THE MICHIGAN PENAL CODE
Act 328 of 1931
750.520c Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree; felony.
Sec. 520c.
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if the person engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:
(a) That other person is under 13 years of age.
(b) That other person is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and any of the following:
(i) The actor is a member of the same household as the victim.
(ii) The actor is related by blood or affinity to the fourth degree to the victim.
(iii) The actor is in a position of authority over the victim and the actor used this authority to coerce the victim to submit.
(iv) The actor is a teacher, substitute teacher, or administrator of the public school, nonpublic school, school district, or intermediate school district in which that other person is enrolled.
(v) The actor is an employee or a contractual service provider of the public school, nonpublic school, school district, or intermediate school district in which that other person is enrolled, or is a volunteer who is not a student in any public school or nonpublic school, or is an employee of this state or of a local unit of government of this state or of the United States assigned to provide any service to that public school, nonpublic school, school district, or intermediate school district, and the actor uses his or her employee, contractual, or volunteer status to gain access to, or to establish a relationship with, that other person.
(vi) The actor is an employee, contractual service provider, or volunteer of a child care organization, or a person licensed to operate a foster family home or a foster family group home in which that other person is a resident and the sexual contact occurs during the period of that other person's residency. As used in this subdivision, "child care organization", "foster family home", and "foster family group home" mean those terms as defined in section 1 of 1973 PA 116, MCL 722.111.
(c) Sexual contact occurs under circumstances involving the commission of any other felony.
(d) The actor is aided or abetted by 1 or more other persons and either of the following circumstances exists:
(i) The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.
(ii) The actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact. Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, any of the circumstances listed in section 520b(1)(f).
(e) The actor is armed with a weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead a person to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual contact. Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, any of the circumstances listed in section 520b(1)(f).
(g) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and the actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.
(h) That other person is mentally incapable, mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and any of the following:
(i) The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the fourth degree.
(ii) The actor is in a position of authority over the victim and used this authority to coerce the victim to submit.
(i) That other person is under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections and the actor is an employee or a contractual employee of, or a volunteer with, the department of corrections who knows that the other person is under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections.
(j) That other person is under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections and the actor is an employee or a contractual employee of, or a volunteer with, a private vendor that operates a youth correctional facility under section 20g of the corrections code of 1953, 1953 PA 232, MCL 791.220g, who knows that the other person is under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections.
(k) That other person is a prisoner or probationer under the jurisdiction of a county for purposes of imprisonment or a work program or other probationary program and the actor is an employee or a contractual employee of or a volunteer with the county or the department of corrections who knows that the other person is under the county's jurisdiction.
(l) The actor knows or has reason to know that a court has detained the victim in a facility while the victim is awaiting a trial or hearing, or committed the victim to a facility as a result of the victim having been found responsible for committing an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, and the actor is an employee or contractual employee of, or a volunteer with, the facility in which the victim is detained or to which the victim was committed.
(2) Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree is a felony punishable as follows:
(a) By imprisonment for not more than 15 years.
(b) In addition to the penalty specified in subdivision (a), the court shall sentence the defendant to lifetime electronic monitoring under section 520n if the violation involved sexual contact committed by an individual 17 years of age or older against an individual less than 13 years of age.
History: Add. 1974, Act 266, Eff. Apr. 1, 1975 ;-- Am. 1983, Act 158, Eff. Mar. 29, 1984 ;-- Am. 2000, Act 227, Eff. Oct. 1, 2000 ;-- Am. 2002, Act 714, Eff. Apr. 1, 2003 ;-- Am. 2006, Act 171, Eff. Aug. 28, 2006 ;-- Am. 2007, Act 163, Eff. July 1, 2008 ;-- Am. 2012, Act 372, Eff. Apr. 1, 2013
Compiler's Notes:
Section 2 of Act 266 of 1974 provides:
“Saving clause.
“All proceedings pending and all rights and liabilities existing, acquired, or incurred at the time this amendatory act takes effect are saved and may be consummated according to the law in force when they are commenced. This amendatory act shall not be construed to affect any prosecution pending or begun before the effective date of this amendatory act.”
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
1,054
cases (
308 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case:
People v. Brantley, 823 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
People v. Brantley, 823 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 15× “However, having examined this provision in context and compared it to MCL 750.520c, we conclude that the Legislature intended the modifying phrase “for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age” to…”
People v. Nyx, 734 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. 2007).
· cites it 18× “I concur with the result reached by the lead opinion affirming the Court of Appeals decision to vacate defendant's conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c. Defendant did not have adequate notice that he faced the charge of CSC II, so…”
People v. Knapp, 624 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 7× “WHAT CONSTITUTES COERCION FOR PURPOSES OF MCL 750.520c(l) (b)(iii); MSA 28.788(3)(l)(b)(iii)? Defendant says that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence that he was in a position of authority over complainant and insufficient evidence that he used his position of…”
People v. Cole, 817 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 2012).
· cites it 7× “520b(2)(d) or MCL 750.520c(2)(b). We answer this question in the affirmative and hold that mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring is part of the sentence itself.”
People v. King, 824 N.W.2d 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 5× “The prosecution argues that lifetime electronic monitoring applies to all persons convicted of CSC-I regardless of the victim’s age, i.”
People v. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d 811 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 9× “520b (first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I))] or [MCL 750.520c (CSC-II)] for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age shall be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring .”
People v. Lemmon, 576 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1998).
· cites it 4× “§ 750.520c; M.S.A. § 28.788(3). [3] M.C.L.”
People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1993).
· cites it 4× “[6] While we disagree that the evidence was relevant to the theory of a true plan, we agree that the evidence is presumptively relevant and material to a disputed issue in the case.”
People of Michigan v. Stanley G Duncan, 494 Mich. 713 (Mich. 2013).
· cites it 3× “520b(1)(a), and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a). His wife, Vita Duncan (Docket No.”
People v. Johnson, 889 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “520b(l)(a), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(l)(a). Defendant was sentenced to 25 to 90 years’ imprisonment for each of his first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions and 71 months to 15 years’ imprisonment for his second-degree criminal…”
People v. Deleon, 895 N.W.2d 577 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 3× ““Sexual contact” means “the intentional touching of the victim’s or [defendant’s] intimate parts .”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1) — 28 cases
People v. Nyx, 734 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. 2007).
“I concur with the result reached by the lead opinion affirming the Court of Appeals decision to vacate defendant's conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c. Defendant did not have adequate notice that he faced the charge of CSC II, so…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(A) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(a) — 441 cases
People of Michigan v. Stanley G Duncan, 494 Mich. 713 (Mich. 2013).
“520b(1)(a), and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a). His wife, Vita Duncan (Docket No.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(b) — 73 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(b)(i) — 18 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(b)(ii) — 26 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(b)(iii) — 11 cases
People v. Nyx, 734 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. 2007).
“I concur with the result reached by the lead opinion affirming the Court of Appeals decision to vacate defendant's conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c. Defendant did not have adequate notice that he faced the charge of CSC II, so…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(c) — 15 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(c)(d)(ii) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(d) — 4 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(d)(ii) — 3 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(e) — 9 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(f) — 26 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(g) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(h) — 4 cases
People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1993).
“[6] While we disagree that the evidence was relevant to the theory of a true plan, we agree that the evidence is presumptively relevant and material to a disputed issue in the case.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(h)(i) — 4 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(h)(ii) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(k) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(l) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(2) — 21 cases
People v. Lemmon, 576 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1998).
“§ 750.520c; M.S.A. § 28.788(3). [3] M.C.L.”
People v. Nyx, 734 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. 2007).
“I concur with the result reached by the lead opinion affirming the Court of Appeals decision to vacate defendant's conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c. Defendant did not have adequate notice that he faced the charge of CSC II, so…”
People v. Brantley, 823 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
“However, having examined this provision in context and compared it to MCL 750.520c, we conclude that the Legislature intended the modifying phrase “for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age” to…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(2)(B) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(2)(a) — 14 cases
People v. King, 824 N.W.2d 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
“The prosecution argues that lifetime electronic monitoring applies to all persons convicted of CSC-I regardless of the victim’s age, i.”
People v. Brantley, 823 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
“However, having examined this provision in context and compared it to MCL 750.520c, we conclude that the Legislature intended the modifying phrase “for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age” to…”
People v. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d 811 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“520b (first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I))] or [MCL 750.520c (CSC-II)] for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age shall be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring .”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(2)(b) — 164 cases
People v. Cole, 817 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 2012).
“520b(2)(d) or MCL 750.520c(2)(b). We answer this question in the affirmative and hold that mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring is part of the sentence itself.”
People v. Brantley, 823 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
“However, having examined this provision in context and compared it to MCL 750.520c, we conclude that the Legislature intended the modifying phrase “for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age” to…”
People v. Hallak, 873 N.W.2d 811 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
“520b (first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I))] or [MCL 750.520c (CSC-II)] for criminal sexual conduct committed by an individual 17 years old or older against an individual less than 13 years of age shall be sentenced to lifetime electronic monitoring .”
People v. King, 824 N.W.2d 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
“The prosecution argues that lifetime electronic monitoring applies to all persons convicted of CSC-I regardless of the victim’s age, i.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(2)(b)(ii) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(2)(c) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(b)(i) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(b)(iii) — 2 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(c) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(f) — 2 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(k) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l) — 14 cases
People v. Nyx, 734 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. 2007).
“I concur with the result reached by the lead opinion affirming the Court of Appeals decision to vacate defendant's conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c. Defendant did not have adequate notice that he faced the charge of CSC II, so…”
People v. Knapp, 624 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
“WHAT CONSTITUTES COERCION FOR PURPOSES OF MCL 750.520c(l) (b)(iii); MSA 28.788(3)(l)(b)(iii)? Defendant says that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence that he was in a position of authority over complainant and insufficient evidence that he used his position of…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(a) — 86 cases
People v. Johnson, 889 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
“520b(l)(a), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(l)(a). Defendant was sentenced to 25 to 90 years’ imprisonment for each of his first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions and 71 months to 15 years’ imprisonment for his second-degree criminal…”
People v. Deleon, 895 N.W.2d 577 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
““Sexual contact” means “the intentional touching of the victim’s or [defendant’s] intimate parts .”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(b) — 10 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(b)(i) — 3 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(b)(ii) — 4 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(b)(iii) — 4 cases
People v. Knapp, 624 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
“WHAT CONSTITUTES COERCION FOR PURPOSES OF MCL 750.520c(l) (b)(iii); MSA 28.788(3)(l)(b)(iii)? Defendant says that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence that he was in a position of authority over complainant and insufficient evidence that he used his position of…”
People v. Nyx, 734 N.W.2d 548 (Mich. 2007).
“I concur with the result reached by the lead opinion affirming the Court of Appeals decision to vacate defendant's conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c. Defendant did not have adequate notice that he faced the charge of CSC II, so…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(bXm) — 1 case
People v. Knapp, 624 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
“WHAT CONSTITUTES COERCION FOR PURPOSES OF MCL 750.520c(l) (b)(iii); MSA 28.788(3)(l)(b)(iii)? Defendant says that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence that he was in a position of authority over complainant and insufficient evidence that he used his position of…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(c) — 6 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(d)(ii) — 1 case
In re TD, 823 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(e) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(f) — 10 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(h) — 2 cases
People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1993).
“[6] While we disagree that the evidence was relevant to the theory of a true plan, we agree that the evidence is presumptively relevant and material to a disputed issue in the case.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(l)(h)(i) — 1 case
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