Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 140B (2026)

Advance payments or settlements of claims by insurers; effect upon liability; admissibility as evidence; credit upon judgment; notice of limitations to claimant by insurer; accrual of cause of action

✓ text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
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Section 140B. Any person against whom a claim or suit for damages on account of bodily injury, property damage, or death is made, or if such person is insured against loss by reason of his liability to pay such damages the insurer of such person may advance money to, or pay bills incurred by or on behalf of, such claimant, or plaintiff, as the case may be, without affecting the question of liability for such damages, and evidence of such payments shall not be admissible at the trial of such suit on the issue of liability or to mitigate damages; but if, in such case, there shall be a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for money damages, the presiding judge of the court in which the judgment is entered shall, upon motion of the defendant, credit upon such judgment the amount of such payments.

Any such insurer who makes an advance payment under this section shall at the time of making such payment, by notice in writing, inform the claimant of the statute of limitations applicable to his claim and the time within which an action is required to be commenced to enforce such claim in a court of competent jurisdiction.

The cause of action of any claimant who receives an advance payment under this section but who is not given the written notice required hereunder shall accrue on the date such written notice is actually given and not on the date the injury or damage was sustained.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases, 1987–2008 · leading case: Allstate Ins. v. Reynolds, 685 N.E.2d 1210 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
Allstate Ins. v. Reynolds, 685 N.E.2d 1210 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 11× “Reynolds moved for summary judgment; the Superior Court judge ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled by the provisions of G. L. c. 231, § 140B, and he allowed Reynolds’s motion.”
DiMaio Fam. Pizza & Luncheonette, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins., 448 F.3d 460 (1st Cir. 2006). · cites it 3× “Second, they maintain that Charter Oak’s failure to comply with the provisions of another statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 140B, tolled the limitations period.”
Trinity Church in the City v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins., 502 N.E.2d 532 (Mass. 1987). · cites it 2× “*55 Trinity also contends that G.L.c. 231, § 140B, [8] provides a separate basis for tolling the limitations period against the seven defendants.”
Dimaio Fam. Pizza & Luncheonette, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins., 349 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D. Mass. 2004). · cites it 2× “Second, Plaintiffs argue that Charter Oak’s failure to comply with yet another statute, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 231, § 140B, tolled the limitations period.”
DiMaio Fam. Pizza & Luncheonette, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins., 342 F.3d 460 (1st Cir. 2006). · cites it 3× “Second, they maintain that Charter Oak’s failure to comply with the provisions of another statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 140B, tolled the limitations period.”
Gendron v. Rhodes, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 512 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002). “The Court rejects, without discussion, Defendants’ alternative argument that the $8,000 was an advancement pursuant to G.L.c. 231, §140B.”
Wendorff v. Maldonado, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. 29 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2008). “Pursuant to G.L.c. 231, §140B, he asks this court to give him a credit against the jury verdict in the amount of $25,000, the amount previously paid to plaintiffs on his behalf by his insurance company.”
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