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Minn. Stat.Chapter 260C. Juvenile Safety and Placement

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2026)

Termination Of Parental Rights

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text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
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CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 2000–2026 180citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 180 opinions since 2000, 29 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b)(4) (1 case).

Subdivision 1.Voluntary and involuntary.

The juvenile court may upon petition, terminate all rights of a parent to a child:

(a) with the written consent of a parent who for good cause desires to terminate parental rights; or

(b) if it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:

(1) that the parent has abandoned the child;

(2) that the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship, including but not limited to providing the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and development, if the parent is physically and financially able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore unreasonable;

(3) that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship either of which are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child. It is presumed that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship upon a showing that the parent's parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated or that the parent's custodial rights to another child have been involuntarily transferred to a relative under a juvenile protection proceeding or a similar process of another jurisdiction;

(4) that following the child's placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child's placement. It is presumed that reasonable efforts under this clause have failed upon a showing that:

(i) a child has resided out of the parental home under court order for a cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding 22 months. In the case of a child under age eight at the time the petition was filed alleging the child to be in need of protection or services, the presumption arises when the child has resided out of the parental home under court order for six months unless the parent has maintained regular contact with the child and the parent is complying with the out-of-home placement plan;

(ii) the court has approved the out-of-home placement plan required under section 260C.212 and filed with the court under section 260C.178;

(iii) conditions leading to the out-of-home placement have not been corrected. It is presumed that conditions leading to a child's out-of-home placement have not been corrected upon a showing that the parent or parents have not substantially complied with the court's orders and a reasonable case plan; and

(iv) reasonable efforts have been made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

This clause does not prohibit the termination of parental rights prior to one year, or in the case of a child under age eight, prior to six months after a child has been placed out of the home.

It is also presumed that reasonable efforts have failed under this clause upon a showing that:

(A) the parent has been diagnosed as chemically dependent by a professional certified to make the diagnosis;

(B) the parent has been required by a case plan to participate in a chemical dependency treatment program;

(C) the treatment programs offered to the parent were culturally, linguistically, and clinically appropriate;

(D) the parent has either failed two or more times to successfully complete a treatment program or has refused at two or more separate meetings with a caseworker to participate in a treatment program; and

(E) the parent continues to abuse chemicals.

(5) that a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent's care that is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack of regard for the child's well-being, such that a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent's care;

(6) that in the case of a child born to a mother who was not married to the child's father when the child was conceived nor when the child was born the person is not entitled to notice of an adoption hearing under section 259.49 and the person has not registered with the fathers' adoption registry under section 259.52;

(7) that the child is neglected and in foster care; or

(8) that the parent has been convicted of a crime listed in section 260.012, paragraph (g), clauses (1) to (5).

In an action involving an American Indian child, sections 260.751 to 260.835 and the Indian Child Welfare Act, United States Code, title 25, sections 1901 to 1923, control to the extent that the provisions of this section are inconsistent with those laws.

Subd. 2.Evidence of abandonment.

For purposes of subdivision 1, clause (b), item (1):

(a) Abandonment is presumed when:

(1) the parent has had no contact with the child on a regular basis and not demonstrated consistent interest in the child's well-being for six months and the social services agency has made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact, unless the parent establishes that an extreme financial or physical hardship or treatment for mental disability or chemical dependency or other good cause prevented the parent from making contact with the child. This presumption does not apply to children whose custody has been determined under chapter 257 or 518; or

(2) the child is an infant under two years of age and has been deserted by the parent under circumstances that show an intent not to return to care for the child.

The court is not prohibited from finding abandonment in the absence of the presumptions in clauses (1) and (2).

(b) The following are prima facie evidence of abandonment where there has been a showing that the person was not entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding under section 259.49:

(1) failure to register with the fathers' adoption registry under section 259.52; or

(2) if the person registered with the fathers' adoption registry under section 259.52:

(i) filing a denial of paternity within 30 days of receipt of notice under section 259.52, subdivision 8;

(ii) failing to timely file an intent to claim parental rights with entry of appearance form within 30 days of receipt of notice under section 259.52, subdivision 10; or

(iii) timely filing an intent to claim parental rights with entry of appearance form within 30 days of receipt of notice under section 259.52, subdivision 10, but failing to initiate a paternity action within 30 days of receiving the fathers' adoption registry notice where there has been no showing of good cause for the delay.

Subd. 3.

[Repealed, 2013 c 125 art 1 s 108]

Subd. 4.Current foster care children.

Except for cases where the child is in placement due solely to the child's developmental disability or a mental illness, where custody has not been transferred to the responsible social services agency, and where the court finds compelling reasons to continue placement, the county attorney shall file a termination of parental rights petition or a petition to transfer permanent legal and physical custody to a relative under section 260C.515, subdivision 4, for all children who have been in out-of-home care for 15 of the most recent 22 months. This requirement does not apply if there is a compelling reason approved by the court for determining that filing a termination of parental rights petition or other permanency petition would not be in the best interests of the child or if the responsible social services agency has not provided reasonable efforts necessary for the safe return of the child, if reasonable efforts are required.

Subd. 5.Adoptive parent.

For purposes of subdivision 1, clause (a), an adoptive parent may not terminate parental rights to an adopted child for a reason that would not apply to a birth parent seeking termination of parental rights to a child under subdivision 1, clause (a).

Subd. 6.When prior finding required.

For purposes of subdivision 1, clause (b), no prior judicial finding of need for protection or services, or neglected and in foster care is required, except as provided in subdivision 1, clause (b), item (5).

Subd. 7.Best interests of child paramount.

In any proceeding under this section, the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration, provided that the conditions in subdivision 1, clause (a), or at least one condition in subdivision 1, clause (b), are found by the court. In proceedings involving an American Indian child, as defined in section 260.755, subdivision 8, the best interests of the child must be determined consistent with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, United States Code, title 25, section 1901, et seq. Where the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.

Subd. 8.Findings regarding reasonable efforts.

In any proceeding under this section, the court shall make specific findings:

(1) that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family; or

(2) that reasonable efforts for reunification are not required as provided under section 260.012.

The 20 cases that cite Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
cites § 260C.301 174×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“The question presented in this case is whether Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2012), which provides that parents who previously have had their parental rights to children involuntarily terminated are presumed to be palpably unfit to parent other children, violates the…”
The case’s holding
Involuntary termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground and must be in the best interest of the child.
Later courts cite it for
“an involuntary termination of parental rights is proper only when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the termination is in the child's best interest.” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child. of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2004).
cites § 260C.301 54×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“See Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1)-(2), (5), (8) (2002).”
The case’s holding
Termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground in addition to a finding that termination is in the children's best interests.
Later courts cite it for
“at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the child's best interests.” · 11 citing courts
3
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381 (Minn. 2008).
cites § 260C.301 45×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“The district court, following a bench trial, terminated father and mother's rights under Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) and (8).”
The case’s holding
A parent must seek a court modification rather than ignoring a provision of an approved case plan that they believe is unreasonable.
Later courts cite it for
“to determine whether the district court's findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” · 6 citing courts
4
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2008).
cites § 260C.301 35×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).”
The case’s holding
A finding is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.
Later courts cite it for
“a finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” · 34 citing courts
5
GREENIn re the Welfare of J.R., 655 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003).
cites § 260C.301 26×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2001); Welfare of M.”
The case’s holding
Failure to adhere to timelines established in the rules of juvenile protection procedure may result in harm to the child (strict compliance with procedural deadlines is required).
Later courts cite it for
“each delay in the termination of a parent's rights equates to a delay in a child's opportunity to have a permanent home and can seriously affect a child's chance for permanent placement.” · 15 citing courts
6
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 260C.301 25×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“It concluded that termination was supported by clear and convincing evidence of four separate statutory grounds: (1) failure to meet parental duties under Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2010); (2) palpable unfitness under Minn.”
The case’s holding
The collateral-legal-consequences rule applies when a minor child dies during the pendency of an appeal (In re the Welfare of the Child of J.K.T.).
Later courts cite it for
“parental rights may be terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” · 8 citing courts
7
GREENIn re the Child of Simon, 662 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 260C.301 40×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“, the district court relied on three statutory criteria, finding that (1) Simon failed to comply with the duties and responsibilities of the parent-child relationship, Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2002); (2) Simon failed to correct the conditions that led to the…”
Later courts cite it for
“ample evidence of a lack of compliance with the duties and responsibilities of the parent-child relationship.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENIn re the Welfare of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 260C.301 16×cited by 83 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“See Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2010) (respectively).”
The case’s holding
A district court's determination regarding the existence of statutory bases for termination and the best interest of the child is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Later courts cite it for
“determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” · 14 citing courts
9
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child. of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 260C.301 20×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“At the same hearing, they waived their rights to a TPR trial and agreed to a voluntary termination of their parental rights under Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a) (2006).”
Later courts cite it for
“due process requires reasonable notice, a timely opportunity for a hearing, the right to counsel, the opportunity to present evidence, the right to an impartial decision-maker, and the right to a reasonable decision based solely on the record.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 260C.301 18×cited by 33 cases
The case’s holding
Parental rights may be terminated only for grave and weighty reasons, and a prior involuntary termination creates a presumption of palpable unfitness that the parent must rebut by clear and convincing evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“parental rights may be terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” · 6 citing courts
11
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child. of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 260C.301 16×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“The district court filed an order on March 14, terminating appellant’s parental rights to the twins under Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), and (8) (2010).”
Later courts cite it for
“to determine whether they address the statutory criteria for termination and are not clearly erroneous, in light of the clear-and- convincing standard of proof.” · 7 citing courts
12
GREENIn re P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 260C.301 42×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2002), creates a presumption of palpable unfitness to be a party to the parent-and-child relationship where parental rights to another child have been previously involuntarily terminated.”
Later courts cite it for
“adjudicated as failing to adequately provide for the child's health and safety,” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child. of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 260C.301 19×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“” Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (6) (2012).”
Later courts cite it for
“consists of weighing three primary factors: the child's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship, the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship, and any competing interest of the child.” · 4 citing courts
14
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 260C.301 12×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“Louis County Public Health and Human Services (county) filed a termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) petition under Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2006), alleging that the parents are presumed to be palpably unfit based on their previous involuntary terminations.”
The case’s holding
A parent must do more than engage in services to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness; the parent must demonstrate that parenting abilities have improved, not merely cooperate superficially.
Later courts cite it for
“a parent must do more than engage in services; a parent must demonstrate that his or her parenting abilities have improved.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENIn re G. J. Parents F., 920 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 260C.301 14×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“Nevertheless, in this case, we will invoke our discretion to briefly consider whether the evidence is sufficient to clearly and convincingly establish a statutory basis for termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2016). 4 See *655 Minn.”
Later courts cite it for
“apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court's conclusion that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENIn re Welfare of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 260C.301 16×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“See Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5) (2006).”
The case’s holding
A parent rebuts the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness by introducing evidence sufficient to justify a finding that she is not palpably unfit, shifting only the burden of production.
Later courts cite it for
“justify a finding of fact' that the parent is not palpably unfit,” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENIn re the Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 2001).
cites § 260C.301 10×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“because: respondent had substantially, continuously or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child relationship, see Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2000); respondent was palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child…”
The case’s holding
Termination of parental rights requires findings that conditions existing at the time of termination will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.
Later courts cite it for
“whether the district court's findings address the statutory criteria and whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” · 7 citing courts
18
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child. of B.J.B., 747 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 260C.301 20×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“On October 5, 2007, after appellant finished the treatment program, the parties signed a stipulation in which appellant admitted to the termination petition under Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2006), which provides grounds for termination if, following the children's…”
Later courts cite it for
“whether a parent's due-process rights have been violated in a termination proceeding is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child of T.P., 747 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 2008).
cites § 260C.301 19×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“(“Mother”) challenges an order of the Otter Tail County District Court terminating her parental rights under Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6) (2006), arguing that the district court erred in concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the statutory criteria…”
Later courts cite it for
“in the parent's care' should not be limited to the physical presence of a parent at the time egregious harm occurs.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENIn re the Welfare of the Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 260C.301 12×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 260C.301
“See Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 3 (2008) (requiring that the county attorney file a TPR petition concerning a child “determined to be the sibling of another child of the parent who was subjected to egregious harm”); see also Minn.”
Later courts cite it for
“close review . . . into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing.” · 4 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
200020132026

One bar per year. Tallest: 42 cases in 2016. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Minn. Ct. App.155Minn.17D.C.28th Cir.1Iowa1D. Minn.1Tenn. Ct. App.1Wis.1
By subsection
(b)(4)1 case
In the Interest of J.H., Minor Child, 952 N.W.2d 157 (Iowa 2020).

Show all 180 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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