ILCS » Chapter 735 · Act 5
Illinois Compiled Statutes

735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (2026)

Childhood sexual abuse

✓ current as of May 2026
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(735 ILCS 5/13-202.2) (from Ch. 110, par. 13-202.2)
    Sec. 13-202.2. Childhood sexual abuse.
    (a) In this Section:
    "Childhood sexual abuse" means an act of sexual abuse that occurs when the person abused is under 18 years of age.
    "Sexual abuse" includes but is not limited to sexual conduct and sexual penetration as defined in Section 11-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
    (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse or a violation of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 in which the victim is a minor must be commenced within 20 years of the date the limitation period begins to run under subsection (d) or within 20 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse or a violation of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 in which the victim is a minor. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.
    (c) If the injury is caused by 2 or more acts of childhood sexual abuse or a violation of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 in which the victim is a minor that are part of a continuing series of acts of childhood sexual abuse or a violation of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 in which the victim is a minor by the same abuser, then the discovery period under subsection (b) shall be computed from the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the last act of childhood sexual abuse or a violation of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 in which the victim is a minor in the continuing series occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by any act of childhood sexual abuse or a violation of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 in which the victim is a minor in the continuing series. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the last act of childhood sexual abuse in the continuing series occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.
    (d) The limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run before the person abused attains the age of 18 years; and, if at the time the person abused attains the age of 18 years he or she is under other legal disability, the limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run until the removal of the disability.
    (d-1) The limitation periods in subsection (b) do not run during a time period when the person abused is subject to threats, intimidation, manipulation, fraudulent concealment, or fraud perpetrated by the abuser or by any person acting in the interest of the abuser.
    (e) This Section applies to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1990 as well as to actions commenced on or after that date. The changes made by this amendatory Act of 1993 shall apply only to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1993. The changes made by this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly apply to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly as well as actions commenced on or after that date. The changes made by this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly apply to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly if the action would not have been time barred under any statute of limitations or statute of repose prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly.
    (f) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages based on childhood sexual abuse or a violation of Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 in which the victim is a minor may be commenced at any time; provided, however, that the changes made by this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly apply to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly if the action would not have been time barred under any statute of limitations or statute of repose prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly.
(Source: P.A. 104-159, eff. 1-1-26.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 54 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: Meh v. Lh, 685 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1997).
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Meh v. Lh, 685 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1997). · cites it 10× “2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1992)) governing personal injury actions based on childhood sexual abuse contained a 12-year period of repose.”
Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 885 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 13× “appeals from the trial court's February 17, 2006, order dismissing his complaint with prejudice as being barred under the 1994 childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1994)) and concluding that a more recent limitations statute for survivors of…”
Softcheck v. Imesch, 855 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 5× “2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 2004)), the statute of limitations applicable to childhood sexual abuse cases, effective in 2003, cannot apply retroactively to this case, and, alternatively, that the court's exercise of jurisdiction…”
Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). · cites it 4× “" 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1994). However, the legislature's repeal of the statute of repose is not applied retroactively to revive claims that had expired prior to the repeal of the statute of repose.”
Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. White, 627 F. Supp. 2d 905 (C.D. Ill. 2009). · cites it 5× “The parents assert that their IIED claim against White is “an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse” and is thus governed by the longer statute of limitations in 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2, which provides in relevant part: § 13-202.”
Woods v. Illinois Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 710 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2013). · cites it 2× “On March 23, 2012, Woods’s counsel filed a motion to reconsider, contending that the statute of limitations applicable to Woods’s § 1983 claim is the twenty-year limitations period contained in the Illinois Childhood Sexual Abuse Act, 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2, not the two-year…”
Mary J. Boggs v. Charles S. Adams, 45 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1995). · cites it 6× “735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b). Moreover, section 202.”
Clay v. Kuhl, 696 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). · cites it 14× “On January 10, 1996, the plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against the defendants.”
Meh v. Lh, 669 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). · cites it 7× “The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the general personal injury statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1992)) barred claims against the mother and the statute of repose contained in the childhood sexual abuse section of the…”
Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield, 857 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 3× “2(b) (now see 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 2004)). In effect, then, the statute of repose barred claims for childhood sexual abuse by anyone 30 years or older.”
John Doe No. 2 v. Boy Scouts of Am., 2016 IL App (1st) 152406 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 2× “2(b) provided: “An action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 2 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use 28 The special statute of limitations for personal injury actions based on childhood sexual abuse…”
Doe v. Hinsdale Twp. High Sch. Dist. 86, 905 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). · cites it 5× “2 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 2006)) and that her action was not barred by that statute, because she had filed her complaint within five years after her action accrued.”
Show all 54 citing cases →
— 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(a) — 3 cases
Clay v. Kuhl, 696 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). “On January 10, 1996, the plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against the defendants.”
Forbes v. Bd. of Educ. of the New Berlin Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 16, 2021 IL App (4th) 190902-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
Wall v. Olson, 2025 IL App (1st) 241708-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2025).
— 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) — 31 cases
Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). “" 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1994). However, the legislature's repeal of the statute of repose is not applied retroactively to revive claims that had expired prior to the repeal of the statute of repose.”
Meh v. Lh, 685 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1997). “2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1992)) governing personal injury actions based on childhood sexual abuse contained a 12-year period of repose.”
Mary J. Boggs v. Charles S. Adams, 45 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1995). “735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b). Moreover, section 202.”
Meh v. Lh, 669 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). “The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the general personal injury statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1992)) barred claims against the mother and the statute of repose contained in the childhood sexual abuse section of the…”
Softcheck v. Imesch, 855 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). “2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 2004)), the statute of limitations applicable to childhood sexual abuse cases, effective in 2003, cannot apply retroactively to this case, and, alternatively, that the court's exercise of jurisdiction…”
— 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(c) — 3 cases
Meh v. Lh, 685 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1997). “2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1992)) governing personal injury actions based on childhood sexual abuse contained a 12-year period of repose.”
Clay v. Kuhl, 696 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). “On January 10, 1996, the plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against the defendants.”
Horn v. Goodman, 2016 IL App (3d) 150339 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
— 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(d) — 5 cases
Clay v. Kuhl, 696 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). “On January 10, 1996, the plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against the defendants.”
Doe v. Carlson, 2017 IL App (1st) 160536 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
Doe v. Carlson, 2017 IL App (1st) 160536 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
Clay v. Kuhl, 297 Ill. App. 3d 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
Coe v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 99, 2021 IL App (2d) 210047-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(e) — 16 cases
Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 885 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). “appeals from the trial court's February 17, 2006, order dismissing his complaint with prejudice as being barred under the 1994 childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1994)) and concluding that a more recent limitations statute for survivors of…”
Meh v. Lh, 685 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. 1997). “2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1992)) governing personal injury actions based on childhood sexual abuse contained a 12-year period of repose.”
Perry v. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Reg., 2018 IL 122349 (Ill. 2018).
Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield, 857 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). “2(b) (now see 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 2004)). In effect, then, the statute of repose barred claims for childhood sexual abuse by anyone 30 years or older.”
Mary J. Boggs v. Charles S. Adams, 45 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1995). “735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b). Moreover, section 202.”
— 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(f) — 1 case
Greene v. Woodlawn Unit Sch. Dist. 209 (S.D. Ill. 2023).
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