REVISED JUDICATURE ACT OF 1961
Act 236 of 1961
600.2967 Recovery of damages by firefighter or police officer; circumstances as proof; construction of section; definitions.
Sec. 2967.
(1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official capacity must prove that 1 or more of the following circumstances are present:
(a) An injury or resulting death that is a basis for the cause of action was caused by a person's conduct and that conduct is 1 or more of the following:
(i) Grossly negligent.
(ii) Wanton.
(iii) Willful.
(iv) Intentional.
(v) Conduct that results in a conviction, guilty plea, or plea of no contest to a crime under state or federal law, or a local criminal ordinance that substantially corresponds to a crime under state law.
(b) The cause of action is a product liability action that is based on firefighting or police officer equipment that failed while it was being used by the firefighter or police officer during the legally required or authorized duties of the profession, which duties were performed during an emergency situation and which duties substantially increased the likelihood of the resulting death or injury, and all of the following are true:
(i) The negligent person is not someone whose act or omission resulted in the firefighter's or police officer's presence at the place where the injury occurred; or the person is someone whose act or omission resulted in the firefighter's or police officer's presence at the place where the injury occurred and the action is based on an act by that person that occurred after the firefighter or police officer arrived at the place where the injury occurred.
(ii) The negligent person is not someone from whom the firefighter or police officer had sought or obtained assistance or is not an owner or tenant of the property from where the firefighter or police officer sought or obtained assistance.
(iii) The negligent person is not someone who is an owner or tenant of the property that the firefighter or police officer was on in his or her official capacity; or the person is someone who is an owner or tenant of the property that the firefighter or police officer was on in his or her official capacity and the action is based on an act by that person that occurred after the firefighter or police officer arrived at the place where the injury occurred.
(c) An injury or resulting death that is a basis for the cause of action was caused by a person's ordinary negligence and all of the following are true:
(i) The negligent person is not someone whose act or omission resulted in the firefighter's or police officer's presence at the place where the injury occurred; or the person is someone whose act or omission resulted in the firefighter's or police officer's presence at the place where the injury occurred and the action is based on an act by that person that occurred after the firefighter or police officer arrived at the place where the injury occurred.
(ii) The negligent person is not someone from whom the firefighter or police officer had sought or obtained assistance or is not an owner or tenant of the property from where the firefighter or police officer sought or obtained assistance.
(iii) The negligent person is not someone who is an owner or tenant of the property that the firefighter or police officer was on in his or her official capacity; or the person is someone who is an owner or tenant of the property that the firefighter or police officer was on in his or her official capacity and the action is based on an act by that person that occurred after the firefighter or police officer arrived at the place where the injury occurred.
(iv) The firefighter or police officer was engaged in 1 or more of the following:
(A) Operating, or riding in or on, a motor vehicle that is being operated in conformity with the laws applicable to the general public.
(B) An act involving the legally required or authorized duties of the profession that did not substantially increase the likelihood of the resulting death or injury. The court shall not consider the firefighter or police officer to have been engaged in an act that substantially increased the likelihood of death or injury if the injury occurred within a highway right-of-way, if there was emergency lighting activated at the scene, and if the firefighter or police officer was engaged in emergency medical services, accessing a fire hydrant, traffic control, motorist assistance, or a traffic stop for a possible violation of law.
(2) This section shall not be construed to affect a right, remedy, procedure, or limitation of action that is otherwise provided by statute or common law.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) "Grossly negligent" means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injury results.
(b) "Person" means an individual or a partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or other legal entity.
(c) "Product liability action" means that term as defined in section 2945.
History: Add. 1998, Act 389, Imd. Eff. Nov. 30, 1998
Compiler's Notes:
Enacting section 1 of Act 389 of 1998 provides:
“Enacting section 1. Sections 2965, 2966, and 2967 of the revised judicature act of 1961, 1961 PA 236, MCL 600.2965, 600.2966, and 600.2967, as added by this amendatory act, do not apply to a cause of action arising before the effective date of this amendatory act.”
Notes of Decisions
Boulton v. Fenton Twp., 726 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 4× “2966 and MCL 600.2967 are unconstitutional because the original house bill was amended so that its original purpose was changed in violation of the second sentence of Const 1963, art 4, § 24.”
Tull v. Wtf, Inc, 706 N.W.2d 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 6× “The trial court’s order was based on its finding that plaintiffs claim under the dramshop act was precluded by the “firefighters’ rule,” MCL 600.2967. We reverse. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff is a Genesee Township police officer.”
Lego v. Liss, 874 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2016).
· cites it 3× “2966, especially when it is read in conjunction with the general firefighter’s rule, MCL 600.2967. 2 That rule provides that a firefighter or police officer may sue for damages for injuries arising *562 out of a normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk of his or her profession if…”
Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d 308 (Ind. 2009).
“2d 110, 119 (2000) (fireman's rule applies to emergency medical technicians (EMT's) and bars claims for negligent conduct which necessitated the EMT's presence and which caused EMT's injury) Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967 (West 2000) (codifying the fireman's rule and thus…”
Harris-Fields v. Syze, 600 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1999).
· cites it 3× “As applicable to a case like the instant one, MCL § 600.2967; MSA 27A.2967 provides: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her…”
Emily Kincaid v. Robert Croskey (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 18× “2967 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official…”
Mckim v. Forward Lodging, Inc, 702 N.W.2d 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Plaintiff arrived during normal business hours and remained in a parking lot open to the general public. See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 345(2), p 227 (limiting the application of the common-law "fireman's rule" when the public officer is injured on a portion of the land open to…”
Kristy Bastine v. City of Southfield (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 5× “2966, especially when it is read in conjunction with the general firefighter’s rule, MCL 600.2967. That rule provides that a -3- firefighter or police officer may sue for damages for injuries arising out of a normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk of his or her profession if the…”
Michael Lego v. Jake Liss (Mich. 2014).
“In addressing the first issue, the parties shall also address whether, and if so to what extent, MCL 600.2967 informs the interpretation of MCL 600.”
Mccaw v. T & L Operations, Inc., 619 N.W.2d 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
“2967(l)(c)(i), effective November 30, 1998, provides that, in order to recover damages for an injury or death that was caused by ordinary negligence and that arose from the normal, foreseeable risks of his profession, a safety officer must prove that [t]he negligent person is…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(1) — 5 cases
Boulton v. Fenton Twp., 726 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
“2966 and MCL 600.2967 are unconstitutional because the original house bill was amended so that its original purpose was changed in violation of the second sentence of Const 1963, art 4, § 24.”
Lego v. Liss, 874 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2016).
“2966, especially when it is read in conjunction with the general firefighter’s rule, MCL 600.2967. 2 That rule provides that a firefighter or police officer may sue for damages for injuries arising *562 out of a normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk of his or her profession if…”
Mckim v. Forward Lodging, Inc, 702 N.W.2d 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
“Plaintiff arrived during normal business hours and remained in a parking lot open to the general public. See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 345(2), p 227 (limiting the application of the common-law "fireman's rule" when the public officer is injured on a portion of the land open to…”
Kristy Bastine v. City of Southfield (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
“2966, especially when it is read in conjunction with the general firefighter’s rule, MCL 600.2967. That rule provides that a -3- firefighter or police officer may sue for damages for injuries arising out of a normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk of his or her profession if the…”
Emily Kincaid v. Robert Croskey (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“2967 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(1)(a) — 1 case
Emily Kincaid v. Robert Croskey (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“2967 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(1)(a)(i) — 1 case
Kristy Bastine v. City of Southfield (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
“2966, especially when it is read in conjunction with the general firefighter’s rule, MCL 600.2967. That rule provides that a -3- firefighter or police officer may sue for damages for injuries arising out of a normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk of his or her profession if the…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(1)(c) — 1 case
Emily Kincaid v. Robert Croskey (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“2967 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(1)(c)(iv) — 1 case
Emily Kincaid v. Robert Croskey (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“2967 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(1)(c)(iv)(A) — 1 case
Emily Kincaid v. Robert Croskey (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“2967 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(1)(c)(iv)(B) — 1 case
Emily Kincaid v. Robert Croskey (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“2967 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(2) — 1 case
Tull v. Wtf, Inc, 706 N.W.2d 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
“The trial court’s order was based on its finding that plaintiffs claim under the dramshop act was precluded by the “firefighters’ rule,” MCL 600.2967. We reverse. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff is a Genesee Township police officer.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(3)(a) — 1 case
Emily Kincaid v. Robert Croskey (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“2967 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in section 2966, a firefighter or police officer who seeks to recover damages for injury or death arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of his or her profession while acting in his or her official…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(l)(a)(i) — 1 case
Lego v. Liss, 874 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2016).
“2966, especially when it is read in conjunction with the general firefighter’s rule, MCL 600.2967. 2 That rule provides that a firefighter or police officer may sue for damages for injuries arising *562 out of a normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk of his or her profession if…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2967(l)(c)(i) — 1 case
Mccaw v. T & L Operations, Inc., 619 N.W.2d 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
“2967(l)(c)(i), effective November 30, 1998, provides that, in order to recover damages for an injury or death that was caused by ordinary negligence and that arose from the normal, foreseeable risks of his profession, a safety officer must prove that [t]he negligent person is…”
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