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Illinois Compiled Statutes

750 ILCS 60/220 (2026)

Duration and extension of orders

✓ current as of May 2026
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(750 ILCS 60/220) (from Ch. 40, par. 2312-20)
    Sec. 220. Duration and extension of orders.
    (a) Duration of emergency and interim orders. Unless re-opened or extended or voided by entry of an order of greater duration:
        (1) Emergency orders issued under Section 217 shall
    
be effective for not less than 14 nor more than 21 days;
        (2) Interim orders shall be effective for up to 30
    
days.
    (b) Duration of plenary orders.
        (0.05) A plenary order of protection entered under
    
this Act shall be valid for a fixed period of time, not to exceed two years.
        (1) A plenary order of protection entered in
    
conjunction with another civil proceeding shall remain in effect as follows:
            (i) if entered as preliminary relief in that
        
other proceeding, until entry of final judgment in that other proceeding;
            (ii) if incorporated into the final judgment in
        
that other proceeding, until the order of protection is vacated or modified; or
            (iii) if incorporated in an order for involuntary
        
commitment, until termination of both the involuntary commitment and any voluntary commitment, or for a fixed period of time not exceeding 2 years.
        (2) Duration of an order of protection entered in
    
conjunction with a criminal prosecution or delinquency petition shall remain in effect as provided in Section 112A-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
    (c) Computation of time. The duration of an order of protection shall not be reduced by the duration of any prior order of protection.
    (d) Law enforcement records. When a plenary order of protection expires upon the occurrence of a specified event, rather than upon a specified date as provided in subsection (b), no expiration date shall be entered in Illinois State Police records. To remove the plenary order from those records, either party shall request the clerk of the court to file a certified copy of an order stating that the specified event has occurred or that the plenary order has been vacated or modified with the Sheriff, and the Sheriff shall direct that law enforcement records shall be promptly corrected in accordance with the filed order.
    (e) Extension of orders. Any emergency, interim or plenary order may be extended one or more times, as required, provided that the requirements of Section 217, 218 or 219, as appropriate, are satisfied. If the motion for extension is uncontested and petitioner seeks no modification of the order, the order may be extended on the basis of petitioner's motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension. An extension of a plenary order of protection may be granted, upon good cause shown, to remain in effect until the order of protection is vacated or modified. Extensions may be granted only in open court and not under the provisions of subsection (c) of Section 217, which applies only when the court is unavailable at the close of business or on a court holiday.
    (f) Termination date. Any order of protection which would expire on a court holiday shall instead expire at the close of the next court business day.
    (g) Statement of purpose. The practice of dismissing or suspending a criminal prosecution in exchange for the issuance of an order of protection undermines the purposes of this Act. This Section shall not be construed as encouraging that practice.
(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 32 cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1996–2025 · leading case: Graham v. Van Rengen, 2024 IL App (2d) 230611 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).
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Graham v. Van Rengen, 2024 IL App (2d) 230611 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024). · cites it 8× “During debate on the bill, Representative William Davis, the sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives, noted that there had been various news stories in which victims of domestic violence had been murdered.”
Stapp v. Jansen, 2013 IL App (4th) 120513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). · cites it 2× “Pursuant to 750 ILCS 60/220(e), the court finds that the petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has made multiple attempts to contact her while the Plenary Order of Protection has been in effect; that said attempt[s] at contacts have been in…”
Peck v. Otten, 768 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 2× “750 ILCS 60/220 (West 2000). When a court does not state a termination date, the order automatically expires in two years.”
Goodman v. Goodman, 2023 IL App (2d) 220086 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). “Goodman II, 2020 IL App (2d) 200289-U, ¶ 46 (quoting 750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 2018)). We held that there was no evidence to support a finding of good cause, such as continued hostility or harassment.”
A.A. v. Nita A., 2023 IL App (1st) 230011 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). “See 750 ILCS 60/220(b)(0.05) (West 2020). -6- No.”
In re Marriage of Goodman, 2020 IL App (2d) 200289-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 7× “However, it was continued for six months after petitioner filed, on August 29, 2019, a motion to extend the plenary order of protection pursuant to section 220(e) of the Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 2018)). In the motion to extend, petitioner reiterated the…”
Lutz v. Lutz, 728 N.E.2d 1234 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “Section 220(e) of the Act (750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 1998)) provides a plenary order of protection may be extended on the basis of petitioner’s motion or affidavit stating no material change in circumstance has occurred since the entry of the order.”
People v. Cuevas, 862 N.E.2d 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). · cites it 2× “750 ILCS 60/220(b)(2)(iii) (West 2004). Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 364 days' periodic imprisonment and 30 months' probation, entered a no-contact *637 order as a condition of his sentence, and entered an order of protection on behalf of the victim.”
Sanchez v. Torres, 2016 IL App (1st) 151189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “750 ILCS 60/220(a), (b) (West 2012). -5- 1-15-1189 ¶ 18 Trial Court’s Findings of Abuse ¶ 19 In any proceeding to obtain an order of protection, the inquiry centers on whether the petitioner has been abused.”
Wood v. Wood, 672 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). “” A plenary order of protection may endure at most for two years (750 ILCS 60/220(b) (West 1994)), and Victor and Emily’s concern about rent is legitimate.”
Koshinski v. Trame, 2017 IL App (5th) 150398 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “” 750 ILCS 60/220(a)(1) (West 2014). For emergency and interim orders of protection, the respondent may petition the court to reopen the order upon two days’ notice to the petitioner.”
Creaser v. Creaser, 794 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “Since an emergency order of protection cannot last for more than 21 days (750 ILCS 60/220 (West 2002)), insufficient time for an ordinary appeal to this court, there is no opportunity to review the standards for issuance of an emergency order, except under an exception to the…”
Show all 32 citing cases →
— 750 ILCS 60/220(a) — 1 case
Sanchez v. Torres, 2016 IL App (1st) 151189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “750 ILCS 60/220(a), (b) (West 2012). -5- 1-15-1189 ¶ 18 Trial Court’s Findings of Abuse ¶ 19 In any proceeding to obtain an order of protection, the inquiry centers on whether the petitioner has been abused.”
— 750 ILCS 60/220(a)(1) — 9 cases
Koshinski v. Trame, 2017 IL App (5th) 150398 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “” 750 ILCS 60/220(a)(1) (West 2014). For emergency and interim orders of protection, the respondent may petition the court to reopen the order upon two days’ notice to the petitioner.”
In re A.M., 2013 IL App (3d) 120809 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
People v. Brzowski, 2015 IL App (3d) 120376 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
People v. Brzowski, 2015 IL App (3d) 120376 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
Sandberg v. Brian B., 2018 IL App (2d) 180082 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
— 750 ILCS 60/220(a)(2) — 1 case
Hendrix v. Truelove, 2021 IL App (4th) 200441-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 750 ILCS 60/220(b) — 10 cases
A.A. v. Nita A., 2023 IL App (1st) 230011 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). “See 750 ILCS 60/220(b)(0.05) (West 2020). -6- No.”
Graham v. Van Rengen, 2024 IL App (2d) 230611 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024). “During debate on the bill, Representative William Davis, the sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives, noted that there had been various news stories in which victims of domestic violence had been murdered.”
Wood v. Wood, 672 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). “” A plenary order of protection may endure at most for two years (750 ILCS 60/220(b) (West 1994)), and Victor and Emily’s concern about rent is legitimate.”
Kaire v. Murphy, 2025 IL App (3d) 240329-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2025).
People v. Derossett, 2022 IL App (5th) 200018-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 750 ILCS 60/220(b)(2) — 2 cases
People v. Derossett, 2022 IL App (5th) 200018-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
People v. Derossett, 2022 IL App (5th) 200019-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 750 ILCS 60/220(b)(2)(iii) — 1 case
People v. Cuevas, 862 N.E.2d 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). “750 ILCS 60/220(b)(2)(iii) (West 2004). Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 364 days' periodic imprisonment and 30 months' probation, entered a no-contact *637 order as a condition of his sentence, and entered an order of protection on behalf of the victim.”
— 750 ILCS 60/220(e) — 10 cases
Graham v. Van Rengen, 2024 IL App (2d) 230611 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024). “During debate on the bill, Representative William Davis, the sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives, noted that there had been various news stories in which victims of domestic violence had been murdered.”
Stapp v. Jansen, 2013 IL App (4th) 120513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). “Pursuant to 750 ILCS 60/220(e), the court finds that the petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has made multiple attempts to contact her while the Plenary Order of Protection has been in effect; that said attempt[s] at contacts have been in…”
Goodman v. Goodman, 2023 IL App (2d) 220086 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). “Goodman II, 2020 IL App (2d) 200289-U, ¶ 46 (quoting 750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 2018)). We held that there was no evidence to support a finding of good cause, such as continued hostility or harassment.”
In re Marriage of Goodman, 2020 IL App (2d) 200289-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “However, it was continued for six months after petitioner filed, on August 29, 2019, a motion to extend the plenary order of protection pursuant to section 220(e) of the Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 2018)). In the motion to extend, petitioner reiterated the…”
Lutz v. Lutz, 728 N.E.2d 1234 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “Section 220(e) of the Act (750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 1998)) provides a plenary order of protection may be extended on the basis of petitioner’s motion or affidavit stating no material change in circumstance has occurred since the entry of the order.”
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