Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366 (2026)

Sexual assault: Definition; penalties; exclusions

✓ current as of July 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section NRSleg.state.nv.us (official) Justiaon Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
NRS 200.366  Sexual assault: Definition; penalties; exclusions.

      1.  A person is guilty of sexual assault if the person:

      (a) Subjects another person to sexual penetration, or forces another person to make a sexual penetration on themselves or another, or on a beast, against the will of the victim or under conditions in which the perpetrator knows or should know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of the perpetrator’s conduct; or

      (b) Commits a sexual penetration upon a child under the age of 14 years or causes a child under the age of 14 years to make a sexual penetration on themselves or another, or on a beast.

      2.  Except as otherwise provided in subsections 3 and 4, a person who commits a sexual assault is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished:

      (a) If substantial bodily harm to the victim results from the actions of the defendant committed in connection with or as a part of the sexual assault, by imprisonment in the state prison:

             (1) For life without the possibility of parole; or

             (2) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 15 years has been served.

      (b) If no substantial bodily harm to the victim results, by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served.

      3.  Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, a person who commits a sexual assault against a child under the age of 16 years is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished:

      (a) If the crime results in substantial bodily harm to the child, by imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.

      (b) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c), if the crime does not result in substantial bodily harm to the child, by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 25 years has been served.

      (c) If the crime is committed against a child under the age of 14 years and does not result in substantial bodily harm to the child, by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 35 years has been served.

      4.  A person who commits a sexual assault against a child under the age of 16 years and who has been previously convicted of:

      (a) A sexual assault pursuant to this section or any other sexual offense against a child; or

      (b) An offense committed in another jurisdiction that, if committed in this State, would constitute a sexual assault pursuant to this section or any other sexual offense against a child,

Ê is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.

      5.  The provisions of this section do not apply to a person who is less than 18 years of age and who commits any of the acts described in paragraph (b) of subsection 1 if the person is not more than 2 years older than the person upon whom the act was committed unless:

      (a) The person committing the act uses force or threatens the use of force; or

      (b) The person committing the act knows or should know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of the perpetrator’s conduct.

      6.  For the purpose of this section, “other sexual offense against a child” means any act committed by an adult upon a child constituting:

      (a) Incest pursuant to NRS 201.180;

      (b) Lewdness with a child pursuant to NRS 201.230;

      (c) Sado-masochistic abuse pursuant to NRS 201.262; or

      (d) Luring a child using a computer, system or network pursuant to NRS 201.560, if punished as a felony.

      (Added to NRS by 1977, 1626; A 1991, 612; 1995, 1186; 1997, 1179, 1719; 1999, 431; 2003, 2825; 2005, 2874; 2007, 3255; 2015, 2235; 2021, 1392)

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 192 cases (38 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1996).
Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1996). · cites it 10× “On the other hand, Doyle was convicted under the sexual assault statute (NRS 200.366) involving substantial bodily harm.”
Redmen v. State, 828 P.2d 395 (Nev. 1992). · cites it 10× “556 with NRS 200.366. NRS 200.366(3) states: "The trier of fact in a trial for sexual assault shall determine whether substantial bodily harm has been inflicted on the victim and if so, the sentence to be imposed upon the perpetrator.”
McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010). · cites it 2× “Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §200.366 (3) (Michie 1992).”
Brown v. State, 934 P.2d 235 (Nev. 1997). · cites it 9× “The district court erred in separately sentencing Troy for sexual assault of a child and child abuse by sexual abuse because such sentences violate the constitution’s double jeopardy clause Troy was convicted of Counts I and II, which were for sexual assault on a child under…”
Crowley v. State, 83 P.3d 282 (Nev. 2004). · cites it 4× “364(2) defines sexual penetration, as used in NRS 200.366, as "cunnilingus, fellatio, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or any object manipulated or inserted by a person into the genital or anal openings of the body of another, including sexual…”
Lofthouse (jason) Vs. State, 2020 NV 44 (Nev. 2020). · cites it 6× “, NRS 200.366 (sexual assault); NRS 200.400(4) (battery with intent to commit sexual assault).”
Weber v. State, 119 P.3d 107 (Nev. 2005). · cites it 2× “[47] See NRS 200.366(1); McNair v. State, 108 Nev.”
McNair v. State, 825 P.2d 571 (Nev. 1992). · cites it 2× “Our legal inquiry into the issue of nonconsent, an essential *57 element of sexual assault, encompasses two aspects: (1) whether the circumstances surrounding the incidents indicate that the victims had reasonably demonstrated their lack of consent and (2) whether it was…”
Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447 (Nev. 2003). · cites it 2× “[2] See NRS 200.366(2)(b). [3] See U.S. v. Keating, 147 F.”
Braunstein v. State, 40 P.3d 413 (Nev. 2002). · cites it 2× “[33] NRS 200.366(1) defines sexual assault as follows: A person who subjects another person to sexual penetration, or who forces another person to make a sexual penetration on himself or another, or on a beast, against the will of the victim or under conditions in *421 which the…”
Ledbetter v. State, 129 P.3d 671 (Nev. 2006). · cites it 2× “NRS 200.366 sets forth the possible penalties for the crime of sexual assault on a minor and has been amended several times since 1989, [27] which is the year Ledbetter's abuse of L.”
Honea (joshua) Vs. State, 2020 NV 32 (Nev. 2020). · cites it 8× “: In this opinion, we are asked to examine a previous version of NRS 200.366 (2007), Nevada's sexual assault statute, to determine whether age alone was determinative of nonconsent or of the victim's ability to resist or understand the nature of the sexual conduct.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(1) — 45 cases
Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1996). “On the other hand, Doyle was convicted under the sexual assault statute (NRS 200.366) involving substantial bodily harm.”
Weber v. State, 119 P.3d 107 (Nev. 2005). “[47] See NRS 200.366(1); McNair v. State, 108 Nev.”
Braunstein v. State, 40 P.3d 413 (Nev. 2002). “[33] NRS 200.366(1) defines sexual assault as follows: A person who subjects another person to sexual penetration, or who forces another person to make a sexual penetration on himself or another, or on a beast, against the will of the victim or under conditions in *421 which the…”
Crowley v. State, 83 P.3d 282 (Nev. 2004). “364(2) defines sexual penetration, as used in NRS 200.366, as "cunnilingus, fellatio, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or any object manipulated or inserted by a person into the genital or anal openings of the body of another, including sexual…”
Atkins v. State, 923 P.2d 1119 (Nev. 1996).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(1)(a) — 13 cases
Lipsitz v. State, 442 P.3d 138 (Nev. 2019).
Dickey v. State, 540 P.3d 442 (Nev. 2024).
Chasing Horse (nathan) v. Dist. Ct. (state), 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 63 (Nev. 2024).
Lipsitz (ryan) Vs. State, 2019 NV 17 (Nev. 2019).
Lotte-Lublin v. Cosby (D. Nev. 2024).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(1)(b) — 7 cases
Lofthouse (jason) Vs. State, 2020 NV 44 (Nev. 2020). “, NRS 200.366 (sexual assault); NRS 200.400(4) (battery with intent to commit sexual assault).”
Morrison v. State, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 24 (Nev. 2024).
Gunera-pastrana (gustavo) Vs. State, 2021 NV 29 (Nev. 2021).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(2) — 6 cases
Lofthouse (jason) Vs. State, 2020 NV 44 (Nev. 2020). “, NRS 200.366 (sexual assault); NRS 200.400(4) (battery with intent to commit sexual assault).”
Demosthenes v. Williams, 637 P.2d 1203 (Nev. 1981).
Garcia (jonathan) v. State, 566 P.3d 1112 (Nev. 2025).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(2)(a) — 2 cases
Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1996). “On the other hand, Doyle was convicted under the sexual assault statute (NRS 200.366) involving substantial bodily harm.”
Brown v. State, 934 P.2d 235 (Nev. 1997). “The district court erred in separately sentencing Troy for sexual assault of a child and child abuse by sexual abuse because such sentences violate the constitution’s double jeopardy clause Troy was convicted of Counts I and II, which were for sexual assault on a child under…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(2)(a)(1) — 3 cases
Redmen v. State, 828 P.2d 395 (Nev. 1992). “556 with NRS 200.366. NRS 200.366(3) states: "The trier of fact in a trial for sexual assault shall determine whether substantial bodily harm has been inflicted on the victim and if so, the sentence to be imposed upon the perpetrator.”
Owens v. Bean (D. Nev. 2025).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(2)(a)(2) — 3 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(2)(b) — 11 cases
Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447 (Nev. 2003). “[2] See NRS 200.366(2)(b). [3] See U.S. v. Keating, 147 F.”
Castillo v. State, 874 P.2d 1252 (Nev. 1994).
Rogers v. State, 267 P.3d 802 (Nev. 2011).
State v. Gonzalez (Nev. 2023).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(2)(b)(2) — 1 case
Meyer v. State, 603 P.2d 1066 (Nev. 1979).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(2)(c) — 6 cases
Griego v. State, 893 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1995).
Felix v. State, 849 P.2d 220 (Nev. 1993).
Botts v. State, 854 P.2d 856 (Nev. 1993).
Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v. Frank, 734 P.2d 1241 (Nev. 1987).
Meyer v. State, 603 P.2d 1066 (Nev. 1979).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(3) — 3 cases
Redmen v. State, 828 P.2d 395 (Nev. 1992). “556 with NRS 200.366. NRS 200.366(3) states: "The trier of fact in a trial for sexual assault shall determine whether substantial bodily harm has been inflicted on the victim and if so, the sentence to be imposed upon the perpetrator.”
Brown v. State, 934 P.2d 235 (Nev. 1997). “The district court erred in separately sentencing Troy for sexual assault of a child and child abuse by sexual abuse because such sentences violate the constitution’s double jeopardy clause Troy was convicted of Counts I and II, which were for sexual assault on a child under…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(3)(a) — 2 cases
Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901 (Nev. 1996). “On the other hand, Doyle was convicted under the sexual assault statute (NRS 200.366) involving substantial bodily harm.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(3)(b) — 4 cases
Flores-Martinez (Christian) Vs. State, 476 P.3d 860 (Nev. 2020).
Nemcek (Mark) v. State (Nev. 2016).
Hermanson v. Baca (D. Nev. 2022).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(3)(b)(2) — 1 case
Cahuec v. Smith (D. Nev. 2020).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(3)(c) — 13 cases
Perez v. State, 313 P.3d 862 (Nev. 2013).
Mariscal-ochoa (manuel) v. State, 550 P.3d 813 (Nev. 2024).
Alotaibi (mazen) Vs. State, 2017 NV 81 (Nev. 2017).
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.366(4) — 2 cases
Hermanson v. Baca (D. Nev. 2022).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.