Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 29 (2026)

Statement concerning theft; recovery of vehicles; restitution

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 29. Whenever a motor vehicle is stolen or misappropriated, the owner of record shall sign and submit to the appropriate police authority a statement under the penalties of perjury on a form containing such information relating to the theft or misappropriation of the vehicle as is prescribed by the registrar of motor vehicles.

Whenever a stolen or misappropriated motor vehicle is recovered by a police officer or other law enforcement officer, the police department shall notify the registry of motor vehicles, the owner of record and the storage facility if any, as soon as possible after the identity of the owner is determined. Such notification may be made by letter, telephone call or personal visit to the owner and shall include information as to the location of the recovered vehicle. In the event the vehicle is placed in a garage or other storage facility, the owner of said facility shall lose his lien for the reasonable charges for storage and towing unless he notifies the owner of record of the vehicle by certified mail and return receipt requested within five days of the date of said recovery or his actual knowledge of the identity of the owner of record. Said notice shall contain the information on the location of the vehicle and the amount of charge due on said vehicle.

The court shall, after a defendant is convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of section twenty-eight, conduct an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the extent of the damages or financial loss suffered as a result of the defendant's crime. A person found guilty of violating subsection (a) of section twenty-eight shall in all cases, upon conviction, in addition to any other punishment, be ordered to make restitution to the insurer for any financial loss sustained as a result of the commission of the crime; provided, however, that restitution shall not be ordered to a party whom the court determines to be aggrieved without that party's consent. Restitution shall be imposed in addition to incarceration or fine, and not in lieu thereof; provided, however, the court shall consider the defendant's present and future ability to pay in its determinations regarding a fine; provided, further, that, whenever possible subject to the constraints of this paragraph and the first paragraph of said subsection (a) of section twenty-eight, the amount of a fine imposed for a violation of said subsection (a) of section twenty-eight shall equal twice the amount of damages or financial loss suffered as a result of the defendant's crime.

In determining the amount, time and method of payment of restitution, the court shall consider the financial resources of the defendant and the burden restitution will impose on the defendant. Upon a real or impending change in financial circumstances, a defendant ordered to pay restitution may petition the court for a modification of the amount, time or method of payment of restitution. If the court finds that because of any such change the payment of restitution will cause a substantial financial hardship to the defendant or the defendant's immediate family or the defendant's dependents, the court may grant remission from any payment of restitution or modify the amount, time or method of payment.

If a defendant who is required to make restitution defaults in any payment of restitution or installment thereof, the court shall hold him in contempt unless said defendant has made a good faith effort to pay such restitution. If said defendant has made a good faith effort to pay such restitution, the court may modify the amount, time or method of payment, but may not grant complete remission from payment of restitution.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 1987–2016 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Buckley, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 177 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016).
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Commonwealth v. Buckley, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 177 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 2× “In particular, the defendant argues that, apart from and subsequent to his conduct in stealing the victim’s vehicle, the victim’s economic loss was caused by the failure of the victim and others to comply with three requirements imposed by G. L. c. 266, § 29: 8 first, the…”
Commonwealth v. Cheney, 800 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 2003). “We stated that “we believe[d] that the procedure, utilized in this case either generally or under the statute, would not be constitutionally offensive,” implying that the articulated procedure might be permissible even in prosecutions brought under statutes other than G. L. c.…”
Dines v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 548 N.E.2d 1268 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). · cites it 3× “The trial judge found that the plaintiff’s storage rates were reasonable and that he had complied in all respects with the notice requirements of G. L. c. 266, § 29. 1 The judge ruled *197 that the plaintiff was entitled to twenty dollars per day for the period which he claimed,…”
Commonwealth v. Vascovitch, 661 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). “…guilty of violating G. L. c. 266, § 28(a), must pay restitution in addition to punishment, and not in lieu thereof. G. L. c. 266, § 29.”
Commonwealth v. Giacalone, 507 N.E.2d 769 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). “, G. L. c. 266, § 29. An inadvertent failure to present additional proof through a witness who actually had seen the burned vehicle should not lead to a retrial where there is no indication of any genuine question as to the place where and the condition in which the victim’s…”
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 68 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015). “” G. L. c. 266, § 29, as appearing in St. 1980, c.”
Source One Fin. Corp. v. McCarthy's Towing, Inc., 2014 Mass. App. Div. 48 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 2014). · cites it 2× “255, §39A and G.L.c. 266, §29. Those statutes refer to the towing company’s notice obligations in cases of, respectively, police-ordered tows following an accident and police-ordered tows of a recovered stolen vehicle.”
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Falcon Towing & Recovery Corp., 23 Mass. L. Rptr. 57 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2007). “255, §39A (storage after an accident), and G.L.c. 266, §29 (storage of a stolen vehicle upon order of police) are construed narrowly and do not fit these facts.”
Dines v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 1988 Mass. App. Div. 120 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1988). “G.L.c.266,§29 provides that unless notice is given to the owner in five days by the storage facility the lien shall be lost.”
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