ILCS » Chapter 740 · Act 10
Illinois Compiled Statutes

740 ILCS 10/7 (2026)

The following civil actions and remedies are authorized under this Act:     (1) The Attorney General, with such assistance as he may from time to time require of the State's Attorneys in the several counties, shall bring suit in the Circuit Court to prevent and restrain violations of Section 3 of this Act

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section IL-ILGAilga.gov JustiaChapter on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
(740 ILCS 10/7) (from Ch. 38, par. 60-7)
    Sec. 7. The following civil actions and remedies are authorized under this Act:
    (1) The Attorney General, with such assistance as he may from time to time require of the State's Attorneys in the several counties, shall bring suit in the Circuit Court to prevent and restrain violations of Section 3 of this Act. In such a proceeding, the court shall determine whether a violation has been committed, and shall enter such judgment as it considers necessary to remove the effects of any violation which it finds, and to prevent such violation from continuing or from being renewed in the future. The court, in its discretion, may exercise all powers necessary for this purpose, including, but not limited to, injunction, divestiture of property, divorcement of business units, dissolution of domestic corporations or associations, and suspension or termination of the right of foreign corporations or associations to do business in the State of Illinois.
    (2) Any person who has been injured in his business or property, or is threatened with such injury, by a violation of Section 3 of this Act may maintain an action in the Circuit Court for damages, or for an injunction, or both, against any person who has committed such violation. If, in an action for an injunction, the court issues an injunction, the plaintiff shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorney's fees. In an action for damages, if injury is found to be due to a violation of subsections (1) or (4) of Section 3 of this Act, the person injured shall be awarded 3 times the amount of actual damages resulting from that violation, together with costs and reasonable attorney's fees. If injury is found to be due to a violation of subsections (2) or (3) of Section 3 of this Act, the person injured shall recover the actual damages caused by the violation, together with costs and reasonable attorney's fees, and if it is shown that such violation was willful, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount recovered as damages up to a total of 3 times the amount of actual damages. This State, counties, municipalities, townships and any political subdivision organized under the authority of this State, and the United States, are considered a person having standing to bring an action under this subsection. The Attorney General may bring an action on behalf of this State, counties, municipalities, townships and other political subdivisions organized under the authority of this State to recover the damages under this subsection or by any comparable Federal law.
    The Attorney General may also bring an action in the name of this State, as parens patriae on behalf of persons residing in this State, to recover the damages under this subsection or any comparable federal law. The powers granted in this Section are in addition to and not in derogation of the common law powers of the Attorney General to act as parens patriae.
    No provision of this Act shall deny any person who is an indirect purchaser the right to sue for damages. Provided, however, that in any case in which claims are asserted against a defendant by both direct and indirect purchasers, the court shall take all steps necessary to avoid duplicate liability for the same injury including transfer and consolidation of all actions. Provided further that no person shall be authorized to maintain a class action in any court of this State for indirect purchasers asserting claims under this Act, with the sole exception of this State's Attorney General, who may maintain an action parens patriae as provided in this subsection.
    Beginning January 1, 1970, a file setting out the names of all special assistant attorneys general retained to prosecute antitrust matters and containing all terms and conditions of any arrangement or agreement regarding fees or compensation made between any such special assistant attorney general and the office of the Attorney General shall be maintained in the office of the Attorney General, open during all business hours to public inspection.
    Any action for damages under this subsection is forever barred unless commenced within 4 years after the cause of action accrued, except that, whenever any action is brought by the Attorney General for a violation of this Act, the running of the foregoing statute of limitations, with respect to every private right of action for damages under the subsection which is based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in the action by the Attorney General, shall be suspended during the pendency thereof, and for one year thereafter. No cause of action barred under existing law on July 21, 1965 shall be revived by this Act. In any action for damages under this subsection the court may, in its discretion, award reasonable fees to the prevailing defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.
    (3) Upon a finding that any domestic or foreign corporation organized or operating under the laws of this State has been engaged in conduct prohibited by Section 3 of this Act, or the terms of any injunction issued under this Act, a circuit court may, upon petition of the Attorney General, order the revocation, forfeiture or suspension of the charter, franchise, certificate of authority or privileges of any corporation operating under the laws of this State, or the dissolution of any such corporation.
    (4) In lieu of any criminal penalty otherwise prescribed for a violation of this Act, and in addition to any action under this Act or any Federal antitrust law, the Attorney General may bring an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the State against any person, trustee, director, manager or other officer or agent of a corporation, or against a corporation, domestic or foreign, to recover a penalty not to exceed $1,000,000 from every corporation or $100,000 from every other person for any act herein declared illegal. The action must be brought within 4 years after the commission of the act upon which it is based. Nothing in this subsection shall impair the right of any person to bring an action under subsection (2) of this Section.
(Source: P.A. 96-751, eff. 1-1-10.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21 cases, 1994–2019 · leading case: In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772 (E.D. Ill. 2017).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772 (E.D. Ill. 2017). “See 740 ILCS 10/7(2). On this basis, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim under Illinois's antitrust statute must be dismissed.”
Yang v. City of Chicago, 745 N.E.2d 541 (Ill. 2001). “2(c) (West 1998); 735 ILCS 5/2 — 203(c) (West 1998); 740 ILCS 10/7(2) (West 1998); 740 ILCS 110/15 (West 1998); 745 ILCS 70/12 (West 1998); 775 ILCS 5/8B — 104 (West 1998); 815 ILCS 505/2W (West 1998); 815 ILCS 602/5 — 120 (West 1998); 815 ILCS 605/11 (West 1998); 815 ILCS…”
Cnty. of Cook v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 2× “The plaintiffs contend that they have standing under both the Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/7, 11a (West 1996)) and the Illinois Antitrust Act (Antitrust Act) (740 ILCS 10/7(2) (West 1996)). Therefore, the remoteness analysis does not apply to them.”
In re Propranolol Antitrust Litig., 249 F. Supp. 3d 712 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). “with the sole exception of this State’s Attorney General,” 740 ILCS 10/7(2), it is “not obvious that the formulaic expression ‘in any court of this State’ appearing in an Illinois statute applies to a federal court in [New York].”
City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 730 (E.D. Ill. 2019). “Illinois Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot bring their claims under the Illinois Antitrust Act because, while it allows for recovery by indirect purchasers, it provides that "no person shall be authorized to maintain a class action in any court of this State for indirect…”
In re Opana ER Antritrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 704 (N.D. Ill. 2016). “See, 740 ILCS 10/7(2). Defendants note that courts have dismissed indirect purchaser class action claims asserted in federal court under Illinois law for this reason.”
Paulson v. Cnty. of De Kalb, 644 N.E.2d 37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). · cites it 2× “60—7(2) (now 740 ILCS 10/7(2) (West 1992))) are punitive, the State may not maintain both an action for treble damages under section 7(2) and an action for civil penalties under section 7(4) (Ill.”
Lg Display Co. v. Lisa Madigan, 665 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2011). “The defendants maintain that because the IAA pro *772 vides that “no person shall be authorized to maintain a class action in any court of this State for indirect purchasers asserting claims under this Act, with the sole exception of this State’s Attorney General, who may…”
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund & Cent. States Jt. Bd. Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Philip Morris Inc., 196 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1999). “1997) (holding that Illinois would apply the federal remoteness approach to a claim under state antitrust laws), and, as we have observed, the Illinois Brick doctrine is only one of several obstacles to insurers' recovery on an antitrust claim.”
In Re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 295 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2003). “740 ILCS 10/7(2). But in other respects Illinois antitrust law uses the federal approach, see O'Regan v.”
Bueker v. Madison Cnty., IL, 2016 IL App (5th) 150282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “740 ILCS 10/7(2) (West 2012). The defendants argue that in certifying the class, the circuit court failed to account for the fact that in the years before and after the alleged conspiracy, a significant percentage of the delinquent taxes sold at the Madison County tax auctions…”
In Re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 610 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D. Pa. 2009). “While Illinois Brick does not preempt state antitrust law, some states, including Illinois, have followed the Supreme Court’s lead in denying indirect purchasers standing to bring antitrust claims. Because indirect purchasers do not have standing to bring antitrust claims, these…”
Show all 21 citing cases →
— 740 ILCS 10/7(2) — 17 cases
In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772 (E.D. Ill. 2017). “See 740 ILCS 10/7(2). On this basis, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim under Illinois's antitrust statute must be dismissed.”
Yang v. City of Chicago, 745 N.E.2d 541 (Ill. 2001). “2(c) (West 1998); 735 ILCS 5/2 — 203(c) (West 1998); 740 ILCS 10/7(2) (West 1998); 740 ILCS 110/15 (West 1998); 745 ILCS 70/12 (West 1998); 775 ILCS 5/8B — 104 (West 1998); 815 ILCS 505/2W (West 1998); 815 ILCS 602/5 — 120 (West 1998); 815 ILCS 605/11 (West 1998); 815 ILCS…”
Cnty. of Cook v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “The plaintiffs contend that they have standing under both the Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/7, 11a (West 1996)) and the Illinois Antitrust Act (Antitrust Act) (740 ILCS 10/7(2) (West 1996)). Therefore, the remoteness analysis does not apply to them.”
In re Propranolol Antitrust Litig., 249 F. Supp. 3d 712 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). “with the sole exception of this State’s Attorney General,” 740 ILCS 10/7(2), it is “not obvious that the formulaic expression ‘in any court of this State’ appearing in an Illinois statute applies to a federal court in [New York].”
City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 730 (E.D. Ill. 2019). “Illinois Defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot bring their claims under the Illinois Antitrust Act because, while it allows for recovery by indirect purchasers, it provides that "no person shall be authorized to maintain a class action in any court of this State for indirect…”
— 740 ILCS 10/7(4) — 1 case
Paulson v. Cnty. of De Kalb, 644 N.E.2d 37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). “60—7(2) (now 740 ILCS 10/7(2) (West 1992))) are punitive, the State may not maintain both an action for treble damages under section 7(2) and an action for civil penalties under section 7(4) (Ill.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.