History:
L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3202; Repealed, L. 2010, ch. 136, § 307; July 1, 2011.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Test of "willful conduct" discussed; civil penalties case does not require more stringent standard than criminal case. State ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, 536, 646 P.2d 1091 (1982).
3. Accused's lack of knowledge of victim's age is no defense to crime. State v. Fore, 17 Kan. App. 2d 703, 705, 843 P.2d 292 (1992).
4. Trial court refusal to give jury instruction on ignorance of mistake or fact upheld. State v. Neighbors, 21 Kan. App. 2d 824, 831, 908 P.2d 649 (1995).
5. Failure to instruct on general criminal intent in aggravated indecent liberties (K.S.A. 21-3504) case not clearly erroneous. State v. Isley, 262 Kan. 281, 292, 936 P.2d 275 (1997).
6. Defendant bartender guilty of selling cereal malt beverage to person underage although patron's ID was checked but misread by a third party; general criminal intent crime. State v. Pendleton, 26 Kan. App. 2d 565, 567, 990 P.2d 1241 (1999).
State v. Butler, 416 P.3d 116 (Kan. 2018). “Proof of willful conduct shall be required to establish criminal intent, unless the statute defining the crime expressly provides that the prohibited act is criminal if done in a wanton manner.”
United States v. Wilson, 66 M.J. 39 (C.A.A.F. 2008). · cites it 2ד021 (West 2007); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3202 (2007); La. Rev.”
State Ex Rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 646 P.2d 1091 (Kan. 1982). · cites it 2ד) Moreover, proof of `criminal intent' does not require proof of knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the statute under which the accused is prosecuted, or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that statute.”
State v. Neighbors, 908 P.2d 649 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 4ד” The cross-reference to K.S.A. 21-3202 is particularly important in this case, because the latter statute provides: “Proof of criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the statute under which the accused is prosecuted, or the…”
State v. Burhans, 89 P.3d 629 (Kan. 2004). · cites it 2דmatter of either fact or law, except as provided in section 21-3202, is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the crime.”
State v. Fore, 843 P.2d 292 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 6דSuffice it to say that K.S.A. 21-3202 expressly bars lack of knowledge about a minor’s age as a defense to the crimes charged.”
State v. Jones, 276 P.3d 804 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 4ד" This instruction mirrors the language of K.S.A. 21-3202(1). Jones was charged under K.”
State v. Robinson, 718 P.2d 1313 (Kan. 1986). · cites it 2ד21-3201 states that except as provided in K.S.A. 21-3202, 21-3204 and 21-3405, criminal intent is an essential element of every crime defined by the code.”
State v. Dubish, 675 P.2d 877 (Kan. 1984). “21-3201 states that except as provided by sections 21-3202, 21-3204 and 21-3405, a criminal intent is an essential element of *717 every crime defined by the Kansas Criminal Code.”
State v. Lewis, 953 P.2d 1016 (Kan. 1998). “K.S.A. 21-3202(2). The defendant further argues that the Kansas Criminal Code authorizes strict liability only “if the crime is a misdemeanor or traffic infraction” and the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose *849 to impose absolute liability.”
State v. Cantrell, 673 P.2d 1147 (Kan. 1983). “21-3201(1) states: “Except as provided by sections 21-3202, 21-3204, and 21-3405, a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime defined by this code.”
State v. Sterling, 680 P.2d 301 (Kan. 1984). “(1) Except as provided by sections 21-3202, 21-3204, and 21-3405, a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime defined by this code.”
State Ex Rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 646 P.2d 1091 (Kan. 1982). “) Moreover, proof of `criminal intent' does not require proof of knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the statute under which the accused is prosecuted, or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that statute.”
State v. Jones, 276 P.3d 804 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). “" This instruction mirrors the language of K.S.A. 21-3202(1). Jones was charged under K.”
— K.S.A. § 21-3202(2) — 9 cases
State v. Lewis, 953 P.2d 1016 (Kan. 1998). “K.S.A. 21-3202(2). The defendant further argues that the Kansas Criminal Code authorizes strict liability only “if the crime is a misdemeanor or traffic infraction” and the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose *849 to impose absolute liability.”
State v. Fore, 843 P.2d 292 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). “Suffice it to say that K.S.A. 21-3202 expressly bars lack of knowledge about a minor’s age as a defense to the crimes charged.”
State v. Robinson, 718 P.2d 1313 (Kan. 1986). “21-3201 states that except as provided in K.S.A. 21-3202, 21-3204 and 21-3405, criminal intent is an essential element of every crime defined by the code.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.