§806-28 Characterization of the act.
The indictment need not allege that the offense was committed or the act done "feloniously",
"unlawfully", "wilfully", "knowingly", "maliciously",
"with force and arms", or otherwise except where such
characterization is used in the statutory definition of the offense. Where the
characterization is so used the indictment may employ the words of the statute
or other words substantially of the same import. In alleging the transaction
the indictment may use the nounal, adjectival, verbal, or adverbial form of the
statutory name of the offense. [L 1915, c 215, pt of §2; RL 1925, §4040; RL
1935, §5499; RL 1945, §10801; RL 1955, §258-11; HRS §711-28; ren L 1972, c 9,
pt of §1]
Case Notes
As the plain language of §806-2 limits the application of the
criminal procedure provisions of this chapter to the circuit courts, the
appellate court erred by extending the application of this section to the
district courts. 127 H. 48, 276 P.3d 617 (2012).
See 35 H. 324 (1940); 37 H. 586 (1947).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
6
cases, 1982–2012 · leading case:
State v. Nesmith, 276 P.3d 617 (Haw. 2012).
State v. Nesmith, 276 P.3d 617 (Haw. 2012).
· cites it 76× “3d 1224, 1229 (2000), the distinction between general and specific intent has been abandoned; and (4) that in Nesmith, the ICA erred by extending HRS § 806-28 (1993) [4] to the district courts, as the plain language of HRS § 806-2 (1993) limits the application of the criminal…”
State v. Nesmith, 257 P.3d 245 (Haw. App. 2011).
· cites it 16× “HRS § 806-28 provides in relevant part that "[t]he indictment need not allege that the offense was committed or the act done `feloniously', `unlawfully', `wilfully', `knowingly', `maliciously, `with force and arms', or otherwise except where such characterization is used in the…”
State v. Kane, 652 P.2d 642 (Haw. App. 1982).
· cites it 12× “Alternatively, the State argues that although HRS § 702-204 requires that the accused act “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly,” the indictment need not allege state of mind because HRS § 806-28 (1976) provides: § 806-28 Characterization of the act.”
State v. Torres, 660 P.2d 522 (Haw. 1983).
· cites it 4× “And the State maintains there was no defect in the particular charge, since the governing procedural statute, HRS § 806-28, expressly provides an indictment need not allege the crime was committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, “except where such characterization is…”
State v. McDowell, 672 P.2d 554 (Haw. 1983).
“Hence, under § 806-28, HRS, a particularized allegation of the general intent in the indictment is not required.”
State v. Yamamoto. (Haw. 2012).
· cites it 26× “3d 1224, 1229 (2000), the distinction between general and specific intent has been abandoned; and (4) that in Nesmith, the ICA erred by extending HRS § 806-28 (1993)4 to the district courts, as the plain language of HRS § 806-2 (1993) limits the application of the criminal…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.