Mass. Gen. Laws » Part IV Title I Chapter 265
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43 (2026)

Stalking; punishment

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 43. (a) Whoever (1) willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a specific person which seriously alarms or annoys that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and (2) makes a threat with the intent to place the person in imminent fear of death or bodily injury, shall be guilty of the crime of stalking and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 21/2 years or by both such fine and imprisonment. The conduct, acts or threats described in this subsection shall include, but not be limited to, conduct, acts or threats conducted by mail or by use of a telephonic or telecommunication device or electronic communication device including, but not limited to, any device that transfers signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-electronic or photo-optical system, including, but not limited to, electronic mail, internet communications, instant messages or facsimile communications.

(b) Whoever commits the crime of stalking in violation of a temporary or permanent vacate, restraining, or no-contact order or judgment issued pursuant to sections eighteen, thirty-four B, or thirty-four C of chapter two hundred and eight; or section thirty-two of chapter two hundred and nine; or sections three, four, or five of chapter two hundred and nine A; or sections fifteen or twenty of chapter two hundred and nine C or a protection order issued by another jurisdiction; or a temporary restraining order or preliminary or permanent injunction issued by the superior court, shall be punished by imprisonment in a jail or the state prison for not less than one year and not more than five years. No sentence imposed under the provisions of this subsection shall be less than a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of one year.

A prosecution commenced hereunder shall not be placed on file or continued without a finding, and the sentence imposed upon a person convicted of violating any provision of this subsection shall not be reduced to less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as established herein, nor shall said sentence of imprisonment imposed upon any person be suspended or reduced until such person shall have served said mandatory term of imprisonment.

A person convicted of violating any provision of this subsection shall not, until he shall have served the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment established herein, be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, work release or receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct under sections one hundred and twenty-nine, one hundred and twenty-nine C and one hundred and twenty-nine D of chapter one hundred and twenty-seven; provided, however, that the commissioner of correction may, on the recommendation of the warden, superintendent, or other person in charge of a correctional institution, grant to said offender a temporary release in the custody of an officer of such institution for the following purposes only: to attend the funeral of next of kin or spouse; to visit a critically ill close relative or spouse; or to obtain emergency medical services unavailable at said institution. The provisions of section eighty-seven of chapter two hundred and seventy-six relating to the power of the court to place certain offenders on probation shall not apply to any person 18 years of age or over charged with a violation of this subsection. The provisions of section thirty-one of chapter two hundred and seventy-nine shall not apply to any person convicted of violating any provision of this subsection.

(c) Whoever, after having been convicted of the crime of stalking, commits a second or subsequent such crime shall be punished by imprisonment in a jail or the state prison for not less than two years and not more than ten years. No sentence imposed under the provisions of this subsection shall be less than a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years.

A prosecution commenced hereunder shall not be placed on file or continued without a finding, and the sentence imposed upon a person convicted of violating any provision of this subsection shall not be reduced to less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as established herein, nor shall said sentence of imprisonment imposed upon any person be suspended or reduced until such person shall have served said mandatory term of imprisonment.

A person convicted of violating any provision of this subsection shall not, until he shall have served the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment established herein, be eligible for probation, parole, furlough, work release or receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct under sections one hundred and twenty-nine, one hundred and twenty-nine C and one hundred and twenty-nine D of chapter one hundred and twenty-seven; provided, however, that the commissioner of correction may, on the recommendation of the warden, superintendent, or other person in charge of a correctional institution, grant to said offender a temporary release in the custody of an officer of such institution for the following purposes only: to attend the funeral of next of kin or spouse; to visit a critically ill close relative or spouse; or to obtain emergency medical services unavailable at said institution. The provisions of section eighty-seven of chapter two hundred and seventy-six relating to the power of the court to place certain offenders on probation shall not apply to any person 18 years of age or over charged with a violation of this subsection. The provisions of section thirty-one of chapter two hundred and seventy-nine shall not apply to any person convicted of violating any provision of this section.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 75 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Alphas, 712 N.E.2d 575 (Mass. 1999).
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Commonwealth v. Alphas, 712 N.E.2d 575 (Mass. 1999). · cites it 6× “After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of four counts of stalking in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 43, a statute which proscribes two distinct types of stalking, stalking by harassment and stalking by following.”
Commonwealth v. Walters, 37 N.E.3d 980 (Mass. 2015). · cites it 8× “This case raises the question whether a posting to the Web site Facebook may constitute a threat within the meaning of the stalking statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a) (§ 43 [a]). We conclude that although content posted to Facebook may qualify as a threat as defined in the statute,…”
Commonwealth v. Welch, 825 N.E.2d 1005 (Mass. 2005). · cites it 5× “Particularly instructive to our analysis is the closely related criminal stalking statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43. The criminal harassment law was passed in response to a perceived loophole *88 in the stalking statute.”
Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 59 N.E.3d 1105 (Mass. 2016). · cites it 5× “Moreover, this interpretation does meet the legislative goal, emphasized by the dissent, see post at , of closing "a perceived loophole" in the criminal stalking statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43, because the stalking statute requires proof of an intent to place the alleged victim "in…”
Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 637 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1994). · cites it 5× “The defendant challenges a portion of the Commonwealth’s new stalking statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43, inserted by St. 1992, c.”
Commonwealth v. Matsos, 657 N.E.2d 467 (Mass. 1995). · cites it 8× “The defendant challenges his conviction by a jury of six in the District Court under the so-called stalking statute, G. L. c. 265, § 43, inserted by St. 1992, c.”
O'BRIEN v. Borowski, 961 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 2012). · cites it 2× “attery on a person with an intellectual disability], 13H [indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen years or older], 22 [rape], 22A [rape of a child], 23 [rape and abuse of a child], 24 [assault with intent to commit rape], 24B [assault of a child with intent to commit…”
Commonwealth v. Muckle, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 384 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 6× “268, § 13B (count 1); stalking in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 43 (count 2); threatening to commit a crime in violation of G.”
Edge v. Commonwealth, 883 N.E.2d 928 (Mass. 2008). · cites it 4× “265, § 43 (£ ). In securing the indictment, the Commonwealth presented the grand jury with evidence of the incidents underlying the violations of the 209A order on which Edge had previously been sentenced.”
Commonwealth v. James Lehan., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 246 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021). · cites it 4× “At the trial of a criminal complaint charging, inter alia, criminal stalking in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a), evidence showing vandalism of the victim's car by the defendant, an incident in which the defendant grabbed the victim's arm, and the defendant's conduct…”
United States v. Mastera, 435 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006). · cites it 2× “Whether two *60 crimes occurred on separate occasions within the meaning of the ACCA “requires a case-by-case examination of the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Steams, 387 F.”
Commonwealth v. Julien, 797 N.E.2d 470 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 2× “266, § 1; stalking, G. L. c. 265, § 43(a); threats, G. L. c. 275, § 2; and thirteen counts 1 of assault with intent to commit murder, G.”
Show all 75 citing cases →
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43(6) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Gupta, 2 N.E.3d 903 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43(a) — 15 cases
Commonwealth v. Muckle, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 384 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016). “268, § 13B (count 1); stalking in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 43 (count 2); threatening to commit a crime in violation of G.”
Commonwealth v. Julien, 797 N.E.2d 470 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). “266, § 1; stalking, G. L. c. 265, § 43(a); threats, G. L. c. 275, § 2; and thirteen counts 1 of assault with intent to commit murder, G.”
Smith v. Jones, 915 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009).
State v. Rucker, 987 P.2d 1080 (Kan. 1999).
Afrasiabi v. Massachusetts, 272 F. Supp. 3d 256 (D. Mass. 2017).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43(b) — 1 case
Commonwealth v. Jones, 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 238 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2011).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 43(h) — 1 case
Hennessey v. Sarkis, 764 N.E.2d 873 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.