Hawaii Revised Statutes

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 806-34 (2026)

  Sufficiency of averments as to offense and transaction

✓ current as of July 2026
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     §806-34  Sufficiency of averments as to offense and transaction.  In an indictment the offense may be charged either by name or by reference to the statute defining or making it punishable; and the transaction may be stated with so much detail of time, place, and circumstances and such particulars as to the person (if any) against whom, and the thing (if any) in respect to which the offense was committed, as are necessary to identify the transaction, to bring it within the statutory definition of the offense charged, to show that the court has jurisdiction, and to give the accused reasonable notice of the facts.

     Averments which so charge the offense and the transaction shall be held to be sufficient. [L 1915, c 215, pt of §2; RL 1925, §4048; RL 1935, §5507; RL 1945, §10809; RL 1955, §258-19; HRS §711-34; ren L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]

 

Rules of Court

 

  Nature and contents of indictment, see HRPP rule 7(d).

 

Case Notes

 

  Indictment gives reasonable notice to defendant of nature of offense and is not bad for absence of further particulars.  43 H. 54 (1958).

  Applied in holding an indictment for forgery under §708-852 to be sufficient.  55 H. 621, 525 P.2d 571 (1974).

  Counts in indictment must be dismissed where defendant could not be principal and counts did not allege defendant was accomplice or cite accomplice statute.  67 H. 398, 688 P.2d 1152 (1984).

  Cited:  37 H. 625, 643 (1947).

  See 33 H. 180 (1934); 34 H. 209 (1937).

 

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19 cases, 1983–2013 · leading case: State v. Walker, 273 P.3d 1161 (Haw. 2012).
State v. Walker, 273 P.3d 1161 (Haw. 2012). · cites it 24× “15 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** are set by statute[]” in HRS § 806-34: In an indictment the offense may be charged either by name or by reference to the statute defining or making it punishable; and the transaction may be stated with so…”
State v. Nesmith, 276 P.3d 617 (Haw. 2012). · cites it 8× “); HRS § 806-34 (1993) (stating that, in an indictment, "the transaction may be stated with so much detail of time, place, and circumstances and such particulars as to the person (if any) against whom, and the thing (if any) in respect to which the offense was committed," all of…”
State v. Tominiko, 266 P.3d 1122 (Haw. 2011). · cites it 12× “"); HRS § 806-34 (1993) (stating that, in an indictment, "the transaction may be stated with so much detail of time, place, and circumstances and such particulars as to the person (if any) against whom, and the thing (if any) in respect to which the offense was committed," all…”
State v. Stan's Contracting, Inc., 137 P.3d 331 (Haw. 2006). · cites it 8× “The information presented to the grand jury was insufficient to satisfy article I, sections 10 and H of the Hawai'i Constitution.”
State v. Arceo, 928 P.2d 843 (Haw. 1996). · cites it 4× “]"); HRS § 806-34 (1993) ("In an indictment[,] the offense .”
State v. Mita, 245 P.3d 458 (Haw. 2010). · cites it 6× “3d at *474 1112-13 (citing HRS § 806-34 (1993)). "In particular, `where the definition of an offense includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the [charge] shall charge the offense in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species and descend…”
State v. Cummings, 63 P.3d 1109 (Haw. 2003). · cites it 4× “is essential to the court's jurisdiction," (brackets added)); HRS § 806-34 (1993) (explaining that an indictment may state an offense "with so much detail of time, place, and circumstances and such particulars as to the person (if any) against whom, and the *1113 thing (if any)…”
State v. Apollonio., 311 P.3d 676 (Haw. 2013). · cites it 4× “HRS § 806-34 (1993) does not support the proposition that an insufficient charge is a jurisdictional defect.”
State v. Walker, 284 P.3d 905 (Haw. App. 2011). · cites it 18× “HRS § 806-34 (1993). Although the statute was written using the permissive “may,” the Hawaii Supreme Court has construed HRS § 806-34 to set forth mandatory requirements for a charge.”
State v. Wheeler, 219 P.3d 1170 (Haw. 2009). · cites it 2× “, dissenting) (in assault ease, oral charge alleged that defendant had caused injury, but not bodily injury, to the complaining witness; dissent notes that “[s]uch an omission, however, might have been cured had the deputy prosecutor articulated with specificity the type of…”
State v. Israel, 890 P.2d 303 (Haw. 1995). · cites it 4× “See HRS § 806-34 (1985). 5 The principal criteria are *70 first, whether the [charge] “contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, ‘and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he [or she] must be prepared to meet,’” and, secondly, ‘“in case any other…”
State v. Hitchcock, 235 P.3d 365 (Haw. 2010). · cites it 4× “is essential to the court's jurisdiction," (brackets added)); HRS § 806-34 (1993) (explaining that an indictment may state an offense "with so much detail of time, place, and circumstances and such particulars as to the person (if any) against whom, and the thing (if any) in…”
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