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Mass. Gen. LawsPart I Title II Chapter 21E

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 4 (2026)

Response actions; assessment, containment and removal; liability of persons providing care, assistance or advice

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1985–2024 55citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 55 opinions since 1985, 1 of them in the last five years.

Section 4. The department, whenever it has reason to believe that oil or hazardous material has been released or that there is a threat of release of oil or hazardous material, is authorized to take or arrange for such response actions as it reasonably deems necessary. Releases and threats of release for which the department undertakes such response actions, and the extent of such response actions, shall be determined by reference to the Massachusetts contingency plan. Prior to undertaking any response action, the department shall notify the owner or operator of the site or vessel or a fiduciary, city or town or secured lender that has title to or possession of a site or vessel of its intent to take such action. Such notice shall not be required when the department does not know the identity or location of the owner or operator or of a fiduciary, city or town or secured lender that has title to or possession of a site or vessel, or when because of an emergency or other circumstances, the giving of such notice would be impractical. In the event the department and the department of public health jointly determine the need for, scope and cost of a study of the public health effects of a release or threat of release of oil or hazardous material, the department shall provide for the conduct of such a study under the direction of the department of public health.

Nothing in this section shall preclude assessment, containment and removal by any person threatened or damaged by such release or threat of release, provided such assessment, containment and removal is conducted in accordance with the Massachusetts contingency plan and consistently with assessment, containment and removal actions conducted by the department. Chemicals shall not be used in the assessment, containment and removal of released oil or hazardous materials unless and until their use has been authorized by the department.

Any person who undertakes a necessary and appropriate response action regarding the release or threat of release of oil or hazardous material shall be entitled to reimbursement from any other person liable for such release or threat of release for the reasonable costs of such response action. If two or more persons are liable pursuant to section five for such release or threat of release, each shall be liable to the others for their equitable share of the costs of such response action. All claims and actions for contribution, reimbursement or equitable share by persons other than the commonwealth pursuant to this paragraph, except those pending in court on the effective date of section four A shall be subject to, and brought in accordance with, the procedures set forth in section four A.

Any person who without charge renders assistance at the request of a duly authorized representative of the department in removing oil or hazardous material released shall not be liable, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for civil damages as a result of any act or omission by him in removing such oil or hazardous material, except for acts or omissions of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Any person, except a person who is liable pursuant to clause (1) of paragraph (a) of section five, who provides care, assistance or advice in response to a release or threat of release of oil into or on to the tidal waters of the United States including without limitation the territorial sea, or to any tidal shorelines adjoining any waters of the United States, or to the zone established by Presidential Proclamation numbered 5030 dated March tenth, nineteen hundred and eighty-three, including without limitation, the ocean waters of the areas referred to as ''eastern special areas'' in Article 3 (1) of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary, signed June first, nineteen hundred and ninety, and said care, assistance or advice is consistent with applicable state law, or the National Contingency Plan or as otherwise directed by the federal on-scene coordinator predesignated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency or the United States Coast Guard to coordinate and direct a federal response for oil removal under subpart D of the National Contingency Plan, or by the state official with responsibility for oil spill response shall not be liable, notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section five, for removal costs or damages which result from actions taken or omitted to be taken in the course of providing such care, assistance, or advice, except with respect to personal injury or wrongful death, or if such person is grossly negligent or engages in willful misconduct. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term damages shall mean any damages, costs, expenses or economic loss of any kind for which liability may exist under the laws of this state resulting from, arising out of or related to the discharge or threatened discharge of oil. As used in the preceding sentence, the term discharge shall mean any emission, other than natural seepage, intentional or unintentional, and including but not limited to spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping of oil, oil refuse, oil mixed with wastes, other than dredge spoil, or petroleum, but not including hazardous substances which are specifically listed under 42 USC 9601 (14) (A) through (F) and which are subject to the provisions of that Act. Nothing in this section shall affect the liability of a person as described in clause (1) of paragraph (a) of section five, for oil spill response under any other provision of the General Laws.

The 20 cases that cite Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 4 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 888 N.E.2d 897 (Mass. 2008).
cites § 4 12×cited by 97 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The trustees commenced this action in the Superior Court to accomplish the cost recovery; their claims under G. L. c. 21E, § 4, as well as a contract-based claim, were tried to a jury, and the trial judge thereafter tried jury-waived the various parties’ claims to attorney’s…”
The case’s holding
A court must determine if a contract is ambiguous by examining the language itself before using extrinsic evidence as an interpretive guide.
Later courts cite it for
“to answer the ambiguity question, the court must first examine the language of the contract by itself, independent of extrinsic evidence concerning the drafting history or the intention of the parties.” · 26 citing courts
2
GREENCommonwealth v. Boston Edison Co., 444 Mass. 324 (2005).
cites § 4 18×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Our review of the judge’s ruling presents us with the following questions of law concerning the meaning of, and relationship between, G. L. c. 21E, §§ 4 and 5 (a): (1) whether, on this record, the Commonwealth is a liable party under G.”
Later courts cite it for
“the proper exercise of enforcement discretion . . . is not ordinarily judicially reviewable” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENMartignetti v. Haigh-Farr, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1131 (Mass. 1997).
cites § 4 13×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Summary judgment was denied for the claim brought under G. L. c. 21E, § 4, and the action proceeded to trial on that claim.”
The case’s holding
Claims for reimbursement of hazardous waste response costs are actions for contribution requiring equitable allocation among liable parties based on relative fault rather than joint and several liability.
4
GREENThomas & Betts Corp. v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 915 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2019).
cites § 4 4×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The claims, which were primarily brought under § 4 of Chapter 21E, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 4, sought reimbursement for the money that Thomas & Betts and New Albertson's each had spent on the cleanup.”
Later courts cite it for
“as the party seeking the award of attorney's fees, new albertson's bears the burden of producing the necessary evidence for it.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENBlack v. Coastal Oil New England, Inc., 699 N.E.2d 353 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 4 10×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 4
“39 for response costs under G. L. c. 21E, § 4, $2,190,000 for damages to their realty under G.”
6
GREENTaygeta Corp. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 763 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 2002).
cites § 4 2×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 4
“2 IE was drafted in a comprehensive fashion to compel the prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous material and to ensure that costs and damages are borne by the appropriate responsible parties.”
The case’s holding
A continuing nuisance claim is timely if property rights are invaded by repeated or recurring wrongs that result in new harm on each occasion.
Later courts cite it for
“in most instances, the question when a plaintiff knew or should have known of its cause of action is one of fact that will be decided by the trier of fact.” · 10 citing courts
7
GREENSanitoy, Inc. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 602 N.E.2d 193 (Mass. 1992).
cites § 4 4×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Indeed, G. L. c. 21E, § 4, “create[d] a private right of action to enforce the purposes of the Act.”
The case’s holding
Courts may not reduce a statutory award of reasonable attorneys' fees in a private reimbursement suit under the hazardous material release act by a percentage of response costs recovered.
8
GREENOne Wheeler Road Assocs. v. Foxboro Co., 843 F. Supp. 792 (D. Mass. 1994).
cites § 4 4×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Mass.Gen.L. ch. 21E, § 4 — Statute of Limitations At the time this complaint was filed in 1990, chapter 21E had no specified statute of limitations.”
9
GREENUtica Mut. Ins. v. Weathermark Investments, Inc., 292 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2002).
cites § 4 2×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 4
“, Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 21E, § 4 (“Response actions.”
The case’s holding
A pollution exclusion reaching losses from demands to respond to pollutants is ambiguous as to nonremediation property damage and is construed against the insurer.
10
GREENGarweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92 (Mass. 1993).
cites § 4 2×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Under G. L. c. 21E, § 4 (1990 ed.), a plaintiff has a private right of action to enforce the purpose of the act, Sheehy v.”
The case’s holding
The economic loss rule bars recovery for purely economic losses in negligence actions where the defendant causes no personal injury or physical damage to the plaintiff's property.
Later courts cite it for
“the traditional economic loss rule provides that, when a defendant interferes with a contract or economic opportunity due to negligence and causes no harm to either the person or property of the plaintiff, the plaintiff may not recover for purely economic losses.” · 14 citing courts
11
GREENScott v. NG US 1, Inc., 450 Mass. 760 (2008).
cites § 4 1×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 4
“21E is prompt “assessment, containment and removal,” G. L. c. 21E, § 4, of hazardous materials.”
The case’s holding
A court may pierce the corporate veil only where a parent exercises pervasive control over a subsidiary and there is a fraudulent or injurious consequence of the relationship.
Later courts cite it for
“a veil may be pierced only where the parent exercises 'some form of pervasive control' of the activities of the subsidiary 'and there is some fraudulent or injurious consequence of the intercorporate relationship.” · 6 citing courts
12
cites § 4 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 4 (amended 1992).”
13
GREENGraves v. R.M. Packer Co., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 760 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 4 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 4
“3 The court reserved for its determination the claims under G. L. c. 21E, § 4, 4 and G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 11.”
Later courts cite it for
“afford a 'basis for a reasonable judgment” · 1 citing court
14
GREENHill v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 439 Mass. 266 (2003).
cites § 4 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The jury awarded “response costs” under G. L. c. 21E, § 4,3 4 to A & P in the amount of $239,904.”
15
GREENAcme Laundry Co. v. Sec'y of Env't Affairs, 575 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. 1991).
cites § 4 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 4
“" G.L.c. 21E, § 4 (1990 ed.). Section 8 authorizes the department to enter any site in order to "undertake such actions relative to the assessment, containment, and removal" of releases.”
Later courts cite it for
“principal source of insight into the legislative intent.” · 4 citing courts
16
REDGen. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 711 N.E.2d 589 (Mass. 1999).
cites § 4 1×cited by 97 cases
Overruled by DaRosa v. City of New Bedford Monsanto Co. on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 1 says in part.
Where it cites § 4
“760, 770-771 (1991) (Legislature’s removal from G. L. c. 21E, § 4, of limitation in analogous Federal statute [CERCLA] indicates intent to “structure [G.”
The case’s holding
The policy deliberation exemption protects documents shared with federal agencies if such sharing is integral to fostering independent discussions to ensure the quality of governmental decisions.
Later courts cite it for
“foster independent discussions between those responsible for a governmental decision in order to secure the quality of the decision.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENNascimento v. Preferred Mut. Ins., 478 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Mass. 2007).
cites § 4 4×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The Leal complaint sought recovery of response costs, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, §§ 4 and 4A, and compensation for property damage related to the spill, pursuant to Mass.”
18
GREENNascimento v. Preferred Mut. Ins., 513 F.3d 273 (1st Cir. 2008).
cites § 4 1×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 4
“On February 15, 2005, the Leals sued Nascimento in Massachusetts Superior Court, Hampden County (the “Leal suit” or the “Leal complaint”), on various counts: Count I-Continuing Trespass, Count II — Continuing Nuisance, Count III — Negligence, Count IV — Response Costs Pursuant…”
Later courts cite it for
“an insured cannot force its insurer to defend him by simply providing to the insurer facts which, if proven, would create coverage.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENRubenstein v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 708 N.E.2d 639 (Mass. 1999).
cites § 4 1×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The plaintiffs, the trustees of Security Mills Realty Trust (trust), commenced this declaratory judgment action in 1990 in the Superior Court, seeking a declaration that various insurance companies, including the defendant, had a duty to defend and indemnify them in an action…”
The case’s holding
An insured is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees incurred in successfully establishing an insurer's duty to defend under an insurance policy.
Later courts cite it for
“an insurer must tread cautiously regarding its duty to defend an insured against third-party actions in view of the expansive interpretation given to that duty.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENOliveira v. Pereira, 605 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. 1992).
cites § 4 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 4
“G. L. c. 21E, § 4. Section 4 simply allows for reimbursement 9 of expenditures made.”
The case’s holding
An action for reimbursement under the Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act is a tort claim that accrues on the date the assessment costs are paid.
Later courts cite it for
“the judge found the joint owner of the land ... to be jointly and severally liable for the costs of assessment, containment, and removal of contamination at the site.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198520042024

One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 1994. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Mass.16Mass. Super. Ct.16D. Mass.9Mass. App. Ct.91st Cir.4Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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