3d 805 (Haw. App. 2008).
cites § 706-601 4×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“2007) provides currently, as it did when Appellants were charged and sentenced, as follows: Pre-sentence diagnosis and report.”
13
GREENState v. Medeiros, 791 P.2d 730 (Haw. App. 1990).
cites § 706-601 6×subsections: (2) 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“Medeiros’ second point on appeal is that the trial judge erred in sentencing her before requesting a pre-sentence report pursuant to HRS § 706-601 (Supp. 1989), which reads: (1) The court shall order a pre-sentence correctional diagnosis of the defendant and accord due…”
The case’s holding
A trial court has wide discretion to accept or refuse a nolo contendere plea, and its refusal is reviewed only for manifest abuse of that discretion.
Later courts cite it for
“the trial court is vested with wide discretion to accept or refuse a nolo contendere plea,” · 1 citing court
14
GREENState v. Fry, 602 P.2d 13 (Haw. 1979).
cites § 706-601 2×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“16 HRS § 706-601(2) states: “The court may order a pre-sentence diagnosis in any other case.”
The case’s holding
A court may correct an illegal sentence at any time without violating double jeopardy even if the correction increases the punishment.
Later courts cite it for
“arbitrary or capricious actions by the judge and a rigid refusal to consider the defendant's contentions.” · 2 citing courts
15
YELLOWState v. Schroeder, 880 P.2d 208 (Haw. App. 1992).
cites § 706-601 4×subsections: (1)(a) 2×cited by 13 cases
Later history unclear: State v. Schroeder (1994), the Hawaii Supreme Court's opinion in this case, reads "Accordingly, because the circuit court committed plain error in imposing the sentence in the absence of reasonable notice a…
Where it cites § 706-601
“1991); (2) the mandatory minimum sentence imposed for Count II was illegal because (a) the indictment did not give him notice of the possibility of its imposition, and (b) the sentencing court did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had used or threatened to use a…”
Later courts cite it for
“must be alleged in the indictment in order to give the defendant notice that they will be relied on to prove the defendant's guilt and support the sentence to be imposed, and they must be determined by the trier of fact.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Mundon., 292 P.3d 205 (Haw. 2012).
cites § 706-601 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“See HRS § 706-601(1) (“[T]he court shall order a pre-sentence correctional diagnosis and accord due consideration to a written report of the diagnosis before imposing sentence.”
The case’s holding
Under the double jeopardy clause's collateral estoppel principle, prosecutors may not introduce evidence of acts a jury found the defendant did not commit in an earlier acquittal at retrial.
Later courts cite it for
“unless there are good reasons found by the court for permitting otherwise, the court should instruct all counsel that they and their witnesses must refrain from using the term victim.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Durham, 254 P.3d 425 (Haw. 2011).
cites § 706-601 3×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“As to any statutory right, the court noted that the statutes at issue, §§ 706-601 to -604 (1976), did not "mention that the probation officer’s recommendation must be made available to defendants.”
Later courts cite it for
“the question of whether the defendant should be sentenced to imprisonment or to probation is no less significant than the question of guilt.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENState v. Hopkins, 592 P.2d 810 (Haw. 1979).
cites § 706-601 2×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“HRS § 706-601 (1976 Repl.) provides that a court shall order a pre-sentence diagnosis and report where the defendant has either been convicted of a felony or is less than twenty-two (22) years old and has been convicted of a crime.”
The case’s holding
The trier of fact may accept or reject any witness's testimony in whole or in part (credibility assessment).
Later courts cite it for
“viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the s tatc, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Domut., 457 P.3d 822 (Haw. 2020).
cites § 706-601 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“HRS § 706-601(1)&(2)(2014). In appropriate cases, trial courts should exercise their discretion to order PSIs for misdemeanor convictions so that they can appropriately consider HRS § 706-606 (2014) sentencing factors.”
20
GREENState v. Drozdowski, 854 P.2d 238 (Haw. App. 1993).
cites § 706-601 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 706-601
“] Ordinary sentencing procedures involve a pre-sentence diagnosis and report. HRS § 706-601 (1985 & Supp.”
The case’s holding
A court may admit evidence not otherwise subject to the Hawaii Rules of Evidence at a sentencing proceeding imposing a mandatory minimum term, giving defendant a fair opportunity to be heard.
Later courts cite it for
“based on the record, we conclude that the evidence reasonably satisfied the court.” · 1 citing court

Show all 30 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197520002025

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1979. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Haw.19Haw. App.11
By subsection
(1)9 cases
State v. Hussein. , 229 P.3d 313 (Haw. 2010).“3d at 362 (quoting HRS § 706-601 (Supp.2003)). Based on the foregoing, in Heggland , the contents of the PSI were a subject of discussion at the sentencing hearing and in this court’s opinion on appeal.”
State v. Mundon., 292 P.3d 205 (Haw. 2012).“See HRS § 706-601(1) (“[T]he court shall order a pre-sentence correctional diagnosis and accord due consideration to a written report of the diagnosis before imposing sentence.”
State v. Harter., 340 P.3d 440 (Haw. 2014).“HRS § 706-601(1) & (2) (Supp.1997). Had the court requested a pre-sentence report, the court would have received a report on Harter’s physical and mental condition, which likely would have more fully informed the court’s sentencing decision.”
State v. Domut., 457 P.3d 822 (Haw. 2020).“HRS § 706-601(1)&(2)(2014). In appropriate cases, trial courts should exercise their discretion to order PSIs for misdemeanor convictions so that they can appropriately consider HRS § 706-606 (2014) sentencing factors.”
State v. Durham, 254 P.3d 425 (Haw. 2011).“As to any statutory right, the court noted that the statutes at issue, §§ 706-601 to -604 (1976), did not "mention that the probation officer’s recommendation must be made available to defendants.”
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(1)(a)2 cases
State v. Barnes., 450 P.3d 743 (Haw. 2019).“2 HRS § 706-601 (2014) required that a pre-sentence diagnosis and report be prepared regarding Barnes.”
State v. Schroeder, 880 P.2d 208 (Haw. App. 1992).“1991); (2) the mandatory minimum sentence imposed for Count II was illegal because (a) the indictment did not give him notice of the possibility of its imposition, and (b) the sentencing court did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had used or threatened to use a…”
(2)6 cases
State v. Kahawai, 83 P.3d 725 (Haw. 2004).“2d 523, 525 (1992) (quoting Commentary on HRS § 706-601)) (brackets omitted). This proposition is exemplified in United States v.”
State v. Fry, 602 P.2d 13 (Haw. 1979).“16 HRS § 706-601(2) states: “The court may order a pre-sentence diagnosis in any other case.”
Keawe v. State, 901 P.2d 481 (Haw. 1995).“” Commentary to HRS § 706-601 (1985). In State v. Fry, 61 Haw.”
State v. Medeiros, 791 P.2d 730 (Haw. App. 1990).“Medeiros’ second point on appeal is that the trial judge erred in sentencing her before requesting a pre-sentence report pursuant to HRS § 706-601 (Supp. 1989), which reads: (1) The court shall order a pre-sentence correctional diagnosis of the defendant and accord due…”
State v. Schaefer, 184 P.3d 805 (Haw. App. 2008).“2007) provides currently, as it did when Appellants were charged and sentenced, as follows: Pre-sentence diagnosis and report.”
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(3)2 cases
State v. Vaden., 526 P.3d 620 (Haw. 2023).
State v. Patoc, 581 P.3d 294 (Haw. App. 2025).

Show all 30 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

Hawaii Revised Statutes Home  |  Search Hawaii  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com