Mass. Gen. Laws » Part III Title II Chapter 231
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85Q (2026)

Standard of care owed children; maintenance of artificial condition upon land

✓ text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
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Section 85Q. Any person who maintains an artificial condition upon his own land shall be liable for physical harm to children trespassing thereon if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the land owner knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, (b) the condition is one of which the land owner knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, (d) the utility to the land owner of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and (e) the land owner fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 28 cases, 1979–2012 · leading case: Schofield v. Merrill, 435 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1982).
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Schofield v. Merrill, 435 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1982). · cites it 16× “An occupier of land will also be held to a duty of ordinary care *253 to certain foreseeable child trespassers, in conformity with the statutory negligence standard imposed by G.L.c. 231, § 85Q (inserted by St. 1977, c.”
Mathis v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 565 N.E.2d 1180 (Mass. 1991). · cites it 5× “The jury found that MEC violated its duty toward foreseeable child trespassers under G. L. c. 231, § 85Q (1988 ed.). The jury also found that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent.”
Soule v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 390 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. 1979). · cites it 6× “This "Draconian" [7] doctrine concerning child trespassers has recently been softened in Massachusetts by the passage of G.L.c. 231, § 85Q, inserted by St. 1977, c.”
Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012). “See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 85Q (West 2012); Soule v.”
McDonald v. Consol. Rail Corp., 502 N.E.2d 521 (Mass. 1987). · cites it 3× “Accordingly, the judge instructed the jury on the elements of G. L. c. 231, § 85Q. This exception to the common law rule as to trespassers imposes the duty of reasonable care in statutorily specified circumstances.”
Barnett v. City of Lynn, 745 N.E.2d 344 (Mass. 2001). “The Superior Court judge also ruled that the evidence did not support the plaintiff’s claim that the city had created an attractive nuisance under G. L. c. 231, § 85Q. The plaintiff has not challenged that ruling on appeal.”
Beausoleil v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 138 F. Supp. 2d 189 (D. Mass. 2001). · cites it 2× “The Child Trespasser Statute Contrary to plaintiffs contention, the Massachusetts Child Trespasser Statute, M.G.L. c. 231, § 85Q, also did not impose a duty of reasonable care on the defendants in this cases even if Danielle Beausoleil was a trespasser.”
Oldham v. Nerolich, 452 N.E.2d 225 (Mass. 1983). · cites it 2× “The application of the duty owed to trespassing children, G. L. c. 231, § 85Q, to the facts of the instant case has been raised by the plaintiff for the first time on appeal.”
Briggs v. Taylor, 494 N.E.2d 1023 (Mass. 1986). · cites it 2× “Futhermore, the plaintiffs are not aided by G. L. c. 231, § 85Q (1984 ed.), the so-called attractive nuisance statute.”
Gage v. City of Westfield, 532 N.E.2d 62 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988). “, 378 Mass 177, 182 (1979); G. L. c. 231, § 85Q. Nor did the plaintiffs claim that railroad employees knew the decedents to be helplessly trapped in a *695 position of peril.”
Phachansiri v. City of Lowell, 623 N.E.2d 1124 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). · cites it 2× “The case was tried before a jury in the Superior Court and was submitted to the jury on special questions which ostensibly tracked the child trespasser statute, G. L. c. 231, § 85Q. Only questions one and two are pertinent to this appeal.”
Jad v. Boston & Maine Corp., 530 N.E.2d 197 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988). · cites it 3× “” 2 Because the B & M was an occupier rather than the owner of the land, the judge also concluded that G. L. c. 231, § 85Q, the so-called “child-trespasser” statute, was inapplicable to the B & M.”
Show all 28 citing cases →
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85Q(b): 1 case
Leger v. Bemis Bro. Bag Co., 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 262 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1993).
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85Q(c): 1 case
Puskey v. W. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 972 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
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