ILCS » Chapter 740 · Act 45
Illinois Compiled Statutes

740 ILCS 45/10.1 (2026)

Award of compensation

✓ current as of May 2026
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(740 ILCS 45/10.1) (from Ch. 70, par. 80.1)
    Sec. 10.1. Award of compensation. The awarding of compensation and the amount of compensation to which an applicant and other persons are entitled shall be based on the following factors:
        (a) Each victim may be compensated for his or her
    
pecuniary loss up to the maximum amount allowable.
        (b) Each dependent may be compensated for loss of
    
support, as provided in paragraph (15) of subsection (h) of Section 2.
        (c) Any person, even though not dependent upon the
    
victim for his or her support, may be compensated for reasonable expenses of the victim to the extent to which he or she has paid or become obligated to pay such expenses and only after compensation for reasonable funeral, medical and hospital expenses of the victim have been awarded may compensation be made for reasonable expenses of the victim incurred for psychological treatment of a mental or emotional condition caused or aggravated by the crime. Persons that have paid or become obligated to pay expenses for a victim shall share the maximum award with the amount divided in proportion to the amount of the actual loss among those entitled to compensation.
        (d) Except for claims listed under subsection (d-1)
    
of this Section, an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim's injury or death was caused by provocation or incitement by the victim or the victim assisting, attempting, or committing a criminal act.
        (d-1) For claims that a law enforcement officer's use
    
of force resulted in injury or death to a victim, an award shall be reduced or denied to the extent by which the victim's behavior posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the law enforcement officer or another person and such behavior of the victim was a direct and proximate cause of the victim's injury or death. If a police report has been made, the police report shall not be the sole factor if the Attorney General or Court of Claims has identified reliable information that conflicts with the police report.
        (d-2) A person who is criminally responsible for the
    
crime upon which a claim is based or an accomplice of such person shall not be eligible to receive an award with respect to such claim. A member of the family of a person criminally responsible for the crime upon which a claim is based or a member of the family of an accomplice of such person shall be eligible to receive an award, unless the person criminally responsible will receive substantial economic benefit or unjust enrichment from the compensation. In no event shall an applicant be denied compensation solely because of the applicant's or the victim's familial relationship with the offender or because of the sharing of a dwelling by the victim or applicant and the offender.
        (d-3) A denial or reduction shall not automatically
    
bar the survivors of homicide victims from receiving compensation for counseling, crime scene cleanup, relocation, funeral or burial costs, and loss of support.
        (e) An award shall be reduced by the amount of
    
benefits, payments or awards payable under those sources which are required to be listed under item (7) of Section 7.1(a) and any other sources except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant, which the applicant or any other person dependent for the support of a deceased victim, as the case may be, has received or to which he or she is entitled as a result of injury to or death of the victim.
        (f) A final award shall not exceed $10,000 for a
    
crime committed prior to September 22, 1979, $15,000 for a crime committed on or after September 22, 1979 and prior to January 1, 1986, $25,000 for a crime committed on or after January 1, 1986 and prior to August 7, 1998, $27,000 for a crime committed on or after August 7, 1998 and prior to August 7, 2022, or $45,000 per victim for a crime committed on or after August 7, 2022. For any applicant who is not a victim, if the total pecuniary loss is greater than the maximum amount allowed, the award shall be divided in proportion to the amount of actual loss among those entitled to compensation who are not victims.
        (g) Compensation under this Act is a secondary source
    
of compensation and the applicant must show that he or she has exhausted the benefits reasonably available under the Criminal Victims' Escrow Account Act or any governmental or medical or health insurance programs, including, but not limited to, Workers' Compensation, the Federal Medicare program, the State Public Aid program, Social Security Administration burial benefits, and Veterans Administration burial benefits, and life, health, accident, full vehicle coverage (including towing insurance, if available), or liability insurance. Crowdfunding resources available to applicants are not considered collateral sources of payment, regardless of any statements made about what expenses the crowdfunding resources will be used to pay.
(Source: P.A. 102-27, eff. 1-1-22; 102-905, eff. 1-1-23; 103-564, eff. 11-17-23; 103-1037, eff. 1-1-25.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 1994–2000 · leading case: Armstrong v. State, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 657 (1996).
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In re Cherrington, 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 615 (1994). “” 740 ILCS 45/10.1(g). The Crime Victims Compensation Act further states: “Where compensation is awarded under this Act and the person receiving same also receives any sum required to be, and that has not been deducted under Section 10.”
Armstrong v. State, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 657 (1996). “The victims conduct and his membership in a gang provoked and contributed to his own death and, therefore, the claim will be denied under 740 ILCS 45/10.1(d), which states that an award may be denied where the decedent provoked and contributed to his own death.”
In re Lopez, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 616 (1996). “” 740 ILCS 45/10.1(g). The Act further states “where compensation is awarded under this Act and the person receiving same also receives any sum required to be, and that has not been deducted under Section 10.”
In re Bueno, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 636 (1995). “(740 ILCS 45/10.1(c) (1992).) The Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) indicated that Ms.”
In re Armstrong, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 600 (1996). “1(d) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/10.1(d)), which states that an award may be denied where the decedent provoked and contributed to his own death.”
In re Fadragas, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 565 (1999). “While pensions are specifically excluded as a source which would reduce the amount of benefits (740 ILCS 45/10.1(e)), Claimant has not proven the amount of pension loss, if any, by a preponderance of the evidence.”
In re Snow, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 569 (1995). “1(g) of the Act (740 ILCS 45/10.1(g)) which requires applicants to exhaust, and to prove that they have exhausted, alternatively available benefits for the claimed losses, including public aid: “(g) compensation under this Act is a secondary source of compensation and the…”
In re Anderson, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 629 (2000). “1(d) of the Act (740 ILCS 45/10.1(d)), that the victim’s conduct contributed to his death to such an extent that the claim should be denied.”
— 740 ILCS 45/10.1(c) — 1 case
In re Bueno, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 636 (1995). “(740 ILCS 45/10.1(c) (1992).) The Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) indicated that Ms.”
— 740 ILCS 45/10.1(d) — 3 cases
Armstrong v. State, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 657 (1996). “The victims conduct and his membership in a gang provoked and contributed to his own death and, therefore, the claim will be denied under 740 ILCS 45/10.1(d), which states that an award may be denied where the decedent provoked and contributed to his own death.”
In re Armstrong, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 600 (1996). “1(d) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/10.1(d)), which states that an award may be denied where the decedent provoked and contributed to his own death.”
In re Anderson, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 629 (2000). “1(d) of the Act (740 ILCS 45/10.1(d)), that the victim’s conduct contributed to his death to such an extent that the claim should be denied.”
— 740 ILCS 45/10.1(e) — 1 case
In re Fadragas, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 565 (1999). “While pensions are specifically excluded as a source which would reduce the amount of benefits (740 ILCS 45/10.1(e)), Claimant has not proven the amount of pension loss, if any, by a preponderance of the evidence.”
— 740 ILCS 45/10.1(g) — 3 cases
In re Cherrington, 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 615 (1994). “” 740 ILCS 45/10.1(g). The Crime Victims Compensation Act further states: “Where compensation is awarded under this Act and the person receiving same also receives any sum required to be, and that has not been deducted under Section 10.”
In re Lopez, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 616 (1996). “” 740 ILCS 45/10.1(g). The Act further states “where compensation is awarded under this Act and the person receiving same also receives any sum required to be, and that has not been deducted under Section 10.”
In re Snow, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 569 (1995). “1(g) of the Act (740 ILCS 45/10.1(g)) which requires applicants to exhaust, and to prove that they have exhausted, alternatively available benefits for the claimed losses, including public aid: “(g) compensation under this Act is a secondary source of compensation and the…”
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