(1) In case of death, injury, or property damage to any innocent third party proximately caused by the action of a law enforcement officer employed by a political subdivision during vehicular pursuit, damages shall be paid to such third party by the political subdivision employing the officer.
(2) Upon payment by a political subdivision of those damages sustained by an innocent third party, whether upon voluntary settlement or in satisfaction of a judgment, the political subdivision shall be entitled to reimbursement of the amount of damages paid by the political subdivision from each and all of the following sources:
(a) The driver of the fleeing vehicle;
(b) Any organization, including a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation, liable for the conduct of the driver of the fleeing vehicle;
(c) Every insurer or self-insurance surety of either the driver of the fleeing vehicle or any organization, including a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation, liable for the conduct of the driver of the fleeing vehicle, except that no such insurer or self-insurance surety shall be required to pay in excess of the liability limit of its applicable policies or bonds;
(d) Any uninsured or underinsured motorist insurer or self-insurance surety legally liable to the innocent third party, except that the sum recoverable from such insurer or self-insurance surety shall not exceed the highest limit of liability determined in accord with the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Act;
(e) The state employing law enforcement officers whose actions contributed to the proximate cause of death, injury, or property damage sustained by the innocent third party, except that the liability of the state shall not exceed the damages sustained by the innocent third party apportioned equally among all political subdivisions employing law enforcement officers whose actions contributed to the proximate cause of the death, injury, or property damage sustained by the innocent third party and the state; and
(f) Any political subdivision employing law enforcement officers whose actions contributed to the proximate cause of death, injury, or property damage sustained by the innocent third party, except that the liability of the political subdivision shall not exceed the lesser of (i) its maximum statutory liability pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act or (ii) damages sustained by the innocent third party apportioned equally among all political subdivisions and the state employing law enforcement officers whose actions contributed to the proximate cause of the death, injury, or property damage sustained by the innocent third party.
(3) This section shall not relieve any public or private source required statutorily or contractually to pay benefits for disability or loss of earned income or medical expenses of the duty to pay such benefits when due. No such source of payment shall have any right of subrogation or contribution against the political subdivision.
(4) This section shall be considered part of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act and all provisions of the act apply.
(5) For purposes of this section, vehicular pursuit means an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle to apprehend one or more occupants of another motor vehicle, when the driver of the fleeing vehicle is or should be aware of such attempt and is resisting apprehension by maintaining or increasing his or her speed, ignoring the officer, or attempting to elude the officer while driving at speeds in excess of those reasonable and proper under the conditions.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1992–2024 · leading case:
Henery v. City of Omaha, 641 N.W.2d 644 (Neb. 2002).
Henery v. City of Omaha, 641 N.W.2d 644 (Neb. 2002).
· cites it 31× “Henery, the special administrator of Henery’s estate (special administrator), filed a petition in the district court for Douglas County alleging that the City of Omaha was liable for damages due to Henery’s death by operation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 1991) in that…”
Staley v. City of Omaha, 713 N.W.2d 457 (Neb. 2006).
· cites it 10× “1999), alleging negligence on the part of the officer conducting the pursuit and strict liability under § 13-911. Following a bench trial, the district court for Douglas County found that the officer was not negligent but held that the City was strictly liable based on a finding…”
Jura v. City of Omaha, 727 N.W.2d 735 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 9× “Jura (Amanda), was an “innocent third party,” thus entitling her estate to recover under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 1997). We affirm the trial court’s finding that Amanda was not an innocent third party.”
Williams v. City of Omaha, 293 Neb. 320 (2015).
· cites it 25× “A police pursuit as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 2012) involves multiple elements and is a much more nuanced matter than simply deciding whether one vehicle is trying to catch up to, or maintain sight of, another.”
Perez v. City of Omaha, 731 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 32× “The issues were whether a police vehicular pursuit pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 1997) occurred and, if so, whether Dale, the driver of one of the vehicles involved, knew or should have known about any such pursuit and whether any such pursuit was the proximate…”
Fales v. Cnty. of Stanton, 898 N.W.2d 352 (Neb. 2017).
· cites it 21× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 2012) provides a remedy to an innocent third party for damages caused by a law enforcement officer’s vehicular pursuit.”
Reed v. City of Omaha, 724 N.W.2d 834 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 16× “This appeal involves a case in which a police pursuit resulted in a traffic accident wherein two passengers were killed and whether one of them, Robin Abraham, was an “innocent third party,” thus entitling her estate to recover under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 1997). We…”
Allied Mut. Ins. v. City of Lincoln, 694 N.W.2d 832 (Neb. 2005).
· cites it 2× “BACKGROUND In 1999, Sarah Cockson, in her individual capacity, and Robert Cockson, as personal representative of the estate of Laura Cockson, filed a claim against the city under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 1997) of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, alleging that…”
Meyer v. State, 650 N.W.2d 459 (Neb. 2002).
· cites it 3× “In Stewart , we construed Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 1991), which addressed vehicular pursuits conducted by officers of political subdivisions.”
Lalley v. City of Omaha, 670 N.W.2d 327 (Neb. 2003).
· cites it 4× “Following a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment by the City and the OPD, overruled Lalley’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Lalley’s petition with prejudice.”
Stewart v. City of Omaha, 494 N.W.2d 130 (Neb. 1993).
· cites it 6× “In the petition’s second cause of action, it was alleged that the City was strictly liable to Stewart’s estate by operation of § 13-911 in that Stewart was an innocent third party whose death was proximately caused by the vehicular pursuit by the Omaha police officer.”
Mid Century Ins. v. City of Omaha, 494 N.W.2d 320 (Neb. 1992).
· cites it 6× “The theory upon which the case was tried to the court was that the accident was proximately caused by law enforcement officers during vehicular pursuit as set forth in § 13-911. Section 13-911 provides as follows: In case of death, injury, or property damage to any innocent…”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911(1): 7 cases
Jura v. City of Omaha, 727 N.W.2d 735 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007).
“Jura (Amanda), was an “innocent third party,” thus entitling her estate to recover under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 1997). We affirm the trial court’s finding that Amanda was not an innocent third party.”
Staley v. City of Omaha, 713 N.W.2d 457 (Neb. 2006).
“1999), alleging negligence on the part of the officer conducting the pursuit and strict liability under § 13-911. Following a bench trial, the district court for Douglas County found that the officer was not negligent but held that the City was strictly liable based on a finding…”
Reed v. City of Omaha, 724 N.W.2d 834 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006).
“This appeal involves a case in which a police pursuit resulted in a traffic accident wherein two passengers were killed and whether one of them, Robin Abraham, was an “innocent third party,” thus entitling her estate to recover under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 1997). We…”
Fales v. Cnty. of Stanton, 898 N.W.2d 352 (Neb. 2017).
“Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 2012) provides a remedy to an innocent third party for damages caused by a law enforcement officer’s vehicular pursuit.”
Williams v. City of Omaha, 293 Neb. 320 (2015).
“A police pursuit as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 2012) involves multiple elements and is a much more nuanced matter than simply deciding whether one vehicle is trying to catch up to, or maintain sight of, another.”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911(2): 1 case
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911(2)(c): 1 case
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911(5): 3 cases
Staley v. City of Omaha, 713 N.W.2d 457 (Neb. 2006).
“1999), alleging negligence on the part of the officer conducting the pursuit and strict liability under § 13-911. Following a bench trial, the district court for Douglas County found that the officer was not negligent but held that the City was strictly liable based on a finding…”
Williams v. City of Omaha, 293 Neb. 320 (2015).
“A police pursuit as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-911 (Reissue 2012) involves multiple elements and is a much more nuanced matter than simply deciding whether one vehicle is trying to catch up to, or maintain sight of, another.”
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