Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.166 (2026)

Felony committed in violation of order for protection or order to restrict conduct; restriction on probation and suspension of sentence

✓ current as of July 2026
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NRS 193.166  Felony committed in violation of order for protection or order to restrict conduct; restriction on probation and suspension of sentence.

      1.  Except as otherwise provided in NRS 193.169, a person who commits a crime that is punishable as a felony, other than a crime that is punishable as a felony pursuant to subsection 6 of NRS 33.400, subsection 5 of NRS 200.378 or subsection 5 of NRS 200.591, in violation of:

      (a) A temporary or extended order for protection against domestic violence issued pursuant to NRS 33.020;

      (b) An order for protection against harassment in the workplace issued pursuant to NRS 33.270;

      (c) A temporary or extended order for the protection of a child issued pursuant to NRS 33.400;

      (d) An emergency or extended order for protection against high-risk behavior issued pursuant to NRS 33.570 or 33.580;

      (e) An order for protection against domestic violence issued in an action or proceeding brought pursuant to title 11 of NRS;

      (f) A temporary or extended order issued pursuant to NRS 200.378; or

      (g) A temporary or extended order issued pursuant to NRS 200.591,

Ê shall, in addition to the term of imprisonment prescribed by statute for the crime, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 5 years. If the crime committed by the person is punishable as a category A felony or category B felony, in addition to the term of imprisonment prescribed by statute for that crime, the person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 20 years.

      2.  In determining the length of the additional penalty imposed pursuant to this section, the court shall consider the following information:

      (a) The facts and circumstances of the crime;

      (b) The criminal history of the person;

      (c) The impact of the crime on any victim;

      (d) Any mitigating factors presented by the person; and

      (e) Any other relevant information.

Ê The court shall state on the record that it has considered the information described in paragraphs (a) to (e), inclusive, in determining the length of the additional penalty imposed.

      3.  The sentence prescribed by this section:

      (a) Must not exceed the sentence imposed for the crime; and

      (b) Runs concurrently or consecutively with the sentence prescribed by statute for the crime, as ordered by the court.

      4.  The court shall not grant probation to or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of attempted murder, battery which involves the use of a deadly weapon, battery which results in substantial bodily harm or battery which is committed by strangulation as described in NRS 200.481 or 200.485 if an additional term of imprisonment may be imposed for that primary offense pursuant to this section.

      5.  This section does not create a separate offense but provides an additional penalty for the primary offense, whose imposition is contingent upon the finding of the prescribed fact.

      (Added to NRS by 2003, 1514; A 2005, 953; 2007, 58, 3189; 2009, 86, 227; 2019, 4178; 2021, 600; 2023, 1606)

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2009–2022 · leading case: Truesdell v. State, 304 P.3d 396 (Nev. 2013).
Truesdell v. State, 304 P.3d 396 (Nev. 2013). · cites it 4× “In contrast, the validity of a TPO is not an element that the State must prove for the crime of home invasion or for a sentence enhancement for the violation of a TPO.”
Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 218 P.3d 501 (Nev. 2009). · cites it 2× “163(1)); felonies committed in violation of a protective order (NRS 193.166(2)); crimes committed against persons over age 60 or vulnerable persons (NRS 193.”
Branch (Ashley) v. State (Nev. 2018). · cites it 2× “? As the State correctly argues, the EPO was not being offered solely for sentencing enhancement purposes under NRS 193.166(1)(a). 1 Although the EPO likely constitutes evidence of a prior bad act, it was admissible to show Ashley's motive, intent, and lack of mistake or…”
Konops (Kenneth) Vs. State, 472 P.3d 192 (Nev. 2020). “Based on this evidence, a rational juror could have found that appellant maliciously engaged in a course of conduct including objectively threatening behavior that was intended to place the victim in "reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm." NRS 200.575(1), (3).…”
Grimes v. Williams (D. Nev. 2022). “According to the victim, Grimes walked over to the kitchen counter, 27 grabbed a knife from a drying rack next to the kitchen sink, and dragged her back to the front door before stabbing her 21 times. 28 1 We conclude that a rational juror could infer from these circumstances…”
Rico-Rivas (Salvador) v. State (Nev. 2015). “Rico- Rivas first challenges the admission of evidence of a temporary protective order (TPO) obtained by the victim against him and argues that the TPO was relevant only as to his sentence and should not have been admitted at trial.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.166(1)(a) — 3 cases
Truesdell v. State, 304 P.3d 396 (Nev. 2013). “In contrast, the validity of a TPO is not an element that the State must prove for the crime of home invasion or for a sentence enhancement for the violation of a TPO.”
Branch (Ashley) v. State (Nev. 2018). “? As the State correctly argues, the EPO was not being offered solely for sentencing enhancement purposes under NRS 193.166(1)(a). 1 Although the EPO likely constitutes evidence of a prior bad act, it was admissible to show Ashley's motive, intent, and lack of mistake or…”
Konops (Kenneth) Vs. State, 472 P.3d 192 (Nev. 2020). “Based on this evidence, a rational juror could have found that appellant maliciously engaged in a course of conduct including objectively threatening behavior that was intended to place the victim in "reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm." NRS 200.575(1), (3).…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.166(2) — 1 case
Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 218 P.3d 501 (Nev. 2009). “163(1)); felonies committed in violation of a protective order (NRS 193.166(2)); crimes committed against persons over age 60 or vulnerable persons (NRS 193.”
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