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Illinois Compiled Statutes

720 ILCS 5/4-3 (2026)

Mental state

✓ current as of May 2026
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(720 ILCS 5/4-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 4-3)
    Sec. 4-3. Mental state.
    (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7.
    (b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4, 4-5 or 4-6 is applicable.
    (c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as such.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 44 cases (14 in the last 5 years), 1994–2025 · leading case: People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123 (Ill. 2023).
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People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123 (Ill. 2023). · cites it 2× “After recognizing that the statute made no reference to a mens rea requirement, the court examined the statutory guidelines in section 4-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2006)), which provides the default rules for a culpable mental state.”
People v. Harris, 2017 IL App (1st) 140777 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 2× “” 720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2012). Section 4-3(a) states: “A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which -5- involves absolute liability,[1] unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental…”
People v. Hernandez, 967 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 2× “¶ 32 The Frieberg court discussed the section of the Criminal Code of 1961 pertaining to mental state (now 720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2008)), section 4-3(b), which states: "[i]f the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a…”
Lawrence v. Regent Realty Grp., Inc., 754 N.E.2d 334 (Ill. 2001). “See 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b), 4-9 (West 1998); People v.”
People v. Anderson, 759 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). “" 720 ILCS 5/4-3(a), (b) (West 2000). Because no mental state is prescribed in the statute concerning aggravated criminal sexual assault, defendant contends that the mental states prescribed in sections 4-4 (intent) and 4-5 (knowledge) are applicable to the offense of aggravated…”
People v. Bona, 2018 IL App (2d) 160581 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2012) ("If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element.”
People v. Sroga, 2022 IL 126978 (Ill. 2022). · cites it 2× “¶ 16 Generally, if a “statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4 [(intent)], 4-5 [(knowledge)] or 4-6 [(recklessness)] is…”
People v. Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092 (Ill. 2019). “Under the home invasion statute, the State is required to prove the defendant had knowledge of the court order prohibiting him from entering the victim's home, not that he understood the law.”
People v. Stiles, 779 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). “Compare 720 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 2000) (`Voluntary Act') with 720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2000) (`Mental State').”
People v. Grever, 819 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “Compare 720 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 1998) ("A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically capable of performing") with 720 ILCS 5/4-3(a) (West 1998) ("A person is not…”
People v. DePalma, 627 N.E.2d 1236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). “Knowledge is one of the alternative mental states required by section 4-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 1992); see also 720 ILCS 5/4-5 (West 1992)), and it appears to me to be an appropriate mental state applicable to the VIN statute in question.”
People v. Collier, 2020 IL App (1st) 162519 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021). “720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) (West 2014); People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill.”
Show all 44 citing cases →
— 720 ILCS 5/4-3(a) — 8 cases
People v. Anderson, 759 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). “" 720 ILCS 5/4-3(a), (b) (West 2000). Because no mental state is prescribed in the statute concerning aggravated criminal sexual assault, defendant contends that the mental states prescribed in sections 4-4 (intent) and 4-5 (knowledge) are applicable to the offense of aggravated…”
People v. Hernandez, 967 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “¶ 32 The Frieberg court discussed the section of the Criminal Code of 1961 pertaining to mental state (now 720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2008)), section 4-3(b), which states: "[i]f the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a…”
People v. Grever, 819 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “Compare 720 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 1998) ("A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically capable of performing") with 720 ILCS 5/4-3(a) (West 1998) ("A person is not…”
People v. Fields, 2022 IL App (4th) 210194 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
People v. Hernandez, 2012 IL App (1st) 92841 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
— 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) — 23 cases
People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123 (Ill. 2023). “After recognizing that the statute made no reference to a mens rea requirement, the court examined the statutory guidelines in section 4-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2006)), which provides the default rules for a culpable mental state.”
Lawrence v. Regent Realty Grp., Inc., 754 N.E.2d 334 (Ill. 2001). “See 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b), 4-9 (West 1998); People v.”
People v. Sroga, 2022 IL 126978 (Ill. 2022). “¶ 16 Generally, if a “statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4 [(intent)], 4-5 [(knowledge)] or 4-6 [(recklessness)] is…”
People v. Harris, 2017 IL App (1st) 140777 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “” 720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2012). Section 4-3(a) states: “A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which -5- involves absolute liability,[1] unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental…”
People v. Collier, 2020 IL App (1st) 162519 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021). “720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) (West 2014); People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill.”
— 720 ILCS 5/4-3(c) — 6 cases
People v. Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092 (Ill. 2019). “Under the home invasion statute, the State is required to prove the defendant had knowledge of the court order prohibiting him from entering the victim's home, not that he understood the law.”
People v. Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092 (Ill. 2019).
Matter of Extradition of Kulekowskis, 881 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
People v. Fields, 2022 IL App (4th) 210194 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
People v. Lewis, 2016 IL App (4th) 140852 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
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