History:
L. 1992, ch. 21, § 1; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 158; L. 1994, ch. 348, § 17; L. 1996, ch. 30, § 4; L. 1996, ch. 258, § 9; Repealed, L. 2010, ch. 136, § 307; July 1, 2011.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Conviction under section does not require persons inside building be put in immediate apprehension of bodily harm. State v. Caldwell, 21 Kan. App. 2d 466, 469, 901 P.2d 35 (1995).
2. Criminal discharge of a firearm does not merge with homicide for felony-murder purposes. State v. Alderson, 260 Kan. 445, 455, 459, 922 P.2d 435 (1996).
3. Offense hereunder does not merge with homicide; double jeopardy not violated by conviction and punishment for both. State v. Sims, 262 Kan. 165, 171, 936 P.2d 779 (1997).
4. When defendant charged in drive-by shooting may be convicted of aggravated assault and criminal discharge of firearm examined. State v. Taylor, 25 Kan. App. 2d 407, 415, 416, 965 P.2d 834 (1998).
5. Offenses did not merge; felony murder charge was proper based upon criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, an inherently dangerous felony. State v. Rayton, 268 Kan. 711, 1 P.3d 854 (2000).
6. No error in admitting defendant's pretrial statement nor in imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Ramos, 271 Kan. 520, 24 P.3d 95 (2001).
7. Convictions of aggravated assault and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle are not multiplicitous; but separate convictions for each occupant are multiplicitous. State v. Gomez, 36 Kan. App. 2d 664, 673, 675, 143 P.3d 92 (2006).
8. Section cited in court rejecting defendant's multiplicity argument; court not required to give requested additional jury instruction. State v. Conway, 284 Kan. 37, 53, 55, 56, 159 P.3d 917 (2007).
9. Felony murder and criminal discharge of a firearm are intended to be separate offenses; cumulative punishments authorized. State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541, 546, 547, 556, 175 P.3d 221 (2008).
10. Conviction hereunder; case involved upward departure sentence from presumptive probation sentence; sentencing upheld. State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 735, 737, 175 P.3d 832 (2008).
11. Discussed in felony murder case where K.S.A. 21-4219 was the underlying felony; discussion of availability of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329, 332, 337, 368, 184 P.3d 247 (2008).
12. Conviction for felony murder upheld even though defendant acquitted of underlying felony. State v. Herron, 286 Kan. 959, 964, 967, 189 P.3d 1173 (2008).
State v. Farmer, 175 P.3d 221 (Kan. 2008). · cites it 12דThus, the argument goes, the State has used the criminal discharge statute in a situation it was not intended to cover. Farmer also argues that "by [electing] to pursue this shooting as a drive-by shooting charge rather than aggravated battery or aggravated assault," the State…”
State v. Gomez, 143 P.3d 92 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 18ד21-4219 provides: “(a) Criminal discharge of a firearm at an unoccupied dwelling is the malicious, intentional and unauthorized discharge of any firearm at an unoccupied building. “Criminal discharge of a firearm at an unoccupied dwelling is a severity level 8, person felony.”
State v. Llamas, 311 P.3d 399 (Kan. 2013). · cites it 7ד21-3401(b) (defining first-degree murder to include felony murder); K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 21-3436(a)(15) (defining inherently dangerous felony, whether or not such felony is distinct from the homicide, to include felony violation of K.”
State v. Conway, 159 P.3d 917 (Kan. 2007). · cites it 8ד21-3436(a)(15) states that “any felony offense as provided in K.S.A. 21-4219, and amendments thereto”: “shall be deemed an inherently dangerous felony whether or not such felony is so distinct from the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (b) of K.”
State v. Jefferson, 310 P.3d 331 (Kan. 2013). · cites it 7ד” K.S.A. 21-4219(b). The State charged Jefferson with a severity level 3 person felony based on the fact that the crime resulted in great bodily harm to Jackson.”
State v. Walker, 153 P.3d 1257 (Kan. 2007). · cites it 3ד21-3436(a)(15) provides that any felony offense provided for in K.S.A. 21-4219 and amendments thereto “shall be deemed an inherently dangerous felony whether or not such felony is so distinct from the homicide alleged to be a violation of’ the felony-murder statute.”
United States v. Ford, 613 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2010). · cites it 3דFord challenges the district court’s finding that one of his prior convictions qualifies as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA: his 1997 Kansas conviction for criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling or occupied vehicle, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4219 (b)…”
State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435 (Kan. 1996). · cites it 4דThe underlying felony was criminal discharge of a firearm pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4219. This statute provides: “(b) .”
State v. Pollman, 441 P.3d 511 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 16דK.S.A. 21-4219 prohibited criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, at an unoccupied dwelling, or at an occupied vehicle and categorized all three as person felonies.”
State v. Levy, 485 P.3d 605 (Kan. 2021). “" Compare K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 21-4219(b) (criminalizing "the malicious, intentional and unauthorized discharge of a firearm") with K.”
State v. Sims, 280 P.3d 780 (Kan. 2012). · cites it 3ד21-4219(b), which served as tire underlying felony for the felony-murder conviction, but that the complaint did not specify which subsection of *823 K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4219 applied for the felony-murder charge.”
State v. Sims, 960 P.2d 1271 (Kan. 1998). · cites it 3ד2d 435 (1996), where we pointed out that the legislature determined that criminal discharge of a firearm, K.S.A. 21-4219, does not merge with homicide, citing K.”
State v. Gomez, 143 P.3d 92 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). “21-4219 provides: “(a) Criminal discharge of a firearm at an unoccupied dwelling is the malicious, intentional and unauthorized discharge of any firearm at an unoccupied building. “Criminal discharge of a firearm at an unoccupied dwelling is a severity level 8, person felony.”
State v. Farmer, 175 P.3d 221 (Kan. 2008). “Thus, the argument goes, the State has used the criminal discharge statute in a situation it was not intended to cover. Farmer also argues that "by [electing] to pursue this shooting as a drive-by shooting charge rather than aggravated battery or aggravated assault," the State…”
State v. Llamas, 311 P.3d 399 (Kan. 2013). “21-3401(b) (defining first-degree murder to include felony murder); K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 21-3436(a)(15) (defining inherently dangerous felony, whether or not such felony is distinct from the homicide, to include felony violation of K.”
State v. Jefferson, 310 P.3d 331 (Kan. 2013). “” K.S.A. 21-4219(b). The State charged Jefferson with a severity level 3 person felony based on the fact that the crime resulted in great bodily harm to Jackson.”
State v. Gomez, 143 P.3d 92 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). “21-4219 provides: “(a) Criminal discharge of a firearm at an unoccupied dwelling is the malicious, intentional and unauthorized discharge of any firearm at an unoccupied building. “Criminal discharge of a firearm at an unoccupied dwelling is a severity level 8, person felony.”
State v. Conway, 159 P.3d 917 (Kan. 2007). “21-3436(a)(15) states that “any felony offense as provided in K.S.A. 21-4219, and amendments thereto”: “shall be deemed an inherently dangerous felony whether or not such felony is so distinct from the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (b) of K.”
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