Railroad property rights which are extinguished upon cessation of service by the railroad
divest when the department of transportation or the railroad, having obtained authority to
abandon the rail line, removes the track materials to the right-of-way. If the department of
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Tue Dec 09 22:15:06 2025 Iowa Code 2026, Chapter 327G (33, 0)
§327G.76, RAILROAD RIGHTS-OF-WAY, CROSSINGS, TRACKS, AND FENCING 10\n\ntransportation does not acquire the line and the railway company does not remove the track
materials, the property rights which are extinguished upon cessation of service by the railroad
divest one year after the railway obtains the final authorization necessary from the proper
authority to remove the track materials.
[C24, 27, 31, 35, 39, §7861; C46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 66, 71, 73, 75, §473.1; C77, 79, 81, §327G.76]
83 Acts, ch 121, §5; 2009 Acts, ch 97, §10
Referred to in §327G.77
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Notes of Decisions
Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
· cites it 2× “See Iowa Code § 327G.76 (2020); Caquelin III, 140 Fed.”
McClurg Fam. Farm, LLC v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 1 (Fed. Cl. 2014).
· cites it 4× “at 229-31 , that certain deeded easements were limited to railroad purposes and, therefore, subject to Iowa Code § 327G.76. *8 [[Image here]] *9 [[Image here]] *10 [[Image here]] In Burgess, a number of the “right-of-way” deeds indicated that the property owner granted the…”
Burgess v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 223 (Fed. Cl. 2013).
· cites it 2× “7 Defendant also agrees that under Iowa Code § 327G.76, 8 these easements extinguished due to non-use before the NITU in question was issued, making defendant liable for a takings.”
Jenkins v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 598 (Fed. Cl. 2011).
“Iowa Code § 327G.76 and 327G.77 govern the abandonment and reversion of rail corridor right-of-ways.”
Butler v. Hoover Nature Trail, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
“Hoover Nature Trail also argues the tax deed is superior to the Butler’s claim to the right-of-way in section 18 since no original deed exists.”
MacErich Real Est. Co. v. City of Ames, 433 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 1988).
“76 to provide for extinguishment upon cessation of service. We are led to that understanding not only by the language of section 327G.”
Est. of Rockafellow v. Lihs, 494 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).
“Iowa Code § 327G.76, .77 (1991). The deed expressly limits the easement to railroad purposes.”
McClurg Fam. Farm, LLC. v. United States (Fed. Cl. 2014).
· cites it 5× “at 229-31 , that certain deeded easements were limited to railroad purposes and, therefore, subject to Iowa Code § 327G.76. Claimant Name Claim Source The Estate of Theodore Pranger; Loreen J.”
Louis A. Burgess v. United States (Fed. Cl. 2013).
· cites it 2× “7 Defendant also agrees that under Iowa Code § 327G.76,8 6 In several instances, the parcels in these categories will be identified in a chart that lists the name(s) of the claimant(s), as well as the claim identifier that the parties have assigned to the claim in their class…”
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