PART II.
BURGLARY AND OTHER OFFENSES OF INTRUSION
§708-810 Burglary in the first degree.
(1) A person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree if the person
intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building, with intent to commit
therein a crime against a person or against property rights, and:
(a) The person is armed with a dangerous instrument
in the course of committing the offense;
(b) The person intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone in the
course of committing the offense; or
(c) The person recklessly disregards a risk that the
building is the dwelling of another, and the building is such a dwelling.
(2) An act occurs "in the course of
committing the offense" if it occurs in effecting entry or while in the
building or in immediate flight therefrom.
(3) In the case of a dwelling that is a
multi-unit building, the owner of the multi-unit building, owner of an
individual unit, a property manager, or an authorized representative of the
condominium association may act as a complainant.
(4) Burglary in the first degree shall be a
class B felony. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993; am L 2024, c 240, §3]
Revision Note
In subsection (1)(a), "or" deleted pursuant to
§23G-15.
Case Notes
No merit to defendant's arguments regarding defendant's
sentence, where defendant contended, inter alia, that repeat offender statute
did not apply to defendant's offense, where defendant was convicted of burglary
in first degree of a dwelling in violation of subsection (1)(c). 105 F.3d 463
(1997).
Defendant's prior conviction of burglary in the first degree
qualified as a "crime of violence" under the residual clause of the
career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. §4B1.1, and thus supported the application
of an enhanced sentence for violent crime in aid of racketeering. 883 F.3d
1207 (2018).
Accomplice. 58 H. 404, 570 P.2d 844 (1977).
Although there was no direct evidence that appellant did not
have permission to enter residence, a reasonable mind could infer that
appellant did not have permission. 78 H. 383, 894 P.2d 80 (1995).
First degree burglary not an included offense of first degree
robbery. 81 H. 309, 916 P.2d 1210 (1996).
A perpetrator "remains unlawfully" for the purposes
of a burglary prosecution only in situations where the individual makes an
initial lawful entry, that subsequently becomes unlawful. 89 H. 284, 972 P.2d
287 (1998).
Because the broad language of this section does not evidence
an intent to confine crimes "against a person" to those enumerated in
chapter 707, and harassment under §711-1106 is a crime against a person,
burglary conviction under this section may be predicated on offense of
harassment. 89 H. 284, 972 P.2d 287 (1998).
In order to sustain a burglary conviction under this section,
the evidence must show that the unlawful entry was effected for the purpose of
committing an offense against a person or property rights; the intent to commit
the offense must have existed at the time the unlawful entry was made. 89 H.
284, 972 P.2d 287 (1998).
Where trial court failed to correct prosecution's erroneous
interpretation of "remains unlawfully" under this section,
defendant's constitutional rights to due process and a unanimous jury verdict
violated. 89 H. 284, 972 P.2d 287 (1998).
Theft in the second degree is not a lesser included offense
of burglary in the first degree. 2 H. App. 579, 637 P.2d 780 (1981).
Conviction of first degree burglary affirmed where defendant
intentionally entered a separately secured bedroom and bath area of nightclub.
9 H. App. 307, 837 P.2d 1308 (1992).
Conviction affirmed, where defendant argued that court erred
in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on burglary in first
degree count on ground that, since tent defendant was charged with having
entered was not a building, it was not a dwelling within definition of this
section. 9 H. App. 368, 842 P.2d 267 (1992).
Prosecution satisfied its burden of proving that storage shed
was in a garage that was part of a building that was a dwelling. 86 H. 143
(App.), 948 P.2d 564 (1997).
As robbery in the first degree under §708-840(1)(b)(ii) does
not include the element required under subsection (1)(c) for burglary in the
first degree of intentionally entering or remaining unlawfully in a building,
it was possible for defendant to commit robbery in the first degree without
committing burglary in the first degree; thus the crimes are not included in
each other and do not merge. 109 H. 327 (App.), 126 P.3d 370 (2005).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
116
cases (
18 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case:
State v. Maugaotega, 114 P.3d 905 (Haw. 2005).
State v. Maugaotega, 114 P.3d 905 (Haw. 2005).
· cites it 16× “2003); (4) burglary in the first degree (Count IV), in violation of HRS § 708-810(1)(c) (1993); (5) place to keep firearm (Count VI), in violation of HRS § 134-6(c) and (e) (Supp.”
State v. Lagat, 40 P.3d 894 (Haw. 2002).
· cites it 12× “Because the burglary statutes (HRS §§ 708-810 and 708-811) are identical to the UEMV statute to the extent that each essentially provides that a person commits burglary/UEMV if he or she intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building/motor vehicle with the intent to…”
State v. Timoteo, 952 P.2d 865 (Haw. 1997).
· cites it 14× “[3] HRS § 708-810 (1985) provides: Burglary in the first degree.”
State v. Yamada, 57 P.3d 467 (Haw. 2002).
· cites it 10× “HRS § 708-810(1 )(a) provides: A person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree if the person intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building, with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or against px'operty rights, and: .”
Birano v. State., 426 P.3d 387 (Haw. 2018).
· cites it 8× “Therefore, the State was required to prove that Birano intended to take property from Dumlao through the threat of force in order to convict Birano of robbery. Birano's burglary conviction, on the other hand, could be sustained only if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt…”
State v. Vinge, 916 P.2d 1210 (Haw. 1996).
· cites it 14× “]” HRS § 708-810. First degree robbery includes no such element.”
State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131 (Haw. 2003).
· cites it 6× “NOTES [1] HRS § 708-810(1)(c) provides: Burglary in the first degree.”
State v. Freitas, 602 P.2d 914 (Haw. 1979).
· cites it 8× “1 HRS § 708-810 provides: “Burglary in the first degree.”
State v. Israel, 890 P.2d 303 (Haw. 1995).
· cites it 6× “Under certain conditions as specified in §§ 708-810(1)(a), (b) and (c), the crime becomes one of burglary in the first degree. Thus, the crime alleged in the present case is that of intentionally entering or intentionally remaining unlawfully on the described premises; but what…”
State v. Mahoe, 972 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1998).
· cites it 7× “HRS § 708-810 (1993) provides, in pertinent part, that: (1) A person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree if the person intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building, with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or against property rights,…”
State v. Maugaotega, 168 P.3d 562 (Haw. 2007).
· cites it 4× “2003), three counts of burglary in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 708-810(1)(c) (1993), two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 707-730(1)(a) (1993 & Supp.”
State v. Mitsuda, 947 P.2d 349 (Haw. 1997).
· cites it 6× “Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant Scott Yoshio Mitsuda was convicted of Burglary in the First Degree, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-810(1)(c) (1993) (Count I) [1] and Robbery in the First Degree, in violation of HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(ii) (1993) [2]…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(1) — 8 cases
Birano v. State., 426 P.3d 387 (Haw. 2018).
“Therefore, the State was required to prove that Birano intended to take property from Dumlao through the threat of force in order to convict Birano of robbery. Birano's burglary conviction, on the other hand, could be sustained only if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(1)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Yamada, 57 P.3d 467 (Haw. 2002).
“HRS § 708-810(1 )(a) provides: A person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree if the person intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building, with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or against px'operty rights, and: .”
State v. Israel, 890 P.2d 303 (Haw. 1995).
“Under certain conditions as specified in §§ 708-810(1)(a), (b) and (c), the crime becomes one of burglary in the first degree. Thus, the crime alleged in the present case is that of intentionally entering or intentionally remaining unlawfully on the described premises; but what…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(1)(c) — 43 cases
State v. Maugaotega, 114 P.3d 905 (Haw. 2005).
“2003); (4) burglary in the first degree (Count IV), in violation of HRS § 708-810(1)(c) (1993); (5) place to keep firearm (Count VI), in violation of HRS § 134-6(c) and (e) (Supp.”
Birano v. State., 426 P.3d 387 (Haw. 2018).
“Therefore, the State was required to prove that Birano intended to take property from Dumlao through the threat of force in order to convict Birano of robbery. Birano's burglary conviction, on the other hand, could be sustained only if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt…”
State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131 (Haw. 2003).
“NOTES [1] HRS § 708-810(1)(c) provides: Burglary in the first degree.”
State v. Israel, 890 P.2d 303 (Haw. 1995).
“Under certain conditions as specified in §§ 708-810(1)(a), (b) and (c), the crime becomes one of burglary in the first degree. Thus, the crime alleged in the present case is that of intentionally entering or intentionally remaining unlawfully on the described premises; but what…”
State v. Timoteo, 952 P.2d 865 (Haw. 1997).
“[3] HRS § 708-810 (1985) provides: Burglary in the first degree.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(1)(e) — 2 cases
State v. Maugaotega, 114 P.3d 905 (Haw. 2005).
“2003); (4) burglary in the first degree (Count IV), in violation of HRS § 708-810(1)(c) (1993); (5) place to keep firearm (Count VI), in violation of HRS § 134-6(c) and (e) (Supp.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(3) — 4 cases
State v. Timoteo, 952 P.2d 865 (Haw. 1997).
“[3] HRS § 708-810 (1985) provides: Burglary in the first degree.”
State v. Mitsuda, 947 P.2d 349 (Haw. 1997).
“Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant Scott Yoshio Mitsuda was convicted of Burglary in the First Degree, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-810(1)(c) (1993) (Count I) [1] and Robbery in the First Degree, in violation of HRS § 708-840(1)(b)(ii) (1993) [2]…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(l)(a) — 4 cases
State v. Vinge, 916 P.2d 1210 (Haw. 1996).
“]” HRS § 708-810. First degree robbery includes no such element.”
State v. Yamada, 57 P.3d 467 (Haw. 2002).
“HRS § 708-810(1 )(a) provides: A person commits the offense of burglary in the first degree if the person intentionally enters or remains unlawfully in a building, with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or against px'operty rights, and: .”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(l)(c) — 31 cases
State v. Freitas, 602 P.2d 914 (Haw. 1979).
“1 HRS § 708-810 provides: “Burglary in the first degree.”
State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131 (Haw. 2003).
“NOTES [1] HRS § 708-810(1)(c) provides: Burglary in the first degree.”
State v. Timoteo, 952 P.2d 865 (Haw. 1997).
“[3] HRS § 708-810 (1985) provides: Burglary in the first degree.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(l)(e) — 2 cases
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-810(lXc) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.