Hawaii Revised Statutes

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-704 (2026)

  Negligent homicide in the third degree

✓ current as of July 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section HI-LEGcapitol.hawaii.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

     §707-704  Negligent homicide in the third degree.  (1)  A person is guilty of the offense of negligent homicide in the third degree if that person causes the death of another person by the operation of a vehicle in a manner which is simple negligence.

     (2)  "Simple negligence" as used in this section:

     (a)  A person acts with simple negligence with respect to the person's conduct when the person should be aware of a risk that the person engages in that conduct.

     (b)  A person acts with simple negligence with respect to attendant circumstances when the person should be aware of a risk that those circumstances exist.

     (c)  A person acts with simple negligence with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person should be aware of a risk that the person's conduct will cause that result.

     (d)  A risk is within the meaning of this subsection if the person's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of the person's conduct and the circumstances known to the person, involves a deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation.

     (3)  Negligent homicide in the third degree is a misdemeanor. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1988, c 292, §3]

 

Cross References

 

  Negligence with respect to result of conduct, see §702-206.

 

Case Notes

 

  Court has discretion to grant deferred acceptance of guilty or deferred acceptance of no contest pleas for second degree negligent homicide.  69 H. 438, 746 P.2d 568 (1987).

  As nonconformity with relevant statutory standards may be admissible as evidence of negligence in civil cases, and simple negligence is defined by subsection (2)(d) to be violation of "the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation", a jury may, consistent with the requirements of due process and other rules peculiar to the criminal process, be allowed to also consider relevant statutes or ordinances in criminal negligent homicide cases.  88 H. 296, 966 P.2d 608 (1998).

  Not inconsistent that jury found defendant not guilty of negligent homicide in the third degree, but guilty of intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failing to stop at accident scene.  77 H. 329 (App.), 884 P.2d 392 (1994).

 

COMMENTARY ON §§707-703 AND 707-704

 

  In adopting the Code in 1972, the legislature basically retained much of the prior Hawaii law relating to negligent homicide.  Like the previous Hawaii law, negligent homicide under the Code is divided into two degrees.  As in prior law, the Code restricts the offense to cases involving the operation of a "vehicle."  However, under prior law negligent homicide in the first degree was committed where a person by the operation of any vehicle in a "grossly negligent" manner caused the death of another.  HRS §748-9.  Under the Code, §707-703(1), a person is guilty of negligent homicide in the first degree if the person causes the death of another person by the operation of a vehicle in a "negligent" manner.  The statutorily defined standard of "negligence" upon which this offense is based is set forth in §702-206(4).  The actor should be aware of a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" with respect to the actor's conduct, the attendant circumstances, and the result of the actor's conduct.  The actor's failure to perceive the risk must constitute a "gross deviation" from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation.  (See §702-206(4).)  The offense is a class C felony.

  The prior law made it negligent homicide in the second degree in the case where a person, by the operation of a vehicle in a "negligent" manner, caused the death of another.  HRS §749-9(b).  Section 707-704(1) of the Code provides that a person is guilty of negligent homicide in the second degree if the person causes the death of another person by the operation of a vehicle "in a manner which is simple negligence."  Negligent homicide in the second degree is a misdemeanor.  Under §707-704(2), a person acts with "simple negligence" when the person should be aware of a "risk" (not "substantial and unjustifiable risk", as stated in §702-206(4)) with respect to the person's conduct, the attendant circumstances, and the result of the person's conduct.  The person's failure to perceive the risk must constitute a "deviation" (not "gross deviation", as stated in §702-206(4)) from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation.

  The Code as adopted differs in several respects from the recommendation of the Proposed Draft with respect to negligent homicide.  The Proposed Draft provided that a person is guilty of negligent homicide if "he negligently causes the death of another person."  It constituted the crime as a misdemeanor.  Under the Proposed Draft, the offense had only one degree and it was not restricted to the operation of a vehicle.  Also, the draft did not recognize as a basis for culpability the standard of "simple negligence" set forth in the Code's second degree negligent homicide.

  In Conference Committee Report No. 2 (1972), it is stated:

  Your Committee has agreed to the creation of two degrees of negligent homicide in order to preserve the present law distinction between gross negligence and simple negligence.  Your Committee finds that expansion of the offense of negligent homicide beyond the scope of the operation of a motor vehicle is not necessary at the present time.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §§707-703 AND 707-704

 

  Act 292, Session Laws 1988, amended these sections by making negligent homicide in the second degree a class C felony and negligent homicide in the third degree a misdemeanor.  The legislature felt that stronger measures were needed to protect the public and to deter those who negligently operate a motor vehicle, which results in bodily injury or death to others.  Senate Conference Committee Report No. 278, House Conference Committee Report No. 105-88.

  Act 316, Session Laws 2012, amended §707-703 to include a provision for incidents involving a vulnerable highway user.  Hawaii's roadways have often been called dangerous for pedestrians, cyclists, and others who legally use the public right of way without being in a motor vehicle.  Unfortunately, when collisions occur between motor vehicles and these individuals, the outcome is often catastrophic.  Amending the offense of negligent homicide in the second degree to include a provision for incidents in which vulnerable highway users are involved may, at the very least, increase driver awareness of these individuals.  Conference Committee Report No. 33-12.

 

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1982–2023 · leading case: State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003).
State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003). · cites it 22× “[The defendant] responded that HRS § 707-704 involves `simple negligence,' [as defined by HRS § 707-704(2),] which is distinguishable from `negligence,' and is thus not within the class of offenses for which DANC pleas may not be given. The trial court, agreeing with [the…”
State v. Oshiro, 746 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1987). · cites it 18× “State had charged Aton with second-degree negligent homicide under HRS § 707-704 (1985). State contends that 1) a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is the only appropriate remedy since no appeal exists from the grant of a DANC plea; and 2) the trial court abused its discretion…”
State v. Blyenburg., 520 P.3d 264 (Haw. 2022). · cites it 9× “(“[T]he legislature also added to the Code the offense of negligent homicide in the second degree, set forth in [HRS] § 707-704, which introduces a less culpable state of mind called ‘simple negligence’ – essentially a civil standard of negligence.”
State v. Tabigne, 966 P.2d 608 (Haw. 1998). · cites it 16× “BACKGROUND Tabigne was charged by a complaint filed on June 28,1996, with one count of negligent homicide in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-704, see supra note 1, and one count of driving without no-fault insurance, in violation of HRS § 431:100-104 (1993).”
State v. Rapozo, 235 P.3d 325 (Haw. 2010). · cites it 4× “(quoting HRS § 707-704 (1976)). On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for acquittal on the ground that his conduct constituted a de minimis offense under HRS § 702-236.”
State v. Johnson, 653 P.2d 428 (Haw. App. 1982). · cites it 9× “After jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of Negligent Homicide in the Second Degree, HRS § 707-704 (1976), which reads: (1) A person is guilty of the offense of negligent homicide in the second degree if he causes the death of another person by the…”
United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008). · cites it 2× “2003)); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 707-704 (offense called "negligent homicide in the third degree" and requires only ordinary negligence); Mass.”
State v. Lian-Wen Chen, 884 P.2d 392 (Haw. App. 1994). · cites it 3× “On July 23, 1991, Defendant-Appellant Lian-Wen Chen (Defendant) was charged in Count I of the subject indictment with failing to stop at the scene of an accident in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-12(a) (1985), and in Count II with negligent homicide in the…”
Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816 (Del. 2008). “, § 40-6-393(c); Hawaii, Haw.Rev.Stat. § 707-704; Idaho, Idaho Code.”
Surnow v. Buddemeyer, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1086 (D. Haw. 2019). · cites it 2× “On October 12, 2018, Buddemeyer was convicted, following a jury trial, of Negligent Homicide in the Third Degree in violation of HRS § 707-704. Judgment (November 30, 2018), Ex.”
Surnow v. Buddemeyer, 380 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (D. Haw. 2019). · cites it 2× “On October 12, 2018, Buddemeyer was convicted, following a jury trial, of Negligent Homicide in the Third Degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-704 . Judgment (November 30, 2018), Ex.”
State v. Correa, 744 P.2d 84 (Haw. 1987). · cites it 2× “Appellant broke the rules of this program and was also convicted of Negligent Homicide in the Second Degree under HRS § 707-704. 2 HRS § 706-671(1) reads in pertinent part: Credit for time of detention prior to sentence; credit for imprisonment under earlier sentence for same…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-704(1) — 3 cases
State v. Oshiro, 746 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1987). “State had charged Aton with second-degree negligent homicide under HRS § 707-704 (1985). State contends that 1) a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is the only appropriate remedy since no appeal exists from the grant of a DANC plea; and 2) the trial court abused its discretion…”
State v. Tabigne, 966 P.2d 608 (Haw. 1998). “BACKGROUND Tabigne was charged by a complaint filed on June 28,1996, with one count of negligent homicide in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-704, see supra note 1, and one count of driving without no-fault insurance, in violation of HRS § 431:100-104 (1993).”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-704(2) — 5 cases
State v. Blyenburg., 520 P.3d 264 (Haw. 2022). “(“[T]he legislature also added to the Code the offense of negligent homicide in the second degree, set forth in [HRS] § 707-704, which introduces a less culpable state of mind called ‘simple negligence’ – essentially a civil standard of negligence.”
State v. Sakamoto, 70 P.3d 635 (Haw. 2003). “[The defendant] responded that HRS § 707-704 involves `simple negligence,' [as defined by HRS § 707-704(2),] which is distinguishable from `negligence,' and is thus not within the class of offenses for which DANC pleas may not be given. The trial court, agreeing with [the…”
State v. Oshiro, 746 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1987). “State had charged Aton with second-degree negligent homicide under HRS § 707-704 (1985). State contends that 1) a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is the only appropriate remedy since no appeal exists from the grant of a DANC plea; and 2) the trial court abused its discretion…”
State v. Johnson, 653 P.2d 428 (Haw. App. 1982). “After jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of Negligent Homicide in the Second Degree, HRS § 707-704 (1976), which reads: (1) A person is guilty of the offense of negligent homicide in the second degree if he causes the death of another person by the…”
State v. Blyenburg, 499 P.3d 419 (Haw. App. 2021).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-704(2)(a) — 1 case
State v. Buddemeyer, 537 P.3d 441 (Haw. App. 2023).
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-704(2)(d) — 3 cases
State v. Tabigne, 966 P.2d 608 (Haw. 1998). “BACKGROUND Tabigne was charged by a complaint filed on June 28,1996, with one count of negligent homicide in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-704, see supra note 1, and one count of driving without no-fault insurance, in violation of HRS § 431:100-104 (1993).”
State v. Buddemeyer, 537 P.3d 441 (Haw. App. 2023).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.