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K.S.A.Chapter 84

K.S.A. § 84-3-104 (2026)

Negotiable instrument

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1971–2025 29citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 29 opinions since 1971, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (3 cases).

84-3-104. Negotiable instrument. (a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instrument" means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:

(1) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;

(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and

(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.

(b) "Instrument" means a negotiable instrument.

(c) An order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a), except paragraph (1), and otherwise falls within the definition of "check" in subsection (f) is a negotiable instrument and a check.

(d) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this article.

(e) An instrument is a "note" if it is a promise and is a "draft" if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both "note" and "draft," a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either.

(f) "Check" means (1) a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank, (2) a cashier's check or teller's check, or (3) a demand draft. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such as "money order."

(g) "Cashier's check" means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank.

(h) "Teller's check" means a draft drawn by a bank (1) on another bank, or (2) payable at or through a bank.

(i) "Traveler's check" means an instrument that (1) is payable on demand, (2) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank, (3) is designated by the term "traveler's check" or by a substantially similar term, and (4) requires, as a condition to payment, a countersignature by a person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument.

(j) "Certificate of deposit" means an instrument containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has been received by the bank and a promise by the bank to repay the sum of money. A certificate of deposit is a note of the bank.

(k) "Demand draft" means a writing not signed by a customer that is created by a third party under the purported authority of the customer for the purpose of charging the customer's account with a bank. A demand draft shall contain the customer's account number and may contain any or all of the following:

(1) The customer's printed or typewritten name.

(2) A notation that the customer authorized the draft.

(3) The statement "No Signature Required" or words to that effect. A demand draft shall not include a check purportedly drawn by and bearing the signature of a fiduciary, as defined in subsection (a)(1) of K.S.A. 84-3-307, and amendments thereto.

History: L. 1991, ch. 296, § 4; L. 2005, ch. 58, § 2; July 1.

KANSAS COMMENT, 1996

This important section sets forth the elements of a negotiable instrument. It defines the distinctions between "note," "draft," "check," and "certificate of deposit," the four most important types of negotiable instruments, and defines several other common ones. The elements of negotiability as set forth in this section are treated in detail in the sections which follow. The present section is derived from the former 84-3-104, 84-3-106, 84-3-112 and 84-3-118.

It should be emphasized that although negotiability is still alive and well with respect to checks; as to drafts and notes executed by commercial parties, negotiable notes arising out of consumer credit sales are forbidden by the Kansas Consumer Credit Code, K.S.A. 16a-3-307, under penalties provided by K.S.A. 16a-5-201. Moreover, the doctrine of negotiability is dead in consumer credit transactions because the Consumer Credit Code expressly precludes holder in due course status to any creditor. See K.S.A. 16a-3-403, 16a-3-404 and 16a-3-405 and Kansas Comments to those sections. The federal government has also done away with much of negotiability through the Federal Trade Commission regulations. See 16 C.F.R. Part 433.

Subsection a. This subsection defines a negotiable instrument. The basic requirements are that it be an unconditional order or promise to pay a fixed sum of money to a person or that person's transferee at a definite date or on demand. It is often said "a negotiable instrument is a courier without luggage," and very few other terms are permitted.

Subsection b. This section makes it clear that any reference in Article 3 to an "instrument" refers only to negotiable instruments which meet those requirements.

Subsections c through j. Subsection (c) comports with the normal understanding that checks are negotiable instruments, even if the negotiability language is omitted. For other instruments, subsection (d) permits the issuer to opt out of Article 3 (and generally prevent holder in due course status of transferees) by conspicuously denying negotiability. The definitions of "cashier's checks," "teller's checks" and "traveler's checks" are new.

Revisor's Note:

Former section 84-3-104 was repealed by L. 1991, ch. 296, § 111 and the number reassigned to the current text.

Attorney General's Opinions:

Certificate of deposit defined. 2006-10.

CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Cited; whether demand for payment on letter of credit was nonconforming relieving bank of obligation to pay examined. Brul v. MidAmerican Bank & Trust Co., 820 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (1993).

2. On certified question (K.S.A. 60-3201 et seq.) whether article 4 of Kansas U.C.C. applies to electronic fund transfers examined. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Sylvan State Bank, 254 Kan. 836, 843, 869 P.2d 675 (1994).

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 84-3-104 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSec. Bank & Trust Co. of Blackwell v. Case (In re George), 85 B.R. 133 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988).
cites § 84-3-104 5×subsections: (1) (1)(b)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“” On their face, “instrument,” “document” and “security” as defined in K.”
2
GREENArmy Nat'l Bank v. Equity Developers, Inc., 774 P.2d 919 (Kan. 1989).
cites § 84-3-104 2×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“84-9-105(l)(i) defines an instrument as: “[A] negotiable instrument (defined in K.S.A. 84-3-104 and amendments thereto), or a certificated security (defined in K.”
The case’s holding
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs priority of security interests in promissory notes and the mortgages that secure them, with perfection achieved by taking possession of the notes.
Later courts cite it for
“the court must determine if the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether they are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law.” · 3 citing courts
3
REDFed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Kan. 1985).
cites § 84-3-104 2×subsections: (1) (1)(d)cited by 15 cases
Reversed by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Jack Galloway (1988): the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“Under the Code, a holder in due course is a holder who takes an “instrument.”
Later courts cite it for
“galloway's partial payments on the note did not toll the statute of limitations as to this guaranty agreement.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENBank IV Topeka, N.A. v. Topeka Bank & Trust Co., 807 P.2d 686 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 84-3-104 2×subsections: (1)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“84-9-105(1)(i) defines the term “instrument” as follows: “ ‘Instrument’ means a negotiable instrument (defined in K.S.A. 84-3-104 and amendments thereto), or a certificated security (defined in K.”
Later courts cite it for
“that, given careful thought, most professionals would not desire to trade in an instrument that is marked nontransferable.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Foster, 312 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2013).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“Moreover, the UCC’s definition of “negotiable instrument” applies only to “an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money” and requires some veiy specific conditions.”
Later courts cite it for
“alternative means are legislatively determined, distinct, material elements of a crime, as opposed to legislative descriptions of the material elements or of the factual circumstances that would prove the crime.” · 5 citing courts
6
GREENHospicomm, Inc. v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 338 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“at 680-81 (citing K.S.A. 84-3-104). The court went on to recognize that the 1990 statute adopting that definition' identified the writings that complied with the section to include drafts, checks, certificates of deposit, and notes.”
Later courts cite it for
“article 4 does not contemplate electronic -withdrawals” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENSinclair Oil Corp. v. Sylvan State Bank, 869 P.2d 675 (Kan. 1994).
cites § 84-3-104 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“Article 4 now incorporates the K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 84-3-104 definition of “instrument,” K.”
8
GREENIBP, Inc. v. Mercantile Bank of Topeka, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (D. Kan. 1998).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“See K.S.A. 84-3-104(a, f). Moreover, as noted above, Mercantile exercised the requisite good faith and ordinary care in honoring the check.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is well established, however, that a party cannot rely on unauthenticated documents to avoid summary judgment.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENHalpin v. Frankenberger, 644 P.2d 452 (Kan. 1982).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he has a right of recourse.” Halpin was not a party to the Frankenberger guaranty agreement and it was not an “instrument” as that term is defined in the *349 U.”
Later courts cite it for
“a surety or guarantor, on paying the debt of the principal, is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor in all or any of the securities, means or remedies which the creditor has for enforcing payment against the principal debtor or against other sureties or guarantors.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENMartinez v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc. (In re Martinez), 455 B.R. 755 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 , 1546 (10th Cir.”
11
GREENGregoire v. Lowndes Bank, 342 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1986).
cites § 84-3-104 1×subsections: (1)(b)cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“To be “negotiable,” an instrument “must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money_” K.S.A. 84-3-104(l)(b) (emphasis added)_ [A] guaranty is by its very nature a conditional promise to pay.”
12
GREENIn re Dvorak, 176 B.R. 929 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“K.S.A. 84-3-104. An indemnity agreement fails this definition in several respects.”
13
GREENState v. PIERCE, 490 P.2d 584 (Kan. 1971).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“" By definition a check is a negotiable instrument and therefore creates a pecuniary obligation upon the maker and renders to the payee an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money which is a benefit to the payee (K.S.A. 84-3-104). Although the common law rule was…”
14
GREENBrul v. MidAmerican Bank & Trust Co., 820 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Kan. 1993).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“See K.S.A. 84-3-104 (Supp.1992). If not required to return the original promissory note, the plaintiffs could negotiate it to a third party for value and thus receive more than they might be due under the note while potentially subjecting Mr.”
15
GREENThomson McKinnon Sec., Inc. v. Hiegel (In re Hiegel), 117 B.R. 655 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1990).
cites § 84-3-104 1×subsections: (2)(b)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“This Court finds that the debtors’ payments of their monthly bills for July and additional mortgage payments on the eve of filing their petition, falls within the scope of pre-bankruptcy planning.”
Later courts cite it for
“the purpose of section 727(a)(4)(a) is to allow creditors to have adequate information of the debtor's estate without the need for an examination or investigation to determine if the statements are correct.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENFarm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Carmody, 88 P.3d 1250 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“” See K.S.A. 84-3-104. Even Farm Bureau acknowledges that when the checks were deposited, a creditor/debtor relationship was created between the account holder and the bank.”
17
GREENState v. Dickens, 757 P.2d 321 (Kan. 1988).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“K.S.A. 84-3-104. It is an order to pay a sum certain in money.”
18
GREENFed. Deposit Ins. v. Cent. Air Control, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 898 (D. Kan. 1992).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“1 The six promissory notes are instruments under K.S.A. 84-3-104 and FDIC is a holder under K.”
19
GREENSaloga v. Cent. Kansas Credit Union, 783 P.2d 339 (Kan. 1989).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“See K.S.A. 84-3-104. .There is no specific statement in the UCC that the issuing financial institution may not be held to constructive notice when canceling an instrument.”
20
NEUTRALBank of Am., N.A. v. Inda, 303 P.3d 696 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 84-3-104 1×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 84-3-104
“K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 84-3-104. Under K.S.A. 84-3-301, a person entitled to enforce an instrument can be any of the following: “(a) the holder of tire instrument, (b) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (c) a person not in possession of the…”
Later courts cite it for
“in order to grant summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action, the trial court must find undisputed evidence in the record that the defendant signed a promissory note secured by a mortgage, that the plaintiff is the valid holder of the note and the mortgage, and that the defendant has defaulted on the note.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197119982025

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1994. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Kan.8D. Kan.8Kan. Ct. App.6Bankr. D. Kan.410th Cir.1E.D. Pa.1W. Va.1
By subsection
(1)3 cases
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Kan. 1985).“Under the Code, a holder in due course is a holder who takes an “instrument.”
Bank IV Topeka, N.A. v. Topeka Bank & Trust Co., 807 P.2d 686 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).“84-9-105(1)(i) defines the term “instrument” as follows: “ ‘Instrument’ means a negotiable instrument (defined in K.S.A. 84-3-104 and amendments thereto), or a certificated security (defined in K.”
Sec. Bank & Trust Co. of Blackwell v. Case (In re George), 85 B.R. 133 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988).“” On their face, “instrument,” “document” and “security” as defined in K.”
(1)(b)2 cases
Gregoire v. Lowndes Bank, 342 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1986).“To be “negotiable,” an instrument “must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money_” K.S.A. 84-3-104(l)(b) (emphasis added)_ [A] guaranty is by its very nature a conditional promise to pay.”
(1)(d)1 case
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Kan. 1985).
(2)(b)2 cases
Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc. v. Hiegel (In re Hiegel), 117 B.R. 655 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1990).“This Court finds that the debtors’ payments of their monthly bills for July and additional mortgage payments on the eve of filing their petition, falls within the scope of pre-bankruptcy planning.”
State v. Montgomery, 796 P.2d 559 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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