§803-11 Entering house to arrest.
Whenever it is necessary to enter a house to arrest an offender, and entrance
is refused, the officer or person making the arrest may force an entrance by
breaking doors or other barriers. But before breaking any door, the officer or
person shall first demand entrance in a loud voice, and state that the officer
or person is the bearer of a warrant of arrest; or if it is in a case in which
arrest is lawful without warrant, the officer or person shall substantially
state that information in an audible voice. [PC 1869, c 49, §10; RL 1925,
§3976; RL 1935, §5410; RL 1945, §10711; RL 1955, §255-11; HRS §708-11; ren L
1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1985]
Cross References
See Const. art. I, §7.
Case Notes
Breaking gate, when proper. 1 H. 72 (1852).
Section not implicated where entry is gained through an open
door without use of force. 83 H. 13, 924 P.2d 181 (1996).
Where a ruse is accompanied by the use of force to gain entry
during the execution of either a search or arrest warrant, police officers are
required to comply with the knock and announce rule. 98 H. 18, 41 P.3d 174
(2002).
Because it violates the plain language of this section, the
doctrine of substantial compliance, that "substantial compliance"
with this section is legally sufficient in the absence of exigent
circumstances, is expressly rejected. 108 H. 436, 121 P.3d 901 (2005).
Where the police opened a closed screen door and broke the
threshold of defendant's dwelling prior to announcing that they bore an arrest
warrant and failed to wait a reasonable time after demanding entry, this
section was violated; thus, subsequent search of defendant's home and seizure
of evidence therefrom were inadmissible. 108 H. 436, 121 P.3d 901 (2005).
Where officers failed to state they were bearers of an arrest
warrant before "breaking" the screen door and failed to wait a "reasonable
time" after demanding entrance before "breaking" the door and
crossing the threshold, the officers did not satisfy the "knock and
announce" rule nor did they comply with the requirements of this section
and the trial court's conclusions of law to the contrary were erroneous. 108
H. 446 (App.), 121 P.3d 911 (2005).
Cited: 22 H. 597, 602 (1915), questioned 26 H. 363 (1922).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
10
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1980–2022 · leading case:
State v. Harada, 41 P.3d 174 (Haw. 2002).
State v. Harada, 41 P.3d 174 (Haw. 2002).
· cites it 116× “The relevant analysis as set forth in Eleneki is as follows: In Dixon , we held that "HRS § 803-11 is not implicated where entry is gained through an open door without use of force.”
State v. Maldonado, 121 P.3d 901 (Haw. 2005).
· cites it 49× “We granted the prosecution’s application for a writ of certiorari for two purposes: first, to address the following question raised by the prosecution—whether HRS § 803-11 (1993), 5 the so-called “knock-and-announee” rule, may be satisfied by substantial compliance.”
State v. Dixon, 924 P.2d 181 (Haw. 1996).
· cites it 42× “On May 10, 1995, Dixon filed a motion to suppress evidence, contending that, because the HPD officers failed to follow the “knock and announce” procedures of HRS § 803-11 before entering the hotel room, their entry was unlawful and in violation of his right to privacy; thus,…”
State v. Eleneki, 993 P.2d 1191 (Haw. 2000).
· cites it 18× “In its opening brief, the prosecution argued that the circuit court erred in granting the motion because the constitutional parameters of the knock and announce rule are the same for the execution of an arrest warrant under HRS § 803-11 and a search warrant under HRS § 803-37,…”
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
· cites it 2× “19 (1979); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-11 (1977); Idaho Code § 19-611 (1979); Ill.”
State v. Garcia, 887 P.2d 671 (Haw. App. 1995).
· cites it 7× “Whenever it is necessary to enter a house to arrest an offender, and entrance is refused, the officer or person making the arrest may force an entrance by breaking doors or other barriers.”
State v. Lloyd, 606 P.2d 913 (Haw. 1980).
· cites it 4× “6 The defendant has also advanced the argument that because the police failed to announce their purpose before entering, pursuant to HRS § 803-11, their failure to do so rendered the entry illegal.”
State v. Maldonado, 121 P.3d 911 (Haw. App. 2005).
· cites it 30× “) The circuit court found that “one or more officers knocked on the door, announced their presence and office (both the police and the sheriff) and demanded entry; then one or more officers partially entered the front door of defendant MALDONADO’S residence, by opening a screen…”
State v. Keanaaina., 508 P.3d 814 (Haw. 2022).
· cites it 2× “2d 1191, 1194 (2000) (“Although the language of HRS §§ 803-11 and 803-37 differs, the purposes of the ‘knock and announce rule’ are identical in each context .”
State v. KINI, 188 P.3d 833 (Haw. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “(3) FOF 10 is not clearly erroneous because although the evidence in the record on appeal shows that Maldonado did not physically possess or show to the police officers the June 23, 2004 document at the time of Kini's arrest, the evidence shows that she did possess the document…”
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