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K.S.A.Chapter 84

K.S.A. § 84-9-501 (2026)

Filing office

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1975–2023 27citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 27 opinions since 1975, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (4 cases).

84-9-501. Filing office. (a) Filing offices. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), if the law of this state governs perfection of a security interest or agricultural lien, the office in which to file a financing statement to perfect the security interest or agricultural lien is: (1) The office designated for the filing or recording of a record of a mortgage on the related real property, if:

(A) The collateral is as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut; or

(B) the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing and the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures; or

(2) the office of the secretary of state, in all other cases, including a case in which the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures and the financing statement is not filed as a fixture filing.

(b) Filing office for transmitting utilities. The office in which to file a financing statement to perfect a security interest in collateral, including fixtures, of a transmitting utility is the office of the secretary of state. The financing statement also constitutes a fixture filing as to the collateral indicated in the financing statement which is or is to become fixtures.

History: L. 2000, ch. 142, § 72; July 1, 2001.

KANSAS COMMENT, 1996

This section, which does not vary from the 1995 Official Text, has not been amended since 1972.

Subsection (1). The subsection gives the secured party the rights provided under Part 5 (84-9-501 through 84-9-507) and, except as limited by subsection (3), those provided in the security agreement. Thus, the creditor and debtor are given great latitude and need to take care in defining "default" in the security agreement. Default is not a defined term in the Uniform Commercial Code, so without definition "default" would include only failure to pay. Other events, such as failure to insure the collateral, refusal to allow inspection of the collateral, failure to pay taxes or insurance, moving or selling the collateral without permission, death or insolvency of the debtor, failure of the debtor to make payments to other creditors, or whenever the secured party "deems itself insecure" should be considered for the security agreement. See 84-1-208. The only limit on the "insecurity" clause is the creditor's subjective "good faith." A common practice is to state the business conditions upon which the loan is conditioned as warranties, and provide that any breach of those conditions is a default. Moreover, the typical security agreement (as well as the accompanying promissory note) may contain an "acceleration clause" which provides that upon the happening of an event of default the entire unpaid balance becomes due and owing. See 84-1-208 and 84-3-108(1)(b). See Jensen v. State Bank of Allison, 518 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1975) for an example of an insecurity/acceleration clause in action. Although Article 9 is the primary source of law governing default by a commercial or agricultural debtor, special protections are given to consumer debtors under the Kansas Uniform Consumer Credit Code. In case of conflict between the two statutes, the UCCC controls. See 84-9-203(4). In particular, K.S.A. 16a-5-109 provides an objective definition of "default" in secured transactions where the credit is used for personal, family or household purposes. (See K.S.A. 16a-1-301(10), (11), (12) and (13) for the scope of the Kansas UCCC.) The test under the UCCC is whether the consumer has failed to make a required payment or whether "the prospect of payment, performance, or realization of collateral is significantly impaired." Moreover, the burden is on the creditor to prove "significant impairment." As a practical matter, this means that broad insecurity and acceleration clauses, while still available for commercial or agricultural transactions, are limited where consumer transactions are involved. However, there is nothing in this subsection or the Kansas UCCC which prohibits creditors from attempting to define "significant impairment" in the security agreement itself. In fact, this subsection invites such a delineation.

Under the second and last sentences of this subsection, as well as subsection (2), the rights and remedies of the secured party are cumulative. Although the subsection indicates that the creditor could move against the collateral, obtain a personal judgment against the debtor, pursue any surety, or seek to enforce the obligation through any other means, in any order, and it is clear that the drafters intended great flexibility and an elimination of any election of remedies approach, there are currently two limitations under Kansas law to the general rule of cumulative remedies. First, a Kansas bankruptcy decision, In re Wilson, 390 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Kan. 1975), holds that failure of a secured lender to seek judicial enforcement of an Article 9 security interest at the time it obtained a personal judgment against the debtor constituted an impermissible attempt to split a cause of action. Therefore, the lender was not allowed to seek judicial foreclosure on its secured claim when the debtor later filed bankruptcy. This is consistent with precode case, Kearny v. Nunn, 156 K. 563, 134 P.2d 635 (1943), which held an action to foreclose the lien barred a latter action on the note. A later Tenth Circuit decision, In re Hill, 648 F.2d 1282 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying Colorado law), appears to reject the reasoning in Wilson. It would appear that Kansas is in a very small minority holding that the judicial actions must be brought together. See White & Summers Practitioner Treatise at § 34-4.

The second possible limitation is the doctrine of equitable marshalling, under which a senior lien claimant must resort first to assets not subject to a junior lien so as to avoid inequity. The Kansas courts have in the past approved this doctrine as a limit on the senior secured creditor (see, e.g., Rundquist v. O'Leary, 184 K. 496, 337 P.2d 1017 (1959)), and both 84-1-103 and Official Comment 3 to 84-9-311 suggest that it could be incorporated into Article 9 transactions.

Subsection (2). This subsection, which is simply a cross reference to the rest of part 5 and 84-9-207, is the source of most of the litigation on repossession or foreclosure, and only those rights specified in 84-9-501(3) may be waived. Since the debtor has normally lost both the money and the collateral after default, it is important the secured party pay particular attention to the required notices and the rules regarding disposition of the collateral.

Subsection (3). This subsection is intended to prevent the secured party from overreaching in the security agreement. The debtor's rights as set forth in Part 5 of Article 9 (as well as the Kansas UCCC) are given as a matter of public policy; they cannot be waived in the original documents. Note that the list of non-waivable items does not include repossession free from breach of the peace, as provided in 84-9-503. This omission should be treated as either a legislative oversight or a recognition that it would be stating the obvious to provide that a debtor cannot agree in the security agreement to a bashing down of the debtor's home door or to burglary to get the piano following default. Although the debtor's rights cannot be waived in the security agreement, the agreement "may determine the standards by which the fulfillment of these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." For example, the security agreement could provide a reasonable time and conditions under which foreclosure sale would take place, thus filling out the broad "commercially reasonable" requirement of 84-9-504. Moreover, 84-9-504 and 84-9-505 contain special language which allows the debtor to waive certain foreclosure rights after default, even though this cannot be done in the original security agreement.

Subsection (4). This subsection is an application of the cumulative remedies doctrine set forth in subsection (1). It allows proceedings against the personal property, if the agreement covers both real estate and personalty. Alternatively, the secured party may proceed against both the real and the personal property under the applicable real estate security law. Prior Kansas law was probably in accord. See Liberty Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 143 K. 422, 54 P.2d 937 (1936), where a note was secured by both real estate and chattel mortgages, and the court held that the foreclosure was one cause of action; the trial court's order to sell the real estate first was held valid. In Mfg. Co. v. Lewis, 30 K. 541, 1 P. 812 (1883), the court said that the mortgagee could foreclose on the chattels and later foreclose on the land.

Subsection (5). Subsection (5) makes clear that any judgment lien which the secured party acquires against the collateral is in effect a continuation of the original perfected security interest; the lien relates back to the date of perfection of the security interest. In other words, if the secured party chooses not to enforce the security interest under Article 9, but pursuant to a judgment, the trustee cannot treat the creditor as unsecured with respect to the collateral or treat it as a preference. However, seizure of other assets not covered by a prior perfected security interest could be upset by the trustee under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 547).

The second sentence of this subsection provides that a judicial sale is a foreclosure of a security interest to which the requirements of Part 5 do not apply. Pre-UCC Kansas case law was in accord, holding that the chattel mortgage foreclosure sale is a judicial sale under the supervision of the court, and no compliance with the notice requirements of former K.S.A. 58-308 was necessary. Liberty Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 143 K. 422, 54 P.2d 937 (1936). See also K.S.A. 60-1006, which establishes a procedure by which the Article 9 secured creditor may foreclose and obtain a judgment in replevin and a deficiency judgment in personam against the debtor.

Revisor's Note:

Former section 84-9-501 was repealed by L. 2000, ch. 142, § 155 and the number reassigned to the current text.

Law Review and Bar Journal References:

The supreme court of Kansas has recognized that the code leaves the parties free to contract concerning their rights on default, J. Eugene Balloun, 16 K.L.R. 437, 441 (1968).

Paragraph (1) mentioned in discussion of impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code upon Kansas, Barkley Clark, 18 K.L.R. 277, 291 (1970).

U.C.C. remedies upon default of security agreement discussed in "Survey of Kansas Law: Secured Transactions," Gerald D. Haag, 21 K.L.R. 107, 113, 114 (1972).

Changes in repossession law under the UCCC discussed in "The New Kansas Consumer Legislation," Barkley Clark, 42 J.B.A.K. 147, 197 (1973).

Tenth Circuit Survey on Contracts, U.C.C. and U.C.C.C., Martin R. Ufford, 15 W.L.J. 541, 551, 552 (1976).

Creditor's remedies under U.C.C., 25 K.L.R. 150 (1976).

Warranty violations in tripartite finance lease agreements, Winton A. Winter, Jr., 25 K.L.R. 573, 583 (1977).

"Survey of Kansas Law: Secured Transactions," J. Eugene Balloun, 27 K.L.R. 301, 303 (1979).

"Survey of Kansas Law: Property," 29 K.L.R. 555 (1981).

"Survey of Kansas Law: Secured Transactions," J. Eugene Balloun, 32 K.L.R. 351, 368 (1984).

"Commercial Law—Commercially Unreasonable Foreclosure Sales in the Context of a Surety Relationship—United States v. Lattauzio," John S. Clifford, 34 K.L.R. 175, 182, 183, 187 (1985).

"Is the Agricultural Security Interest Legally Healthy?" David A. Lander, 34 K.L.R. 505, 508, 512 (1986).

"Equipment Leases Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code," Charles D. Lee, 57 J.K.B.A. No. 1, 27, 30 (1988).

"Creditor Beware: From Default Through Deficiency Judgment," Wanda M. Temm, 60 J.K.B.A. No. 8, 17, 19 (1991).

"Revised Article 9 in Kansas," Hon. John K. Pearson, 51 K.L.R. 769, 832, 833 (2003).

"A Brief Overview of Revised Article 9 in Kansas," John K. Pearson and J. Scott Pohl, 72 J.K.B.A. No. 8, 22 (2003).

"The Untapped Potential of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act," Amy Fellows, 74 J.K.B.A. No. 4, 24 (2005).

Attorney General's Opinions:

Record of mortgage can be filed as a financing statement covering fixtures with the register of deeds in the county where the collateral is located if such record complies with the fixture filing requirements without using a UCC-1 form. 2009-19.

CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. In a garnishment proceeding involving priorities between creditors as to funds in hands of clerk, the prior judgment creditor entitled to funds in dispute. Rural Gas, Inc. v. Shepek, 205 Kan. 397, 400, 469 P.2d 341.

2. Subsection (5) construed; judgment creditor precluded by principles of res judicata from bringing subsequent action to enforce security agreement. In re Wilson, 390 F. Supp. 1121.

3. Cited in holding enforceable lien existed between original parties; no action for damages for breach of contract when damage not a result of such breach. Kansas State Bank v. Overseas Motosport, Inc., 222 Kan. 26, 28, 29, 563 P.2d 414.

4. Mentioned in holding lien waived for failure to file lien statement and surrendering possession of race car. Weatherhead v. Boettcher, 3 Kan. App. 2d 261, 262, 594 P.2d 257.

5. Cited in showing legislative intent to impose absolute and non-delegable duties on one party to contract. State v. Mwaura, 4 Kan. App. 2d 738, 741, 610 P.2d 662.

6. Rights and remedies of secured party upon debtor's default are cumulative. Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 572, 662 P.2d 1301 (1983).

7. If properly employed, UCC protects unpaid sellers in variety of ways. Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat. Bank and Trust, 723 F.2d 1449, 1453 (1983).

8. Where UCCC silent, courts may look to UCC decisions in determining commercially reasonable dispositions. Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 863, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984).

9. Rights of creditor and debtor may be changed by UCCC; where UCC and UCCC conflict, UCCC controls. Kelley v. Commercial National Bank, 235 Kan. 45, 51, 678 P.2d 620 (1984).

10. Creditor cannot pursue remedies herein when secured status not attained under K.S.A. 84-9-203(1)(a). Farmers State Bank v. Haflich, 10 Kan. App. 2d 333, 338, 699 P.2d 553 (1985).

11. Securing loan does not deprive bank of remedy available to unsecured creditor bank. Karner v. Willis, 10 Kan. App. 2d 432, 435, 700 P.2d 582 (1985).

12. Debtor's notes not merged in judgment in defendant secured creditor's favor to bar action against subsequent secured creditor for conversion. Bank of Oklahoma v. Fidelity State Bank & Trust Co., 623 F. Supp. 479, 484 (1985).

13. Cited; provisions dealing with secured party's interest in proceeds prevailing over default provisions after debtor files bankruptcy examined. Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc., 796 F.2d 1293, 1296, 1297, 62 B.R. [168] [171] [172] (1986).

14. Ban's lien on tools on repossessed tools as possessory or nonpossessory security interest examined. In re Sanders, 61 B.R. 381, 384 (1986).

15. Defense of commercial reasonableness cannot be waived; impairment of collateral rule applicable between guarantor and secured party with collateral. U.S. v. Hunter, 652 F. Supp. 774, 778 (1987).

16. Cited; bank's right to possess collateral under security agreement as shielding it from liability for wrongful execution on original note examined. Wellsville Bank v. Sutterby, 12 Kan. App. 2d 585, 591, 752 P.2d 700 (1988).

17. Cited; whether security agreement may be altered by course of dealing (K.S.A. 84-1-205) examined. Riley State Bank v. Spillman, 242 Kan. 696, 699, 750 P.2d 1024 (1988).

18. Provision prohibiting debtor from waiving defense of commercially unreasonable sale of collateral construed to inure to benefit of guarantor. U.S. v. Kelley, 890 F.2d 220 (1989).

19. Creditor claiming security interest in airplane for parts properly perfected interest precluding financing statement filing. In re Arcentral, Inc., 289 B.R. 170, 172 (2003).

20. Bankruptcy trustee's attempted avoidance of lien on modular home denied; court distinguishes modular homes from mobile homes. In re Brouillette, 389 B.R. 214, 221 (2008).

21. Secured creditor's failure to foreclose on its security interest would not operate as waiver of its future right to realize on its collateral. In re Kuhn, 408 B.R. 528 (2009).

22. A financing statement must use the identical name as on the debtor's driver's license unless the official safe search harbor is satisfied. In re Prestion, 612 B.R. 770, 774 (Bkrtcy. D. Kan. 2019).

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 84-9-501 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENUnited States v. Hunter, 652 F. Supp. 774 (D. Kan. 1987).
cites § 84-9-501 8×subsections: (3)(b) 8×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“K.S.A. § 84-9-501(3)(b), which provides: (3) To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated below may not be waived or varied except as provided with respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) of…”
2
GREENMaxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc., 796 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1986).
cites § 84-9-501 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“§ 84-9-306 or the provisions of K.S.A. §§ 84-9-501 and 84-9-504 apply? We first address Maxi’s contention that the bankruptcy court erred in applying the “proceeds” provisions of § 84-9-306 in the circumstances of this case.”
Later courts cite it for
“before a security interest may be enforced against the debtor, certain formal requirements must be met.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENIn re Sanders, 61 B.R. 381 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986).
cites § 84-9-501 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“” See K.S.A. § 84-9-501(1). A nonpossessory security interest may become a possessory security interest.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is the origin of the creditor's interest rather than the means of enforcement that determines the nature of the lien.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENKuhn v. Wagnon (In re Kuhn), 408 B.R. 528 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009).
cites § 84-9-501 10×subsections: (5)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“He relies upon the Kansas comments to K.S.A. 84-9-501 (1996), Home State Bank v.”
5
GREENRiley State Bank v. Spillman, 750 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1988).
cites § 84-9-501 2×subsections: (1)cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“The 1983 Kansas Comment to K.S.A. 84-9-501 notes: “[T]he creditor is given great latitude in defining ‘default’ broadly in the security agreement; normally, the definition would include not only failure to pay an installment, but other events such as failure to insure the…”
Later courts cite it for
“no waiver by the secured party of any default shall be effective unless in writing nor operate as a waiver of any other default or of the same default on a future occasion.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENIn re Wilson, 390 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Kan. 1975).
cites § 84-9-501 4×subsections: (5) 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“In support of its argument, Liberty Loan points to the following provisions of K.S.A. 84-9-501: "(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has the rights and remedies provided in this part .”
Later courts cite it for
“rule 806 was intended to promote efficiency in the appeals process, it was not intended as a trap for the unwary litigant.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENMedling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 678 P.2d 1115 (Kan. 1984).
cites § 84-9-501 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“Kansas Comment 1 of 16a-5-103 states: “Where there has been a default with respect to a secured consumer credit transaction, the rights of the creditor and debtor are controlled by part 5 (Default) of UCC article 9 (K.S.A. 84-9-501, et seq.), except to the extent that such…”
Later courts cite it for
“it cannot be denied that tire more sophisticated debtor is in a better position to grapple fairly with the creditor . . . .” · 1 citing court
8
NO FLAGMull Drilling Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrube, L.P.), 407 B.R. 82 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
cites § 84-9-501 3×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“This filing is effective as a financing statement covering as-extract *98 ed collateral as provided by K.S.A. 84-9-501, and amendments thereto, and the security interest provided by this section is perfected as of the date of recording.”
9
GREENBank of Oklahoma v. Fid. State Bank & Trust Co., 623 F. Supp. 479 (D. Kan. 1985).
cites § 84-9-501 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“84-9-501: (1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has the rights and remedies provided in this part____ He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure____ The…”
10
GREENClark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 662 P.2d 1301 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 84-9-501 1×subsections: (1)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 84-9-501(1). Unless otherwise agreed, a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral.”
Later courts cite it for
“under k.s.a. 60-513(b), a cause of action in tort for conversion ... accrues when substantial injury first appears or when it becomes reasonably ascertainable.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENKelley v. Com. Nat'l Bank, 678 P.2d 620 (Kan. 1984).
cites § 84-9-501 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“” Where there is a default in a secured transaction, the rights of the creditor and debtor are controlled by K.S.A. 84-9-501 et seq. Such rights may be changed by the Uniform Consumer Credit Code; K.”
12
GREENWellsville Bank v. Sutterby, 752 P.2d 700 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 84-9-501 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action.”
13
GREENCoats State Bank v. Grey (In re Grey), 29 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
cites § 84-9-501 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“K.S.A. § 84-9-501 to -507 (Supp.1982). Therefore, the holding of American State Bank cannot be read to apply to a party whose rights are not affected.”
14
GREENState v. Mwaura, 610 P.2d 662 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980).
cites § 84-9-501 1×subsections: (3)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“84-4-103(1) [prohibiting disclaimer of a bank’s responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care]; and K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 84-9-501(3) [prohibiting waiver or variation of certain rights of the debtor and duties of the secured party where a default…”
Later courts cite it for
“duties which cannot be delegated to a tenant” · 1 citing court
15
GREENUnion Nat'l Bank of Wichita v. Schmitz, 853 P.2d 1180 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 84-9-501 1×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“However, when the UCCC is silent on consumer default, then the UCC provisions on default (K.S.A. 84-9-501 et seq.) are to be applied.”
16
GREENGierke v. Hayes, 724 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 84-9-501 1×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“K.S.A. 84-9-501. Therefore, appellants argue, the security agreement contemplates the possibility of a judgment against respondent and thus appellants’ petition states a proper cause of action.”
17
GREENNazar v. W. State Bank (In re Brouillette), 389 B.R. 214 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008).
cites § 84-9-501 1×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“84-9-401 (Ensley 1983) (proper office for filing a fixture filing is the office designated for recording mortgages); K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 84-9-501(a) (proper office for filing a fixture filing is the office designated for recording mortgages); K.”
18
GREENFarmers State Bank v. Haflich, 699 P.2d 553 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 84-9-501 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“Absent this, the Bank could not pursue the creditors’ remedies provided in K.S.A. 84-9-501 et seq. We note with interest that a Bank officer testified at trial that although the vehicles were not on the security agreement, there were liens on the titles and a “secured title…”
Later courts cite it for
“the notice of right to cure sent a debtor must strictly comply with the provisions of the relevant kansas statute; otherwise any repossession thereafter by the creditor will be wrongful.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENIn re Vann, 177 B.R. 704 (D. Kan. 1995).
cites § 84-9-501 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“Comment 4 (“This Section applies when the secured party has possession of the collateral before default, as a pledgee, and also when he has taken possession of the collateral after default.”
20
GREENKarner v. Willis, 700 P.2d 582 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 84-9-501 1×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 84-9-501
“K.S.A. 84-9-501. There is no reason for a bank which takes the precaution of requiring collateral to secure its loan to be deprived of a remedy which would be available to an unsecured creditor bank.”
Later courts cite it for
“additional option of pursuing the collateral according to the terms of the security agreement,” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197519992023

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1985. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Kan. Ct. App.9D. Kan.6Bankr. D. Kan.5Kan.3Bankr. D. Del.210th Cir.1Mo. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(1)4 cases
In re Sanders, 61 B.R. 381 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986).“” See K.S.A. § 84-9-501(1). A nonpossessory security interest may become a possessory security interest.”
Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 662 P.2d 1301 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).“K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 84-9-501(1). Unless otherwise agreed, a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral.”
Riley State Bank v. Spillman, 750 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1988).“The 1983 Kansas Comment to K.S.A. 84-9-501 notes: “[T]he creditor is given great latitude in defining ‘default’ broadly in the security agreement; normally, the definition would include not only failure to pay an installment, but other events such as failure to insure the…”
In re Vann, 177 B.R. 704 (D. Kan. 1995).“Comment 4 (“This Section applies when the secured party has possession of the collateral before default, as a pledgee, and also when he has taken possession of the collateral after default.”
(3)1 case
State v. Mwaura, 610 P.2d 662 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980).“84-4-103(1) [prohibiting disclaimer of a bank’s responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care]; and K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 84-9-501(3) [prohibiting waiver or variation of certain rights of the debtor and duties of the secured party where a default…”
(3)(b)2 cases
United States v. Hunter, 652 F. Supp. 774 (D. Kan. 1987).“K.S.A. § 84-9-501(3)(b), which provides: (3) To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated below may not be waived or varied except as provided with respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) of…”
United States v. Healy, 923 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Kan. 1996).
(5)3 cases
In re Wilson, 390 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Kan. 1975).“In support of its argument, Liberty Loan points to the following provisions of K.S.A. 84-9-501: "(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has the rights and remedies provided in this part .”
Kuhn v. Wagnon (In re Kuhn), 408 B.R. 528 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009).“He relies upon the Kansas comments to K.S.A. 84-9-501 (1996), Home State Bank v.”
Liberty Loan Corp. v. Wallace, 390 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Kan. 1975).

Show all 27 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

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